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t the 1886 meeting of the National Prison Association,1 
Hamilton Mabie, who would later become an eminent literary 
scholar and editor of the turn-of-the-century United States, gave a 
lecture titled “The Press and Crime,” describing how newspapers and 
fiction shape the public perception of imprisonment. Four decades 
later, in 1929, the president of that organization, George C. Erksine, 
declared in his keynote address, “Probably never in recent times has 
the attention of the public been centered on crime and criminals as it 
is to-day. The head-lines of the morning paper, the table of contents 
of the current magazines, a casual glance at the shelves of any book 
store, the growing list of federal, state and municipal crime commis-
sions, all bear witness to this modern trend.”2 The literary scholar and 
prison administrator both address the need for acknowledging the 
record of crime and punishment as it has been described in popu-
lar representations, whether fictional or not. Slowly, the NPA, which 
became the American Prison Association in 1908 and the American 
Correction Association in 1955, began to do so. In 1974 two of 
the nine papers presented on the psychological treatment of prison-
ers responded directly to Stanley Kubrick’s representation of prison 
“rehabilitation” in A Clockwork Orange (1971).
 Over the next two decades, prison administrators continued to 
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lament that imagined prisons shape public understanding of incar-
ceration. In 1998 ACA President Reginald A. Wilkinson offered this 
anecdote: “I wrote a letter to the HBO producers of the dramatic 
series entitled: ‘Oz.’ I explained that the stereotyping and misrepre- 
sentations of the corrections profession in their drama is unacceptable. 
Of course, the response that I received was that the show was designed 
to ‘entertain’ and was not meant to depict reality.”3 Wilkinson’s criti-
cism points to the permeability of imagination and actuality, particu-
larly for audiences regularly fascinated by reality entertainment, and 
the complaint was echoed the next year by Angela Davis’s critique 
of skewed public perception due to the “grossly sensationalized genre 
of Hollywood prison films.”4 The evidence is on their side, as indi-
cated in recent studies of actual police practices and representations 
of minorities in fictional crime series on television; one such study 
concludes that “the viewing of fictional programming may lead to 
associations of minorities with crime, victimization, and criminal jus-
tice themes.”5
 The vexed relationship of “fictional programming” and actuality 
in the representation of prisons gained clarity for me the summer 
of 2001, when a particular incident illustrated how the imagina-
tion of incarceration can overwrite its actuality. One Sunday after-
noon Turner Network Television (TNT) featured Frank Darabont’s 
The Shawshank Redemption (1994),6 a well-known Academy Award 
Best Picture nominee in which Tim Robbins and Morgan Freeman 
play long-term convicts whose friendship redeems each of them. 
At the same time, the Discovery Channel screened the documen-
tary Maximum Security Prisons—or rather it was scheduled, but there 
was a problem with the cable signal, and Discovery displayed only 
a blank monitor. That blankness contrasted sharply with The Shaw-
shank Redemption, where actors play convicts on-screen, the charac-
ters sitting in a theater watching a Rita Hayworth film. When Andy 
Dufresne (Robbins) leaves the theater, he is attacked, brutally beaten, 
and presumably raped by a group referred to as “the Sisters.” On the 
Discovery Channel, Maximum Security Prisons ended and Supermax 
began its account of a high-security facility, but the signal remained 
blocked and the screen dark. Back on TNT, in The Shawshank Redemp-
tion, Andy tries to get funding from the warden to buy new books 
for the prison library.
 Too much could be made of whatever technological glitch left 
Maximum Security Prisons unwatchable that afternoon—though Martin 
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Luther King III cites a similar experience he had the same year, 
one he recounts in his keynote address at the 2001 ACA conference.7 
There is a crucial lesson in the blank screen of Maximum Security 
Prisons as a documentary contrasted with the glossy and familiar look 
and characters of Frank Darabont’s film, with its coherent, humanist 
narrative, in which a white man imprisoned for a crime for which he 
is innocent learns about compassion from a black man who is guilty. 
The documentary would not have provided access to some unmedi-
ated “real,” given that it, like The Shawshank Redemption, would feature 
the efforts of producers funding the venture, a director choosing and 
structuring scenes, editors building narrative continuity, and the rest 
of the production crew that make film and video such collaborative 
work. However, there are critical differences between depictions by 
actors and by prisoners, fictional narratives and documentaries, the 
realistic and the “real.” Certainly there are challenges to authenticity 
and the problems of the real, but an important separation remains 
between Freeman (playing Red) and Supermax prison inmate Kenny 
Collins, who speaks in the prison protest “Live from Death Row,”8 
described in chapter 8. The difference between the popular Holly-
wood film and the unseeable Discovery documentary illustrates one 
of the central tenets of this book: that actual prisons contrast sharply 
with their many representations in books, films, television, and other 
media. These screens of the imagination offer the projections of what 
is both hoped and feared to be true of prisons, places that are by 
definition difficult to access—except by black men, who enter far 
too easily.
 There is a simultaneous causality and disjuncture between the 
historical record and popular fictions, a difference that is particularly 
stark for imprisonment as it is endured by those within and imagined 
by those without. A largely unremarked tension exists between the 
set of social and institution practices of incarceration and its many 
descriptions varying in media, genre, popularity, and stakes in the 
real. Prisons are a ubiquitous part of how contemporary U.S. culture 
imagines itself, as suggested by the more than 250 U.S. films featur-
ing men in prison and almost 100 focusing on women in prison.9 
However, aside from the incarcerated population and those who work 
and visit there, actual prisons are closed off from visibility, thus cre-
ating a space for imagined interiors, whether projected on-screen or 
cast on the page to reveal the mystery. Nevertheless, that unveiling 
often merely capitulates to the contradictory fantasies of audiences 
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who conceive of prisons in varied ways: as forces of order; places 
of rehabilitation; torture chambers of psychic, physical, and sexual 
violence; consolidations of uniformly violent, dangerous, and, most 
often, black criminals; medieval dungeons or high-tech facilities; or 
all of these at once. These fantasies, particularly in the absence of 
lived experience, prove formative for widely held assumptions regard-
ing actual incarceration. Various critics of popular culture such as 
Henry A. Giroux, Ed Guerrero, and bell hooks argue that fictions 
shape public perception,10 but producers and audiences also speak 
to that matter themselves. For example, a 2002 advertisement in Pre-
miere magazine for the Suncoast film retail company features a store 
manager’s pitch for the company’s products with this endorsement of 
The Shawshank Redemption: “They do a great job of capturing how it 
must feel to be behind bars and then be free again.”11
 Those not themselves incarcerated look to popular and provoca-
tive projections, and this book explores that must, that subjunctive, 
that imagined actuality. As inmate Simon “Sam” Guitierrez of States-
ville Prison, Illinois, writes, “Prison life is really nothing like what 
the press, television, and movies suggest.”12 The fascination with 
imprisonment emerges in the gap between historical actuality and its 
imagining. While I am not claiming an unmediated real, this book 
does focus on texts that traverse that gulf, works that make some 
claim to the real even as they are held in tension between imagina-
tion and actuality. That impulse guides the selection of three novels, 
William Faulkner’s Sanctuary (1931), Light in August (1932), and Go 
Down, Moses (1942); two books situated between cultural biography 
and fiction, Eldridge Cleaver’s Soul on Ice (1968) and Norman Mail-
er’s The Executioner’s Song (1979); three films, Tony Kaye’s American 
History X (1998), Norman Jewison’s The Hurricane (1999), and Liz 
Garbus, Wilbert Rideau, and John Stack’s The Farm: Life Inside Angola 
Prison (1998); and two performances, Ken Webster’s Jury Duty (1999) 
and a 1999 protest, “Live from Death Row,”13 where actual prisoners 
communicate via speakerphone with an assembled audience.
 The movement back and forth between history and imagination 
is of course not restricted to books, films, and performances, as it 
also shapes national politics in significant ways. George H. W. Bush’s 
1988 presidential campaign famously deployed the image of Wil-
lie Horton and thereby drew on the long-standing mythic fear of 
black men as rapists in order to attack Democratic candidate Michael 
Dukakis’s record on crime. For many, the single repeat offender of 
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the ad campaign that prominently featured Horton’s police file photo 
represented black masculinity in general. Five years later, with an 
increasing number of black men behind bars, the commissioner of 
Pennsylvania’s Department of Corrections claimed, “The Willie Hor-
ton phenomenon has affected just about every correctional system 
in this country.”14 Prison administrators suggest that imagined fears 
contribute to actual incarceration. However, imprisonment is not fan-
tasy but daily lived experience for more than two million people. 
Corrections cost U.S. taxpayers over $60 billion in 2001, with half 
of that spent on prisons, which contain a population overwhelmingly 
male and more than 40 percent black. Another 4.7 million people 
are on parole or probation, or are held in an alternate facility. Those 
numbers reflect a fourfold increase in the rates of imprisonment since 
1980. Furthermore, among those in federal and state prisons and 
county jails, black men are overrepresented by a factor of more than 
seven in comparison to white men, and a factor of almost three in 
comparison to Hispanic men.15 That overrepresentation of black men 
in prison presents a reversal of their historical underrepresentation 
in many public forums, from involvement in political leadership to 
inclusion in national literature. There are of course numerous struc-
tural (i.e., economic) factors shaping race and possibility in the United 
States, but the sheer number of imprisoned black men is both a cause 
and a consequence of an expectation of criminality.
 The stakes are high in the critique of the representations of 
imprisonment—the connections between imagination and actuality 
and those in and out of prisons—especially because of the danger-
ous temptation to equate black masculinity with criminality. There 
is jurisprudential law, easily understood as historically contingent: 
the contradictions and revisions between the separate but equal of 
Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) and its overturning in Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion (1954), for example. Then there is natural law, seemingly axiom-
atic and universal. The problem is that centuries of racism shape the 
cultural landscape of both fiction and social expectation. Repeatedly 
and uncritically participating in fictions governed by the inexorable 
logic of “realism” maintains long-held stereotypes. Twentieth-century 
representations of black men too often capitulate to the black super-
masculine menial, who becomes the criminal and thus the prisoner.
 That overrepresentation of black men in prison equally serves 
opposite arguments. First, inequalities in education, employment, and 
social services have perpetuated the disenfranchisement of black men 
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even as the criminal justice system inequitably punishes them; sec-
ond—its opposite—black men are “naturally” more likely to commit 
crimes. Of course, endorsing the latter of these is unequivocally racist 
and ignores the racial injustice throughout U.S. history. It is claimed 
only by those as unafraid of their own racism as American History X’s 
white supremacist Derek Vineyard (Edward Norton): “One in every 
three black males is in some phase of the correctional system. Is that 
a coincidence or do these people have, you know, like a racial com-
mitment to crime?” However, the repeated projections on page and 
screen cast shadows that color criminality and create cultural expec-
tation, the relentless process by which an imagined symbolic of real-
ism overwrites the real. While the terms imaginary, symbolic, and real 
carry with them Lacanian associations, their meanings are not bound 
there. It is only an accident of history that Lionel Trilling’s essay 
“Reality in America” appeared in The Liberal Imagination (1950),16 but 
the Imagination’s containment of “Reality” at least suggests that imag-
ining the real takes place beyond psychoanalysis. Antonio Gramsci 
makes this point in his description of utopian “concrete fantasy,” a 
counterhegemonic strategy of alienated groups.17 However, imagina-
tion can participate in repression as well as in resistance.
 My personal hope, and scholarly dedication, is that constructing 
a clearer sense of popular conceptions of imprisonment and their 
tension with the historical record can create the possibility for those 
expectations to be recognized, reappraised, and reorganized. Gain-
ing a clearer sense of the historical processes of representation and 
expectation may help unbalance the tacit equation of criminality 
with black masculinity—because the black man accused of murder, 
sex crime, or assault still maintains a mythic force in the United 
States. Euphemistic courts of public opinion try cases in ways similar 
to conventional jurisprudence. They share the characteristic of situ-
ations of undecidability that nonetheless demand decisions. Courts 
both literal and figurative reach conclusions that in effect simultane-
ously record and invent history, retroactively determining what has 
happened already. Legal courts do so with the attendant material 
consequences of exoneration, fine, or imprisonment. However, such 
actual trials mandate the presence of the accused; there is no compa-
rable imperative of habeas corpus in courts of public opinion. Popular 
conceptions of blackness and crime can take place in the absence of 
either one. Decades of representation have effects less immediately 
tangible but nonetheless pervasive, as the equation of black masculinity 
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with criminality is balanced through the fulfillment of the desire to 
see black men in prison.
 There has been insufficient critical attention paid to the relation-
ship between actual imprisonment and the ways in which it is imag-
ined and represented, particularly with regard to race. Still, popular 
music, especially the predominantly black cultural production of hip-
hop, has given its voice to incarceration with a mix of glorification 
and harsh criticism. Rap artists like Snoop Dogg, Ja Rule, the Geto 
Boyz, and DMX offer prison as a setting in their lyrics, album covers, 
liner notes, and videos, attesting to the degree to which incarcera-
tion in the experience of black men and their communities has been 
naturalized both actually and in representation. Ja Rule goes so far as 
to title his 2003 album Blood in My Eye—album cover replete with 
background prison—a nod to George Jackson’s prison-writing trea-
tise.18 In addition, hood films of the past two decades feature rap stars 
such as Ice Cube, DMX, Snoop Dogg, Nas, and Tupac Shakur19 and 
represent young black men trapped in a nihilistic world of criminal-
ity, bound for prison or violent death, and often do so uncritically, 
without attention to other possibilities. Nevertheless, there are musi-
cians in rap and other genres who testify to the social forces shaping 
imprisonment. In 1988 Public Enemy linked black masculinity to 
political imprisonment in “Black Steel in the Hour of Chaos,” and 
NWA derided racial profiling in “Fuck the Police.”20 The problems 
of the African-American community feature prominently in the art 
form that rapidly became its voice, and Public Enemy front man 
Chuck D has frequently called rap the “black CNN.”
 At the close of the twentieth century, as rates of incarceration and 
the overall prison population reached unprecedented levels, Public 
Enemy continued to describe racial imprisonment practices, acknowl-
edging in their song “I” (1999) that “prison for me is an industry,” 
and suggesting, “Maybe prison is the skin I’m within”21—insinuat-
ing both the racial bias of criminalization and the boundaries of the 
self. That year saw similar critiques from others, as political rock-
ers Rage Against the Machine describe in “Calm Like a Bomb”: 
“There’s a mass without roofs / a prison to fill.”22 In a similar vein, 
but much more specifically, Mos Def ’s “Mathematics” (1999) clarifies 
the scope of the problem, intimating that black unemployment causes 
the crime contributing to the “global jail economy,” and explaining 
that expanding sentencing only increases the racial aspect of prison 
populations:
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stiffer stipulations attached to each sentence
budget cutbacks but increased police presence
and even if you get out of prison still livin’
join the other five million under state supervision
this is business, no faces just lines and statistics
from your phone, your zip code, to SSI digits
the system break man, child, and women into figures
two columns for who is, and who ain’t niggaz.23
Mos Def ’s accurate mention of longer sentences as a major cause for 
prison expansion is joined by increased penalties for drug crimes in 
the “Prison Song” (2001) of System of a Down, an Armenian metal 
group. They declare, “Minor drug offenders fill your prisons,” then 
continue:
all research and successful drug policy show
that treatment should be increased
and law enforcement decreased
while abolishing mandatory minimum sentences
they’re trying to build a prison
(for you and me to live in).24
These popular artists offer an analysis of incarceration at the turn 
of the twenty-first century that resembles the work of critics such 
as Derrick Bell, Bell Gale Chevigny, David Cole, Angela Davis, 
Steven Donziger, Auli Ek, H. Bruce Franklin, Ruth Wilson Gil-
more, Tara Herivel, Marc Mauer, Quentin Miller, and Paul Wright, 
all of whom point to racial inequities in increased incarceration 
and longer sentences.25 In his 2000 MLA presentation, Franklin 
declares: “Just as we now assume that one cannot intelligently teach 
nineteenth-century American literature without recognizing slavery 
as context, one cannot responsibly teach contemporary American lit-
erature without recognizing the American prison system as context.” 
Franklin’s call here echoes the emphasis on incarceration patterns 
made in Mary Helen Washington’s presidential address at the 1996 
American Studies Association meeting and Davis’s jeremiad there two 
years later.26 Since then, imprisonment has grown as an organizing 
topic for panels at academic conferences and collections of essays, but 
it remains insufficiently addressed as a central issue in U.S. history 
and literary studies. In drawing attention to the historical context of 
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imprisonment, Franklin relies on the tacit relationship of historical 
and literary study to assert the significance of incarceration in the 
contemporary United States, as well as in its literary history. In pairing 
slavery and imprisonment, he claims both their related practice and 
their equal importance in constructions and revisions of the nation 
and its literature. The rhetorical gambit is powerful—my interest lies 
in joining these critics and historians in demonstrating the degree to 
which that assessment is accurate.
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This book organizes its study of the representation of crimi-nality and imprisonment from 1931 to 1999 through a set of 
texts that emphasize the tensions between imagination and history. 
Faulkner’s Go Down, Moses focuses on crime and punishment in 
reconstructing the racial past of the Old and New South. The novel 
begins with the chase for an escaped slave and ends four generations 
later with a black man imprisoned and executed in Chicago, his body 
returned to his native Jefferson, Mississippi—a narrative trajectory 
scarcely noted by Faulkner’s many admirers, but a dominant struc-
tural pattern in a novel often suggested to lack one. Faulkner suggests 
that the character’s criminality is part of a pattern of racial inequity 
perpetuated through a genealogical span, beginning with Southern 
slavery and progressing through jim crow to 1940.
Imprisonment in
U.S. History and the
Cultural Imagination
Not courthouses nor even churches but jails were the true records of a 
county’s, a community’s history, since not only the cryptic forgotten initials 
and words and even phrases cries of defiance and indictment scratched into 
the walls but the very walls themselves held [ . . . ] the agonies and shames 
and griefs.
—William Faulkner, Intruder in the Dust1
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 In Soul on Ice, Cleaver operates in various registers, sometimes, like 
Mailer, observing himself watching the time of his time, comment-
ing on contemporary events and popular culture, though in his case 
with a prison-cell view. Cleaver’s account of a black man’s “becom-
ing” in prison at times resembles social criticism and, at other times, 
mythmaking, with his description of crime, imprisonment, race, and 
gender. A decade later, Mailer’s The Executioner’s Song claims to be a 
“true life novel” in its subtitle and narrates the history of its present, 
excerpting news clippings, interviews, and other materials that pro-
vide a texture of historical documentation to the narrative of Gary 
Gilmore’s crimes, trial, and execution. Mailer demonstrates the role 
narration plays in telling history as he documents the media circus 
surrounding Gilmore’s case, which involves lawyers playing the part 
of reporters, reporters shaping popular opinion, and movie producers 
contributing to the outcome of events.
 Similarly, the three films and two performances surveyed in this 
book all variously situate themselves in actuality. American History X 
offers a code of realism, its characters spouting incarceration statistics 
to substantiate its truth-value. The Hurricane draws from past events 
and incorporates a cinema verité style and even occasional news foot-
age, while The Farm is a full-fledged documentary. The play Jury Duty 
is based on a true story, and the activist demonstration “Live from 
Death Row” protests the death penalty and is thus a historical event 
only addressed here as a performance.
 Despite their differences of genre and media, these are all represen-
tations of crime and punishment shaped by imagination, but invested 
in operating in historical terms, drawing relationships between fiction 
and actuality. This first chapter establishes the book’s methodology of 
textual analysis, incorporating tactics of psychoanalysis with the larger 
strategy of historically accounting for the production and reception 
of these books, films, and performances. It next offers a brief history 
of U.S. imprisonment, describes the cultural imagination as popu-
lar representations of varying truth-value, and proposes the category 
“prisoner” as an index of identity, an important matter given the 
prevalence of incarceration and the relative scarcity of literary and 
cultural criticism of prison representation.
 These books, films, and performances are addressed foremost as 
a part of a historical record, telling a type of truth in their various 
adherences to frameworks of fiction and nonfiction. I situate their 
representations of imprisonment with respect to two other means of 
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knowing actual past prison practice and policy: first, in the anony-
mous exactitude of statistics as accounted by historians, sociologists, 
and the U.S. Department of Justice; and second, in registers rang-
ing from praise to polemic to declarations of policy and academic 
research as offered in the annual proceedings of the nation’s foremost 
organization of prison administrators, by turns the National Prison 
Association, the American Prison Association, and the American 
Correctional Association. These representations receive greater tex-
ture by drawing upon U.S. historiography to demonstrate that prison 
history is central to national history.2 The effort in each chapter is to 
offer theoretically inflected explorations of the mutually informative 
relationships of actual imprisonment and its representation, wherein 
the depictions of prisons and prisoners are held in tension between 
imagination and history.
 The historical expanse of the study and the many genres and 
media show the degree to which incarceration, a concealed prac-
tice, proliferates in the language and images of the twentieth-century 
United States. The descriptive analysis at times is offered in broad 
strokes because the picture is large, but it is drawn in finer detail to 
describe the prison history shaping these books, films, and perfor-
mances. That variety demands a range of critical approaches sensi-
tive to the ways in which different works operate while attendant to 
the historical contexts from which they are inseparable. Texts that 
are literary, bureaucratic, theoretical, documentary, and ephemeral 
function differently, but bringing them together is necessary both to 
demonstrate and to interrogate the unacknowledged pervasiveness of 
imprisonment in the popular imagination and in historical actual-
ity—and to show how each has affected the other. That approach 
involves multiple strategies of investigation, including close analysis 
of the works themselves that is sensitive to their various media, to 
the historical and cultural moments of their production and original 
reception, and to the texts’ implication in individual and collective 
psychoanalytic models.
 That combination of efforts conducts this book’s proposition that 
the history, literary and otherwise, of the United States is indivisible 
from that of its prisons. First, imprisonment is a condition of human 
experience that shapes the identity of those incarcerated and the 
national identity of the state that imprisons. Second, the history of 
racial incarceration in the nation tacitly criminalizes black masculin-
ity in the cultural imagination, in effect if not in intent a strategy 
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of racial containment, which many of these texts render visible and 
often contest. Third, the texts under discussion generally offer a tac-
tic of resistance in an expanded model of personal identity, a social 
subjectivity emphasizing an engagement with history and a collec-
tive sense of the self in that history at odds with the American ideal 
of autonomous individualism. Historically, incarceration has been a 
place of struggle between forces that would isolate the prisoner and 
the efforts to demonstrate the social and historical contingencies of 
imprisonment.
 The degree to which these books, films, and performances impli-
cate themselves in their respective histories complicates the approach 
of historical contextualization that has been the dominant trend in 
U.S. literary criticism since the 1980s. Such historicism incorporates 
fiction, documentary evidence, and historiography as a way of mak-
ing sense of history, literary and otherwise. The presumption of that 
methodology is that history can be understood as a social uncon-
scious, its direct access unavailable after the fact, and therefore medi-
ated through its textualization and subsequent interpretation.3 John 
Sloop makes such a point in his study of the representation of pris-
oners in nonfiction periodicals: “[T]he weight of past narratives and 
characterizations of the prisoner work as social forces in shaping 
the depiction and motives of the prisoner of the present and hence 
force the issues of race and gender. Because the public has a memory 
of the discourses concerning prisoners, however ephemeral, all new 
constructions of the prisoner begin with past characterizations as a 
base.”4 Representations with claims to the real play an important part 
in defining the shape of what might be understood as the cultural 
imagination, the pages and screens of thought and belief in which 
people recognize themselves and others.5
 The “real” of history is fleetingly experienced, lastingly available 
only in its textual narration, and the stories which tell that his-
tory are inflected by the circumstances of their own making. These 
descriptions of cultural production and historical process are not 
solely the domain of theorists and critics, but are part of popular 
culture itself. As Rage Against the Machine front man Zack de la 
Rocha describes such historical narrativization in the song “Testify,” 
opening the band’s 1999 album: “Who controls the past now / Con-
trols the future / Who controls the present now / Controls the past / 
. . . Now testify!”6 This book, then, renders a history of imprisonment 
in order to contribute to the imagination of a different future.
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 The confluence of the personal, the cultural, and the historical in 
the constructions of character in books, films, and performances invites 
historically and, at times, psychoanalytically nuanced approaches. The 
texts that are widely or highly regarded (or both) at particular his-
torical moments can be understood as meeting some need, fulfilling 
some lack or expectation in their representations. This book there-
fore makes occasional use of psychoanalytic terms to describe how 
these books, films, and performances function, the ways they oper-
ate in helping shape the cultural imagination. Incorporating such 
an interpretative framework does not fulfill an ahistorical theoretical 
imperative. Instead, doing so responds to the degree to which the 
texts surveyed regularly implicate both individual and social accounts, 
and challenge the distinctions between the personal and cultural past 
and between imagination and history—what might be remembered, 
known, believed, and recorded to be true. The works surveyed traffic 
back and forth between historical and imaginative fields of discourse, 
and each is shaped by and contends with social expectations informed, 
in part, by the layered representations of the cultural imagination. The 
analysis conducted, then, tracks among various discursive registers of 
theoretically inflected and historicized readings to demonstrate how 
works making a claim to the real tell their own sort of truth.
 Such study unites various theoretical approaches, whether his-
toricizing, psychoanalyzing, or emphasizing differences in the per-
formances of and limits to cultural identity. This book makes use of 
various vocabularies and methods (most explicitly those of Freud, 
Lacan, and Deleuze and Guattari, and, more implicitly, Foucault, 
Jameson, and de Certeau) in order to clarify aspects of texts that might 
otherwise escape notice. These matters are many, but related: the 
social unconscious of Faulkner’s imagined Jefferson, Mississippi; the 
misrecognition of blackness as criminality; the “Negro” crimes and 
sentences of Light in August, Soul on Ice, The Hurricane, The Farm, and 
“Live from Death Row”; the community accountability for crime and 
punishment in Go Down, Moses, Soul on Ice, The Executioner’s Song, and 
virtually all of the films and performances; schizophrenia as described 
in Soul on Ice, The Executioner’s Song, and The Hurricane; and the resis-
tance to individual autonomy and support for social identity in many 
of the texts. Psychoanalytic terminology describes the representation 
of character and agency in narrative, because such depictions offer a 
literary mirror of subjectivity. Lacan’s theorization of identification 
provides a powerful tool for understanding how characters in books, 
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films, and performances are situated within symbolic orders, as well 
as how audiences and producers of texts misrecognize themselves 
in them. However, Deleuze and Guattari also prove useful in their 
rejection of the primacy of that “I” and of the investments in per-
sonal history that psychoanalysis makes. They instead emphasize social 
context and place, nicely encapsulated in their claim, “A schizophrenic 
out for a walk is a better model than a neurotic lying on the analyst’s 
couch.”7
 However, this study works to guard against the seduction of those 
theoretical discourses. In the effort to better illuminate cultural func-
tions of prisons as they are projected on page, screen, and stage, such 
application can shine so brightly as to obscure the representations 
themselves. At one extreme, criticism wholly in one vein or another 
can inadvertently treat the theoretical discourse as a closed symbolic 
order, the self-substantiating name-of-the-father. At the other, work-
ing with a variety of models can lead to muddied or specious applica-
tion or appropriation, poaching and name checking. To avoid these 
pitfalls, I have foregrounded accounts of the texts themselves, incor-
porating terms and approaches and thereby hoping to clarify rather 
than cloud how imprisonment and the identity of the prisoner func-
tion in different ways over time. I balance theoretical reading with an 
account of the diverse interests producing and receiving books, films, 
and performances—writers, directors, producers, and audiences dem-
onstrating varying levels of disinterest, dismay, and desire regarding 
black men in prison—to bring together the mechanics of production 
with the various responses of theorists, critics, and general readers and 
viewers.
 The effort here is to apply various theoretical vocabularies bridged 
by shared participation not only in the topic of imprisonment, but 
also through the historicist imperative to relate these texts to the con-
texts from which they are inseparable. Indeed, I hope to demonstrate 
that any particular lens of this or that theory attentive to what these 
texts do, what they produce, always is implicated in history and its 
narration. “The history of now”—my phrase to suggest the effort to 
think critically about the present as both a set of consequences and a 
site of struggle—is at once the product of what has already happened, 
and the process of a cultural imagination recreating that past in its 
own terms, thereby laying a blueprint for future images and imag-
inings. The historical and material overwriting of prisoners in the 
United States has limited dramatically their ability to participate in 
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that process. The right of habeas corpus in the court of public opinion 
is not one constitutionally upheld, and the reiterative projections of 
imprisonment shape documentary and other aspects of the historical 
record that then reinforce mainstream imaginations of imprisonment. 
Scholars, therefore, must make a greater effort to return prisoners to 
history, to recognize the changes through time in what it means to 
be imprisoned, a demarcation of human experience that carries tre-
mendous cultural force.
 In the opening epigraph of this chapter, a provocative passage 
from Intruder in the Dust (1948), Faulkner imagines the history of 
Yoknapatawpha County scratched into the walls of its jail in a nearly 
illegible graffiti of identities and indictments—a linguistic reversal, as 
the accusations are offered by those themselves convicted and impris-
oned. The novel itself is not among the author’s most heralded, and 
even his avid readers may be unfamiliar with its narrative. However, 
one of its characters is very familiar, Lucas Beauchamp, a name recog-
nized from Go Down, Moses, where he plays alternately trickster and 
tragic hero, a black sharecropper who repudiates the wealth but not 
the pride of his white McCaslin grandfather. In Intruder in the Dust, 
Beauchamp spends almost the entire novel in jail, anticipating his 
lynching by the family of a white man he is said to have killed, until 
he convinces the nephew of the county attorney to undertake the 
role of detective, exhuming the corpse of the murdered man to prove 
his innocence. Readers see in Lucas a black man awaiting execution 
by mob or jury, a figure with a lineage extending back in history and 
in fiction to Nat Turner and William Wells Brown’s George Green of 
Clotel (1853).8 (Coincidentally, Nat and George are also the names of 
Lucas’s daughter and her husband in Go Down, Moses.) Turner’s actual 
death sentence and Green’s fictional one are both pronounced in 
response to slave rebellion, while the threat of lynching for a murder 
he did not commit hangs over Beauchamp. Various characters remark 
that he is actually punished for his pride—conveyed from his white 
ancestor—and his repeated refusal to “be a nigger.”9 In the eyes of the 
townspeople of Jefferson, sitting behind bars is the first time Lucas 
looks like a black man.
 The past imagined in the walls of the jail in Intruder in the Dust is 
not written in the novel, and readers must turn to Go Down, Moses 
for a richer sense of how crime and punishment shape cultural his-
tory—to read, in effect, the “agonies and shames and griefs” in the 
prison walls. That writing on the wall toward which Faulkner gestures 
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in Intruder in the Dust is actually recorded in the well-known ledger 
section of “The Bear” in the earlier novel, though the “cryptic for-
gotten initials and words and even phrases” there conduct a record of 
slavery rather than imprisonment. In Faulkner’s fictional nineteenth- 
and twentieth-century South, there is not necessarily much change 
among various practices of racial social control. The opening episode 
of Go Down, Moses, for instance, is a vignette featuring Beauchamp’s 
father, a slave, whereas the next section depicts the jim crow Missis-
sippi of an elderly Lucas, who asks if he will be plowing the crops 
of Parchman Farm, a prison, instead of his tenant farm. The sense is 
that there would be little difference.10
 Unlike other Yoknapatawpha landmarks, Parchman Farm is a 
matter of historical fact, and David Oshinsky, in his book “Worse 
Than Slavery”: Parchman Farm and the Ordeal of Jim Crow Justice (1997), 
demonstrates that antebellum strategies of racial containment were 
perpetuated in such prisons. The degree to which Southern rac-
ism informed incarceration in the years following Reconstruction 
appears in the claims of prison officials of the time. A South Carolina 
chair of a prison’s board of directors in 1888 declared that prisons 
in the state existed to house freed slaves: “After the emancipation 
of the colored people, whose idea of freedom from bondage was 
freedom from work and license to pillage, we had to establish means 
for their control. Hence came the penitentiary.”11 The same year, an 
Alabama prison administrator blamed a 250 percent greater mortality 
rate among black prisoners on their weak constitutions.12 However, 
prison history in the United States cannot be collapsed to the racism 
of jim crow—when black men were imprisoned for hazily defined 
and variously enforced crimes such as mischief and vagrancy, prison 
administrations stood to make small fortunes leasing black and white 
convicts as contract labor, and conditions proved so inhumane that 
five to ten years effectively mandated a life sentence. The history of 
incarceration extends both before and after jim crow.
 Walnut Street Jail was established in Philadelphia in 1776 and 
became the nation’s first prison in 1790. Walnut Street represented a 
fundamental change in punishment, a shift from the bodily abuse of 
stocks, whipping, and execution to confinement and discipline. The 
most prominent proponent of such a system was an ardent aboli-
tionist and the nation’s preeminent medical doctor, Benjamin Rush, 
who signed the Declaration of Independence alongside Benjamin 
Franklin and presented a proposal for a penitentiary model in the 
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latter’s living room in 1787. That plan emphasized reform, preven-
tion, and deterrence through “bodily pain, labour, watchfulness, soli-
tude, and silence.”13 Rush’s description, informed by Enlightenment 
ideals of justice and Protestant imperatives of discipline and work, was 
endorsed by Thomas Jefferson, who made further revisions, includ-
ing offering changes to the criminal code as well as to architectural 
drawings. The jail, which held prisoners until their sentencing or for 
very brief durations, became the prison, where confinement was the 
punishment. Many of those confined at Walnut Street were African-
Americans, overrepresented by a factor of more than seven when 
compared to whites, primarily serving sentences for property crimes 
such as theft.14 The rapid expansion of incarceration led to over-
crowding at the downtown Philadelphia facility, and Pennsylvania’s 
Eastern State Penitentiary at Cherry Hill was built to replace it in 
1829. It was the largest building in the United States at the time. 
Prisoners in the Pennsylvania model of isolation almost never left 
their cells, laboring, sleeping, and eating in close to absolute isolation 
for the duration of their sentences.
 An alternate model of congregate imprisonment developed at 
Auburn Penitentiary in New York, built in 1819, where prisoners slept 
in separate cells but worked together in silence enforced by frequent 
whipping. Out of favor as a punishment per se, whipping remained 
accepted as a means of discipline within prisons. The Auburn model 
typically proved more profitable than the Pennsylvania system, and 
debates over the relative merits of the two resulted in a battle of 
pamphlets whose rhetorical volume approached that of contemporary 
arguments for and against slavery.15
 Both models maintained at least the idea of rehabilitation of the 
individual as a component of  Jacksonian democracy, and their con-
struction and practices proliferated throughout the United States, 
attracting international attention and emulation. Alexis de Toc-
queville’s journey through the nation in 1831, which led to his Democ-
racy in America (1835),16 was originally intended, in part, to inspect 
the prison system in order to provide a model for the French gov-
ernment. The system lost esteem, however, as attention shifted away 
from reform in the 1850s, and prisons increasingly holding African-
Americans and new immigrants received less money for construction 
and maintenance. Ballooning numbers made the isolation and silence 
of the Pennsylvania and Auburn models no longer tenable due to 
overcrowding and insufficient staffs, negative factors compounded 
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by the lack of sanitation and health services, as well as by harsh labor 
conditions.17 Even any intention of reform faded in the subsequent 
decades, until the deplorable conditions surveyed by an examining 
committee and the urgency to organize and professionalize correc-
tional policy led to the formation of the National Prison Associa-
tion in 1870. Rutherford B. Hayes, the U.S. president from 1877 to 
1881, was the organization’s first president, in 1870, and thereafter 
from 1883 until 1892, a tenure twice as long as any other head of the 
association. Aspects of a proto-Progressive platform appear in his 
keynote address at the NPA congress in 1888, which links criminal-
ity and its attendant imprisonment not to deficient character but to 
socioeconomic factors such as unemployment.18 A reverend speaking 
after Hayes cites a warden’s view that one-third of prisoners do not 
belong in prison, one-third should be there forever, and one-third 
should have in-and-out privileges.19
 However, all the prisoners were there, and the renamed American 
Prison Association renewed its commitment to reforming prisoners on 
its sixtieth anniversary, in 1930, without more substantively address-
ing the consistently deleterious conditions of the nation’s prisons. 
What approaches might prove rehabilitative and reduce recidivism 
remained up for debate, and experiments in education conducted 
by Zebulon Brockway at Elmira Reformatory and elsewhere in the 
1880s and 1890s gave way to a medical model of treatment. Doctors 
and administrators advocated psychological classification and indi-
vidualized remedies, but budgets did not provide the resources for 
the implementation of those practices. There were also growing chal-
lenges to the labor that typically accompanied imprisonment. Abuses 
of convict leasing had decreased, but even the possibility of humane 
work came under legal attack by organized labor and industrial inter-
ests concerned about marketplace competition, culminating with the 
Hayes-Cooper Act (1935) and the Ashurst-Sumner Act (1940), which 
sharply prohibited productive inmate work, making occupation for 
prisoners increasingly rare.
 Even as the APA again changed its name in 1955 to the American 
Correctional Association to emphasize the imperative to reform, it was 
a gesture more conciliatory to aspiration than actuality. However, 
the Brown v. Board of Education decision the year earlier had laid the 
basis for subsequent improvements in prison conditions in the 1960s. 
National movements organized around the struggle for racial equal-
ity led to the Civil Rights Act in 1964, which drew from laws that 
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were written in the years after 1865 to protect the rights of former 
slaves and then served as a constitutional basis against discrimination a 
century later. By extension, the Civil Rights Act also provided for 
prison reform, as did the expansion of the writ of habeas corpus, 
the guarantee of appearance in court, one of the rights suspended 
by the British government, thus precipitating the Declaration of 
Independence, which Rush signed. These expanded applications of 
federal law reversed the “hands off ” policy that had previously rel-
egated prison oversight entirely to states. In 1970 many jails and 
prisons—largely in the South—were declared practices of cruel and 
unusual punishment for operating little better than slavery.20 Derrick 
Bell and other legal scholars and historians of critical race theory 
link such disregard sustained over the subsequent decades directly to 
the overrepresentation of people of color in prison, thus deeming 
it a consequence of racism.21 In 2005, thirty-five years later, lethally 
inadequate medical treatment for prisoners in California, the nation’s 
largest system, sent prison health care into receivership after a lengthy 
legal battle. U.S. prisons have shifted from international admiration in 
the early nineteenth century to global condemnation at the begin-
ning of the twenty-first. In many ways, then, U.S. prison history is 
national history.
 There is more of the story to tell, but an obvious question remains: 
what does prison history have to do with U.S. literature? Certainly 
there is Beauchamp in the Jefferson jail throughout most of Intruder 
in the Dust, and careful historical study of Mississippi imprisonment 
practices through the first half of the twentieth century might dem-
onstrate the degree to which the narrative account does or does not 
match actual incarceration practices of the place and time. However, 
I am less interested in Lucas Beauchamp than I am in the people of 
Jefferson who want, who need to see him behind bars. That history 
of desire and fear is much longer and more complex. It is a matter of 
cultural expectation constituted in the tension between imagination 
and historical actuality; the real of the latter is mediated, accessed 
through representations and narrations of all shapes and sorts. Books, 
films, performances, and other forms of discourse emerge from, are 
inflected by, and transform the diverse sets of social practices and 
participatory spectatorship that make up culture. Their historically 
specific analysis provides a valuable instrument by which to gain a 
sense of the tenor of time and chart its change. Furthermore, the texts 
of this book cue themselves to be read as telling a sort of truth, as 
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they traffic back and forth between actual and imagined histories of 
what audiences want, need, and fear to be true of incarceration.
 The books, films, and performances studied in this book either 
foreground or vividly repress how race shapes practices and patterns 
of imprisonment. W. E. B. DuBois declared in 1903 that the “prob-
lem of the twentieth-century is the problem of the color line,”22 and 
Martin Luther King III quotes this line as well before the American 
Correctional Association in 2001: “I submit to you that our problem 
is still the color line.”23 The racial division sees its starkest enactment 
in U.S. prisons, where, a century after DuBois, rates of imprisonment 
for black men drastically outpace those for white. That overrepre-
sentation in actual numbers both emerges from and contributes to 
the phenomenon of conflating black masculinity and criminality. In 
Thirteen Ways of Looking at a Black Man (1997), Henry Louis Gates Jr. 
offers an anecdote of a black male professor mistaken for a criminal 
and writes, “I don’t know a black man who doesn’t have at least one 
[of these stories] to tell.”24 The novels, memoirs, feature films, docu-
mentaries, and performances surveyed in this book tell more of these 
stories. In Light in August the murder of Joanna Burden prompts the 
townspeople of Jefferson to hope, to know a black man did it.25 Dale 
Pierre is a background character in The Executioner’s Song, but he is 
a black man whose defense costs a district attorney hopeful’s chance 
at election, because that defense lawyer has come to believe the man 
was innocent, “convicted by the Jury because he was black.”26 The 
arrest of Rubin Carter and John Artis initiating their imprisonment 
in The Hurricane begins with their being pulled over; when an offi-
cer tells them that the police are looking for two black men, Carter 
responds, “Any two will do?” In “Live from Death Row,” Jody Lee 
Miles, a white man, testifies on the raced nature of the death penalty 
from the vantage point of death row. This misrecognition of blackness 
as criminality serves as the focal point of analysis.
 The structural design of this project draws attention to the perva-
siveness of imprisonment in a variety of twentieth-century U.S. texts. 
To focus on a single medium or genre, or to read synchronically and 
survey a set of contemporaneous texts, or to scan diachronically and 
track through time the writing of a single author such as Faulkner 
would localize the degree to which the imagined prisons have satu-
rated U.S. cultural production. This book thus broadens its scope and 
reads at a slant in cutting across culture and through history to dem-
onstrate the proliferation of images of incarceration. The three periods 
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bracketed by the texts surveyed offer rates of change from 1929 to 
1942, 1968 to 1979, and 1980 to 1999. The first period demonstrates 
how Faulkner’s view of raced crime and punishment and the social 
responsibility for it evolved, when both his fiction and the historical 
record suggest an equation of lynching and execution in the South. 
The second charts the possibilities of understanding imprisonment as 
a historical and political phenomenon in 1968, and the disappearance 
of that definitional context by 1979; between Cleaver and Mailer 
there are diminishing possibilities for situating prisoners in history. 
The third period involves an unprecedented increase in imprison-
ment. The films and performances of 1998 and 1999 show how the 
fascination with imaginary prisons at the brink of the twenty-first 
century obscures their concrete actuality, a tendency resisted in more-
marginal productions, such as The Farm, discussed in chapter 7, and 
the drama and demonstration described in chapter 8.
 All of these representations foreground incarceration in a manner 
that literary and cultural critics largely have missed. Humanities and 
social sciences scholarship of the past quarter century increasingly 
has organized its inquiry through matters of identity, of gender, race, 
class, ethnicity, and sexuality—differences constituted in, and them-
selves shaping, history. Increasingly, identity has been addressed not as 
a stable ontological categorization, but as a culturally situated struggle 
among competing groups, enacted by individuals through socially 
coded performances. A definitional statement made by the American 
Prison Association provides a point of entry into the performative 
character of criminalization and its attendant incarceration. The 
first of the NPA’s Declaration of Principles, established in 1870 with 
the organization’s founding and revised and reaffirmed sixty years 
later in 1930, lists a set of definitions: “Crime is a violation of duties 
imposed by law, which inflicts an injury upon others. Criminals are 
persons convicted of crime by competent courts. Punishment is suf-
fering inflicted upon the criminal for the wrong done by him, with 
a special view to secure his reformation.”27 The organization renewed 
those principles yet again, sixty years later, in 1990.28 Crime, then, 
is an act against written law with its own effect: injury. A person 
becomes a criminal, however, not in committing the act of a crime, 
but through declaration by the court; criminality is a determination 
by a judge or jury. Criminalization is thus a jurisprudential process, 
not coincident with the commission of the crime but, rather, an effect 
of conviction.
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 That can seem a matter of linguistic hairsplitting until one consid-
ers the number of laws broken regularly in virtually all social segments 
of the United States: stock market insider trading, exceeding the 
speed limit, the at times lethal negligence of pharmaceutical compa-
nies and other corporate failures, the battery and aggravated assault of 
spousal and child abuse and acquaintance rape, driving while intoxi-
cated, illegal drug use (and the attendant sale)—whether by profes-
sional athletes, right-wing polemicists such as Rush Limbaugh, or the 
inner-city populations he regularly demonizes—or any number of 
infractions that are part of the texture of everyday life as it is prac-
ticed and imagined in culture. According to the APA Declaration, the 
cynical maxim “It’s not a crime if you don’t get caught” is framed 
more accurately in terms of the process of criminalization rather 
than the commission of crime. A person is not born a criminal and 
does not become one in breaking the law, but only through a court’s 
conviction.
 That determination has consequences, such as in the 2000 U.S. 
national election, when the definition and deployment of the catego-
ries of “prisoner” and “probable felon” as well as the interpretation 
of those identities helped shift the outcome of the presidency. The 
purging of voter rolls during the highly contested 2000 U.S. presi-
dential election in the state of Florida illustrates the tense interplay 
of blackness and the identity of prisoner. Florida was one of thir-
teen states that at the time prohibited former offenders from voting 
unless granted particular clemency, even after their sentences were 
completed. The names of thousands of men and women were on 
waiting lists to have their rights reinstated, and the delay at the office 
of Governor Jeb Bush, George W. Bush’s brother, was two to three 
years. At the time, black men and women outnumbered white by 3.3 
in Florida prisons. More than 30 percent of the black men in Florida 
could not vote because of previous convictions, and black voters in 
the state voted for Democratic candidates typically by a margin of nine 
to one. Therefore, a tremendous number of potential voters, many of 
them black men, already were removed from the democratic process 
due to state law and bureaucracy.
 In addition to the people already on record as ineligible to vote 
due to a prior conviction, a list of more than fifty-seven thousand 
names of “probable felons” was assembled and distributed to the 
county voter-registration boards in order to facilitate their removal 
from the catalog of eligible voters. The list featured ten times the 

Imprisonment in U.S. History
number of names generated for previous elections, an increase the U.S. 
Commission on Civil Rights attributed to gross extrapolation of the 
data, such as close but not precise matches of names and dates, and 
outright mistakes, such as a woman being mistaken for her sister, an 
ex-offender, and a man barred from voting in 2000 for a conviction 
alleged to have occurred seven years in the future.29
 Such disenfranchisement illustrates how criminality is an identity 
historically subject to categorization, description, and definition to 
the extent that it transforms “persons” to “felons” whose very delin-
quency follows and defines them even after serving their sentences or 
in the absence of any offense at all. The practice of surveillance and 
strategic reading of the voter rolls in this case effectively produced 
criminals in the absence of any actual crime or injured party before 
the assignment of the “probable felon” status, which itself constituted 
its own injury in the loss of voting rights. The list and its use illustrate 
Michel Foucault’s claim that “prison, and no doubt punishment in 
general, is not intended to eliminate offences, but rather distinguish 
them, to distribute them, to use them; that it is not so much that they 
render docile those who are liable to transgress the law, but that they 
tend to assimilate the transgression of the laws in a general tactics of 
subjection.”30 The “probable felon” list produced criminality where 
there often was none, and to profound political effect.
 A common criticism leveled against Foucault, that he mistakenly 
equates intent with effect, seems similarly applicable in this situation 
with regard to whether Florida’s effort in this instance was inten-
tionally racist. However, the Voter Rights Act (1965) is explicit on 
the matter that intent and effect need not be coincident to deter-
mine that voters have lost their constitutional right to vote. In the 
executive summary of the findings of the U.S. Commission on Civil 
Rights’ investigation of the 2000 election in Florida, the Commis-
sion determined, “The VRA does not require intent to discriminate. 
Neither does it require proof of a conspiracy. Violations of the VRA 
can be established by evidence that the action or inaction of respon-
sible officials and other evidence constitute a ‘totality of the cir-
cumstances’ that denied citizens their right to vote.” That “totality” 
includes “voting procedures and voting technologies and [ . . . ] the 
laws, the procedures, and the decisions that produced those results, 
viewed in the context of social and historical factors.”31 The Voter 
Rights Act provides powerful leverage to the analysis of the histori-
cal practices of incarceration identified in this book: the question of 
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racist intent, in other words, is not the point in the overrepresenta-
tion of black men in prison. The effect is the key, as becomes clear in 
the American Correctional Association’s official endorsement in 2001 
of the “restoration of voting rights” to former felons after the com-
pletion of a sentence: “Disenfranchisement,” the ACA argues, “dis-
proportionately affects segments of the population,” and fulfills no 
corrective purpose.32 Nevertheless, states continue to disenfranchise, 
demonstrating that imprisonment produces a particular identity, the 
prisoner and former prisoner—and the possibility of being misrec-
ognized as a “probable felon.”
 Criminalization is thus a matter of interpellation, of being named. 
The term invokes Louis Althusser and his claim of subjects as hailed 
into being.33 He offers the example of a policeman’s call, “you there!,” 
which implies both the threat and the psychoanalytic guilt presumed 
in such a naming, and he describes that hailing as the entry of the 
subject into history.34 That singular interpellation as identity forma-
tion is nicely exemplified with regard to race and gender in such 
noted examples as Frantz Fanon’s “Look, a Negro!” and Judith Butler’s 
“It’s a girl!”35 Like those interpellations, the identity of the crimi-
nal, and subsequently the prisoner, has its presumably straightforward 
cause, originary and singularly definitive: the person is black and not 
white; the newborn child has these sexual parts and not those; the 
accused is guilty rather than innocent. However, as with other indices, 
the facticity of criminalization and the incarceration with which it 
has become increasing equivalent are not always so straightforward. 
The black and white of race is particularly vexed, at times denoting a 
perception of skin color and thus far more a psychological and cultural 
matter than one of biology, in other instances signifying ethnicity or 
ideology.
 The identity of prisoner differs from race, ethnicity, gender, sexual-
ity, and other matters of human difference in that it is not deter-
mined through one’s genealogy or culturally encoded behaviors, 
not necessarily written on the body or its willful performances. 
Imprisonment occurs through processes in which a subject’s agency 
varies, from extensive, as in the conscious decision to commit a seri-
ous felony, to none at all, as in innocence or accident. It can occur 
at virtually any point in one’s life, a seemingly sudden ontological 
transformation wherein a person becomes an alleged criminal, then a 
convict and felon, accompanied by a set of legal ramifications ranging 
from registration to incarceration to execution. Given that anyone 
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can become a prisoner—though, of course, some are far more likely 
than others to do so—incarceration in part resembles the category 
of disability. Disability studies has emerged as a crucial category of 
human experience in the humanities and social sciences since the 
Americans with Disabilities Act (1990). The comparison between 
imprisonment and disability perhaps invokes immediate responses 
of a naïve ethical equivalency, but even a glance at history, literary or 
otherwise, demonstrates how each has been treated as a sign of moral 
failure. The clearest example of this phenomenon in U.S. letters is 
Nathaniel Hawthorne’s The Scarlet Letter (1850) and the titular mark 
Hester Prynne bears in her community after completing her sentence. 
The narrative indicts the culture that punishes her, even as it signi-
fies Roger Chillingworth’s moral decrepitude through his increasing 
physical deformity, a bodily disfigurement and disability equated in 
the novel with evil. Those associations of disability have faded as our 
culture has grown more knowledgeable regarding the many sorts of 
physical and mental difference and their many causes; it is past time 
for us to gain a clearer sense of the many variations of criminalization 
and their own multiple causes.
 I describe the category of prisoner as a matter of identity, because 
identity serves as the hinge between I and we, the axis between psy-
choanalytic and historicizing approaches so attuned to single and plu-
ral, the individual subject and the social body. The books, films, and 
performances addressed in this book all are invested deeply in matters 
of human agency and the sense of its possibility with regard to crimi-
nality and imprisonment. Those investments invite different ways of 
reading, particularly psychoanalytic and historicizing, two approaches 
often understood as occupying opposite poles.36 The difference can 
be understood as one of scope. Psychoanalytic approaches offer a 
microphysics of authority focused on the individual subject, wherein 
the origins of character can be traced to an uneasy combination of 
difference and universality: idiosyncratic personal history organized 
through the cross-cultural and transhistorical terms of psychoanalysis 
that describe human experience.
 In contrast, historically nuanced study offers a macrophysics of 
power and its operation over time in cultural terrain split along fault 
lines of human difference: race, gender, ethnicity, sexuality, class, and 
other engines of history. This is part of the reason that most attempts 
to bridge the perceived gap between the two approaches have located 
themselves in the study of race37—psychoanalysis largely defined by 

Chapter 1
Freud and Lacan, after all, already was organized by gender and sexu-
ality. Some critics and theorists bridge this gap, though given the 
prevalence of historical study, such efforts can sometimes seem an 
offering by apologists, or an attempt to leverage the cachet of his-
tory. Cultural critics and theorists working in the register of psycho-
analysis might object to this description,38 but even the most fully 
developed dual approaches often open with an apology regarding 
psychoanalysis’s traditional emphasis on individual and family dramas. 
The question so famously posed by Carolyn Porter, “are we being 
historical yet?,”39 continues to ring among critics bridging theoreti-
cal vocabularies. Rather than pretending to offer any unifying theory, 
this book traffics between the micro- and macro- approaches, as these 
texts themselves do in their accounts of the individual and social 
forces that shape criminalization and its attendant imprisonment.
 While prison, race, and masculinity are the key terms of this book, 
I sometimes employ a fairly uncomplicated treatment of the latter 
two, foregrounding incarceration. As prison studies becomes more 
central to historical, literary, and cultural studies, then analyses that are 
more specifically inflected will continue to appear to emphasize how 
imprisonment shapes gender and sexuality. For example, patriarchy 
as man-is-dominant engages prisoners in a subordinate role to “the 
man” who keeps them down; within that hierarchy, male prisoners 
subordinate one another, sometimes in violent rituals of male prison 
rape wherein the victim consequently may be perceived as homo-
sexual while the perpetrator is not.40 Nevertheless, this study largely 
treats incarceration as the primary variable in the cultural function of 
imprisonment, and while its purpose and practice change historically, 
it remains linked to race.
 The development of The Heath Anthology of American Literature 
offers a means to trace how, since the 1970s, identity and the politics 
of identity have grown to be understood as the fault lines of cul-
tural history and the fundamental organizing principles for humanities 
and social sciences. As the most prominent of the collections orga-
nized to emphasize the multicultural nature of U.S. literary history, 
the anthology offers one commonplace to address the attention to 
cultural difference as well as the relative scarcity of the discussion of 
incarceration. The self-professed genealogy offered in the collection’s 
preface traces its origins to discussions challenging the national canon 
in 1968 and then the 1979 project titled “Reconstructing Ameri-
can Literature,” which led to the so-titled 1982 conference at Yale 
and to a text of the same name providing pedagogical strategies for 
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reformulating national literature courses.41 Early participant Richard 
Yarborough later became the associate general editor of the anthology, 
which in its 2005 edition includes a section on prison literature. In a 
2003 lecture Yarborough addresses representation of black masculinity 
in “recent U.S. historical cinema.”42 He calls attention to the trend 
of the Europeanization of black masculinity in these films, each of 
which is a historical drama leveraging the cachet of being “based on 
a true story.” However, he does not point out that his selection of 
Amistad (1997), Rosewood (1997), and The Hurricane includes repre-
sentations of the early-nineteenth-century revolt, a massacre, and an 
unjust imprisonment, an arc that follows the historical telos of slavery, 
jim crow lynching, and the raced incarceration of black men—the 
history that underwrites this book. Yarborough’s oversight is no per-
nicious disavowal of a nation’s raced corrections history. Instead, he 
overlooks imprisonment, quite literally “sees over”43 the phenom-
enon I describe: pervasive imagination’s concealment of the history of 
imprisonment, where almost one of every three black men and one 
out of every twenty-three white men are likely to be imprisoned at 
some point during their lives.
 Given that human cost and the proliferative representations of 
imprisonment, it is curious that there has not been more of a cor-
responding discourse in film or literary studies. Bruce Crowther’s 
Captured on Film: The Prison Movie (1989)44 is an encyclopedia rather 
than an analysis of movies set in prison; Nicole Rafter’s Shots in the 
Mirror: Crime Films and Society (2000)45 includes a provocative chapter 
focusing on prison films, but it also emphasizes breadth rather than 
depth. Though many books make prisons both marginal and central 
to their narratives and settings,46 there is insufficient analysis focusing 
specifically on representations of imprisonment in U.S. literature. H. 
Bruce Franklin’s Prison Literature in America and Dennis Massey’s Doing 
Time in American Prisons: A Study of Modern Novels (1989) are critical 
entries in the field, as is Auli Ek’s Race and Masculinity in Contemporary 
American Prison Narratives (2005). While Ek and I engage some of the 
same imaginative works and some of the same critics and theorists, we 
differ in scope and method. The scope of her book is largely a present 
not specifically linked to past practices. The basis for that presentism 
is probably indicated when she suggests that the prison films she cri-
tiques “resist the postmodernist mode of examining the complexity of 
concept and values.”47 I am skeptical that only postmodernism studies 
such matters, which simply could be called careful analysis. Further-
more, that “mode” is generally suspicious of historical periodization 
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in particular and continuity in general, but archival work and other 
historical evidence demonstrates constancies of racial control within 
corrections. Nevertheless, Ek rightly demonstrates that “the image of 
the criminal serves symbolic social and cultural needs” inextricably 
linked with racial difference.48 
 Such study has proven marginal to the more developed area 
of law and literature, in which prisons appear scarcely, if at all.49 
These works sort the differences and dependencies between the 
two discourses of law and literature, twin fields focusing on the 
uses and effects of language. Their paired study addresses the lit-
erary representation of law as agonistic inquiry, the courtroom as 
stage and place of contest, the function of the tropes of jurisprudence 
in literature, and the application of literary examples and method-
ologies to law. In addition to such texts that focus primarily on the 
depictions of trials, David Guest offers a critique of U.S. fiction repre-
senting the death penalty in Sentenced to Death: The American Novel and 
Capital Punishment (1997).50 However, much lies unexamined in the 
space between trial and execution, and death is not the only sentence. 
The limited critical enterprise drawing attention to the narratives of 
imprisonment offered in U.S. literature reproduces the larger invis-
ibility of imprisonment for those not themselves in prison.
 That absence of more-critical comment on representations of 
imprisonment occurs, in part, because of the evolution of the term 
prison. The semantic shift from a condition of captivity to a place of 
punishment reflects the crux of Foucault’s argument in Discipline and 
Punish, in which he charts the shift of punishment of the body to 
discipline and individuation. The legitimacy of the historiographical 
method of Foucault’s Discipline and Punish has received significant 
criticism.51 Though it is written as critical theory and a “history of 
the present,”52 it still does draw primarily from eighteenth- and nine-
teenth-century prison history—if to illustrate its points rather than 
serve as their basis. In addition, some subaltern studies, the analyses 
of power’s sedimentation of culture, have been informed by prison 
practice. For example, it is difficult to conceive of Gramsci’s rich 
description of hegemony not inflected by his situation of writing 
within prison walls. Dick Hebdige draws heavily from Gramsci in 
his definitive Subculture (1979),53 and he frames his argument with the 
prison writing of Jean Genet. Therefore, some of the critical theory 
formative of historically nuanced cultural study has been shaped by 
actual and imagined incarceration. However, theoretically informed 
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analyses of literature typically employ prison to mean a general sense 
of confinement, rather than a specific material condition.54
 Such figurative use likely has been informed both by Foucault’s 
emphasis on the organization of power (for which imprisonment is 
largely a metaphor) and by Jameson’s use of the term in his critique 
of formalism in The Prison-House of Language (1972).55 Jameson and 
Foucault drew titular attention to prisons even as the first, in his 
argument, and the second, in his employment by subsequent critics, 
made imprisonment figurative, a metaphor for the limits of formal-
ism and the operation of power, respectively. Jameson’s and Foucault’s 
work proved valuable for analyses of cultural production attendant to 
historical conditions, but the shift to prison as an abstraction over-
writes what is itself a material circumstance, a bait and switch of the 
literal and the figurative that reproduces the gap between actual and 
imagined prisons.
 This book certainly relies on Foucault’s work on prisons in addi-
tion to his formulation of history as a genealogy of discourse, power, 
and discursive authority, as well as on Jameson’s emphasis on historic-
ity and the embedded politics of texts. However, prison as a metaphor 
causes a slippage, since academics writing about images of imprison-
ment as punishment end up writing about an existential state. For 
example, Martha Duncan’s Romantic Outlaws, Beloved Prisons (1996),56 
in examining fiction from Aeschylean tragedy to twentieth-century 
fiction through the lenses of political science and law, flattens or 
effaces the cultural and historical contingencies of the texts she reads, 
and writes a sense of the popular at the expense of the complexity of 
historical actuality as it might be understood through various records 
and textualities. In analyses such as these, prison becomes a trope.
 That trope making is not unexpected, as “prison” provides a pow-
erful and polymorphous sign. For Frederick Douglass, there is the 
“prison-house of slavery,” while race itself is such a state in DuBois’s 
description of whiteness as a “prison-house closed round about us all.” 
Richard Wright describes America as “a black sprawling prison full 
of tiny black cells,” and for James Baldwin there is the “sunlit prison 
of the American dream.” To Malcolm X, whose own experience 
made prison more than a metaphor, “our color became to us like a 
prison.”57 Given the power of the image, it should not come entirely 
as a surprise that imprisonment becomes a metaphor for the racial 
operation of power. Nevertheless, the focus in this book remains on 
prison not as a metaphorical state or a feeling of being confined, but 

Chapter 1
as a real and imagined place of bodily confinement within wire and 
concrete.
 The distinction is important. For instance, at his best Ioan Davies 
in Writers in Prison (1990) makes salient points regarding how prison 
writers counter strategies of domination; at his worst, Davies com-
mits solipsistic excesses in claims such as “the metaphoric prison and 
the real prison are ultimately one and the same,” and “Death Row 
becomes the land that we all inhabit.”58 Something is lost when 
imprisonment becomes primarily a metaphor, either for the circuitry 
of force in societies or for a bleak perception of a psychological 
or philosophical condition. There are rhetorically powerful reasons 
for challenging the distinctions between those in and out of prison. 
Indeed, the lack of widespread concern regarding imprisonment prac-
tices can be attributed, in part, to the lack of identification, of mutual 
recognition between those imprisoned and those not. However, any 
such challenge to definitions of criminality and practices of impris-
onment must be grounded in the specificity of material, cultural, and 
historical conditions.
 There is attention to such experience in examinations and col-
lections of prison writing, the discursive work of prisoners them-
selves. Bell Gale Chevigny and Franklin, in particular, have addressed 
the constructed invisibility of prisons by focusing on prisoners’ texts. 
Franklin argues that the main lines of American literature can be 
traced from the “plantation to the penitentiary.”59 His Prison Literature 
in America offers extended readings of the writing of captives, from 
slave narratives to writing of the mid-1970s. He shifts from reading 
these works to offering more of the writing itself in his collection 
Prison Writing in 20th-Century America (1998). That anthology and 
Chevigny’s Doing Time: 25 Years of Prison Writing (1999) both under-
score that the wording of the Thirteenth Amendment effectively made 
racial incarceration a de facto extension of slavery.60 They primar-
ily emphasize the self-representations of prisoners themselves. Simi-
larly, prison teachers and activists such as Robert Ellis Gordon and 
Kathleen O’Shea juxtapose prisoners’ stories with their own, writing 
themselves in the spaces between the prison writing they include 
in, respectively, The Funhouse Mirror: Reflections on Prison (2000) and 
Women on the Row: Revelations from Both Sides of the Bars (2000).61
 Such prison writing and its study—the prisoners, teachers, scholars, 
and activists producing and drawing attention to the writing describ-
ing prison from the inside, largely in an effort for social justice—are 
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excellent and necessary in their own right. This book has a different 
though related strategy and draws attention to the sheer pervasive-
ness of prisoners both real and imagined, written and screened from 
both sides of prison walls. The views from inside and out create dual 
vantage points from which to examine the degree to which those 
in prison and the nation that imprisons mirror one another, as such 
reflection proves a key trope for the growing body of prison writing. 
A poem printed in the prison magazine the Angolite in 1985 poses 
the matter this way:
Go ahead
Lock us up
Lock us all up
Lock away the ones you see
In the mirror while you’re shaving
Because we’re all just reflections
Of your world
Of the world you think we’ve left behind.62
Like this poet, Chevigny claims that “prison reflects the state of soci-
ety,” and Attica historian Tom Wicker argues that what happens 
inside the walls “inevitably reflects the society outside.”63 However, as 
Gordon’s titular “funhouse mirror” suggests, the reflection can distort 
and prove grotesque. 
 Such mirroring and the (mis)identification it implies require a 
closer look. While generally the imagination of prisons overwrites 
their actuality, this book also demonstrates that prisoners and the cul-
ture that incarcerates sometimes mirror one another, sometimes reflect 
on one another, and fundamentally alter one another. For example, 
Faulkner’s description of the cause of criminality in the early 1930s is 
the same as that offered by prison officials of the time. Cleaver writes 
a prison-cell view of domestic and international policy of the mid-
1960s, and he and Mailer train their critical gazes on the absurdities 
on both sides of prison walls. However, the depictions back and forth 
not only represent history, but play a role in its development. Rep-
resentation offering itself as “real” participates in the texture of that 
reality, changes the course of human events. Cleaver’s writing in 1968 
made him a key figure in ACA discussions of the early 1970s. Mailer’s 
“true life novel” scrupulously (and sometimes less so) documents the 
events surrounding Gary Gilmore’s incarceration and execution in 
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1976 and 1977, including how television producers, reporters, law-
yers, and writers shaped the events they recorded. The documentary 
The Farm is at once part of the historical record and itself critically 
informed by prior imaginings of prison. The literature and film of 
the cultural imagination less reflect historical actuality than they play 
a dynamic role in it. What Richard Poirier writes of Mailer is true 
of many of writers and directors surveyed: “I would take his engage-
ments with language as political rather than simply literary ones: they 
are a way of discovering how to hold together elements that perhaps 
by nature would tend to destroy one another, both in a political and 
in a literary structure.”64 Sorting the political, historical, and literary 
structures of these books, films, and performances makes their cat-
egorization difficult, as they all blur boundaries of fiction, history, and 
myth in their imperative to tell the “truth.”
 The truth they tell, particularly with regard to racial oppression, 
often demonstrates undermined ideals of equality, at times imbuing 
these books, films, and performances with a rhetoric of dissent famil-
iar in U.S. literary history.65 Such dissent has become associated not 
only with the self-representation of black men, but also with their 
representation by others, a rhetorical strategy often relating twentieth-
century imprisonment to nineteenth-century slavery. For example, the 
films set in prisons in chapters 5, 6, and 7 all cite that racial history. 
Vexed as its depiction of black masculinity is, Kaye’s American History 
X closes its narrative of imprisonment and racist violence in the 1990s 
with an epigraph from Abraham Lincoln calling for racial harmony. 
The Hurricane draws verbatim from the autobiography of Rubin Carter 
written in prison, where he identifies “Carter” as the “slave name” 
from ancestors working fields in the South.66 The documentary The 
Farm chronicles the lives of six inmates, four of whom are black, in 
the slave plantation turned penitentiary. Furthermore, Faulkner’s Go 
Down, Moses, with its central conflict beginning in slavery in the 
antebellum South, ends more than a hundred years later in a chapter 
that shares the title of the book, drawn from a nineteenth-century 
spiritual. Not only Franklin and other critics, activists, and historians, 
but also directors and writers draw the comparison between slavery 
and incarceration, the latter as the extension of the former.
 Nevertheless, Faulkner’s position in writing Go Down, Moses is not 
the same as that of Cleaver, in Soul on Ice, or Carter, in The Sixteenth 
Round, each telling his own history; there is no ethical equivalency 
or naive postmodern collapse of all distinction between novel and 
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autobiography. While meaningfully related, there remains a differ-
ence between the imprisoned character of Butch Beauchamp in a 
fictional 1940s and those actually in prison then. Mailer’s articulation 
of masculinity in the characterization of the “white negro,”67 though 
endorsed by Cleaver, does not equate to the blackness of Cleaver 
himself. I am not interested in discussions of authenticity as such, 
untethered from historical and cultural contingencies. However, crit-
ics such as Chevigny, Franklin, and Barbara Harlow usefully describe 
the literature of prisoners as prison writing, as opposed to prisons in 
writing, the representation of prisoners by those not themselves incar-
cerated.68 The selection for this book balances views from within and 
without prison walls. Faulkner writes and Kaye films from outside, but 
Cleaver is behind bars. The Executioner’s Song and The Hurricane both 
draw from prison writing, and the latter at times filmed on location 
inside Ralway Prison. The Farm is shot almost entirely within Angola 
State Prison, with one inmate, Wilbert Rideau, receiving directorial 
credit. “Live from Death Row” allows prisoners to speak for them-
selves, an effort Webster’s Jury Duty takes pains to re-create.
 Prisoners’ self-representations and their depictions by others are 
joined in order to offer views from both the margin and the center, 
with an eye toward clarifying how the prisoners are defined from 
within and without. At the turn of the twentieth-first century, prisons 
are split between lived experience for an unprecedented number of 
U.S. citizens and a polymorphous sign in the cultural imagination. 
Describing the relationship between the history and the represen-
tation of incarceration requires historiographical approaches joined 
with ways of reading that illuminate and clarify evolving notions of 
criminalization, imprisonment, and the social responsibility for prisons 
and prisoners.
Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are organized around the five literary texts sur-
veyed in this book, representations of imprisonment written from 
both sides of prison walls: Faulkner’s three novels from without, 
Cleaver’s account from within, and Mailer’s crossing back and forth. 
Chapter 2, “Literary Execution: Race, Crime, and Punishment in 
Three Faulkner Novels,” examines criminality in Sanctuary and Light 
in August, and more extensively in Go Down, Moses. All close with 
the deaths of characters condemned for murder; in the latter two, 
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the characters are of mixed race. The earlier novels treat criminality 
in psychoanalytic terms of family history and early childhood. It is 
a model that these early novels do not seem to trust but for which 
no other option seems available. The views of criminal cause corre-
spond to those of prison officials of the time, who relied on records 
of personal history and psychological classification. In contrast, Go 
Down, Moses offers a social rather than personal history producing 
the criminal. Its narrative trajectory implies that twentieth-century 
incarceration is the inexorable conclusion of slavery and jim crow, a 
radical claim at the time. In the final pages of the novel, responsibil-
ity not for the crimes but for the condemned falls to the white male 
business community. The representation of incarceration and execu-
tion at times capitulates to assumptions of blackness, masculinity, and 
criminality, but in the end Go Down, Moses challenges its contempo-
rary views of wardens and other prison officials as recorded in the 
transcripts of the American Prison Association.
 Chapter 3, “Soul on Ice, Schizoanalysis, and the Subject of the 
Prisoner,” focuses on Cleaver’s engagement with autobiography and 
cultural critique. His description of imprisonment regularly shifts 
from personal experience to contemporary historical events. Cleaver 
disdains the emphasis on the individual in psychoanalysis, instead 
beginning a social analysis to sort the divisions of criminality, race, 
and gender. In 1968 he participated through direct involvement and 
writing in efforts of cultural change at a time when radical transfor-
mation seemed possible, not only to activists but also to American 
Correctional Association administrators of the time. Indeed, following 
the release and widespread acclaim for Soul on Ice—it sold two mil-
lion copies and was the New York Times Book of the Year—prison 
officials responded to its critique in contradictory ways, from disdain 
to positive recommendation. Cleaver and ACA presidents viewed their 
historical moment as one at the cusp of revolution, facing a transfor-
mation in what counted as crime and punishment at a time when the 
nation was divided deeply with regard to the possibilities of youth 
movements and racial unity. Cleaver’s social analysis, while prepara-
tory, self-serving, and contradictory, offers a powerful approach to 
accounting for what he considered a cultural hysteria.
 Chapter 4, “The Executioner’s Song and the Narration of His-
tory,” tells a different story of a prisoner, and while similarly situated 
between personal and social, it appears after the revolt at Attica, after 
the dismantling of rehabilitation programs, after the Rockefeller drug 
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laws, and at the beginning of the precipitous rise in incarceration rates. 
The “true life novel” departs from social and cultural implications 
of raced criminality, offering instead a bleak account of seemingly 
inevitable, unexplainable, and race-neutral violence. Gilmore’s crimes 
as Mailer describes them are violent and intentionless phenomena, 
the individual action of a sociopath acting without cause or direc-
tion. Mailer offers his bleak account of Gilmore as a prisoner and 
Gilmore’s effort to maintain autonomy through ruthlessly pursuing his 
own death. However, Mailer maintains a narrative method sensitive to 
social interdependency and the unavailability of that very individual 
autonomy. In the effort to tell the truth—and leaving himself out of 
it—Mailer unravels Gilmore’s effort to opt out of history, even as he 
demonstrates how storytelling shapes the history it tries to tell.
 Films are the focus of the three chapters thereafter. Chapter 5, 
“The Contradictions of ‘Documentary Realism’ in American History 
X,” demonstrates how the film’s many “authors” claim the real and 
the effects of that effort. Screenwriter David McKenna draws from 
his own experiences in Southern California to tell a story that Tony 
Kaye films in cinema verité style, and actor Norton cribs statistics 
from the governor’s office to add lines for verisimilitude. Critics have 
praised the film’s realism, and some teen audiences have questioned 
whether it is based on a true story. The film describes the incarcera-
tion of a white supremacist gang leader (Norton) and his subsequent 
repudiation of racism, a lesson that led to the film’s recommendation 
by Amnesty International and to broad screening in schools. However, 
the film’s editing in postproduction so emphasized the believability 
of the charismatic leader’s racism and disregarded the humanity of 
its black male characters that it leaves available an entirely different 
message: all black men are criminals, and prison redeems both black 
and white men to become the “better angels of our nature.” American 
History X overwrites its own anti–white supremacist tag line, “Some 
legacies must end”—accompanied by a skinhead’s swastika tattoo—in 
its whitewashing of racism’s causes and costs.
 Chapter 6, “‘Based upon a true story’: The Hurricane and the Prob-
lem of Prison Redemption,” critiques another representation of racial 
tension and men in prison. Norman Jewison’s The Hurricane combines 
biographical and fictional elements, incorporating documentary foot-
age in the feature film based on the imprisonment of professional 
boxer Rubin “Hurricane” Carter. The film demonstrates the risks 
of the “apprehension” of history, both the claim to the real and the 

Chapter 1
anxiety over its misrepresentation. Like American History X, The Hurri-
cane offers racism not distributed through social structures but consoli-
dated in particular individuals, as Yarborough and others have noted. 
More significant, the film’s condemnation of racial incarceration is 
undermined by its feel-good narrative, its “triumph of the human 
spirit” genre.
 Chapter 7 is “The Farm: ‘This is no dream or nothing made up, 
this is for real.’” Realistic films become part of a mediascape helping 
to define the shape of a given reality. Fictional films set in prison 
thereby foster the expectations viewers have of what prison really 
must be like, shaping the production of a documentary set in prison 
and featuring actual prisoners. The Farm, more than American His-
tory X and The Hurricane, successfully represents contemporary raced 
imprisonment as a consequence of a history of racism. The filmmak-
ers draw attention to the fact that the Louisiana State Prison is on the 
grounds of a former slave plantation and that the prison perpetuates 
some of the plantation’s practices. Nevertheless, at times it also fills a 
shape established by prior fictions, demonstrating how documentary 
can capitulate to the same popular expectations as would-be block-
busters. Narrative conceits of earlier fictional films set in prison shape 
the production of documentary.
 Chapter 8, “Staging Prisons and the Performance of History,” turns 
from books and films to two performances from the fall of 1999, an 
activist demonstration and a play that both directly concern imprison-
ment. A staging of “Live from Death Row” offers a chance for dialogue 
between a community audience and prisoners. To hear them speak is 
an invitation to take a stand against the death penalty, as well as against 
raced incarceration practices. Jury Duty is a play based on a true story 
that was performed in one instance as a fundraiser for a social work 
program. Ken Webster’s drama draws from his experience on a crimi-
nal trial jury to recount, in a series of retrospective monologues, a 
white female character’s crime and trial, as well as the deliberations 
of members of the jury. The former demonstration emphasizes how 
race and class create the expectation of the criminality of black men 
and their consequent imprisonment, while the latter departs from the 
racial focus to point out how gender and sexuality inform cultural 
expectations of crime and punishment as well. They provide a sense 
of the immediacy and actuality of incarceration in their claims for a 
broader social responsibility for prisons and prisoners.
 Critics, teachers, readers, and citizens must interpret the history of 
imprisonment as it has been represented in order to better understand 
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how and why incarceration currently operates as it does, locking 
up two million people, many for nonviolent offenses, a tremendous 
proportion of them black, most of them from poverty. What counts 
as a crime varies culturally and historically, and the United States is 
likely to maintain prisons to separate some individuals from the rest. 
Sigmund Freud argues in Civilization and Its Discontents (1930) that 
organizations of humanity such as nation-states quell internal discord 
through marking some group as “other” and reacting to that differ-
ence through violence and oppression,69 and we can view transhis-
torical, cross-cultural, and international examples of such phenomena. 
The United States of America is known popularly as the land of the 
free, and that definition may well depend on some of its citizens not 
being free, losing access to life, liberty, and their pursuits. However, 
massive increases in U.S. imprisonment in the past quarter century 
have not fostered peace, and while our society may well think that 
some people belong in prison, we cannot strive for a perfect union 
of “we the people,” and certainly cannot attain it, when so many are 
in prison in large part because they are black or Hispanic and often 
poor.

s imAgined by William Faulkner, Yoknapatawpha County 
was not far from Parchman, with its actual prison well-known 
for harsh conditions and contracted convict labor, making it bear 
harsh resemblance to plantation slavery. Along with early-twentieth-
century Mississippi judicial practices almost indistinguishable from 
lynching, race colored criminality as it was both practiced and imag-
ined in the American South. This chapter demonstrates that Sanctuary, 
Light in August, and Go Down, Moses chart a shift in Faulkner’s sense 
of the causes of crime and the justice of punishment. All three novels 
implicate race with violence in a fashion that mirrors the historical 
record of Southern practice in the first half of the twentieth century. 
The earlier novels trace crime to individual history and equate judicial 
decision with lynching; in contrast, Go Down, Moses abandons the 
Literary Execution 
Race, Crime, and Punishment
in Three Faulkner Novels
If I’m going to finish my crop in this county or finish somebody else’s crop 
in Parchman county, I would like to know it soon as I can.
—Lucas Beauchamp in Go Down, Moses1
Most whites thought of Parchman as a model prison, and the press carried 
endless stories of its profitable ways [ . . . ]. William Faulkner lived in Oxford, 
only eighty miles east of the farm.
—David M. Oshinsky, “Worse Than Slavery”: 
Parchman Farm and the Ordeal of Jim Crow Justice2
2
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emphasis on personal biography, turning instead to a broader social 
context, community accountability for the criminal, and sharp distinc-
tion between lynching and execution.
 My claim of an evolved sense of crime in Faulkner’s writing, then, 
involves matters of human agency and the sense of its possibility 
at particular times and places, and thus incorporates psychoanalysis’s 
emphases on both the individual consciousness and the plural sense of 
social history. Faulkner himself shifted from emphasizing the former 
to the latter in his account of forces that shape criminality between 
his writing of Sanctuary and Light in August and then Go Down, Moses 
a decade later. While I make some use of the psychoanalytic termi-
nology prevalent during these novels’ writing and reception, I am less 
interested in interpreting them wholly within a Freudian or Lacanian 
framework than I am in reading them comparatively as bracketing 
a change in the writer’s sense of individual autonomy, the retribu-
tion for crime, and the social responsibility for punishment. Their 
respective accounts here are situated with regard to other texts as 
well, particularly the historical record of lynching and the credence 
prison officials gave to psychological classification and the individu-
ation of prisoners from 1929 to 1942. The causes of criminality, the 
sorts of punishment, and the relation between the criminal and society 
described in those transcripts provide a historical record in tension 
with the history Faulkner imagines.
 Faulkner’s “own little postage stamp of native soil”3 offers a mythic 
South at once old and new, fictional and immediately recognizable, a 
product of the author’s imagination and his history—both his personal 
experiences and the tensions of cultural difference deeply marking 
the United States from the 1920s to the 1950s. Nineteen novels and 
many shorter works in their aggregate produce the fictional county 
and survey a common landscape over a hundred years. Antediluvian 
characters with extended and entwined genealogies cultivate rela-
tionships among the twelve hundred lively fictions populating the 
twenty-four hundred square miles of wilderness, farmland, hamlets, 
and towns.4 To see what stays the same in Yoknapatawpha and what 
changes is to mark how Faulkner, his world, and his view of it alter 
as well. In the passing of time, the writer’s representation of the set 
of human relations alters, human agency and possibility changing in 
the steepening shadow of history. It is the work of 1929 to 1942, 
particularly The Sound and the Fury, Light in August, Absalom, Absalom!, 
and Go Down, Moses, that most critics suggest includes Faulkner’s 
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most significant writing,5 a historical period most recognizable as the 
Great Depression yielding to World War II, when harsh economic and 
cultural effects were suffered sharply in rural communities. Yoknapa-
tawpha illustrates the poverty, class and race conflicts, transient popu-
lations, and rural to urban shifts experienced in the actual South and 
elsewhere in the country.
 Less well-known regarding this time is that it was the period of 
the greatest number of executions in recent U.S. history. From 1930 
to 1942, between 123 and 199 state executions took place each year, 
the most during any such period. During that time, black men dis-
proportionately received the death penalty in comparison with white 
men. While the frequency of lynching reached new lows by the 1930s, 
some historians suggest a correlation of that racial violence to execu-
tion practices.6 Furthermore, a statistical correlation between lynch-
ing and execution has received insufficient notice. Arthur F. Raper’s 
groundbreaking study of lynching in 1933 demonstrates that while 
the terrorism of lynching rested upon the myth of a black man’s rape 
of a white woman, less than one-sixth of the documented lynchings 
between 1880 and 1930 involved such accusations.7 Exactly the same 
proportion of state executions of black men between 1930 and 1942 
was for the crime of rape, more than eight times the frequency of 
white men, hinting at a substitution effect between lynching and racial 
execution; arguably, the latter practice replaced, at least in part, the 
former.8
 It was against this historical backdrop of race-based lynching giv-
ing way to the relatively frequent state-sanctioned hangings, shoot-
ings, and electrocutions that the initial readers of Sanctuary, Light in 
August, and Go Down, Moses encountered the death sentences of Lee 
Goodwin, Popeye, Joe Christmas, Rider, and Samuel “Butch” Beau-
champ. These five characters split the difference between lynching 
and execution, but where the practices are separated only hazily in 
the earlier works (Christmas’s death is both), they are distinguished 
sharply and are explicitly racial in Go Down, Moses. That transforma-
tion culminates in a repudiation of racist lynching, even as Faulkner 
acknowledges that the turn from mob to jury does not release the 
society that executes from the responsibility for the condemned. 
 Noel Polk points out that in Yoknapatawpha’s county seat “the 
two chief features of Jefferson, Mississippi’s architectural landscape are 
the courthouse and the jail.”9 It is surprising, then, that crime and 
punishment in Faulkner’s fiction have received so little notice. Just as 
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Faulkner’s critics have not sufficiently addressed the matter of incar-
ceration and execution, David Guest’s survey of the representation 
of the death penalty in twentieth-century U.S. literature, Sentenced 
to Death, does not touch on Faulkner. However, Sanctuary, Light in 
August, and Go Down, Moses all center on the origins of criminality 
and its punishment, most particularly when Popeye’s and Christmas’s 
executions are contrasted with Butch Beauchamp’s at the conclusion 
of their respective narratives. Those closures differ as personal psy-
choanalytic history gives way to larger social and genealogical history 
in creating the criminal. Sanctuary and Light in August end with the 
romantic tragedy for which Faulkner is so well-known, where the 
aesthetic of the language offers the saving grace. In contrast, Go Down, 
Moses closes with a starker vision that stages how criminality is the 
responsibility of a society defined in the cultural differences of an 
explicitly democratic Jefferson, the county seat of Yoknapatawpha.
 The three novels offer a changed sense of crime, criminals, causes 
of criminality, and punishment. The definition of crime and the pur-
poses of punishment have been and remain culturally and histori-
cally contingent. Relevant definitions are offered by the American 
Prison Association, which reaffirmed in 1930 the first of the prin-
ciples included in its Declaration: that crime “inflicts an injury upon 
others,” that criminality is determined by “competent courts,” and 
that punishment is “suffering” designed for the purpose of “reforma-
tion.”10 The condition of criminality is treated through punishment 
intended to reform, to remake the criminal. However, which acts 
are considered criminal and the strategies of improvement vary in 
place and time. For instance, a variety of policy changes in the New 
Deal era of the 1930s was a culmination of Progressive efforts and 
addressed the matter of reformation, including education, paid labor, 
psychological classification and treatment, and parole programs. Such 
strategies of rehabilitation came under sharp scorn in Faulkner’s own 
Mississippi, and one newspaper, the Daily Clarion-Ledger, claimed in a 
1934 editorial that it was “dangerous for society to fall into the error 
that science can, through a little remodeling, make model citizens of 
all hardened criminals.”11 None of these five of Faulkner’s criminals 
is remodeled; rather than reformed, made anew, they are destroyed in 
their death sentences. However, their deaths and the paths to those 
ends are not the same; the changes are criminality’s causes and pun-
ishments, and the social responsibility for them.
 The narratives of all three novels are determined largely by violent 
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crime, and the commission, discovery, and punishment of those crimes 
serve as the points of gravity around which Faulkner’s trademark style 
of narrative loops in whorls until it circles back to tell and retell events 
that, chronologically, occur before. Sanctuary builds in tension until 
Popeye murders Tommy and rapes Temple Drake, for which Goodwin 
is accused; Horace Benbow, in defending Goodwin, tracks Temple to a 
Memphis whorehouse, where Popeye has confined her. Temple falsely 
accuses Goodwin, who thereafter is lynched, while Popeye vanishes 
only to reappear and be tried, convicted, and executed because of 
his tacit admission to a murder he did not actually commit. In Light 
in August, Joe Christmas’s childhood memory of a sexual scene is 
linked through the racial epithet nigger to his ambiguous race. Those 
associations bind sexuality and racial violence for him until he finally 
kills Joanna Burden—who has run the gamut from rape victim to 
lover—and is later indicted and escapes, before finally being shot and 
castrated by a deputy of the posse.
 Chronologically speaking, Go Down, Moses begins with Carothers 
McCaslin’s rape of the slave Eunice and then their daughter, Toma-
sina, a genealogy extending through that patriarch’s white sons’ pur-
suit and capture of the escaped slave who is their half brother, which 
leads to the marriages that perpetuate black and white McCaslins 
both. Those raced and entwined genealogies provide much of the 
shape possessed by the baggy monster of a novel. The narrative outline 
of Go Down, Moses is cast in sharper relief in noting its two ends. 
First, in the penultimate section of “Delta Autumn,” the sins of the 
father, incest and miscegenation, are renewed in Roth Edmonds’s son 
borne by his distant relation, she by four generations and he by five 
removed from Carothers McCaslin, the all-father. The second finish is 
the execution, in the titular chapter, of Butch, a son four generations 
after McCaslin, though his is a genealogical dead end. It is also an 
official death in counterpoint to Rider’s lynching at the midpoint of 
the novel. The narrative ends of Goodwin, Popeye, Christmas, Rider, 
and Butch are deaths brought about by combinations of criminality, 
blackness, and sexual violence. Goodwin offers the exception prov-
ing the rule, a rare to the point of unique representation of the 
lynching of a white man in the twentieth century. The crimes and 
punishments of Christmas, Rider, and Butch Beauchamp link directly 
to their race, and Goodwin and Christmas are accused of rape, result-
ing in their sexual mutilation. Lynch mobs kill Goodwin and Rider, 
in contrast with the judicially sanctioned deaths of Popeye and 
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Beauchamp. Christmas’s castration and death at the hands of ad hoc 
deputy Percy Grimm falls between lynching and execution.
 Juries sentence Goodwin, Popeye, Christmas, Rider, and Butch, 
or Faulkner describes such verdicts as foregone conclusions. Good-
win’s and Popeye’s respective juries each deliberate just eight minutes 
before returning with convictions. For Christmas, the “Grand Jury 
was preparing behind locked doors to take the life of a man whom 
few of them had ever seen to know.”12 Rider’s lynching is a given 
to the deputy sheriff (and deputy narrator) of the second half of 
“Pantaloon in Black,” even before the jailbreak, and news of Butch’s 
impending execution is carried on the newswire. Indeed, incarcera-
tion in Faulkner’s fiction at first seems anachronistic, as cells, in all 
of these cases, serve only to hold prisoners until their punishment, 
rather than the confinement serving as the punishment itself.
 That is, pre-Revolutionary practices housed prisoners in jails to 
await their public and bodily punishment. Enlightenment arguments 
offered in Europe by Cesare Becarria and in the United States by 
Benjamin Rush shifted bodily punishment at the end of the eigh-
teenth century to the containment, concealment, and control of 
imprisonment, a shift Foucault famously describes as the shift from 
punishment to discipline. But the incarceration in the cases of all five 
of these characters is only a brief period before their deaths by execu-
tion or lynching. Regarding these two practices, Faulkner, in his let-
ters—belles and otherwise—does not always significantly differentiate 
between the acts of mobs and juries. In a 1931 letter to the Memphis 
Commercial-Appeal, for instance, he suggests that “both had a way of 
being right.”13 The mutual legitimacy Faulkner offers in that letter is 
at odds with the negative view of lynching in his short story “Dry 
September,” written the same year, or with Light in August a year later. 
The attributed rightness of mob and jury is one that should trouble 
readers of Faulkner, but their relation in the South is a matter of 
historical record.
 The seeming anachronism of punishment in these Faulkner nov-
els as well as Faulkner’s dangerous equation of mob and jury reflect 
related matters of criminality and race in early-twentieth-century 
punishment in the South in general and Mississippi in particular. 
First, the public spectacle of lynching perpetuated the visibility of 
officially conducted bodily mutilation and execution that were more 
common of eighteenth-century punishment practices continuing 
until the Civil War. In addition, branding and other maiming for 
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both white and black criminals, even for minor crimes, continued in 
Mississippi decades past the national norm.14 The overdue revisions 
to Mississippi’s criminal code in 1835 did not protect slaves, and 
postbellum racial tensions perpetuated violence against black men 
and women, particularly with the end of Reconstruction. Lynching 
decreased by the 1930s, during which time executions ceased being 
public, and states assumed the responsibility for executions from cities 
and counties. However, given the identical statistics of lynching and 
the execution of black men in the case of rape, the latter practice may 
have perpetuated the practices of the former, contributing to the high 
rates of execution in Southern states.
 The statistical parallel between lynching and official execution is 
not the only correlation between the two. Law enforcement officials 
in the South regularly abetted lynch mobs, whether directly, by hand-
ing over victims, or indirectly, by providing insufficient protection 
for prisoners. Such complicity drew national scrutiny after the 1906 
lynching of Ed Johnson in Chattanooga, Tennessee. Three years later, 
the U.S. Supreme Court determined that law enforcement officers 
had insufficiently protected Johnson. The court initiated the only 
criminal trial in its history to find the sheriff and two deputies guilty 
of contempt of court in United States v. Shipp (1909). Still, Congress’s 
failure to pass the Costigan-Wagner Act in 1935, which would have 
made such complicity a federal crime, resulted from the opposition 
of Southern states. The blocking of Costigan-Wagner demonstrates 
the embedment of lynching in Southern culture in the 1930s, thus 
establishing the basis for it to inform official execution practices as 
conducted by state governments. For example, a Mississippi sheriff 
initially appointed a rape victim’s father as hangman in a 1934 case, a 
trial where the jury debated all of seven minutes.15 The eight-minute 
juries of both Goodwin and Popeye in Sanctuary seem eerily prescient 
of that incident. The supervisor of the U.S. Probation System in 1930 
could address the American Prison Association and “rejoice that their 
day of activity is 1930, rather than 1830, that vengeance of the state, 
of retribution, has largely given way to correctional ideals.”16 How-
ever, the APA from 1870 to 1930 largely featured Northeast mem-
bership, and those ideals did not necessarily extend to the South, to 
Faulkner’s Mississippi.
 What this means for Faulkner’s fiction is a reappraisal of dis-
tinctions between lynching and execution, and a treatment of the 
sensational and violently retributive cases of Goodwin, Popeye, and 
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Christmas as less exceptional than representative. Goodwin’s convic-
tion in Sanctuary includes District Attorney Eustace Graham’s clos-
ing argument in court in favor of lynching, to which Goodwin’s 
defender, Horace Benbow, objects and which the judge sustains; in 
the end, the townspeople have their will done. In like fashion, Percy 
Grimm is at once deputy and knife-wielding mob member. The 
blurring between the punishments, coupled with Faulkner’s 1931 let-
ter to the Memphis paper equating juries and mobs, offers them a 
mutual legitimacy in his writing of the early 1930s, an equation 
that Faulkner no longer found tenable a decade later. In place of 
a lawyer’s argument for lynching in court or a deputy castrating a 
criminal, there is a sharp divorce between mob violence and jurispru-
dential decision in Go Down, Moses, between the tragedy of Rider’s 
lynching in “Pantaloon in Black,” offered in an ironic register at the 
novel’s center, and Butch’s execution at the end.
 The shared narrative closures of jurisprudential decision and con-
sequent violent deaths among these novels suggest their comparison, 
but the most interest lies in the differences among their criminals, 
their origins and executions, and the difference those differences make. 
Also, with regard to race, the virtual equation of black masculinity 
with criminality—an equation by no means Faulkner’s alone and one 
of the most pernicious in U.S. history—is not effaced in the later 
work, but their relationship is more complicated than in the earlier 
novels. Indeed, with its setting, which spans from 1840 to 1940, Go 
Down, Moses implies in its narrative trajectory that twentieth-century 
incarceration is the inexorable conclusion of slavery and of jim crow 
thereafter, and that it is thus an explicitly racial practice. While more 
of Sanctuary likely takes place in jail than any other of Faulkner’s 
novels, possibly surpassed only by Intruder in the Dust, imprisonment 
in Sanctuary serves more as a gothic set piece rather than a culminat-
ing thematic force, as it does in Go Down, Moses. The latter novel, 
with its sprawling historical setting and at times only tenuously linked 
characters, has as one of its most central narrative drives the critical 
representation of the enslavement and imprisonment of its black char-
acters. Tomey’s Turl as a slave in “Was” gives way to Lucas Beauchamp, 
who twice considers reaping cotton not on the Edmondses’ planta-
tion but in the prison fields of Parchman Farm,17 followed by Rider 
and his incarceration and lynching; the novel concludes with Butch 
Beauchamp and his seemingly inevitable execution. Faulkner breaks 
from the bleak certainty of that narrative trajectory in the final coda, 
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when the white male business community takes financial responsibil-
ity for Butch’s funeral and the entire town of Jefferson assembles to 
witness his return.
“This Modern Trend” of Crime—
and Psychoanalysis
To return to Sanctuary, the first of the novels for which crime and 
punishment are so crucial: Faulkner’s depiction of Popeye’s impotence 
and the symbolic substitution of his sexuality take on explicitly Freud-
ian implications numerous times, not the least of which is Temple 
stealing his pistol or repeatedly calling him “daddy.”18 Indeed, their 
sexual relationship, such as it is, mediated by Red though orchestrated 
by Popeye, at times seems not only derivative from but also a parody 
of Freudian myths of erotic neuroses. With Popeye’s whinnying like 
a horse in his voyeurism, he is a gelding to go alongside the Rat 
Man, the Wolf Man, and the rest of the mythological zoo of sexual 
disorders. Psychoanalytic readings are pervasive in the criticism of 
Sanctuary and in accounts of Popeye, Temple, and Horace and Nar-
cissa Benbow. Given the name of the last, Freud’s accounts of narcis-
sism, the repeated motif of mirrors throughout the novel, and Lacan’s 
claim of mirroring in identity formation,19 it is not difficult to see 
why psychoanalysis has proven so pervasive.
 However, most relevant to the matter of criminality and causality 
at hand is the coda that takes place in the final chapter, the trial, after 
Goodwin’s lynching. Popeye’s arrest for killing a policeman, when 
he was instead shooting Red, immediately gives way to his unre-
membered infancy: his mother’s courtship, marriage, abandonment, 
and disease; Popeye’s own near murder as an infant; his sickness, 
curtailed sexual development, and homicidal tendencies even as a 
child.20 Framed as it is between his arrest and trial seven pages later, 
it is difficult not to read that curt life story as an explanatory cause, 
what Guest describes as a diagnostic biography and what prison offi-
cials at the time sought in a case record, retroactively tracing crime 
to early biography: “A case record should reveal a man’s very soul,” 
the criminal type determined in “the individual’s life history.”21 In 
the case of Popeye, the coda offers a causal narrative for the crime he 
actually committed (the murder of Red) to balance his execution for 
the crime of which he is innocent (the murder of the policeman).
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 Faulkner claims in the introduction to the 1932 Modern Library 
edition of Sanctuary that his mercenary writing process for the novel 
deliberately catered to his imagined audience, “what a person in 
Mississippi would believe to be current trends.”22 Among those “cur-
rent trends” Faulkner sought to exploit are criminality and its psycho- 
logical cause. The pulp detective fiction of the 1920s as well as films 
such as Alfred Hitchcock’s Blackmail (1929) and Murder! (1930) may 
have been some of the crime fiction Faulkner surveyed, and he was not 
the only one viewing that cultural landscape. APA President George 
C. Erksine began his presidential address of the 1929 annual congress 
by pointing out the centrality of crime in the cultural imagination: 
“The morning paper, the table of contents of the current magazines, 
a casual glance at the shelves of any book store [ . . . ] all bear wit-
ness to this modern trend.”23 Erksine’s “modern trend” of the perva-
siveness of criminality’s representation was likely one of the several 
“current trends” to which Faulkner refers; psychological analysis is 
another. Erksine closes his address with an emphasis on the neces-
sity of psychologically profiling criminals,24 and five of the forty-two 
papers presented during the general session of the 1929 conference 
focus specifically on psychological approaches to criminology with 
an emphasis on childhood experience.
 The approaches endorsed by the APA less resemble Freudian 
emphases on the unconscious and sexuality than they do the indi-
vidual personality development described by Alfred Adler, who split 
from Freud and his approach in 1907. One indicator of that associa-
tion appears in the discussion following a paper, given at the 1930 
APA congress, that treats criminality largely as a psychological dis-
order, prompting an anxious questioner to suggest that the profiling 
described in that presentation might give a prisoner “a real inferiority 
complex.”25 That complex is a misreading of Adler’s theory of self-
assertion, though that slip, as well as the confusion between Adler’s 
and Freud’s approaches, was common at the time. A 1925 New York 
Times article archly suggests that the psychological disorders “Freud-
ians attribute to repressed sex impulse, Adler attributes to a deficiency 
in the mechanism of self-assertion to the ‘inferiority complex,’ which 
today is on the tongue of thousands who have no idea of what they 
are talking about.”26
 So “a person in Mississippi,” or the larger audience that Faulkner 
knew, believed, and hoped to gain, might have difficulty sorting 
between schools of psychoanalysis that developed through the late 
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1920s, notably with the publication of Freud’s Civilization and Its 
Discontents and Adler’s The Case of Miss R: The Interpretation of a Life 
Story (1929)27 in the years immediately preceding the release of Sanc-
tuary. Psychoanalysis as part of the texture of culture at the time thus 
informs the diagnostic narrative Faulkner offers, and Popeye’s seems 
particularly Freudian. The character’s infancy and impotence are a 
sum of the primacy of preconscious sexual development and anatomy 
as destiny, the two Freudian maxims of psychoanalytic subject forma-
tion. The explanation of Popeye’s criminality narratively follows the 
crime, much as psychoanalysis retroactively locates original cause as 
secreted in unconscious memory. Still, given the almost tacked-on 
nature of Popeye’s biographical vignette, it seems possible to read it as 
Faulkner’s capitulation to a model of behavior he did not believe, but 
for which he did not have an alternative. Not until Go Down, Moses 
would he develop a social and cultural genealogy for subject forma-
tion as an alternative to a repressed personal history based largely on 
sexuality.
 Though Faulkner expands the sophistication of character in 
Light in August compared to Sanctuary, Christmas’s crime and thus 
his subsequent execution, like Popeye’s, has an explanatory narrative, 
an original cause in the primal scene. Whereas Popeye’s arrest trig-
gers his Freudian coda, the return to Christmas’s childhood occurs 
immediately after he begins walking to the house of Joanna Burden, 
where he will kill her. The recollection of the primal scene, written 
through with the obligatory guilt, even opens with a fair descrip-
tion of the operation of a Freudian unconscious: “Memory believes 
before knowing remembers. Believes longer than recollects, longer 
than knowing even wonders. Knows remembers believes.”28 That 
introduction gives way directly to the description of the orphanage, 
the setting of both his theft of toothpaste and his observation of the 
dietitian and Charlie’s sexual encounter, the origin of Christmas’s 
guilt, guilt which is subsequently tied to Christmas’s race when the 
dietitian names him “nigger bastard” to end the scene.29 That moment 
is easily read as simultaneously one of birth and one of entry into 
the social (symbolic) order, albeit an order of violence, sexuality, and 
racism. Upon Christmas’s declaration, “here I am”—his first speech 
offered as a child—to interrupt their intercourse, the dietitian drags 
him “violently out of his vomit” to name him.
 That moment lays the basis for the subsequent hundred-plus pages 
accounting for Christmas’s battles with that misplaced guilt, not the 
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shorthand diagnostic biography of Popeye, but one still chronicling 
both his youth and his crucial violent acts: first, beating the black 
prostitute in the shed, and second, felling his father. The first stages 
again the primal scene, and in case readers miss the association of 
sexual maneuvers in the dark, Faulkner provides Christmas’s recol-
lection in that shed upon seeing the woman—“There was something 
in him trying to get out, like when he had used to think of tooth-
paste.”30 Whatever Christmas knows, remembers, or believes of sex 
is bound with that originary moment, his entry to a raced and gen-
dered symbolic that names him “nigger bastard,” and links sex with 
blackness and violence. That first criminal violence against women 
rises with Bobbie, escalates further with another prostitute beaten 
nearly to death, and culminates in the murder of Joanna Burden.
 Like the personal history that scripts the beginning of Popeye’s 
criminality and narratively appears as the basis for his end, Christmas’s 
origins direct him to his death, though the strictly Freudian struc-
ture of the former gives way in the latter to one best understood 
through a combination of Freud and Lacan. His witness of the pri-
mal scene enters him into the symbolic order, the “here I am” of 
linguistic participation in a world beyond himself. Those Lacanian 
associations increase when he strikes the adopted parent McEachern 
at the dance hall. The oedipal violence of vanquishing the father 
ceases to be entirely literal and shifts to the symbolic. In assailing 
the elder McEachern with the chair, Christmas commits the “Shalt 
Not,”31 striking down the literal father, a scene Faulkner casts in the 
terms of the name-of-the-father in gesturing to the Ten Command-
ments. Light in August later repeats the scene of railing against the 
Father, down to the detail of wielding furniture, when Christmas 
suspends his own ambiguous escape to interrupt a revival hymnal to 
preach blasphemy from the pulpit, brandishing a bench leg.32 Whereas 
Popeye’s criminal psyche seems not entirely satisfactory—but either 
the best Faulkner could offer or what he considered his audience to 
expect—Christmas offers a much more complex figure in terms of 
his violence and its constituent causes. Still, a symbolic narrative larger 
than the self collapses back to the individual, the personal guilt of 
witnessing the primal scene. Faulkner returns to that admission for the 
adult Christmas, when he stops running and says to himself, “Here 
I am.”33 The recognition of self surrenders to consequence, and its 
verbatim repetition links the two moments, tracing his punishment 
back through his personal history to his emergent consciousness.
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 Christmas’s history is personal, its deployment determined, a chain 
of events tracking back through dysfunctional and racial sexual rela-
tionships, to an abusive father, to an unpunished theft of toothpaste. 
In that originary moment Faulkner seems again to almost parody a 
psychoanalytic subject, a psyche unable to abandon the burden of 
unconscious guilt. That sense of self is entirely singular, determined 
by the circumstances shaping Christmas’s character, the rich descrip-
tion taking place largely between the definition of the unconscious—
“Memory believes before knowing remembers”—and Bobbie’s “that 
will do,” which halts Christmas’s beating, a command half-heard as he 
fades into unconsciousness.34 I am not suggesting that the development 
of Christmas’s character takes place outside of history, for the racing 
and gendering of the sexual violence that are the beginning and the 
end of his criminality are matters of social difference and its powerful 
inscription. Instead, it is a matter of emphasis on the relationship 
between subject and history—in effect, the location of agency. One 
of Light in August’s many narrators, Gavin Stevens, describes one of its 
other storytellers, Christmas’s grandmother Mrs. Hines, as narrating in 
terms that “had already been written and worded for her.”35 Stevens 
describes Christmas’s criminality in a similarly determined manner, 
criminality defined by his incarceration, itself built from “whatever 
crimes had molded him and shaped him and left him at last high and 
dry in a barred cell.”36 According to Stevens, the criminal is what 
events have made him.
 These are two different sorts of determination, one of scripted 
events as foregone conclusions, the other as the sort of naturalism 
Richard Wright would employ eight years later in Native Son, a 
comparison Eric J. Sundquist makes as well in Faulkner: The House 
Divided. That sort of naturalist determination of criminality is also 
expressed by Howard A. McDonnell a year after the publication of 
Wright’s novel. McDonnell, a state representative in 1941, suggested 
in a speech in the Mississippi House of Representatives that “crime 
and criminals are the natural results of a given cause.”37 Still, regard-
less of whether narrative events are treated as scripted (“written and 
worded”) or as determined by environmental conditions, both sharply 
curtail agency. Such agency, or personal choice in a given circum-
stance, regularly serves as the axis between the determining forces of 
heredity and environment at the 1929 and 1930 APA conferences.38 
However, what those forces of heredity and environment might be, 
specifically, remains unspoken in the discussions, and the question of 
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race is not raised. Indeed, the proceedings of the annual congress from 
1929 to 1932 never substantively mention race, and a census of pris-
oners provided in the 1929 report makes no mention of it either.39
 The history not recorded there is imagined in Faulkner’s writing. 
For Christmas, the fundamental indeterminate determination is racial 
difference, and blackness in the novel is regularly associated with 
criminality. At one point in Light in August, the accusation of black-
ness is worse than that of murder. When Lucas Burch/Brown tells 
the marshal that Christmas is “a nigger,” the officer responds, “You 
had better be careful what you are saying if it is a white man you are 
talking about [ . . . ] I dont care if he is a murderer or not.”40 To the 
sheriff, being called a “nigger” is imagined as worse than being a 
murderer. Such logic reads in reverse as well, that to be black is to 
be automatically a criminal, the ruthless irrational logic of racism in 
early-twentieth-century Mississippi. One white local told a visitor in 
1908, “When there is a row, we feel like killing a nigger whether he 
has done anything or not.”41 Punishment does not actually require a 
crime when blackness and criminality are not separable in the cultural 
imagination of the early-twentieth-century South. To the townspeo-
ple of Jefferson, the two compound one another. Hearing of Burden’s 
death, they “believed aloud that it was an anonymous negro crime 
committed not by a negro but by Negro and who knew, believed, and 
hoped that she had been ravished too” (emphasis added).42 Like the 
description of Christmas’s unconscious, which “knows remembers 
believes” half-truths of Christmas’s race and original sin, the town is 
of one mind and “knew, believed, and hoped” murder to be explicitly 
racial and sexualized.
 Crucial to the town’s unconscious, then, is the fantasy of a black 
man’s rape of a white woman, an imagined event that inextrica-
bly binds lynching and execution even as it conceals the historical 
actuality of white male slave owners raping black women. Light in 
August reveals the former while leaving the latter unspoken, and so 
it largely remains in Faulkner’s writing until Absalom, Absalom! and 
to a far greater extent in Go Down, Moses. Light in August sees the 
imagined unity in blood vengeance fulfilled in Christmas’s execution 
on Grimm’s terms, directly hailing that fantasy: “Now you’ll let white 
women alone, even in hell.” It is toward this end that Christmas walks 
with an inevitability pervasive in the novel.43
 He leaves the scene of Burden’s murder, “moving from his feet 
upward as death moves,” and thereafter sees, according to Stevens, 
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“an incipient executioner everywhere he look[s].”44 Given how any 
passersby might join a lynch mob, Christmas very well might see in 
any face a potential executioner. He perceives his position as held in 
tension between acted upon and acting (“Something is going to happen 
to me. I am going to do something”) before Burden’s death, and walks 
as if surrounded by executioners thereafter, but the killing is not the 
crux. Directly before the death drive of walking toward execution, he 
thinks, “‘I have never got outside that circle. I have never broken out 
of the ring of what I have already done and cannot ever undo.’”45 In 
fine modernist fashion, he is a circle enclosed on the outside. By race, 
deed, and name, he is the simultaneous capitulation and resistance to 
what other people have called him: “nigger,” Christian, McEachern. 
He repudiates the name of the father even as he assumes the impla-
cable ruthless violence that defines his adopted parent, the aggression 
that colors his sexual behavior. In the last instance, he returns to the 
beginning, as circles do, in the repetition of “here I am” that binds 
the commission of murder with the originary moment, in which the 
perceived crime of toothpaste theft remains inextricable from the 
observation of the primal scene.
 Like the issue of his race, Christmas’s death as lynching or execu-
tion maintains the ambiguity, the resolute tension of both-and. Rather 
than strictly the fulfillment of either the death wish of the con-
demned or the capricious cruelty of an omnipotent opponent, Christ-
mas’s execution ends for him—if not for the community—the play 
of tensions, of ambiguities of character and action. The uncertainty 
of his blackness and parenthood occupy the central ambiguity of a 
character encased in nonabsolutes. Is he black or white? Was Joanna’s 
death murder or self-defense? Is his death an execution or a lynch-
ing? For Faulkner too there is that unknowability, the complex and 
contradictory senses of race, crime, and justice. Nowhere is that “is–is 
not” of the riven self made more clear than in the writer’s equation 
of lynch mobs with juries in his belief that both “have a way of being 
right” from the letter cited earlier and printed a year before Light in 
August.
 There is no such rightness in Christmas’s death and mutilation, 
committed with sufficient savagery to see one would-be executioner 
vomit, another circular return at the character’s death to the vomit 
of his primal scene. Faulkner offers the violence as tragic, then tran-
scendent, in the dying Christmas, a romantic assumption wherein the 
character ascends bodily into the community’s memory:
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[Christmas] seemed to rise soaring into their memories forever and 
ever. They are not to lose it, in whatever peaceful valleys, beside 
whatever placid and reassuring streams of old age, in the mirror-
ing faces of whatever children they will contemplate old disasters 
and newer hopes. It will be there, musing, quiet, steadfast, not fad-
ing and not particularly threatful, but of itself alone serene, of itself 
alone triumphant. Again from the town, deadened a little by its walls, 
the scream of the siren mounted toward its unbelievable crescendo,  
passing out of the realm of hearing.46
Christmas’s end in Light in August is the first of its three closures, 
the other two being those of the Reverend Hightower and Lena 
Grove. The ironic romanticism of contest with a sportive God of 
Christmas’s last pages turns to the linguistic redemption of romantic 
style. The nameless, omniscient narrator foretells the future, knows 
the townspeople’s memories, present and future, “for ever and ever.” 
Christmas’s ghost somehow looms in Jefferson’s shared memory, for-
ever harmless, calm, and somehow victorious. My repeated “some-
how” draws attention to the indefinite quality of this description, 
the “seemed,” the three-times-repeated “whatever” of valleys, streams, 
and children in a town whose courthouses, churches, and jails disap-
pear in this imagined future of natural and transcendental imagery: 
“streams of old age” where time is a river in which one might fish. 
The indefinite description makes that future history as inevitable, 
impotent, and all too late as the siren’s scream, which is “unbeliev-
able” and fades to silence. The possibility for romantic redemption is 
worn-out, but it lacks a substitute. Similarly exhausted but without 
alternative is a psychoanalytic model of character, the cause of crimi-
nality and its attendant incarceration and execution in Sanctuary and 
Light in August.
Invoking Jefferson’s “Corporate Limit”
Ten years later, in Go Down, Moses, Faulkner repudiated that model of 
criminality and, by extension, subject formation. There are similarities 
across the characterizations of Popeye, Christmas, and Beauchamp, 
who as criminals all play the role of the stereotypical gangster, the 
hardman. In Sentenced to Death, Guest describes the characterization 
of the “hardened convict, or criminal ‘hardman’ [ . . . ] a cold-blooded, 
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unpredictable, and violent persona.”47 These are the definitive mascu-
line traits of invulnerability, mastery, and activity. Christmas reproduces 
Popeye’s gangster caricature nearly to the last detail, with his sloping 
hat and drooping cigarette, his casual violence and more casual crime 
of selling liquor, and the rumors of business with a gun in Memphis. 
In Go Down, Moses, Butch is literally hard, his face “impenetrable,” 
his hair “lacquered” and head “bronze,” his name “Butch” a parody 
of masculinity, and he answers the census-taker question about what 
will happen to his corpse with the words of the hardman: “What will 
that matter to me?”48 The hardman does not resist his death sentence 
but, according to Guest, “accepts it and seems to welcome death.”49 
Like Christmas, Butch plays the hardman.
 However, their means of each becoming that way differs dramati-
cally between the novels. Instead of personal history as the first cause 
of criminality—the sum of determining forces embodied in a single 
life but nevertheless traceable to an originating moment—Faulkner 
creates a larger social frame, history as the tracing backward of gene-
alogy. Whereas Quentin Compson cuts his psychology class in The 
Sound and the Fury in order to play his own analysand in the talk-
ing cure of stream of consciousness narrative, the schooling offered 
by Cass and Ike at the heart of “The Bear” is history. They read the 
records of the ledgers to envision and revise a narrative of their fam-
ily and, by extension, the South. Go Down, Moses ends as the original 
text of Sanctuary opens; in the drafts prior to its final publication, 
Sanctuary began with a black man accused of murder awaiting his 
execution. Butch, like Popeye, is condemned for the murder of a 
policeman. Popeye offers no defense, and Butch does not offer much 
of one either, though what he says of himself is at least true of Popeye: 
“It was another guy killed the cop.”50 The substitution of accusation 
for actuality in the case of Popeye is a sheer unknown for Butch, for 
readers are never sure whether Butch did in fact kill anyone. That 
ambiguity features in Christmas’s crime as well, as his murder of Bur-
den is at least partly self-defense. Nevertheless, while their respective 
narratives leave undecided, or at least problematic, the question of 
agency in the commission of crime, all three characters are named as 
criminals in courts, which the APA’s first principle defines as separate 
from the commission of crime.
 The novels themselves cannot fully resolve that uncertainty, as the 
moments of the crimes do not appear in the narrative; with regard 
to punishment, only Christmas’s death takes place in the story. The 
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narration of Popeye’s execution stops just short of his actual death, as 
the sheriff opens the trapdoor of the hanging scaffold, and the descrip-
tion does not as closely approach Butch’s end. Readers encounter 
him in his cell the day before his execution and then afterward, as 
his casket arrives in Jefferson. Most important, though, is the lack of 
an explanatory personal history for Butch’s criminality. The explana-
tion of biography offered for Popeye and Christmas lacks a parallel 
in the case of Butch, one end of the McCaslin genealogy. Like Edgar 
Allan Poe’s Fortunato, Beauchamp arrives only to be sealed away 
behind walls, to his death, for reasons obscure and unavailable. The 
little that readers do know of Beauchamp’s past they know through 
District Attorney Stevens’s remembered reading of the “papers of that 
business,” the authoritative discourse that scripts the condemned man 
as “some seed not only violent but dangerous and bad.”51 However, 
that narrative explanation is not the only one available, and the reader 
possesses the preceding episodes of the novel, also “papers of that 
business,” which offer a competing narrative, an entire other dis-
course. That narrative, with its chronicle of miscegenation and sexual 
violence, of tangled or misplaced desires, writes a history of character 
thematically similar to Christmas’s: raced and gendered violence shap-
ing the acts that make the criminal, the prisoner. However, Butch’s 
story is different in terms of scope, and he is claimed by a social body 
extending beyond his own skin.
 I am highlighting distinctions of individual and social subjects 
and their histories as well as distinctions between atomistic and social 
senses of selfhood, because the process of individuation is one means 
by which institutional forces such as incarceration function. Discus-
sions at the annual APA meetings were rife with the aim of indi-
vidualization: “We must learn to individualize”; “Throughout our 
prisons we need individualization.”52 That repeated imperative seems 
most often to refer to treating prisoners either, in humanist fashion, 
as unique individuals, or, in line with Adler, as the products of their 
respective personal histories. However, there is a less-favorable read-
ing available that more closely resembles the Foucauldian prisoner, 
the disciplined subject. Individuals and the means of their produc-
tion are framed in two specific claims made at the APA conference 
at moments contemporaneous to the publications of Light in August 
and Go Down, Moses. One member, Maud Ballington Booth, was 
in 1932 a sufficiently prominent Volunteer of America and member 
of the APA to the extent that she received a standing ovation in 
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introducing another speaker later in the conference,53 and years later 
had a service award named in her honor. In her presentation, “Indi-
vidualization in Prisons,” she describes the means of making prisoners 
into individuals in terms of work and emotion. They should per-
form hard labor, she argues, to earn personal, congratulatory attention 
from wardens and officers. She suggests that the discipline of such 
work and its rote affective response will transform convicts into sol-
diers, prepared so that upon leaving prison, “they go out into the 
world and they take up that burden and they fight that battle.”54 
Recognition as reward purposed to further good works sutures the 
rhetoric of hailed individuality—Althusser’s “hey, you there!”—to 
the Victorian hymn “Onward Christian Soldiers,” made popular as a 
marching tune in the early twentieth century.
 Ten years after Booth’s speech, the rhetoric of war became tenu-
ous in the context of actual overseas battles, and required revision. 
The 1942 APA conference proceedings include much commentary on 
the role of the prison system in wartime. One lecture in particular 
focuses on military service and the psychopathology of criminality 
and determines that some released, paroled, or even current prisoners 
may be drafted for military service—such as is the case of Lee Good-
win’s service in World War I in Sanctuary. However, the contention 
is that those with long records of even minor criminality must not 
serve. Even if such a person has only a single and minor conviction, a 
long arrest record (even without conviction) demonstrates “a wholly 
undesirable fellow,” a psychopath, discipline problem, or gangster.55 
Given that a record of arrest rather than conviction determines the 
nature of such a prisoner, the truth of guilt is legislated not by the 
judicial system but, rather, by the police, the prison board, and the 
Selective Service. Such a practice is the sort Foucault critiques in 
his analysis of a prison system that continues surveillance of released 
prisoners and “pursues as a ‘delinquent’ someone who has acquitted 
himself as an offender.”56 The surveillance of records thus produces 
the psychopath and gangster through the selective reading of criminal 
history. The armed forces cannot draft such a man, because he already 
is a soldier, one at war with the United States.
 For governing bodies to interpret criminals as being at war with 
the United States effectively legitimizes violence against them. One 
defining principle of a nation-state is its right to the enactment of 
violence; such is the legality of war. Imprisonment—the forcible 
incarceration of a citizen or a population—demonstrates one means 
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by which a nation-state wages war on its own people, and execution 
demonstrates the most severe expression of that war. Isolating inmates 
demonstrates the military strategy of defeat in detail, where an army 
beset by a superior number isolates one component of that force 
to develop localized superiority. There is a race-based precedent for 
this dating back to the eighteenth century, when Boston Selectmen 
proclaimed, “If more than two Indians, Negroes or Mulatto servants 
or slaves were to be found in the streets or highways [ . . . ] every 
one so found shall be punished at the House of Correction.”57 The 
eighteenth-century ruling is one of white racist hysteria manifesting 
itself in the refusal to allow (even to the extent of criminalizing) any 
social body distinct from its own whiteness.
 The military metaphor of divide and conquer seems particularly 
apt in the case of incarceration, given the understanding that defeat 
in detail, when applied to prisons, presumes at some level the superior 
numbers of criminals—which is true inside prisons, where there are 
proportionally fewer correctional officers and administration. In the 
South of the early twentieth century, those numbers were similarly 
disproportionate, and Faulkner’s account of Yoknapatawpha County’s 
population as “Whites, 6298; Negroes, 9313,” in the map included 
in the first edition of Absalom, Absalom!, speaks to actual population 
disparities in Mississippi. Jim crow–era laws, through such ill-defined 
“crimes” as mischief and loitering, effectively criminalized blackness. 
Criminalization and incarceration therefore function as a strategy of 
racial containment; individuation demonstrates the fullest extent of 
that detail,58 and execution is the grimmest defeat. Prisons defeat in 
detail through isolation, producing individuals in order to overcome 
them, and the death penalty does so absolutely. Such individuation, 
then, favors biographical first causes and the personal histories of 
Popeye and Christmas.
 Go Down, Moses, however, presents a different case. Instead of a 
personal story as diagnostic biography, a social and genealogical his-
tory is the only explanation readers have for Butch’s criminality and 
execution. At one point in Light in August, Gavin Stevens suggests that 
Christmas literally embodies the conflict of black blood and white 
blood. The conflict between black and white blood ending in Butch 
is staged not in his singular body, but in the sequence of battles per-
petuated through the book—the incest and miscegenation that make 
the book and Butch (the text and the character both) end in death 
row and the return to Jefferson. The contests of black and white 
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blood begin with Carothers McCaslin’s presumed rape of Eunice and 
their daughter, Tomasina, and continue in her son, Tomey’s Turl, flee-
ing from his half brothers and dealing the cards to Hubert Beauchamp. 
The blood feud carries on in Lucas’s violent physical contest with 
Zack and battle of wits with Roth thereafter, the same Roth who sees 
Butch leave Jefferson. Butch lacks a personal diagnostic biography, but 
his genealogy locates him as having emerged from a history of racial 
violence.
 At first glance, Christmas and Butch, their deaths, and the histories 
that precede them all seem quite different. Readers have substantial 
access to Christmas’s thoughts, actions, and perceptions leading up to 
his crime and following it, and we have a fairly clear sense of Joanna 
Burden’s death. Beauchamp remains a cipher, his story brief, the mur-
dered policeman unknown, and Butch’s own culpability for the crime 
far less known than Christmas’s. Also, Faulkner renders Christmas’s 
execution at the hands of a single rogue deputy in horrific detail, 
while the scene of Beauchamp’s death by anonymous penitentiary 
officials is textually absent. Christmas’s personal history, which much 
of the novel comprises, offers the forces of race, childhood experi-
ence, and circumstance to shape the hand that holds the razor. Since 
we know virtually nothing of Samuel Worsham Beauchamp’s narra-
tive, it is neither Sanctuary’s brief interlude of Freudian coda nor Light 
in August’s lengthier description of Christmas’s upbringing, but the 
acts of generations scripting his end. However, despite the differences 
between the streams of action that lead to the executions, and to the 
wake that follows each, Faulkner includes textual cues that suggest and 
even demand a paired reading, particularly in the dual appearances of 
District Attorney Gavin Stevens.
 Stevens appears at the close of each novel as a sort of psycho-
pomp, shepherd of the dead and arranger of funerals. In each case, 
he negotiates with the condemned men’s grandmothers to make sense 
of the raced deaths of their grandsons. In Light in August, Stevens is 
the “District Attorney, a Harvard graduate, a Phi Beta Kappa: a tall, 
loosejointed man with a constant cob pipe, with an untidy mop of 
irongray hair, wearing always loose and unpressed dark gray clothes.”59 
Clearly Faulkner has his mind on that description when he writes 
the attorney ten years later in Go Down, Moses as having “a wild 
shock of prematurely white hair,” “a thin, intelligent, unstable face, 
a rumpled linen suit [ . . . ] Phi Beta Kappa, Harvard, Ph.D.”60 In 
the earlier novel, the lawyer imagines Christmas’s end for his friend 
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the professor, a proxy for readers of the novel. He plays the role 
Shreve makes axiomatic for Faulkner’s most acclaimed work, the “let 
me play a while now,”61 toward which so many scholars have ges-
tured as the crux of Faulkner’s most involved narratives, the hinge 
of meaning making where various audiences, including readers, share 
in narration.
 Part of Stevens’s play in the narrative is a lengthy account of 
Christmas’s vexed escape attempt, which the attorney describes in 
terms of competing black and white blood. Faulkner critic Jay Watson 
indicts that racializing as “at best shaky, at worst racist and absurd.”62 
However, Stevens undercuts his narrative authority with regard to 
what the grandmother, Mrs. Hines, might have told Christmas before 
his doomed escape, when he admits, “But of course I dont know 
what she told him. I dont believe that any man could reconstruct that 
scene.”63 Not any single narrator in Light in August can tell the story, 
but a decade later, several might. Narrative reconstruction is method 
and topic of that central section of “The Bear,” where Cass and Ike 
mirror Shreve and Quentin, retelling not only much of the narrative 
to that point, but also the Civil War and Reconstruction.
 The Gavin Stevens at the end of Go Down, Moses does not tell 
the story of Butch, whom he knows, remembers, and believes to be a 
“bad seed”; he does not because he cannot. Instead of assuming the 
role of narrator for a story not his own, as does the deputy who 
tells Rider’s story but remains unmoved by it, Stevens is less narra-
tor than actor at the end, less unmoved than constantly in motion 
through Jefferson’s square, from his office to that of the newspaper 
editor, back to his office, back to the newspaper, then from “store to 
store and office to office about the square,” then to Miss Worsham’s. 
Stevens is no analysand on a couch, but a man of two minds out in 
the city, believing Butch a “bad seed” but offering time and money 
for his return.64 Stevens has added to Worsham’s twenty-five dollars 
what change he collects from the businesses in the square and nearly 
two hundred dollars out of his and the editor’s pockets to buy Butch’s 
passage back to Jefferson.
 That return figures differently to those who bring him back, and 
not only in terms of money. To his grandmother, Molly Worsham 
Beauchamp,65 Butch operates in symbolic, biblical terms—Benjamin 
sold by pharaoh; to Stevens, Butch is the responsibility of a white, 
middle-class community. While first convinced that the death that 
has not happened yet can be ignored or concealed, Stevens, at the 

Literary Execution
unmade bequest of a woman he barely knows, ends up footing much 
of the bill—in labor, time, and money—for bringing the body back to 
Jefferson. His act is an acknowledgment of half-understood respon-
sibility. In Light in August, Christmas bears a personal guilt, which 
sets him to self-destructive behavior such as taking the braggart Lucas 
as his partner in the moonshine operation or confronting the black 
parishioners. Go Down, Moses, in contrast, features a social responsi- 
bility in Stevens’s work to have the town bring home its own, funds 
gathered as coins in a door-to-door mission to retrieve a man described 
in Stevens’s own words as “a dead nigger” but acknowledged in his 
effort as a native son of Jefferson.66
 Stevens’s concluding actions and their result demonstrate a far-
richer model of community than the singular town whose memory 
Christmas is to haunt. Beauchamp does not vanish into memory but 
returns to become materially present in town, as the funeral proces-
sion circles the twin bastions of the New South, the “Confederate 
monument and the courthouse,”67 to bury him just outside it. The 
sign passed—“Jefferson. Corporate Limit”—marks Butch’s return to 
the social body, his life and death to be recorded in the public voice 
of the local newspaper at Molly’s demand. Butch’s relationship with 
the social sphere, then, represents a different sort from that of Christ-
mas, the mixed-race criminal of a decade before. Faulkner offers 
Christmas’s isolated individuality in terms of an atomistic self, and 
the location of that self—“Here I am”—is an acceptance of pun-
ishment. Elsewhere in Light in August, Byron Bunch describes that 
self-declaration as “I-Am,” “the relinquishment of which is usually 
death.”68 Ten years later, in Go Down, Moses, Faulkner’s Beauchamp is 
claimed by a wider social system that acknowledges his body as part 
of a “We-Are” when he returns to the town’s corporate body, the 
simultaneity of collective and singular that is Jefferson. In Light in 
August, Jefferson as a town often has a single and typically white point 
of view. Of Bunch’s Saturday work, “the town itself or that part of it 
which remembers or thinks about him, believe that he does it for the 
overtime.”69 That unified point of view appears again at Christmas’s 
death and assumption to memory, when Jefferson knows, remembers, 
and believes as one mind.
 The differences between this conclusion and the one of Go Down, 
Moses are tremendous. Jefferson’s town square in the latter novel is not 
that a priori monolith, but is divided far more deeply. Stevens must 
call on the town’s members individually in his breathless request for 
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funeral funds: “It’s to bring a dead nigger home. It’s for Miss Wor-
sham. Never mind about a paper to sign: just give me a dollar. Or a 
half a dollar then. Or a quarter then.”70 Like Lucas facing Zack in 
the novel’s episode “The Fire and the Hearth,” Gavin is going to do 
something, then other people are going to do something, and then it 
will all end, and be all right.
 Of course, it will not be all right. History is not corrected so 
easily; accounts are not so simply set in balance. However, Stevens 
succeeds in some regard when he hails townspeople, calling on them 
with his rote speech for donation without writ petition or receipt, a 
sort of Progressive activist. What he gains offsets his and the editor’s 
personal expenditure, but the change largely gathers the crowd itself, 
the body of people to receive the casket, a reception narrated not as 
one unified memory or a single opinion, but as a crowd described in 
the differences of those who come to watch. They are “the number 
of people, Negroes and whites both.” They are the “idle white men 
and youths and small boys and probably half a hundred Negroes, men 
and women too.” They are those “who had given Stevens the dol-
lars and half-dollars and quarters and the ones who had not.”71 No 
longer a monolith, Jefferson is now black and white, young and old, 
men and women, jobless and workers and businessmen, an audience 
made of their differences of race, age, gender, and class that never-
theless, however briefly, becomes one crowd of watchers to witness 
the history that Molly demands be recorded. It is no request she 
makes of the editor, but a command: “You put hit in de paper. All of 
hit.”72 Where Christmas somehow enters an imaginary, unconscious 
memory of a singular town, Butch’s staged return before an audience 
and entry into the records of history are conceived and midwifed, 
bought and paid for by four people working and paying together, the 
four who ride behind the body: Molly Beauchamp, Miss Worsham, 
the newspaper editor, and Stevens.
 I do not mean to suggest that Butch’s funeral and the audience for 
that return are the saving grace of Go Down, Moses, its relief, a repa-
ration or absolution of racial injustice, letting anyone off the hook. 
Faulkner describes the editor and the attorney in an ironic register, 
as “the designated paladin of justice and truth and right” and “the 
Heidelberg Ph.D.,” respectively.73 Their acceptance of responsibility 
is constantly forced upon them, directed by others—“other” in terms 
of race and gender—such as Molly Beauchamp and Miss Worsham. 
Stevens agrees to account for Butch’s death, to become responsible 
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in a manner that does not level the balance but acknowledges the 
existence of a racial debt.
 Many critics have missed this. Erik Dussere compares the ledgers 
in the fourth section of “The Bear” in Go Down, Moses with Toni 
Morrison’s Beloved (1987) and Sula (1982) to draw excellent points 
regarding the challenge to and impossibility of balancing the his-
torical debt of slavery.74 However, by restricting his reading of Go 
Down, Moses entirely to “The Bear”—a common misreading of the 
novel—he misses the role Butch’s return plays. Phillip Weinstein, 
rather than ignoring him entirely, reads Butch as “not there” and at 
some level Faulkner’s failure.75 Similarly, Eric Sundquist suggests Go 
Down, Moses would be better off without Butch, a consequence of 
the aforementioned common misreading of the text as primarily or 
only Isaac McCaslin’s story. In Sundquist’s survey of Faulkner’s writing 
from 1929 to 1942 and in a landmark critique, an early component of 
the more historically and culturally nuanced approaches developed in 
Americanist study through the 1980s and 1990s, he suggests that Go 
Down, Moses would be improved if it ended with “Delta Autumn.”76
 I am not suggesting that Butch is the novel’s focal point, a move 
akin to Thadious M. Davis’s gambit in Games of Property: Law, Race, 
Gender, and Faulkner’s Go Down, Moses (2003)77 of treating Tomey’s 
Turl as the main character of the novel. However, reading him as 
“not there” or wishing him gone misreads what I am suggesting is 
one of the dominant narrative trajectories that structure the novel, 
which is not a novel of Aristotelian accord of time and place, or one 
of organic unity and fulfilling the modernist emphasis on the exter-
nal world interpreted by any particular consciousness. Instead, the 
framework for the novel is a patchwork history, disjointed and barely 
held together by the struggle for its making and telling, its span 
over a century, narratively suturing slavery to jim crow and lynching, 
to racial incarceration and execution. The fictional Northern court 
convicts Butch and sends him to death; however, the townspeople of 
Jefferson assemble as a court of public opinion present for his (and 
their) judgment. Lynching demonstrates the complete equation of 
courts of public opinion with judicial process in the execution of mob 
“justice”—such is the case in these novels for Goodwin, Christmas, 
and Rider. Go Down, Moses, in its final pages, presents a different reso-
lution, in which Faulkner, through his proxy Stevens, painstakingly 
recalls the body of Butch and brings together a public to witness the 
return.

Chapter 2
 The analysis of Faulkner’s Go Down, Moses, in particular, occupies 
a chapter of this book precisely because of that previously unremarked 
but crucial strand of narrative coherence. The cultural history the 
novel charts and its link of slavery to jim crow–era lynching and 
to incarceration provide an organizing principle, as they suggest a 
decisive response to the question critics have raised since the book’s 
publication as to whether it even has a discernible structure. Further-
more, to expect from the novel a conventional narrative gravitating 
around a main character has led many to misread Isaac McCaslin as 
the novel’s protagonist, irrespective of his absence from many of its 
episodes and conflicts. Doing so mistakenly places white masculin-
ity at the center of history, even though much of the novel’s power 
develops through a black family’s resistance to both marginalization 
and various practices of racial control.
Go Down, Moses offers, in that last instance, a thick description of how 
history is staged in a community made up of the tension between 
singular and plural, a collective of individuals called together, however 
briefly. Light in August relies on an exhausted rhetoric of redemption 
to imagine social unity at Christmas’s death in the first of its three 
closures. Sanctuary does not even offer that much in its two endings, 
the first of which is the nearly parodic account of Popeye’s execu-
tion, when Popeye’s curt scaffold request for the sheriff to fix his 
hair receives the reply, “I’ll fix it for you,” as the trapdoor opens.78 
That death sentence also precedes flights of language, though the 
turn to Temple seems not redemption but indictment. She departs 
with her father from a “gray day, a gray summer, a gray year” into 
dissolution, and in the final line into “the embrace of the season of 
rain and death.”79 Go Down, Moses does not rely on either strategy: 
the exhausted and unbelievable siren over Christmas’s assumption to 
collective memory, or the ironic dissonance of execution quips jux-
taposed with Temple’s fading into a Baudelairean vignette in three 
anapests and an iamb. In contrast, Faulkner offers the two finales of 
the titular “Go Down, Moses” in the register of simple, circumstan-
tial description, Butch stripped and shaved before his execution, and 
Stevens commenting that he has been away from his office these past 
two days.
 Still, it is not Stevens’s last words but Butch’s final sentence that 
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grows richer in a reappraisal of the final section of the novel—“What 
will that matter to me?” In the atomistic terms of the hardman, it 
will not matter at all, for the death of the self is the end of history. 
However, it does not end there, because Butch does not end there. 
Stevens thinks it ends—“it’s all over and done and finished”—when 
Molly Beauchamp sees her grandson “come home right.”80 That echo 
of Lucas seems as unlikely to resolve finally the racial and filial ten-
sions of Lucas’s own thoughts as he faces Zack: “He will do something 
and then I will do something and it will be all over.”81 Butch’s death and 
homecoming are recorded in the paper, written down, but that can-
not finish the matter completely. As the ledger section of “The Bear” 
emphasizes, and what the novel’s reworking of Faulkner’s previous 
themes of criminality and human agency demonstrates, what is writ-
ten down allows for its own reading and rewriting.
 It has become something of an accepted practice to read Faulkner 
as writing a sort of Southern history in Yoknapatawpha County. Toni 
Morrison, whose own work, like Faulkner’s, shows a deep com-
mitment to telling history, suggests that her investment in reading 
Faulkner and his “subjects had something to do with my desire to 
find out something about this country and that artistic articulation 
of its past that was not available in history.”82 In Go Down, Moses, in 
particular, that history and its writing simultaneously remain personal 
and extend into a broader cultural frame. Michael Grimwood does 
well in treating Faulkner’s final version of Go Down, Moses as the 
author’s redress for his negative stereotyping of blackness in some 
of the stories that, in their aggregate, served as an early draft of the 
novel.83
 However, there is a larger history and broader acknowledgment 
the novel makes. A provocative passage from Intruder in the Dust pro-
claims that “not courthouses nor even churches but jails were the true 
records of a county’s, a community’s history,” and the Gavin Stevens 
of Requiem for a Nun similarly locates “the history of a community” 
as being written in “the walls of the jail.”84 Those later novels dem-
onstrate the racial expectation of criminality, as Lucas Beauchamp 
spends most of Intruder in the Dust anticipating a lynch mob motivated 
because he refuses to “be a nigger,” and Nancy Mannigoe is termed 
ten times over a “nigger dope-fiend whore” or variations thereof.85 It 
is in Go Down, Moses that Faulkner offers his first and fullest account 
of the historical process criminalizing blackness, where social history 
in large part defined by race shapes human agency, from Butch’s 
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presumed criminality to the community that sees the executed crimi-
nal return home. In Faulkner’s South, there are painful connections 
between lynching and execution, and between slavery and imprison-
ment. These too need to be put in the paper—so that, like Molly 
Beauchamp, we know where to look.
n the decAdes following the publication of Go Down, Moses, 
the history equating blackness and criminality that contributed to 
containing black men in prison in Faulkner’s South became a matter 
not of region but of nation, even as Southern politics and problems 
became national matters in the 1950s and 1960s. The rise of the 
South might be charted in any number of ways, including Lyndon 
Johnson’s presidency in 1964 as the first elected Southerner in ninety-
two years, Texas Representative Sam Rayburn’s extended tenure as 
House Speaker from 1949 to 1961, and, specifically regarding prison 
policy, the increasing Southern leadership of the American Correc-
tional Association, formerly the American Prison Association.2 Such 
Southern representation mandated its own difficult negotiation of 
regional and national conflicts, and Johnson capitulated to Southern 
states in limiting the civil rights bills he oversaw in 1957 and 1960 as 
Texas senator and majority leader. Thereafter, the national political 
Soul on Ice,
Schizoanalysis, and 
the Subject of Imprisonment
From the beginning, America has been a schizophrenic nation.
—Eldridge Cleaver, Soul on Ice1
3
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implications of Southern racism, of social and electoral disenfranchise-
ment, like the compromises of one hundred years before, could no 
longer be reconciled.
 The divisions were most stark in the violence and riots of the 
first of the “long, hot summers” surrounding the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act and 1965 Voting Rights Act, the highest profile of Johnson’s 
“Great Society” initiatives, enforced by federal troops, unlike the 
earlier toothless recommendations. The civil rights ruling, in particu-
lar, provided a constitutional basis for prison reform. For example, in 
1970 the U.S. District Court in Arkansas ruled, in a culmination of 
a series of cases through the late 1960s, that the entire state’s prison 
system violated prisoners’ civil rights, constituting cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment.3 Prison history remains 
inseparable from the tension between the nation’s racism and its ide-
als of liberty and equality.
 The year 1968 and the decade that followed marked a funda-
mental change in the direction of the nation as embodied in the 
stories of its prisoners, according to both Cleaver’s Soul on Ice and the 
views of prison officials as recorded in the annual conference meet-
ing transcripts of the American Correctional Association, the nation’s 
preeminent organization of prison administrators and policy makers. 
This chapter charts the shift from revolutionary possibility—from 
politicized racial and criminal identities and the social responsibil-
ity for them—to a nation exhausted by perceived threats of cul-
tural change, race, crime, and plural identity. Soul on Ice documents 
the formation of the identity of a prisoner in a manner that gained 
Cleaver release due to the efforts of activist supporters, though he 
fled the country shortly thereafter following a violent confrontation 
between the Black Panthers and the police. In Soul on Ice Cleaver 
both witnesses and appraises. First, he testifies on behalf of prisoners, 
representing them to those outside, enacting a sort of habeas corpus 
in the cultural imagination. Second, Cleaver offers a strategy of cul-
tural psychoanalysis to describe the racial divide in a manner resonant 
with what Deleuze and Guattari later termed “schizoanalysis.” The 
prominence of Cleaver’s prison writing in the late 1960s left its mark 
in history, which echoed in the discourse of those he critiqued, from 
then California Governor Ronald Reagan to the prison officials of 
the ACA.
 However, in the years immediately following Soul on Ice, the 
nation experienced a radical foreclosure in the potential for alterna-
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tives to imprisonment, due to the expansion of criminalization and 
sentencing through the Rockefeller drug laws, the perceived lack of 
alternatives in treatment, and the fear of black militancy. This shift in 
criminal-justice practice contributed to the widespread imagination 
of prisoners as violent, dangerous, and evil, even as prisons grew over-
crowded, filling with nonviolent offenders. Perhaps no one embod-
ied this contradiction of black masculinity as criminally violent and 
necessarily revolutionary better than Cleaver himself: prisoner, Black 
Panther, best-selling author, and presidential candidate.
 Soul on Ice is not an idiosyncratic account of imprisonment pulled 
from the dustbin of history, but is instead indicative, in the promi-
nence at its release and resonance with the historical record of the 
ACA transcripts, of larger cultural trends both contributing to and 
affected by U.S. prison policy. Cleaver describes an identity forma-
tion, a process of “becoming” in prison, taking place both in history 
and with his various and sometimes conflicting desires. While my 
argument makes some use of theoretical vocabularies, it is not an 
exclusively psychoanalytic account of the degree to which Cleaver 
describes his sense of self. Instead, my analysis shows how Soul on Ice 
offers vital testimony at a critical period in U.S. prison policy, a time 
when the possibility of radical change tilted first to progressive reform 
and veered then to an extreme expansion of incarceration. A rich 
history of the ACA conference proceedings remains to be written. 
What follows is, first, an account of discussions of race and social 
change at those meetings immediately after the publication of Soul 
on Ice; second, a demonstration of the similarities between Cleaver’s 
writing and Deleuze and Guattari’s description of schizoanalysis; and 
third, a demonstration of how the social psychoanalysis performed in 
Soul on Ice clarifies the reactions of ACA wardens and administrators 
to Cleaver’s book. Reading from our own historical vantage point 
of decades later, we see more clearly the opportunities lost then to 
redefine the ruthless equation of criminality with black masculinity 
and, in the wake of the even more oppressive racial incarceration that 
has taken place since, the increased urgency of challenging that racism 
now.
 Cleaver documents his tumultuous time in the unique register of 
Soul on Ice: alternately autobiography; literary criticism; myth; cultural 
theory; and a prison-cell view of the mid-1960s, the Watts riots, pro-
tests of the Vietnam War, and the conflicts of race, class, and gender in 
the history of his now. It quickly sold more than a million copies and 
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was named a Book of the Year of 1968 by the New York Times.4 Cleaver 
leveraged such prominence to run for president with the Peace and 
Freedom Party, a cross-racial alliance between that group of largely 
young white radicals and the Black Panther Party. By 1979, he had 
swapped extremes, a wholesale switch from revolutionary to reaction-
ary.5 However, the Cleaver of 1968 looks to the hope of revolution 
and provides a critical account of his crimes and imprisonment as they 
relate to U.S. cultural history in the 1960s. He presents a book-length 
and arguably nonfictional testimonial of incarceration, even as such 
writing soon thereafter provided the basis for several Supreme Court 
cases concerning the development of U.S. prisoners’ right to self- 
representation.6 Like those plaintiffs, Cleaver contests for representa-
tion and against silencing, and his writing demonstrates an imperative 
to confront readers with history. Furthermore, like the officials of the 
ACA, Cleaver is shaped by his historical moment even as he writes 
the words that in part define that history.
 His Soul on Ice is a difficult book. There is of course his immedi-
ate acknowledgment that “I’ve been a rapist”—and it is easy enough 
to stop there, and perhaps many readers do.7 Moreover, to judge the 
book by its cover is to misread it entirely. The back of most paperback 
editions identifies it as a “spiritual autobiography” or “classic autobiog-
raphy,” while the front cover operates in the convention of a whole 
body of writing by black prisoners and former prisoners8 which Soul 
on Ice is a both a part of and apart from: Cleaver’s face in a close-up 
black-and-white photograph, a view similar to the most common book 
jackets of The Autobiography of Malcolm X (1964), George Jackson’s 
Soledad Brother (1970), and Rubin “Hurricane” Carter’s The Sixteenth 
Round (1974). Soul on Ice, however, is far more a work of cultural 
theory and criticism than it is any sort of conventional autobiogra-
phy, its discursive legacy in Frantz Fanon more than in Malcolm X. 
Cleaver’s identity of prisoner number A-29498—a conceit of prison 
identity repeated by Carter in his biography and by Himes in at least 
two short stories9—is the result of his incarceration, but its meanings 
and effects are offered less in personal than national history.
 Of its four parts, only the initial “On Becoming” of “Part One: 
Letters from Prison” conducts even a partially retrospective account of 
the author’s life in the vein of Malcolm X, and the subsequent eight 
letters are snapshots of the time of their writing, during 1965, offered 
out of chronological sequence. “Part Three: Prelude to Love—Three 
Letters” conducts a correspondence between Cleaver and his lawyer 
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and is by far the shortest section, shorter than some of the individual 
chapters of parts two and four. The analysis conducted in those sec-
tions, the longest parts of the book, distances itself rhetorically from 
the “I” so prevalent in the letters of parts one and three, which feature 
a litany of “I was eighteen years old,” “I was black,” “I love you,” “I 
hate you,” “I declared myself for Malcolm X,” “I seek the profound,” 
etc. The identity of the perceiving eye of parts two and four is occa-
sionally the first person, but rather than limiting itself to the close 
quarters of self-reflection, the expository gaze spans culture and his-
tory: youth activism, the racial connotations of boxing and literature, 
the Vietnam War and riot suppression as concomitant police actions, 
the legacies of slavery—all offered with wry wit in tracing their con-
nections. To read Soul on Ice as Cleaver’s life story is to undo its out-
ward direction and to read the political as personal, cultural history as 
a person’s past, and theory and criticism as autobiography, a reading 
that overturns the trajectory the text itself maintains, wherein the self 
is constituted in and understood through its social investments.10
 Cleaver’s self-declarative, autoperformative prison sentence—nine 
years, the time during which he “began to form a concept of what it 
meant to be black in white America”11—writes him into becoming 
with and through the very awareness that only in communication 
does a self-aware subjectivity emerge. There are poststructuralist reso-
nances to that equation of language and the subject, but the wording 
of the Supreme Court ruling in favor of the authority of writ lawyers 
supports it as well. Johnson v. Avery (1969) upheld a district court deci-
sion against a prison regulation prohibiting writ lawyers (prisoners 
serving as legal representatives for other prisoners) because, according 
to the court, that ordinance had “the effect of barring illiterate pris-
oners from access to federal habeas corpus.” In basing their ruling on 
habeas corpus, the court effectively equated one prisoner representing 
another’s legal interests in writing with the actual physical presence of 
that prisoner in the courtroom. In that decision, Justices Hugo Black 
and Byron White dissented, suggesting that the writ lawyer was less 
“motivated by altruism rather than by self-aggrandizement, profit, or 
power.” While an aside might note the circumstantial racing of the 
dissenting justices’ surnames, the emphasis here rests with the majority 
ruling, the equation of subject and statement.
 In 1968, not only Cleaver but also prison wardens and ACA leaders 
recognized the possibility of radical reform, viewed criminality often 
as a political matter, and emphasized the factor of race in incarcera-
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tion. However, through the 1970s diverse strategies of rehabilitation 
widely disappeared as more frequent and longer sentences became 
standard, the term “political prisoner” met disparagement, and race 
dropped as a broad topic, replaced by the problems raised in the over-
crowding brought about by increased imprisonment. The domestic 
“war on crime” effort that Johnson sponsored as the Safe Streets and 
Crime Control Act passed Congress in 1968 as the Law Enforcement 
Administration Act, with a $63 million budget that grew ten-fold by 
1971 under President Richard Nixon. Nearly half of those increased 
funds were dedicated to corrections programs, and they dramatically 
expanded the ACA, while increasing crime rates and perceived failures 
of imprisonment drew national attention. The sense of social crisis in 
1968, the simultaneity of hope and catastrophe, is as apparent in the 
discussions of wardens and other prison officials of the ACA as it was 
elsewhere in the United States. In his presidential address, the warden 
Parker L. Hancock describes the present in terms of radical change, 
claiming that “the pace of American social revolution is accelerating,” 
and “the past blurs and the future seems uncertain.”12
 Hancock adopts a historically informed approach, claiming that 
more-severe punishments during cycles of increased crime are both 
transhistorically phenomenal and counterproductive. Instead, he 
observes that prisons are adopting a “more enlightened correctional 
philosophy,” including community-based alternatives, increased 
access of inmates to education, work, and counseling. All told, “Cor-
rections today is experimenting with programs that hold promise for 
the future.”13 He associates university protests with an evolving view 
of crime, and with the potential for transformation in national culture. 
“The revolt of youth, as seen in student demonstrations from New 
York to California,” has caused crimes committed in the name of war 
protest, drug use, and civil protest against racism, and he concludes 
that “we must reaffirm our traditional values or create new ones.”14 
The ACA, like the universities “from New York to California,” seemed 
poised to consider broad cultural changes—specifically, a changed 
sense of criminality and how prisons might recognize and respond to 
it. The next few years saw the same points raised in nearly identical 
terms. A 1970 participant begins:
It is difficult to speak about corrections today—indeed about any part 
of the administration of criminal justice—without reference to the 
massive social changes which are occurring in this country. Tensions 
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in the black community, a discordant youth culture, an unpopular war 
which is producing an increasing number of young men convicted of 
offenses essentially political in nature, raise profound questions about 
the limits, methods and aims of correctional activities.15
The overall tone of presenters during the social unrest between 1968 
and 1971, reflective of this quote, was open to reform, optimistic 
toward change, and accepting of the possibility of broad-based trans-
formation in prison practice.16
 The beginning of that contentious period saw a split in the per-
ception of criminality and race. In his survey of the representation 
of imprisonment in common U.S. periodicals, John Sloop identifies 
the popular view of black male inmates in 1968 as being at the cusp 
of change. His terms speak directly to characterizations of Cleaver. 
The view of black inmates as violent and irrational felons shifts to a 
divide between, on the one hand, revolutionaries and, on the other, 
irredeemably dangerous criminals, though potentially violent either 
way. In contrast, white male prisoners remain “forever open for reha-
bilitation.”17 The transcripts of the ACA largely follow that split per-
ception of black inmates. In the years immediately following 1968, 
discussions of black inmates are polarized sharply between accounts 
that recognize a legitimate political grievance for black prisoners, and 
descriptions that are derisive and occasionally hysterical.
 The more marginal view from the radical right includes a U.S. 
Army major and director of mental hygiene, who offers a sharply 
critical description of the “Militant Black: A Correctional Prob-
lem.” The administrator portrays such activists in terms of gener-
ally lower intelligence scores, possessing “infantile, narcissistic needs,” 
psychological disorders “of psychotic proportions”; to him activists 
are highly paranoid, a “primordial people using primitive function-
ing.”18 The director suggests that education in black history, group 
counseling, and role-playing can prove constructive for borderline 
cases, but that “the very militant inmate” is a lost cause, demanding 
psychiatric hospitalization and segregation.19 In the major’s view, the 
black militant cannot be a U.S. soldier, because he is already at war 
with the United States, a matter clarified when a later participant, an 
associate warden, describes Cleaver and those like him as having com-
mitted an “act of war against the state.”20 At this same time, the 
formation of a chapter of the Black Panthers at Angola State Prison 
prompted its associate warden to claim that “a certain type of militant 
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or revolutionary inmate, maybe even a Communist type” must remain 
in constant isolation.21
 That view from the radical right was not the norm in the ACA. 
A director of a correctional council in 1969 draws from empirical 
research to depict an “exaggerated” fear of crime in big cities, where 
those living in the safest neighborhoods are the most afraid of violent 
offenses. He criticizes the predominantly white and affluent citizens 
who make baseless demands that police begin “cracking down on 
black militants.”22 The next year, District Court Judge Leon Hig-
ginbotham asked, “Is Yesterday’s Racism Relevant Today in Correc-
tions?” The answer, he implies, is yes. The judge traces a Philadelphia 
prison superintendent’s blame of a riot on “hard-core black militants” 
to the U.S. Constitutional Convention and the revisions to the con-
stitution that allowed for slavery, then to the 1857 Dred Scott case, 
then to Plessy v. Ferguson.23 From 1968 to 1972, the divide over the 
perceptions of black inmates’ activism and the surrounding violence 
seems informed not just by a conservative or liberal bias, but by the 
degree to which those on one side or the other are prepared to situ-
ate contemporary problems in a historical framework.
 The conflicting views came to a head in 1972, the first recorded 
meeting of the ACA after inmates revolted in Attica Prison in New 
York, September 9–13, 1971, where forty-three people died, eleven of 
them hostages, thirty-nine shot by the state troopers sent by Gov-
ernor Nelson Rockefeller. Rockefeller’s Goldman Panel, established 
to ensure prisoners’ rights after the riot, cleared the authorities of 
any wrongdoing, and the ACA’s 1972 panel concerning the “Rights 
of People” appropriated liberal rhetoric, employing the language of 
human rights in safeguarding prison authorities against criticism.24 
In 1973 a “tough on crime” posture fueled the changes in the crimi-
nal code for drug violations that Rockefeller implemented in New 
York, including broader criminalization, mandatory sentencing, and 
longer prison terms.
 The revolt at Attica and the state troopers’ violent incursion that 
concluded it galvanized both sides at the next ACA conference. A 
New York correctional commissioner recognizes that administrators 
must acknowledge the self-appointed political prisoners and the basis 
for their arguments regarding racial and class-based adjudication and 
sentencing. However, he immediately dismisses those concerns—
while “the problem is there [ . . . ] it has no merit” for corrections.25 
The next speaker, an Illinois prison administrator, performs the same 
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reversal, acknowledging that the system of justice is racist and eco-
nomically discriminatory, but insisting that systemic injustice does not 
equate to political imprisonment.26 A chaplain’s paper titled “Attica: 
Anatomy of the New Revolutionary” first cites the prevalence of 
racism in prisons and the general failure of corrections, then char-
acterizes and subsequently condemns black militancy at length, even 
including, verbatim, two pages of Black Panther Party materials.27 
The chaplain demands that corrections administrators not confuse 
legitimate criticism with revolutionary critique.
 Other participants found those two inseparable. Also in 1972, 
Vernon Fox, a Florida State University criminologist, argues that 
prison officials must maintain an awareness of history—especially 
slavery—offering statistics of slave populations, quoting at length a 
deed of slave ownership, and identifying the 1964 and 1965 race riots 
as another iteration of regularly occurring conflict. Fox argues, “The 
majority of persons arrested for crimes are white, but the major-
ity of persons sent to prisons in many jurisdictions are black. The 
social distance and the cultural differentiations have contributed to 
a new ideology of revolution and social change among many blacks, 
an ideology intensely resisted by the white power structure.” He 
claims that a history of inequity produces contemporary racism in 
law enforcement, courtrooms, and prisons, thereby resulting in both 
an ideology of black resistance and a white reactionary response.28 He 
concludes with a detailed account of the violence at Soledad Prison 
from 1970 to 1971 and its fallout, including the deaths of Jonathan 
and George Jackson, tracing the latter’s shooting as the immediate 
reason for the riot at Attica. Fox proposes that the larger social causes 
of racism underlie incarceration patterns and can be addressed only 
through education involving cultural history both in and out of pris-
ons. Several other papers in that session also support the necessity of 
understanding contemporary problems in prison as the product of a 
history of racism and implicated in broader social struggles outside 
of imprisonment.29
 Cleaver is linked directly to the accounts of these administra-
tors. Fox traces the politicizing of black prisoners to the writings 
of Malcolm X, Cleaver, and George Jackson. Another paper offers a 
similar reading list, citing Soul on Ice twice. The presenter points out 
how blackness becomes identified with criminality in the uncritical 
diagnosis that is part of the sociology of corrections.30 Culturally 
sensitive education could address that matter, according to E. Eugene 
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Miller’s “Necessary Preconditions to Achieving Cultural Awareness.” 
He opens by mocking his very invitation to speak on that topic 
because he had worked with blacks and Native Americans and thus 
was presumed able to speak knowledgeably, giving a fifteen-minute 
synopsis of the culture of each. He interprets this very invitation as 
symptomatic of the white racist “paternalism” he argues against. He 
also mentions an ACA position paper published earlier that year 
acknowledging “that racism has and does exist in corrections.” He 
argues for knowledge of and respect for cultural difference and ends 
with a call for an identification of an “us” between corrections admin-
istrators and a “them” of prisoners “without regard to race, color, or 
creed.”31 The call for such specific identification between prisoners 
and those who imprison is a rare one—though it repeats a 1929 par-
ticipant who says of nonprisoners and prisoners alike, “All are brothers 
under the skin.”32 Miller’s encouragement for culturally sensitive his-
tory paradoxically echoes the more reactionary army major’s support 
of black history classes. Presumably the major does not envision them 
being taught by Cleaver, who led such classes in prison.33
 However, as quickly as the storm of Attica raised discussion of race 
in the ACA in 1972, those voices almost entirely disappeared. The 
legitimacy of political prisoners had been a central issue in eight pre-
sentations from 1968 to 1972, but over the next seven years it faded 
to obscurity or derision.34 However, in 1979, both plenary addresses 
deal centrally with race and imprisonment, including the keynote 
address, “Race, Crime, and Corrections” by Charles Silberman, and a 
follow-up by Higginbotham. However, the latter’s speech, “Is Slavery 
Relevant to Corrections Today?,” repeats almost verbatim, in its title, 
argument, examples, and language, his 1970 conference paper. Appar-
ently, so few had heard the first time that the same material could 
serve again nine years later. Questions of race and social struggle were 
discussed broadly as underlying issues of prison policy and practice 
from 1968 through 1972. Thereafter, the vast majority of presenta-
tions ignored these matters, instead reflecting the national shift in 
favor of more-frequent and longer sentencing, which precipitated the 
overcrowding crisis. Numerous participants remarked that correctional 
systems were shifting away from a rehabilitative paradigm based on 
psychological classification and treatment, but that no new model had 
appeared to take its place. The rise of “just desserts”—flat sentenc-
ing irrespective of mitigating individual or social circumstances35—as 
the prevalent punishment matched the “tough on crime” rhetoric 
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adopted by Rockefeller, Nixon, and others. They promoted broader 
and harsher criminalization and incarceration, and thereby initiated 
the dramatic expansion of imprisonment in the United States begin-
ning in the late 1970s, an increase that has disproportionately affected 
black men.
 Soul on Ice in 1968 offered a prescient analysis of the racial divide 
that saw its harshest expression in the prison populations expanding 
through the following decades. Cleaver’s account of himself dem-
onstrates the struggle to enter history, to communicate an identity 
beyond that of the prisoner, and he uses various discursive strategies 
in describing self-conscious identity formation inside prison walls. 
Soul on Ice writes the author as a tense reflection of a larger national 
history that is as much of two minds as the divided view of black 
militancy in the ACA. Cleaver writes, “From the beginning, America 
has been a schizophrenic nation. Its two conflicting images of itself 
were never reconciled”: the white image of “freedom and justice 
for all” and the black image of oppression and resistance.36 Cleaver 
employs “schizophrenia” as the popular misreading of multiple per-
sonality disorder. In the medical discourse of psychology and the 
study of disorders of the brain, schizophrenia is actually a dissociation 
from reality, the inability of the subject to engage the world around 
him or her. However, Cleaver treats schizophrenia in plural and racial 
terms that make explicit the power differential in culture, a disease of 
the social body that produces a failure to acknowledge the fault lines 
of history, the cultural differences that must be named and engaged. 
Though Cleaver generally views the term negatively, the more posi-
tive description in how Deleuze and Guattari theorize it clarifies 
aspects of Soul on Ice.
 The titular aim of Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus is the rejec-
tion of the oedipal “I,” the autonomous, unified self, in which Oedi-
pus is the offspring of Freud and Lacan, initiated in the divorce from 
totality in a psychoanalytic version of the paradox of the Fall. The 
loss of completeness is the split from the imaginary whole, the cause 
of the lack upon which the sense of self is predicated, the manque-
à-être, the lack that is the “want-to-be.”37 Deleuze and Guattari turn 
to Friedrich Nietzsche and Antonin Artaud for a different sense of 
self: if “every name in history is I,” then “I have been my father and 
I have been my son.”38 “I” thereby loses its power. Their hypotheti-
cal schizophrenic says, “‘I won’t say I any more, I’ll never utter the 
word again; it’s just too damn stupid. Every time I hear it, I’ll use the 
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third person instead, if I happen to remember to. If it amuses them. 
And it won’t make one bit of difference.’ And if he does chance to 
utter the word I again, that won’t make any difference either. He is 
too far removed from these problems, too far past them.”39 Writ-
ing against psychoanalysis means overwriting its privileged categories 
with those of the schizoanalytic: replacing the oedipal subject with 
the schizophrenic, the individual with the social, the symbolic with 
the concrete, the expressive with the productive, and the theatrical 
with the historical.40 The schizophrenic is an ever-shifting body of 
“we’s,” and schizoanalysis is the project of tracing such various social 
investments.
 Schizoanalysis works against oedipalization, an individualization 
that is less a matter of a Freudian sexual dynamic of desire for the 
mother than desire for the Other, the strategy by which selfhood 
itself is interpellated, brought into being through divorce from an 
imaginary whole and thereby defined by the lack of the whole it 
desires. Paranoia is a condition of oedipalization whereby the self 
misrecognizes its autonomy, a separate-but-equal individuality situ-
ated in a world of stable meaning. Paranoia thus describes a state in 
which meaning is one with fact, social structures are inviolable, and 
power maintains an a priori fixity not in institutions but through 
imaginary unity under a God-ordained leader. Schizoanalysis attacks 
the primacy of “I” and its stable singularities. Of course the joke is 
that “I” saturates their text and Cleaver’s as well, and “I won’t say I” 
doubly violates itself, invoking the forbidden as both the subject and 
the object of saying, of discourse. However, the contradiction does 
not make any difference for those who situate themselves beyond 
these difficulties, as such plural selves are accustomed to living with 
contradictions.
 Cleaver describes identity in a manner that gains clarity when 
understood in terms of the Deleuzo-Guattarian schizophrenic. Cleaver 
writes, “I was very familiar with the Eldridge who came to prison, but 
that Eldridge no longer exists. And the one I am now is in some ways 
a stranger to me. You may find this very difficult to understand but 
it is very easy for one in prison to lose his sense of self.”41 Certainly 
for the prisoner, this claim is a self-serving dodge. Imprisonment rests 
upon the assumption that the person in prison is the same one who 
was determined in court to be a criminal; to be any other than the 
“Eldridge who came to prison” is to no longer need to be impris-
oned, as he has been corrected, reformed. However, Cleaver’s point 
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is that the subject in history is ever in flux. For the self to be consti-
tuted in its social investments—in the first passage after the opening 
section, “On Becoming,” these identities include being a prisoner, an 
African-American, and a convicted rapist, as well as having a “Higher 
Uneducation”42—is to shift in the ebb and flow of those partial and 
conflicting participations in the social. Imprisonment in its practice, as 
described in Soul on Ice, seeks to oedipalize; it individualizes, isolates, 
and alienates, produces paranoia and surpasses that paranoia, such that 
the question in the condition of Cleaver’s imprisonment is not, Am I 
paranoid? but Am I paranoid enough? He resists that oedipalization, 
tracing different models of the subject in history, actor and acted 
upon, the subject of and subject to, a tension of identity and agency 
perhaps written most severely in the position of prisoners.43
 Cleaver’s prison writing of 1968 demonstrates the implication of 
imprisonment in broader historical and cultural contexts, the black 
man in prison as part of a larger network of misplaced desires. Soul 
on Ice functions to a significant degree as an integrated schizoana-
lytic critique as described in Anti-Oedipus: the combination of radical 
politics, aesthetics, and historical analysis, the synthesis of “the artistic 
machine, the analytic machine, and the revolutionary machine.” In a 
definitive passage of such practice, Deleuze and Guattari turn to a 
letter from Vincent van Gogh to Artaud, an image of prison escape, 
a wall “penetrated with a file,” where the effort is not escape but “at 
once the wall, the breaking through this wall, and the failures of the 
breakthrough.”44 The metaphor of imprisonment, the simultaneity of 
the wall and the breaking of it, and the integrated critique all aptly 
describe Soul on Ice. At a literal level Cleaver acknowledges that the 
political project of the book keeps him incarcerated: “If I had fol-
lowed the path laid down for me by the officials, I’d undoubtedly 
have long since been out of prison.”45 The text itself, in its account 
of the radicalization that Cleaver claims prolongs his stay, is the wall, 
while the letters back and forth in and out of prison and his own 
becoming are the breakthrough. The failures of that breakthrough 
might be viewed as the lack of the transformation of U.S. domestic 
and foreign policy that Cleaver envisioned. The breakthrough and its 
failure are bound to the degree to which the self Cleaver writes is 
a subject constituted in history, even as he tries to rupture that his-
tory, not break from it, but fracture history itself—for what else is 
revolution, whether viewed by the ACA leadership or hailed by 
Cleaver, but the shattering of history?
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 Cleaver in 1968 was in search of revolution, a political project that 
superseded divisions of incarceration and race. He regularly identifies 
with the young white and black protesters of 1965, some of whom 
commit the political crimes described by the ACA, and points out 
his desire to “look with roving eyes for a new John Brown,” claim-
ing that Malcolm X would “accept John Brown [to the Organization 
of Afro-American Unity] if he were around today.” Cleaver further 
claims that the “ghost of John Brown is creeping through subur-
bia,” an image he returns to in his Post-Prison Writings: “a second 
Civil War, with thousands of white John Browns fighting on the 
side of the blacks, plunging America into the depths of its most 
desperate nightmare on the way to realizing the American Dream.”46 
In an echo of Cleaver, Deleuze and Guattari draw relationships 
between, if not equate outright, the political radical with the black 
prisoner. In calling to “become black like John Brown.[,] George 
Jackson,”47 blackness marks not abjectness or complex inferiority but 
revolutionary consciousness, even as it overwrites skin with politics. 
The degree to which race as a signifier slips from skin color to radical 
action is a gesture to the revolt against barriers of racial difference and 
oppression Cleaver views as epitomized in imprisonment. Speaking 
for himself becomes the means by which he can invite cross-racial 
identification.
 Soul on Ice demonstrates Cleaver’s effort to articulate himself, to 
speak his position in and view from prison and thereby reorient 
himself (and thereby those who identify with him) politically and 
personally, to put his individual situation in the larger context of U.S. 
racial history—the exact strategy engaged by Fox, Higginbotham, 
and others in the ACA. Much of Soul on Ice accounts for the acts of 
the self historically, and it often reads like a litany of pairings of the 
personal and historical: Cleaver’s imprisonment and Brown v. Board 
of Education, his violently divided and raced sexual desire and the 
lynching of Emmitt Till.48 The implied argument is that personal acts 
are best understood within narratives larger than personal history. 
The Cleaver of the book is schizophrenic, in Deleuze and Guattari’s 
terms. His account of his psychiatric treatment in prison grows in 
focus and importance when viewed in the context of Deleuze and 
Guattari’s exchange of the autonomy of Oedipus for the social subject 
in history: 
I had several sessions with a psychiatrist. His conclusion was that I 
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hated my mother. How he arrived at this conclusion I’ll never know, 
because he knew nothing about my mother; and when he’d asked 
me questions I would answer him with absurd lies. What revolted me 
about him was that he had heard me denouncing whites, yet each 
time he interviewed me he deliberately guided the conversation back 
to my family life, to my childhood. That in itself was alright [sic], 
but he deliberately blocked all my attempts to bring out the racial 
question.49
 This parody of psychoanalytic treatment, the tracing of all experi-
ence to the childhood relationship with the mother and the attendant 
blocking of the desire to address sociocultural concerns, demonstrates 
Cleaver’s rejection of his oedipalization. He instead opts to under-
stand himself in terms of “the dynamics of race relations in America” 
and a Marxist critique of U.S. capitalism.50 Deleuze and Guattari 
describe that shift as the schizophrenic turn from “daddy-mommy” 
to the “economic and political spheres.”51 The oedipal self impedes 
the flow in the circuitry of the social, which, in the case of Cleaver, 
blocks the attempt to rupture the boundaries of skin color and prison 
walls, to act and write across lines of difference in terms of race and 
incarceration. In Soul on Ice, Cleaver writes against conventional psy-
choanalysis, as Deleuze and Guattari would later do, the latter even 
abandoning his personal practice for cultural critique.
 Cleaver’s rejection of his psychiatric session can be viewed in 
the comic tone he engages so often and so successfully, as when 
he applauds the revolutionary possibilities of desiring beefsteaks or 
prepares to describe the mystery of the holy Trinity as three-in-
one oil.52 However, tricksters regularly mask their masterstrokes in 
humor; keeping in mind the schizoanalytic imperative—the politi-
cal psychoanalysis of desire in social bodies—foregrounds the richer 
implications of Cleaver’s argument. Analyst and analysand must alike 
leave behind the reductive, isolated, and isolating interpretation of 
personal history for wider contexts. Soul on Ice effectively invites the 
racial history of now to get up from the couch and walk around the 
city in order to talk about its troubles. Cleaver adopts the theoreti-
cal approach of implicating the seemingly autonomous author and 
book in intertextual relationships with their historical and cultural 
situations.
 The discursive impulse of such contextualization guides Cleaver’s 
best writing in Soul on Ice and his short story “The Flashlight,” which 
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appeared in Playboy in 1969 and won an O. Henry Award. The story 
features the becoming of the main character, Stacy Mims. He trans-
forms from leader of a band of petty criminals to a loner who uses 
the titular flashlight to interrupt drug activity in his neighborhood, to 
a participant in the gang of “Marijuanos.” In her commentary in 
Eldridge Cleaver (1991), Kathleen Rout underreads “The Flashlight,” 
missing its emphasis on the social. Overall, her book offers far more 
a critical (and metacritical) survey of Cleaver’s primary writings 
than a biography, but the story merits less than a page and a half 
that describes it entirely as a coming-of-age story emphasizing the 
singular individual, replete with the stock psychoanalytic terms of 
Freud and Adler both, from “phallic symbol” to “self-assertion.”53 
However, Cleaver takes pains to implicate the main character in 
a particular cultural space, written in social rather than personal 
history.
 The initial description of Stacy is in terms of an incarnate social 
body composed of himself and his gang members, made in “knowl-
edge of each other, the thick glue of the brotherhood of youth, of 
their separate selves bound into one.”54 The subsequent thick descrip-
tion of the main character emphasizes the neighborhood as a self-sus-
taining environment with its own history. However, Cleaver describes 
it as already receding into the past, both literally, as the dilapidated 
but historied houses are replaced by projects, and figuratively, as the 
nearby, diminishing wilderness is cast in terms of the pastoral, from the 
gang’s hunter/gatherer activities there to its “Indian burial ground” 
and shepherds.55 The middle passage describes Stacy’s own poorly 
understood resistance to both his gang’s criminal activities, which 
have lost their meaning for him, and the terrorism of surveillance 
he initiates on the drug users and dealers, until he becomes first 
their target and then their peer. Cleaver describes the process of 
becoming in terms of two warring voices in one body—resonating 
with DuBois’s famous claim of “double consciousness,” with Gavin 
Stevens’s description of Joe Christmas in Light in August, and with 
a sense of the schizophrenic—as Stacy identifies himself as joining 
the users and dealers through the ritual of smoking (and presum-
ably later selling) marijuana. “He had the sensation of being two 
disembodied beings fighting to inhabit one yielding body. His body, 
offering no resistance, became a battlefield on which two rival armies 
contended.”56 His identity at the close is that of “Marijuano,” part of 
a different social body than his previous gang.
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 The story trades on the cachet of Cleaver’s fame as a former pris-
oner and fugitive as of November 1968. The term prison appears on 
each of the first three pages of the story, and it is easy to do as Rout 
does and read Stacy as Cleaver, who in 1954 first went to prison for 
selling marijuana, then a felony in California. By 1969 the cultural 
climate had changed, and a cartoon in the same issue of Playboy fea-
tures a doctor telling his patient, “I want you to lay off that alcohol 
and switch to pot, Mr. Fuller. Your kidneys are in terrible shape.”57 
Also joining Cleaver’s story in that issue is the article “Hunger in 
America” by U.S. Senator Jacob Javits, who had joined Senator and 
later President Johnson in supporting both the 1957 and 1964 civil 
rights bills. The story itself chronicles the sort of material and spiritual 
poverty that precipitates Stacy’s pursuit of meaning, which is caught 
between his desire to act and to belong. In Javits’s account, identity 
becomes a plural, social sense of selfhood defined in space, subculture 
as a place of mind, described as “that underground world, psychologi-
cally as far beneath the consciousness of a city’s solid citizens as a 
city’s sewerage system is beneath its streets.”58 Individuals and social 
groups both are collectives, and ghettoized communities become the 
cultural unconscious of the society that suppresses them. In a related 
vein, the two issues of Playboy immediately prior to the one featuring 
“The Flashlight” offer articles on “the demise of Freudianism” that 
survey psychoanalytic approaches less invested in personal history than 
in community. So the very psychoanalytic emphases on individuation 
and personal history that Rout reads in “The Flashlight” are resisted 
not only in the text itself, but also in the context of its original pub-
lication.
 Cleaver’s own most fully developed theoretical framework of 
sociohistorical analysis focuses on the racial difference and oppres-
sion he describes as blocked in his earlier parody of Freudian psycho-
analysis. In “The Allegory of the Black Eunuchs” and “The Primeval 
Mitosis,”59 he offers a structure of difference on the twin axes of race 
and gender, defining black and white men and women with respect 
to one another in terms of sexual desire, power, body, and mind, all 
key points of reference in Anti-Oedipus as well. Cleaver identifies four 
allegorical types. The white man as Omnipotent Administrator—the 
mind of systemic power suffering from the “negation and abdica-
tion of his Body”—is in dialectical opposition to the black man, 
the Supermasculine Menial. The white woman, as “beautiful dumb 
blonde” and Ultrafeminine, is desired by men black and white, but 
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available only to the white, who, lacking the body, can never fully 
satisfy her. The black woman is therefore the abject object, Subfemi-
nine, subordinate by gender and race, but nevertheless the “strong 
self-reliant Amazon.” The image binding these types draws straight 
from confinement: the “two sets of handcuffs that have all four of us 
tied together.”60 The allegory escapes the symbolic for the concrete 
by being embodied in Cleaver’s own desires, which are symptomatic 
of the history of racism and slavery in the United States that situates 
white men as conceiving of themselves as superior to black men. 
Given the economic circumstances of production, that superiority 
made black men the force of labor, body without mind to white 
men’s mind without body. Black femininity twins and exacerbates 
this double hierarchy.
 In Cleaver’s description, the surrender of the body inadvertently 
relinquishes the (Freudian) phallus to black masculinity while main-
taining social power (the Lacanian phallus), creating a network of 
blocked desire in a set of relationships of gender and race, the rela-
tionships that determine class and sexuality. Estranged from the body, 
white masculinity hysterically asserts dominion over the physicality 
the body lacks, and thus desires, in blackness. Black masculinity desires 
the white femininity from which it is barred, and is also separated 
from black femininity in the shame of its inferiority. White feminin-
ity can only be satisfied by the bodily engagement whiteness has 
surrendered, and black femininity “is lost between two worlds.”61 
There are of course clear problems with this model, the greatest of 
which include how class becomes a symptom of race and gender, 
how homosexuality is denigrated, and how black women are doubly 
subjugated.62 Still, that model has some critical use-value with regard 
to literary study, though only a few have noticed. As early as 1974, 
Robert Felgar points out in Negro American Literature how the theory 
might apply to Richard Wright’s Native Son.63
 Cleaver recognizes the introductory nature of his analysis. “Just 
how this [psychosexual dynamic] works itself out is a problem for 
analysis by sociologists and social psychologists on the mass level, 
and the headshrinkers and nutcrackers on the individual level.”64 
The pejorative phrase headshrinkers and nutcrackers marks Cleaver’s 
reiteration of his dismissal of conventional psychoanalysis, focusing 
instead on outlining study for “social psychologists on the mass level.” 
He is less concerned with what such ideological structures mean than 
with what they do. Deleuze and Guattari would similarly challenge 
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psychoanalysis in their own formulation of schizoanalysis. Cleaver’s 
attention to indices of difference and the interplay among diverse 
textualities in Soul on Ice should be recognized in cultural-studies 
and postcolonial-theory approaches sensitive to history, identifica-
tion, and alterity. Certainly his analysis is preparatory: “What we are 
outlining here is a perspective from which such analysis might be best 
approached.”65 Cleaver’s heuristic is provocative because it develops 
a model of cultural psychology implicated in historical process; it 
is compelling because its deployment even acknowledges its pre-
liminary role. Cleaver advocates a plural psychoanalysis in order to 
trace the historical causes of cultural conflict—specifically the national 
divides along lines of race, class, gender, and sexuality, of which, he 
argues, his own criminality and incarceration are symptomatic.
 There were clear difficulties for some in treating violence as 
a symptom. In 1968, the year of the publication of Soul on Ice and the 
student strikes at Berkeley, where Cleaver was teaching an experimen-
tal course, California’s governor, Ronald Reagan, warned, “If Eldridge 
Cleaver is allowed to teach our children, they may come home one 
night and slit our throats.”66 That year also saw Reagan contend for 
the Republican nomination for president against both Nixon and 
Rockefeller, even as Cleaver headed the Peace and Freedom Party. 
The oedipal fear demonstrated in the warning by the governor is 
generalized in the address of “our children,” a generational anxiety 
that begs the sort of mass-level social psychology Cleaver advocates.
 Reagan was not alone in pointing to Cleaver. Prison officials regu-
larly commented on Soul on Ice from 1970 to 1972, and some did so 
as derisively as Reagan, even as they, like Cleaver, dismissed psycho-
analytic inquiry—but without proposing an alternative, as he did. For 
example, one ACA presenter in 1970 suggests that penal practices are 
about to undergo a paradigm change, making the requisite gesture to 
Thomas Kuhn. The participant suggests that the rehabilitation model 
of the individual is “attributable to Sigmund Freud,” but it is about 
to change to a model of a community of citizens.67 However, that 
speaker then specifically distances himself from the primacy on social 
environment and its history maintained in Soul on Ice. “Eldridge 
Cleaver tells his followers that crimes committed by members of 
the Black minority are not crimes at all but protests against and 
compensation for deprivation. Of course this rationalization will not 
do.”68 The speaker does recognize a need for change and recommends 
a social renewal akin to Johnson’s “Great Society” in broad-based 
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programs, but in his view, the present and the past, and the social and 
the particular, cannot have any bearing on one another.
 The year after Attica saw the divided image of the black pris-
oner as incorrigible and revolutionary further separate. The split is 
reflected in the perceptions of Cleaver. For instance, the San Quentin 
associate warden, an ACA participant, dismisses both psychoanalysis 
and self-proclaimed political prisoners: “During the 50 years of the 
psychoanalytic fad, prisoners became quite skilled in tracing their 
aberrations to unhappy early experiences.” The associate warden 
goes on to make a joking reference to prisoners exchanging the 
oedipal epithet—likely the only reference to “motherfucker” in the 
137 years of the ACA proceedings.69 In addition, he claims con-
temptuously, “Handsome rewards have been furnished men who gave 
themselves whole-heartedly to the role of ‘political prisoner,’” a part 
he links specifically to Cleaver. The warden’s anxiety, like Reagan’s 
hysterical fears, is inspired by Cleaver’s fusion of his various identi-
ties of black man, convict, political prisoner, writer, teacher, political 
leader, and candidate for office (at various times, Cleaver cam-
paigned for president, senator, mayor, and city council member). That 
social fear was the sort of phenomenon for which he offered an 
investigative approach.
 Some participants in the annual conference recognized aspects 
of this. Two participants suggest Soul on Ice to prison administrators 
because it describes contemporary “racial questions.” One, a soci-
ologist, recommends the book twice and describes how a colleague 
“became physically ill for three days because of his reaction to read-
ing” it.70 The individual body’s illness itself becomes symptomatic 
of its social investments, a description of physical sickness that has 
its own parallel in Soul on Ice, when Cleaver’s bodily illness is the 
response to the estrangement of and challenge to racial expectation.71 
That anonymous prison sociologist’s violent reaction to the book is a 
physical embodiment of the “convulsive spasms of change” perceived 
as imminent in the United States in 1968, according to both the ACA 
president and Cleaver. Personal and social bodies and their violent 
reactions are understood best historically as part of not the personal 
past but the larger cultural histories of difference and conflict.
 In his own analysis, Cleaver’s utopian vision for fulfilling that 
struggle is one in which the bodies of black men and women are 
the “wealth of a nation,” the “human raw material upon which the 
future of society depends and with which, through the implacable 
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march of history to an ever broader base of democracy and equal-
ity, the society will renew and transform itself.”72 Those mechanics 
of a cross-gender Marxist vision resemble the future articulated by 
George Jackson in Soledad Brother and Blood in My Eye. Though Jack-
son is far less optimistic than Cleaver regarding the inevitability of 
transformation, he also links gender equality to revolutionary change: 
“The black man and the black female must be, as I have mentally 
ordered things, completely joined in the act of liberation.” In a letter 
to Angela Davis, Jackson reiterates his position on a “woman’s role” 
in revolution: “the very same as a man’s.”73 The necessity of cross-
gender unity in reading race struggle in terms of class highlights the 
degree to which black masculinity relates to black femininity in its 
formation. Jackson describes this most completely when he claims, 
“The strongest impetus a man will ever have, in an individual sense, 
will come from a woman he admires.” With some of his correspon-
dence with women, Jackson acknowledges an unbridgeable gulf in 
gender difference: “As a woman, you just do not (and I guess never 
will) understand what it means to be a man in this particular situation 
here in the U.S.” However, with Davis, Jackson acknowledges that in 
“generalizing about black women I could never include you in any 
of it that is not complimentary.” Perhaps Jackson’s highest accolade for 
Davis comes in a near aside, in which he places her along with other 
Black Panther leaders: “The leadership of the black prison popula-
tion now definitely identifies with Huey, Bobby, Angela, Eldridge, 
and antifascism.”74 Jackson’s final position on gender difference with 
regard to race in those letters seems to be akin to Cleaver’s before him, 
and to Deleuze and Guattari’s after: revolutionary politics overwrites 
differences of identity, whether gender or race.
 At the close of Soul on Ice, Cleaver’s rosy Marxist version of the 
future gives way to a utopian romance in the subsequent and final 
ending of the book, in which Cleaver invokes the black woman to 
claim her place not as Subfeminine but as sovereign: “Put on your 
crown, my Queen, and we will build a New City on these ruins.”75 
While previously adopting the social and historical sense of self that 
Deleuze and Guattari type as schizophrenic, he remains enamored 
with the individual autonomy that is quite literally Oedipus, the sin-
gular king to match the queen. It is difficult to sort exactly to what 
degree desire here flows away from the postulate of a social subject, to 
what extent the allegorical singular is part-for-whole, or a retreat to 
imagined autonomy. Likely the problematic final section so at odds 
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with much of the rest of the book is, in some measure, an apology for 
the third part, the letters to and from his white female lawyer, letters 
that Ishmael Reed dismisses in his preface to the book as “gushing” 
and “cloying.”76 Jackson is at times equally gushing. He writes to his 
black confidante Davis in the same manner that Cleaver relied on 
his white lawyer, Axelrod. “I’m thinking about you,” pens Jackson. 
“I’ve done nothing else all day. This photograph that I have of you 
is not adequate. Do you recall what Eldridge said regarding pictures 
for the cell?”77 Of course, what Cleaver said about pictures of women 
on cell walls is a bit complicated, as he makes his “pin-up girl” his 
wife, to “fall in love with her and lavish my affections upon her.”78 
However, it is this picture of a white woman that prompts Cleaver’s 
self-described “nervous breakdown,” which subsequently leads to his 
heightened consciousness of race and gender.
 It is thus possible that the final conclusion of romantic adoration of 
black women in Soul on Ice is Cleaver’s effort to write over that earlier 
conflict and his own attraction to Axelrod. The move is less a bait 
and switch of individual and social subjects than a consequence of the 
book’s difficulty: Cleaver shifts so rapidly among various approaches, 
including conflating the personal and the historical, that he often 
(though not always) substitutes vitality for rigor. He clarifies that his 
theorization of race, class, gender, and sexuality in “The Allegory of 
the Black Eunuchs” and “The Primeval Mitosis” is preliminary, and 
like subsequent literary critics of a historicist bent, he ranges among 
documents literary, historical, and popular to provide the basis for his 
cultural critique. However, he does so in a wide-ranging rush and 
with a reliance on the extended quotation of others that at times 
borders on bricolage and can be hasty or wrong.79
 Most often, though, he is successful. One of the final sections of 
the book, “Convalescence,” is a culmination of the earlier theoriza-
tion of the raced and gendered split of mind and body. It reads like a 
Birmingham School cultural-studies polemic, starting with Brown v. 
Board of Education and continuing through an analysis of 1950s and 
’60s popular music and writing inflected by racial critique, a litany 
of injustices that include the lynching of Emmett Till, and a reading 
of the Beatles as minstrels playing a black Jesus performing the Eucha-
rist.80 This approach is so broad as to seem scattered, though it is held 
together by Cleaver’s fierce style and wit and remains a powerful and 
playful model of cultural criticism as a capstone to a book that has a 
too-unremarked place in the history of theory. As the investigations 
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Cleaver engages have taken firmer root and seen tremendous elabo-
ration in historically nuanced cultural studies, critics have mistakenly 
passed over his work that adopts, combines, and deploys what were 
at the time largely nascent lines of inquiry in U.S. letters. Soul on Ice 
is valuable strictly in this regard. As an adaptation of Marxist histori-
cism, Cleaver’s book is part of a tradition that transformed Marx’s 
single gravitational point of class to a more complex system of race, 
gender, class, and other categories of human experience, the fault lines 
of history.
 In addition, his indictment of 1960s U.S. geopolitics speaks directly 
to the history of now, at the start of the twenty-first century, when 
critics regularly compare current international conflicts to those of 
1968. Cleaver argues that a conservative presidency and Congress 
can “manipulate the people by playing upon the have-gun-will-travel 
streak in America’s character.”81 His point about Vietnam echoes in 
the United States today, with its international and domestic policies 
of violence and domination, particularly with regard to the war in 
Iraq and the limits on civil liberties: “Justice is secondary. Security is 
the byword.”82 Furthermore, catalogs and studies of prison writing 
in the vein of Chevigny’s and Franklin’s demonstrate the tendency 
to autobiography and to testifying on one’s own behalf. Soul on Ice 
expands on this tendency to include not only the prison writer’s self-
reflection—or mirroring of the culture that incarcerates—but also his 
reflection on that culture, situating the condition of imprisonment in 
a much larger cultural history. For Cleaver, celebrating those efforts 
faces its own difficulties, given the crimes of theft, assault, and rape 
that preceded his imprisonment, and the degree to which he argues 
that those criminal efforts were part of his will to become. The most 
vituperatively dismissive critics of Soul on Ice read it as if the book 
were an apologist autobiography, a blame-casting story of “I.” For 
example, the conservative nonprofit Intercollegiate Studies Institute 
places it, along with Mailer’s Armies of the Night, among the fifty 
worst books of the twentieth century.83 However, Cleaver far more 
often writes against that sense of self. Speaking for himself becomes 
Cleaver’s strategy of testifying to larger scars of history.
 At a quite literal level of identity, Cleaver ceased to be a pris-
oner through writing, as his writing encouraged the activist efforts 
(including Mailer’s) that saw his release. In a more theorized sense, 
Cleaver’s model of self produced discursively most often resembles a 
social subjectivity, the self that extends past the skin to create space 
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for radical consciousness beyond the isolation of individuality. It is not 
just that Cleaver assigns too much responsibility for his criminality to 
social and historical forces. Soul on Ice provides more space than that 
for the multiple points of view of lived experience situated in history, 
as opposed to the rhetoric of singular autonomy, of the individual 
versus history. There is a tension in the relationship between the sin-
gular and plural, the both-and of the subject in history. For Cleaver, 
this is manifest in how sexual desires of the body are shaped by the 
sedimentary history forming the social, how his desire for his white 
lawyer and his desire to desire the allegorical black woman belong 
both to him and to a broader culture in which he, she, whiteness, and 
blackness are all constituted.
 In 1968 many readers of Soul on Ice were prepared to view the 
prisoner, particularly the black male prisoner, in political and his-
torical terms. As exhibited in the ACA transcripts, even some prison 
officials could accept the book and its author as resisting U.S. racism, 
understanding both as revolutionary. Leading prison administrators 
held the perspective that historical and social forces shape incarcera-
tion. However, through the 1970s the ACA focused on keeping up 
with the radical expansion of imprisonment, irrespective of mitigat-
ing factors or alternative judicial responses. The decade following 
the appearance of Soul on Ice marked diminishing possibilities in 
the condition of prisoners as subjects of and representatives for the 
United States. The 1970s saw the radical foreclosure of possibility 
for discussions of race, criminality, and incarceration. Many factors 
contributed to the change, including the expanded imprisonment 
of drug users, the demonization and dismantling from inside and 
out of the Black Panther organization, the misrepresentation of the 
revolt at Attica, the failure to account for alternatives to imprison-
ment, and the notoriety of violent, apolitical prisoners such as Jack 
Henry Abbot—and, as we will see in the next chapter, Gary Gilmore. 
Incarceration became the sole solution to nearly every criminological 
problem, and blackness equated to criminality without any sense of 
social or historical factors, even as imprisonment, in its widespread 
imagination, presumed guilt of violent, most often murderous crime. 
Cleaver named the problem and began a strategy of analysis that his 
readers, even those among prisons’ top administrators, recognized in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s. Given the tremendous expansion in 
imprisonment in the intervening decades and incarceration’s increas-
ingly stark differences of race, how can we not return to his analysis 
now?
ne of the activists who helped arrange Eldridge Cleaver’s 
1966 release from prison was Norman Mailer. It was one of 
his several associations with prison writers over the decades, most 
infamously his work to see convicted murderer Jack Henry Abbott 
published and freed—only to have Abbott kill again and return 
to prison. However, it is neither his work with Cleaver nor his work 
with Abbott but his story of convicted killer Gary Gilmore that 
became his most acclaimed writing, the Pulitzer Prize–winning The 
Executioner’s Song. Like Soul on Ice, Mailer’s text faces challenging 
questions of genre between biography and history, between nonfiction 
and fiction, and how the book speaks for itself cannot determine the 
matter. The back cover of the 1998 Vintage International Edition2 
splits the difference, as its category code lists it as “Literature/Current 
Affairs.” The accompanying praise from the Miami Herald identifies 
it as “literature of the highest order,” but Random House broadens 
that claim to begin the jacket summary with the phrase “in this 
The Executioner’s Song
and the Narration of History
He had come to decide that the center of America might be insane.
—Norman Mailer, The Armies of the Night1
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monumental work of journalism.”3 The ambiguity is a consequence of 
Mailer’s method, wherein the narration of history is as much a sub-
ject of the book as the imprisoned and executed Gilmore, a national 
history written in the story of its then most famous prisoner.
 The years 1968 through 1979 marked a fundamental shift in the 
direction of cultural change for the nation as embodied in the stories 
of its prisoners, a shift from revolutionary possibility, from politicized 
racial and criminal identities and the social responsibility for them, 
to a nation exhausted by perceived threats of change, race, crime, and 
plural identity. The shift in corrections practice contributed to the 
widespread imagination of prisoners as “not only violent but danger-
ous and bad”—as Gavin Stevens reads Butch Beauchamp—even as 
prisons grew overcrowded, filling with nonviolent offenders such as 
drug users. Like Soul on Ice, The Executioner’s Song testifies on behalf 
of prisoners, makes the accused present in the court of public opinion, 
and also like Cleaver, Mailer uses the term schizophrenia to describe 
social contradictions. However, representative of the shift in the treat-
ment of prisoners, instead of Cleaver’s cultural and political “we,” 
there is Gilmore’s alienated and apolitical “I.” Nevertheless, the bleak-
ness of the latter’s autonomy is undermined, as Mailer simultaneously 
implicates Gilmore in history and documents its narrativization, the 
process by which the past “becomes.” This chapter shows that Mailer 
writes national history in Gilmore’s story. The writer identifies not 
with his ostensible subject in the prisoner, but with the producer 
Larry Schiller and thereby with the process of telling history. The 
Executioner’s Song presents Gilmore’s double bind, his wish to “not 
be” that represents the impossible desire both for autonomy and for 
opting out of history, a desire the book itself thwarts. In that tension 
Mailer describes the diminishing possibilities of prison history, and 
thereby national history, in 1979; in the place of a Black Panther who 
ran for president a decade before, the nation focused on a racist white 
sociopath fighting for his own execution.
 The 1972 Furman v. Georgia decision regarding the death pen-
alty ended a decade-long series of appeals, ruling in favor of three 
black men sentenced to death in the South, one for murder and two 
for rape. In their decision, the Supreme Court placed a moratorium 
on the death penalty because the racial bias of its practice violated 
not only the Eighth Amendment but also the Fourteenth, the latter 
enacted after the Civil War to protect the newly established rights 
of black Americans.4 However, while the court’s decision sanctioned 
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what had been an unofficial moratorium since 1967, the ruling also 
laid the grounds on which states could make the death penalty con-
stitutional. The Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of those 
revised codes in 1976, and the ten-year hiatus ended in 1977 with 
Gary Gilmore’s voluntary execution, a matter that drew the nation’s 
(and Mailer’s) attention.
 Mailer goes further than Cleaver in exploring how “modern life 
is schizoid.” Schizophrenia is one of Mailer’s preferred words, which he 
associates variously with “modern life”; with an “American public” in 
its view of Nixon, its view of international wars and domestic race 
relations, and its view of policemen and criminals all the same; and 
with the American dream, activist students, and the popular percep-
tion of the Vietnam War.5 Mailer is not particularly consistent in his 
use of the term, nor rigorous in his pursuit of it—it is among his 
favorites, after all, so he wears it in a wide range of fashions. Still, 
like Deleuze and Guattari’s schizophrenic, the narrated “Mailer,” the 
“reporter” of both Miami and the Siege of Chicago and The Armies of 
the Night, is constituted in his partial and conflicting investments with 
various groups. He is both a part of and apart from the cocktail party 
of liberal academics, the marchers at the Pentagon, and his fellow 
protesters in jail in The Armies of the Night.
 In particular, racial conflicts are cast in the terms of the “schizo-
phrenia” he describes in Miami and Armies as the “ranch-house life” 
divided on cultural lines, the normalcy of the American dream con-
cealing sharp divides between black and white.6 He documents his 
own participation at the line of that very division at the Chicago 
Democratic Convention. He distances himself from sharing ideals 
with black leftists until his guilt gets the better of him when, onstage, 
“some young Negro from the Panthers or the Rangers or from 
where he did not know” raises their black and white hands clasped 
together, and Mailer feels “rueful at unkind thoughts of late.” These 
thoughts include Mailer having admitted earlier, albeit grudgingly, 
that “he was getting tired of Negroes and their rights.”7 Like the 
Cleaver early on in Soul on Ice, both loving and hating white women, 
the Mailer of 1968 proves deeply divided in his allegiances. Unlike 
Cleaver, and unlike Deleuze and Guattari, Mailer is less prepared to 
allow a tenuously shared radical project to supersede race in iden-
tification. There is no ghost of John Brown circulating in Mailer’s 
writing.
 Eleven years later, The Executioner’s Song produces, rather than 
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claims, this sense of the schizophrenic, though the nation fulfilled 
the writer’s expectation of exhaustion at the questions of race and 
revolution. Mailer’s use of “schizophrenia” in 1968 describes lived 
contradiction; his writing in 1979 embodies it, as it shifts from the 
individual point of view to the social. Armies of the Night opens with 
Time magazine’s account of Mailer’s speech at the Ambassador The-
ater and then his arrest at the Pentagon,8 a shred of the historical 
record the book in its entirety retells and expands. The point of 
view may be the third person, but the author remains the first char-
acter, his unspoken “I” the reader’s eye, his point of view the guide 
as much as Cleaver’s in Soul on Ice. In contrast, Mailer is absent as a 
character in The Executioner’s Song, and the entire work consists of 
competing points of view, incorporating diverse documents to record 
not only history but also its narrativization, the way those who tell 
the story shape the events even as the participants do. The book, in 
both topic and focus, capitulates to the virtual abandonment of racial 
questions, cultural change, and plural identity that characterizes the 
shift in national tenor from eleven years before, instead emphasizing 
an antisocial and apolitical Gilmore’s relentless quest for the death 
that asserts his individual autonomy. However, the ways that Mailer 
narrates the desire to not be demonstrate that there is no path out of 
the sociality of history and its conflicts, in which individuals embody 
political positions, and narrativization is at once a matter of personal 
identification and the retroactive production of contradictory views.
 Such contradiction defines the novel’s fragmented and episodic 
narrative of a multitude of perspectives. Toward the end of the book, 
at Gilmore’s execution, the warden reads what one viewer describes 
as “some official document,” which he hears only as “blah, blah, 
blah.” Mailer overwrites the official papers of that business with com-
peting responses to Gilmore’s own words, “Let’s do it.” Gilmore’s 
uncle, Vern Damico, views the statement as demonstrating the “most 
pronounced amount of courage,” but the lawyer Ron Stanger sees 
instead that his former client “couldn’t think of anything profound.”9 
Such accounts are not merely different interpretations of the same 
event but are exactly opposite, the conflict in perception rendered 
visible as Mailer offers some twenty competing fragments of seven 
points of view of the execution. Mailer critic Robert Merrill, in an 
otherwise excellent analysis of the novel, reads this episode as “per-
haps the most powerful in all of Mailer’s writing,” which may or may 
not be the case. He also identifies the scene as “perceived in much 
the same way by everyone present,” which is not accurate.10
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 The assessment of the literary execution of the scene is pertinent 
to the resemblance between the writer of the book and its primary 
character. Two of Gilmore’s writers, Barry Farrell and Larry Schiller, 
agree that when Gilmore describes the murders he committed, he 
adopts the “same narrative style every hustler and psychopath would 
give you of the most boring, or the most extraordinary evening [ . . . . ] 
Episodic and unstressed.”11 It is a rhetorical gambit on Mailer’s part 
in that if his own highly episodic narrative is similarly unstressed 
and flat in its account of both the boring and the extraordinary, 
then the narrator of the novel is as psychopathic as Gilmore. Mailer’s 
biographer Mary V. Dearborn misses this point when she lauds the 
“equal emphasis” of  “each detail of the story,” particularly surrounding 
Jensen’s murder.12 Regardless, psychopath is not a term from which 
Mailer—once arrested for stabbing his wife—necessarily would with-
hold in describing himself.
 Multiple perspectives define the second half of the book, which 
incorporates not only transcripts of interviews but also excerpts from 
newspapers. Two lengthy accounts that follow the execution include 
stories carried by the Salt Lake Tribune: “ACLU Calls Hansen Murder 
Accomplice,” and “Justice Has Been Served, Hansen Says of Execu-
tion.”13 Again, the juxtaposed articles offer diametrically opposed per-
spectives of the same event. The contradiction resembles aspects of 
Soul on Ice, wherein Cleaver describes his simultaneous love and hate 
for white and black women—and his racial desires and crimes—as 
symptomatic of larger cultural divides. Mailer mostly dodges the issue 
of race and desire in depicting such divisions. Schizophrenia in The 
Executioner’s Song functions as a social negative capability, wherein it 
is not in an individual’s capacity to sustain mystery or contradiction; 
rather, it is a society’s ability to do so and not tear itself apart.
 Such deliberate social commentary in the novel has not escaped 
critique. Jonathan Dee focuses the problem of genre, suggesting that 
the blurring of story and history imagines that “the chasm between 
action and self—between the record we leave behind on this earth 
and the hidden complexity of the living mind—has been closed. 
We can call it, for lack of a better term, the birth of the psycho- 
historical novel.”14 Dee condemns this impulse, concluding that such 
works signal the surrender of the novel’s “unreal power to apprehend, 
and meditate on, the nature of our existence.”15 Dee’s use of the 
term unreal emphasizes both fiction’s extreme power and lack of the 
real. In effect, constructing the interiority of actual people based on 
their historical documents represents a disavowal of the novel’s proper 
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authority, a slip from meditation to mediation, from philosophy to 
history, from imagination to psychology.
 However, the differences between these categories have grown 
complicated in the wake of deconstruction and other aspects of post-
modernity in the writing of fiction and history, and in the analysis 
of each. Furthermore, this book focuses on texts that challenge dis-
tinctions between personal and social history, restlessly and relent-
lessly trafficking back and forth between imagination and history. In 
addition, Mailer’s method of writing Gilmore by integrating various 
textualities has as much to do with illuminating Gilmore as it has to 
do with the writer’s own dissimulation. Mailer encounters the dif-
ficulty of representing imprisonment defined by concealment, and 
the text regularly features the subterfuge and mediation of television 
producers, journalists, lawyers, and others attempting to interview 
Gilmore, often thwarted by prison policies and Supreme Court rulings 
such as Nolan v. Fitzpatrick (1971) and Pell v. Procunier (1974), which 
allowed and then limited such contact. However, Mailer’s meticulous 
account and his formidable sources are also vain efforts to conceal 
his discursive authority in a surfeit of documents, the effort to write 
a story of man and nation with an invisible hand.
 Because of that effort, contextualizing The Executioner’s Song within 
larger fields of discourse seems a little redundant, particularly with 
regard to documents of law and history, as those tactics of literary 
scholarship with a historicist bent are already part of the discursive 
strategy of the novel. There is the author’s general treatment of history 
as a novel and the novel as history, the declared subtitle of Armies of 
the Night and undeclared assumption of much of his work, most espe-
cially the “true life novel” account of Gilmore’s difficult end. These 
are not actual events rewritten as fiction in the vein of John Dos 
Passos’s U.S.A. (1937),16 or, regarding crime and punishment, Native 
Son. Richard Wright acknowledges in “How ‘Bigger’ Was Born” 
that “the newspaper items and some of the incidents in Native Son 
are but fictionalized versions of the Robert Nixon case and rewrites 
of news stories from the Chicago Tribune.”17 Mailer interweaves his 
piecework account of Gilmore with headlines and opening excerpts 
from the Salt Lake Tribune and other papers and their account of 
events Mailer sees as related to the episodes of his text.
 For example, one page incorporates a letter from Gilmore to his 
lover Nicole, a narrative account of the Utah attorney general’s cita-
tion of Pell v. Procunier, and a newspaper excerpt on Gilmore’s exe-
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cution status complete with a neighboring headline, “Carter Wins 
Election.”18 Mailer in his text offers a flurry of claims and counter-
claims for the reader to sort. However, juxtaposition is not analysis, 
and Mailer acknowledges in the afterword that his hand has shaped 
the material not only in selection but also in choosing for and against 
competing accounts, reorganizing, rewriting, and entirely re-creating 
certain moments.19 To some degree, Mailer’s effort to write himself 
out of The Executioner’s Song functions as a response to the excesses 
of in propria persona in Armies and Miami, where he speaks too much 
for himself.
 In comparison to both Mailer’s earlier work and to Soul on Ice, 
where Cleaver at times testifies for himself, The Executioner’s Song 
seems to offer a much different puzzle, as it attempts to efface the 
author’s view in a meticulous documentary narrative through which 
to locate Gilmore. That effort bears on the central question here 
of testimony and the competing forces of the want to not be and 
the will to become, of unwriting and writing the prisoner as a sub-
ject in history. Mailer, in incorporating hundreds and hundreds of 
“interviews, documents, records of court proceedings, and other 
original material,”20 creates a pastiche of competing scripts regard-
ing Gilmore’s plotted execution. Still, Mailer’s involvement is bound 
inextricably with the work of Schiller, who purchased the media 
rights to Gilmore’s life and death, and is thus the proprietor of the 
records and the recorders. Mailer acknowledges in his postscript his 
debt to the interviews Schiller conducted with Nicole, the basis for 
the narration of “this factual account—this, dare I say it, true life 
story, with its real names and real lives—as if it were a novel. [ . . . ] 
Without Schiller, it would not have been feasible to attempt the sec-
ond half of The Executioner’s Song.”21 The Schiller of the text offers 
more than an indispensable source for the narrative; in his obsession 
with recording the truth through documenting history, he becomes a 
stand-in for Mailer. In the attempt to write Gilmore (and the United 
States), Mailer instead writes himself in the mirror of Schiller; Mailer 
misrecognizes himself in Schiller, perhaps because he expected but 
failed to do so in Gilmore. The shift occurs to some extent because 
of the schism between Mailer’s schizoanalytic method and his desire 
for a romantic subject, a unified self that finally proves impoverished 
in the face of historical process and its narrativization that thereby 
shapes subsequent history.
 Mailer works from a diverse set of texts in writing the bulk of The 
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Executioner’s Song, three-quarters of it set in jail and prison, and thus 
having the most in common with Soul on Ice. It is the second section 
that has seen less critical review,22 and this bulk of the novel features 
the excerpts from local and national media accounts. Many of those 
newspaper, magazine, and television descriptions were regulated by 
Schiller and Gilmore: the photocopied letters, the interview questions 
and transcripts, their piecemeal publication in Playboy, the reports 
Schiller’s team leaked to the press or the reports from journalists who 
accessed Gilmore despite Schiller’s best efforts.
 The writer Schiller contracted for that Playboy article, Barry Far-
rell, began the role of writing Gilmore, a role that Mailer plays more 
fully in The Executioner’s Song. What Mailer writes of Farrell he could 
as easily write of himself. Gilmore “was being his own writer,” but 
Farrell “was being given the Gilmore canon, good self-respecting 
convict canon,” and “was loving the job even more than expected 
[ . . . ] What a delight to be altogether out of himself. By God, Barry 
thought, I have all the passions of an archivist. I’m proprietary about 
the material.”23 Drawing upon the prisoner’s own letters to write the 
prisoner resonates with the expansion of habeas corpus in Johnson v. 
Avery, but unlike the writ lawyers Cleaver describes, Farrell is not in 
prison. The thought Mailer locates in Farrell here is a provocative 
one: there is an attitude of ownership in Mailer’s use of “proprietary,” 
balanced by the abandonment of Farrell’s own identity in being “alto-
gether out of himself.” The textualization of the prisoner charts a 
discursive space in between, and mutually occupied by, Gilmore and 
his writer, two men who have never met but whose language together 
produces “Gilmore,” who is thereafter shaped by Mailer.
 The Executioner’s Song conducts, in the register of fiction, a histo-
riography of its present as it simultaneously conducts and reveals the 
historical narrativization in the stops and starts of multiple channels of 
communication. For example, there were the questions invented and 
revised by Farrell and Schiller, posed to Gilmore by the lawyers Bob 
Moody and Stanger, answered by Gilmore, recorded on tape by the 
lawyers, and transcribed by Schiller’s secretaries. These questions and 
answers became documentation that served as a sort of raw material 
first for Farrell and then for Mailer, even as Schiller released pieces 
of the story to the news agencies in an effort to control the wider 
representation. Critics too quick to underwrite that mediation thereby 
overwrite the relationship between Mailer and Gilmore.24
 In 1976–77 Gary Gilmore offered Mailer a true-life Stephen 
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Rojack, from An American Dream, to make it real, a proxy for “the 
themes I’ve been dealing with all my life,”25 but a person other than 
the author so that he could try his hand at writing himself out of the 
story. As he does for Schiller, Gilmore presents for Mailer the oppor-
tunity to render history through writing a person (other than himself) 
in history. Mailer does face a problem, in that he admits: “When I 
started The Executioner’s Song, I thought I would like him [Gilmore] 
more than I did.”26 Mailer was not alone in that response, as the vari-
ous writers involved in the process of collaborative narration regarded 
Gilmore similarly, including the convict himself, Farrell, and Schiller. 
Gilmore regularly recognized himself in negative terms, harboring 
uncontrollable, sourceless violence, though he repeatedly blocked any 
desire to trace that criminality to any childhood cause.27
 Others attempted to resolve that difficulty in searching for a con-
ventional psychoanalytic causality for violence. According to Farrell, 
“The key to every violent criminal could be found in the file of his 
childhood beatings, but Gilmore claimed his mother never touched 
him, and his father never bothered to.”28 Like Farrell, Schiller turns 
to such an oedipal model as an interpretive framework when he 
questions Gilmore with regard to his childhood relationship with his 
mother, offering, in that interrogation, the recognition: “Maybe that’s 
psychoanalytic bullshit, and if so, I stand accused.” Gilmore’s mother, 
Bessie, is more circumspect, suggesting that, regarding her son, she 
did not know “how much was her fault, and how much was the fault 
of the ongoing world.”29 From the late 1960s through the 1970s, 
Cleaver, ACA prison officials, and even Playboy may have begun 
acknowledging that Freudian and Adlerian emphases on childhood 
history were limited and limiting, but in 1979 journalists and produc-
ers were still testing those worn paths of inquiry.
 Even Mailer himself occasionally turns to such psychoanalytic 
expectation, as the first of the book’s three endings turns back to 
Gilmore’s mother saying that she has the same guts Gary has, before 
turning to himself with his own prison rhyme, then his apologia.30 
However, Mailer more often turns away from the psychoanalytic, 
using the personal as a springboard for broader inquiry. For example, 
Nicole Baker once asks Gilmore if he is the devil, a comparison her 
sister makes as well, and in a long letter to her, he writes, “I might 
be further from God than I am from the devil,” a letter that con-
cludes with his referring to her as “Angel,” a repeated nickname.31 
The psychoanalytic talking cure of such free-form letters becomes a 
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methodological starting point for exposition extending well beyond 
the personal. Rather than leave the devils and angels in the realm of 
the imaginary, expressive of the personal, Mailer makes them con-
crete and social. He titles chapter 32 “The Angels and the Demons 
Meet the Devils and the Saints,” which focuses not at all on Gilmore 
directly but entirely on the legal struggle, the contest among many 
groups for determining Gilmore’s fate. Mailer sees in the person of 
Gilmore a center of gravity by which to organize the claims and 
counterclaims, the Eastern and Western Voices that are the two halves 
of the book and the nation.
 In the process of writing how Gilmore, in his celebrity, becomes 
a screen for the nation, it is not Gilmore but the producer Schiller 
who becomes Mailer’s proxy in the text. Mailer repeatedly describes 
Schiller as obsessed with recording history, in part for personal pres-
tige, to be a man of truth. Schiller tells himself, “You recorded his-
tory right. If you did the work that way, you could end up a man 
of substance.”32 More often, however, Schiller’s attention is less to his 
own “substance”—what he is made of—and more to the stuff of the 
real, history as truth. In a telegram Schiller writes to Gilmore, the 
former states, “I am here to record history, not to get involved in it,” 
a claim he immediately overturns in acknowledging that he is already 
in the story.33 To the lawyers, Moody and Stanger, who become the 
interview mediators Schiller uses to communicate with Gilmore after 
being banned from the prison because he is a film producer, Schil-
ler says, “Forget Larry Schiller the businessman . . . That’s a side of 
me, but we’re forgetting it. We have history here. We have to get 
that. [ . . . ] It’s all part of history.” When he tells himself the story 
of what he is doing, Schiller says, “For the first time, Schiller, you 
can’t fictionalize, you can’t make it up, you can’t embroider,” as such 
embellishment would run counter to his “desire to record history, true 
history, not journalistic crap.”34 Schiller obsesses over how he might 
maintain a posture of objectivity, capturing history and placing it on 
view like a curator, accessing and representing an unmediated real. 
Like the character of District Attorney Gavin Stevens at the end of 
Go Down, Moses, who no longer narrates out of hand but must turn 
to the “papers of that business” and meet with the newspaper editor to 
track down what has happened to Butch, Schiller wants not to tell a 
story but to reveal it, even as he orchestrates the revelation. It requires 
some interpretive acrobatics not to read Schiller’s account here as a 
proxy for Mailer’s own purposes in the book, particularly after the 
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incessant self-aggrandizement of Armies of the Night and Miami and 
the Siege of Chicago.
 The proposition that Schiller’s and Mailer’s points of view are 
deeply implicated35 becomes more compelling in the face of the later 
history of their collaboration. Schiller directed the television film 
Master Spy: The Robert Hanssen Story (2002), from Mailer’s screen- 
play, based on the life of the FBI agent and Russian spy, and Schiller 
subsequently authored the novelization of Mailer’s screenplay. The 
working title of the project was Into the Mirror,36 richly suggestive of 
the degree to which the discursive work of each reflects the other. 
The mutual identification that began in their collaboration in the 
case of Gilmore also shows their twin tendencies to write national 
tragedy in particular biographies. Both are obsessed with reading U.S. 
national culture in the lives of its imprisoned antiheroes. For instance, 
in addition to collaborating with Schiller on the stories of Gilm-
ore and Hanssen, Mailer wrote the screenplay adaptation of Schiller’s 
book account, cowritten with James Wilwerth, of the O. J. Simpson 
trial, American Tragedy (1996). Then, too, Mailer has his Oswald’s Tale: 
An American Mystery (1995), while Schiller interviewed Oswald’s killer, 
Jack Ruby, on the latter’s deathbed. Schiller titled his film on Dennis 
Hopper The American Dreamer (1971), and there is Mailer’s fictional 
novel of celebrity murder, An American Dream (1965). Furthermore, 
Mailer considered titling The Executioner’s Song “American Virtue.”37 
In their mutual fascination with imagining the dream of America told 
in the representation of its antiheroes, and through their frequent col-
laboration, even to the extent of rewriting one another’s work, Mailer 
and Schiller offer a reversal of the popular misreading of schizophrenia 
as multiple personality disorder, two voices in one body. Instead, the 
voices of their two bodies become one.
 At stake in those various “true” stories around which they grouped 
their often collaborative efforts is the ability of a criminal case to 
represent a sort of national consciousness. Mailer had grappled with 
these questions before. In an overall negative review of Mailer’s Of a 
Fire on the Moon (1969), Richard Poirier quotes Mailer’s claim that 
“there is an unconscious direction to society, as well as to the indi-
vidual.”38 To a far more successful degree, The Executioner’s Song uses 
Gilmore’s death sentence to conduct its narration of a nation’s fears 
and desires through the diverse array of texts that Mailer employs to 
write the novel. Steve Shoemaker suggests that Mailer’s “The White 
Negro” (1957), in its cross-cultural observation, serves as a proto– 
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New Historicist examination in an anthropological vein.39 In that 
essay, then, Mailer offers a sketch of a method for interpreting the 
subject of culture through the subject in culture.
 Eleven years after “The White Negro,” in Armies of the Night 
Mailer extends that project to understanding cultural history in a 
novel form, the history of now as written by the author participating 
in it. And eleven years after that, The Executioner’s Song refines that 
historiographical imperative by writing the author out of the book, 
though Mailer cannot help but read himself in Schiller. The evolu-
tion of discursive technique represented in these three works also 
marks the high points of Mailer’s oeuvre in terms of critical acclaim, 
as the first is among his most anthologized essays, and the two books 
won Pulitzers for nonfiction and literature, respectively. Like Cleaver, 
then, Mailer works best when blurring distinctions between narrative 
and critique in the challenge of tracing the outline of the subject 
constituted in history. Like Schiller, who does “get involved in it” and 
becomes one of history’s characters whose choices affect the narrative, 
Mailer also plays his part in describing how the narrativization itself 
changes the course of the action.
 The game of finding Mailer is of interest in its own right. How-
ever, that effort takes on greater meaning when keeping in mind the 
degree to which the schizophrenic self emerges in its participation 
in history. Mailer is like Gilmore in that he may “like language” but 
is committed to “tell the truth.” However, unlike Gilmore (and far 
more like Schiller), the Mailer who drafts The Executioner’s Song rec-
ognizes that the truth of history is multiple and conflicting, and is 
shaped in the telling. It is Gilmore who tires of the sounds of others 
and Mailer who reproduces that noise in the competing scripts. That 
incessantly multiperspectival narration is at odds with the object of his 
analysis, with Gilmore’s effort to gather himself at the culmination of 
his violent and aimless personal history that, in retrospect, fulfills his 
deathward trajectory. He admits, upon returning to jail for the two 
murders, “I am in my element now,” and later tells his lawyers-cum-
interviewers, “I figured I’d probably spend the rest of my life in jail 
or commit suicide, or be killed uh, by the police.”40 Paradoxically, all 
of those ends reach fulfillment when Gilmore calls the state’s hand 
in his death sentence, resists the stays of execution purposed on his 
behalf, and faces the riflemen.
 That will to death contrasts with the lack of clarity he has regard-
ing the crimes themselves,41 a reverse of the case of Wright’s “Bigger” 
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Thomas, whose life gains focus in killing even as social and histo-
rial machinations orchestrate his fatalistic trajectory toward execu-
tion. Gilmore looks even less like Cleaver, who views his criminality 
largely as the product of the forces arrayed against him. As a prisoner, 
Gilmore instead resembles Butch Beauchamp, described by Gavin 
Stevens as “some seed not only violent but dangerous and bad,” just 
as Gilmore is frequently violent and describes himself as “vicious” 
and “not a likable person.”42 However, the execution of the character 
Butch comes at the culmination of a genealogical history providing 
coherence for much of the prior episodes of Go Down, Moses. The 
nearly one thousand pages before the scene of Gilmore’s execution 
do not provide a similar sense of cause situating the personal in a 
broader social history.
 The book has less to do with tracing cause for effect—Gilmore’s 
personal history or cultural difference leading him to commit senseless 
murders—than with the complication of causality, of agency, of per-
sonal and social history. Just as acts are never entirely ours, they affect 
more than just us. Documenting “true history” in The Executioner’s 
Song is not as much about meditating on the nature of Gilmore’s 
crime as it is about recording the mediation: the media flurry sur-
rounding his impending execution, the reporting that consequently 
affects the case. Writing history produces a version of events that, in 
its telling, shapes subsequent events, and Mailer represents the process 
of that narrativization and its effects. In response to a New York Times 
front-page article on Gilmore, David Susskind, who early on com-
peted with Schiller for the rights to Gilmore’s story, recalls a story by 
his friend Stanley Greenberg, which Mailer puts forth this way:
Stanley had written a TV story fifteen years ago about a man await-
ing execution. The man had been so long on Death Row that he 
changed in character, and the question became, “Who was being exe-
cuted?” Metamorphosis the play had been called, and Susskind always 
felt that it had had some effect on the end of capital punishment in 
New York State, and maybe even a little to do with the Supreme 
Court decision that saved a lot of men’s lives on Death Row.43
 The teleplay was a script for the series The Defenders, and the 
Supreme Court decision at hand is Furman v. Georgia, a moratorium 
on executions that ended with Gilmore’s death sentence. The assump-
tion is that telling a “true” story can affect history. In a discussion 
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between Susskind and Greenberg regarding a television or film 
account of Gilmore, the latter says, “I even think that reaching a 
large audience can probably save the guy’s life.”44 Early in the devel-
opment of his case, popular representation of Gilmore might have 
made him sufficiently recognizable or sympathetic so as to offer 
reprieve. However, that hope quickly gave way to the emphasis on 
a voluntary execution to end the ten-year hiatus, a more valuable 
media event than a life sentence. The turning point came at a press 
conference featuring Farrell and Dennis Boaz, Gilmore’s lawyer prior 
to Moody and Stanger.
“Don’t you think,” said Barry Farrell, “that if Gilmore isn’t executed, 
he’ll slip right back in with four hundred and twenty-four other 
condemned men and women? A lot of them may have more tragic 
stories than Gilmore.”
 “Gary is the only one,” said Boaz, “who has the courage to face 
the consequences of his act.”
 “How,” asked another reporter, “is Susskind going to do the 
film?”45
 Farrell and Boaz’s dialogue emphasizes the tension between indi-
vidual agency and social identification, foregrounding one of the cen-
tral questions of The Executioner’s Song. The immediate transition to 
the reporter’s banal question, which undercuts their debate, is one 
of the book’s most powerful moments. In The Armies of the Night or 
Miami and the Siege of Chicago, such a disjuncture between history and 
its narration, between a man’s death and the film style of its narra-
tion, between the high and low of human possibility, likely would 
merit an extended expository rant. Here, the sharp turn is not even 
emphasized with a line break. For once, Mailer seems prepared to 
let the seeming artlessness in his words speak for itself. However, 
it would be too easy and inaccurate to cast the reporters as the 
ones whose participation makes Gilmore’s life or death a matter of 
publicity, ratings, and money. When Newsweek put Gilmore on the 
cover, they captioned his mug shot with “DEATH WISH.” His law-
yer, Moody, “felt it gave a big push to the bidding [for his story].”46 
The lawyers themselves, Moody and Stanger, were as much Schiller’s 
link to Gilmore as they were Gilmore’s own legal representatives, 
transceivers in a network that included Gilmore, Schiller, lawyers on 
both sides of the case, the Utah attorney general, the reporters, and 
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the larger media networks themselves. The prison administration was 
involved as well. Director of Corrections Ernie Wright, for example, 
insists, “No movie producer is going to make one dime out of Gil-
more.” Gilmore’s lawyers—one of whom was a member of the State 
Building Board, which approved prison-construction expenditures— 
contest that claim, demanding the written policy preventing it. “Oh, 
it isn’t written,” Director Wright responds, “it’s prison policy.”47
 Of course, as the ACA transcripts demonstrate, some policies were 
written, but the director’s complaint saw partial fulfillment: producers 
such as Schiller may still have profited, but most prisoners did not, as 
cases such as Gilmore’s encouraged state laws passed in the 1980s bar-
ring prisoners from accepting royalties.48 Different versions of events 
competed with one another as newspapers picked and chose among 
reports, and Schiller carefully selected the reporters with whom he 
worked and what he told them: “A pipeline into the biggest local 
paper could enable him to affect the output on the AP and UP sto-
ries.” However, not all papers made use of the material in ways the 
producer anticipated. What Gilmore’s earlier lawyer Boaz says regard-
ing himself to reporters is also true of Schiller; he is “a character,” 
“being acted upon by the real author of these events.”49 In the “true 
life story” Mailer authors, Boaz and Schiller are two of many in a 
narrative in which they have partial but not complete agency.
 So it is for Gilmore as well, though his stakes are far higher. His 
desire to opt out of the social sphere becomes his definitive char-
acteristic in the second half of the novel, and it is part of the nar-
rativization that subsequently scripts his acts. Farrell, as quoted above, 
asks whether Gilmore, if he appeals, will “slip right back in with 
four hundred and twenty-four other condemned men and women.” 
Later, he suggests that “if less attention had been paid to Gilmore 
he might have changed his mind and looked to avoid his execu-
tion. Now Gary was trapped in fame”50—no execution, no film, no 
book. In a paradoxical and quite literally antihumanist reversal of the 
Lacanian subject—the subject constituted in the symbolic order 
of language—in order for Gilmore to enter language, he must die. 
Becoming “Gilmore” means no Gilmore. His narration is predicated 
on the certainty of his death. Gilmore’s self-erasure offers his only 
means of self-presentation, of establishing an identity differentiating 
him from others in his similarly fraught position; his urge to be an 
individual trumps the desire to be alive. In Farrell’s view, scripting 
his own death validates Gilmore’s life more than the living of it, but 
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Farrell (and Schiller) has time and money invested, while the prisoner 
has his life in the balance. Anthony Amsterdam, a consulting lawyer 
to Gilmore’s brother and counsel in Furman v. Georgia, suggests that 
“discharging a competent lawyer, when you are under a death sen-
tence, is a form of suicide in itself. Gary had raised questions about 
free will and self-determination.”51
 Gilmore in effect accepts the very same existentialist model of 
subjectivity that Lacan rejects in his trope of the prison in “The Mir-
ror Stage,” in which liberty “is never more authentic than when it is 
within the walls of a prison,” when “a personality realizes itself only 
in suicide.”52 Whereas Cleaver writes in order to save himself, and his 
prison sentence is the time during which his reading and writing are 
the means of his becoming, Gilmore’s entry to history as written by 
Mailer depends entirely on his literary execution as a historical fact. 
Willing the death of the self becomes a gambit to realize that self 
and to escape the formative processes of history. Owning his death 
to the extent of orchestrating it resists the implication that in his 
life he is subject to forces beyond his ken, whether impulses from 
within that he cannot control or historical forces from without.
 However, as Deleuze and Guattari make clear (and as Lacan sug-
gests), there is no subject outside of history, and such is the case for 
Gilmore. Gilmore believes that his execution fulfills his own indi-
vidual will, but Mailer writes that, according to Richard Giauque, 
another lawyer peripheral to Gilmore’s case, “Gary was being used 
by many people.” According to Giauque, the attorney general, and 
others, “A great many other conservatives obviously wanted to use 
Gary’s willingness to die for their own political ends [ . . . ] Right now, 
to recognize one man’s right to die could have a deadly effect on 
four to five hundred lives in death row.”53 The fear then becomes 
that Gilmore’s will to death could legitimize a broader sense of the 
righteousness of the death penalty, execution as a fulfillment of the 
prisoner’s own intent. Mailer offers the similar view of ACLU repre-
sentative Shirley Pedler: “Capital punishment was not only wrong, 
but his execution might touch off others, for it would demystify the 
taking of life by the state. [ . . . a] methodical, calculated turning of 
the machinery of the State against the individual.”54
 Still, Mailer records Farrell’s consideration of the exact opposite 
possibility, that “if Gilmore were not executed, a major wave of exe-
cutions might be touched off. Every conservative in America would 
say: They couldn’t even shoot this fellow who wanted to be shot. 
Who are we ever going to punish?”55 Farrell’s position seems far less 
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likely, though Mailer’s inclusion of his stance emphasizes the simulta-
neous and competing points of view in the participatory spectatorship 
that is culture. The larger social context of competing ideological 
positions demonstrates that the potential effects of Gilmore’s execu-
tion extend beyond his own life and death; like it or not, agree with it 
or not, he is part of a larger body of death row prisoners whose fates 
are attached to his. Also embedded in the available responses—either 
Gilmore’s execution or its stay will set off a string of executions, 
depending on whom Mailer records—is a sense of the schizophrenic, 
where instead of the individual’s life until death as a single vanishing 
point, life and death both offer disjuncture and undecidability.
 Unlike Cleaver, who constantly places his own imprisonment in 
the context of allegiance with other prisoners, Gilmore himself resists 
the political implications of his execution by contesting his own rep-
resentativeness. When the ACLU and NAACP turn to Gilmore’s case 
as a point of leverage to maintain the moratorium on executions, 
Gilmore’s response is immediate and vituperative. The Provo Herald 
published his open letter to the NAACP: “I’m a white man. Don’t 
want no uncle tom blacks buttin [sic] in. Your contention is that if I 
am executed then a whole bunch of black dudes will be executed. 
Well that’s so apparently stupid I won’t even argue with that silly kind 
of illogic. But you know as well as I do that they’ll kill a white man 
these days a lot quicker than they’ll kill a black man.”56 History proves 
Gilmore wrong with regard to raced execution,57 and this is only one 
of Gilmore’s many racist comments. However, the prognostic verac-
ity of Gilmore’s claim is less significant than Mailer’s curious narra-
tion some pages later. Gil Athay is a lawyer who involves himself in 
contesting Gilmore’s execution not for Gilmore, but for death row 
inmate Dale Pierre, a black man he believes to be innocent, convicted 
“because he was black, a condition to avoid in the state of Utah.”58 
Working for Gilmore’s stay would help maintain the moratorium of 
Furman v. Georgia, staying Pierre’s execution as well. For Athay, the 
presence of both of them on death row was a more-important bond 
than the difference in their races—or even than one’s admitted guilt 
and the other’s believed innocence. The social category of con-
demned prisoner necessitates cross-racial identification; the death 
sentence writes over color. Athay’s involvement, which began with 
his unwilling court appointment as a defender, cast him as lenient on 
crime and thereby cost him the race for attorney general versus the 
“tough on crime” Bob Hansen, who pursued Gilmore’s execution.
 In an odd passage, Mailer describes Athay supporting Pierre because 
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he saw him as innocent, and as “a complex man, a difficult man, but 
now, to Gil Athay, rather a beautiful black man, and besides, Athay 
had always hated capital punishment.”59 Mailer is quick to insert the 
attribution to Gil Athay between difficult and beautiful, writing in the 
quote to attribute the description to an interview transcript rather 
than to himself. Athay’s perception of “a beautiful black man” possibly 
speaks to the race slogan of the linguistic reversal, “Black is beautiful” 
—or it is some other recognition of Athay’s, or just one of many words 
offered in an interview that Mailer seized and rewrote. Regardless of 
what the description means, what Mailer’s direct attribution does is 
distance Athay’s view from his own. Athay views a black man as inno-
cent, complex, and beautiful, but Mailer had grown even more tired 
of race since he stood on a platform eleven years before and clasped 
hands with a young black man moments after telling his assembled 
audience, black and white, men and women, “You’re beautiful.”60
 Athay is just a bit player in the proceedings, and Pierre never 
appears directly. Black characters are scarcely present in The Execu-
tioner’s Song, largely mentioned only in racist comments by Gilmore 
as he attests to the overrepresentation of black men in prison and 
thereby their local superiority there. The cross-racial identification 
Athay engages is absent in Mailer and Gilmore. The racism of the 
latter, coupled with his adherence to imagined autonomy, means that 
he cannot, will not, ally himself with a larger social body of pris-
oners—so many of them black men—and it is Gilmore’s story that 
Mailer tells. It would be historically inaccurate to suggest that Gil-
more was or is representative of U.S. prisoners in general or death 
row prisoners in particular. Mailer’s chronicle makes exceptional what 
was in 1977 already a special case, given that his would be the first 
execution following the Furman v. Georgia decision. And in a final 
analysis that extends after The Executioner’s Song, Athay’s fears, as well 
as those of the lawyer Giaque and the ACLU, seem justified, as Pierre 
was executed in 1987, ten years after Gilmore, and the number of 
executions increased in the 1990s to the levels of the 1950s. Perhaps 
if Mailer had written about Dale Pierre instead of Gilmore—but there 
is no place outside of history from which to judge that conjecture, 
and at the end of the 1970s, Mailer and the majority of the ACA (and 
America?) had grown weary of racial questions.
 The historical events and the actual people participating in them 
as narrated in The Executioner’s Song quite literally know that they are 
the book’s characters, taking part in the various actions that are its 
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story. That awareness shapes the telling. Before his execution, Gilmore 
tells his brother Mikal that he does not know how to conduct himself 
for his execution. “Maybe that’s why I need Schiller,” he says. “He’ll 
be there recording it for history, so I’ll keep cool.”61 Schiller in the 
story and Mailer in the account of it—so dependent on Schiller’s own 
interviews—set the stage for the “true history” of this “true life story” 
to be performed, and its very pretense of objectivity scripts the roles 
for its characters. Gilmore will “keep cool” so that his posthumous 
representation meets his expectations of how a man should behave. 
Given that Schiller functions as Mailer’s proxy in the novel, the last 
exchange between written subject and writer is especially telling: 
when Schiller says good-bye to Gilmore at the execution, he shakes 
hands and says, “I don’t know what I’m here for,” to which Gilmore 
replies, “You’re going to help me escape.” Schiller responds, “I’ll do 
it the best way that’s humanly possible.”62 Where Cleaver writes in 
order to save himself, Gilmore paradoxically opts out of events to 
become the story by which Schiller, via Mailer, will write him into 
history. Writing Gilmore offers him bodily escape from participation 
in the world.
 Except, of course, it does not. Gilmore’s will to not be—as orches-
trated and contested by the condemned himself, the Utah judicial 
system, the ACLU, the prison officials, the NAACP, and the U.S. 
Supreme Court, and as rendered by his double narrators, Schiller and 
Mailer—makes his unmaking not his own, but the result of a cascade 
of claims and counter-claims. And in the final analysis, Gilmore’s 
effort to escape the prison system capitulates to the very ends of that 
system: his ultimate silence and erasure, historically two of the pri-
mary functions of incarceration in the United States. Gilmore’s case 
as offered by Mailer in The Executioner’s Song at one level perpetuates 
a dangerous myth, a myth alongside the myths of prisoners who are 
universally guilty of violent crimes and of blackness and criminality 
as equivalent—the myth that death row, the most final expression 
of incarceration, fulfills the self-erasure those imprisoned are them-
selves seeking.63 The prison system may have made Gilmore and may 
control his life, but he maintains some control over his death, first in 
not appealing his execution, and second in trying twice to kill himself 
more directly, via suicide. Determining one’s own death, however, is 
perhaps the bleakest of all spaces for human agency and possibility. 
Deleuze and Guattari argue that schizoanalysis seeks to allow desire 
to circulate freely by destroying the unified oedipal subject. Gilmore’s 
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want to not be perversely capitulates to their thesis, as his desire for a 
unified, autonomous sense of self can be fulfilled only in his death.
 However, it is not Gilmore but Mailer who has the last word, 
and Mailer’s multivalent narration of Gilmore locates him in a set 
of relations outside of himself. Mailer through his proxy, Schiller, at 
once abets Gilmore’s escape, by writing him into The Executioner’s 
Song, and blocks Gilmore’s attempt to escape, to opt out of history 
as the course of human events, the condition of being subject to 
forces beyond one’s self. Farrell observes that Gilmore is “trapped 
in fame,” but Gilmore, Farrell, Mailer, and Schiller—writers all—are 
implicated in the media operations that are simultaneously the trap 
and the means of fame. Gilmore’s celebrity status relies on and thereby 
perpetuates his demand for his own execution. That desire stems 
from how tired Gilmore is of the “noise” of prison, the sounds of 
other competing voices, the sum of everything ever said and done 
that is history. However, these are the very noises that fill the book, 
including, at the end, the rifle shots, the babble of Gilmore’s lawyers 
and writers, the doctor’s chatter during the autopsy, the conversa-
tion over drinks among the executioners, the conflicting newspaper 
accounts. Executed, Gilmore does not somehow ascend bodily into 
social memory like Joe Christmas; Mailer’s entire effort has been to 
sing the executioner’s song that assembles the readers to view what 
it means for the state to kill a man. Just as Butch is the product of a 
town’s, a community’s, history, Gilmore is part of a larger national self-
image, its schizophrenic sense of itself written in its death sentences.
 Mailer’s account of the prisoner’s participation in his individua-
tion is encapsulated nicely at the end of chapter 17 of the second half, 
“I Am the Land Lord Here.” Like most of the chapters, it re-creates 
many perspectives and textualities, including excerpts of Gilmore’s 
letters, many conversations, a fragment from the local newspaper, part 
of an interview transcript, and a poem by Gilmore, which closes the 
chapter and from which the chapter takes its name. Gilmore answers 
one of Schiller’s questions with, “Right now, I’m a prisoner of my own 
body— / I’m trapped in myself— / Worse than jail!” In Gilmore’s poem, 
written a few years earlier, the speaker goes inside himself to see “A 
mirror of me reflecting myself.”64 Despite the harsh litany of sins and 
evil represented, “There was no scorn to menace here,” because
I built this house I alone 
I am the Land Lord here.
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The poem is subtitled “an introspection by Gary Gilmore,” so the 
speaker and author, like the “Mailer” as narrator and author of The 
Armies of the Night and Miami and the Siege of Chicago, are implied to 
be the same. There is a tension between the poem’s ownership of self-
as-body and the response of feeling “trapped” in the body. Gilmore in 
prison stops at the skin but does not want to, his individuality limited, 
limiting, and inescapable.
 In telling contrast, in his short story “The Flashlight,” Cleaver 
describes the body as at once a prison and an extension beyond the 
self. He initially renders the main character as feeling like “a dynamo 
imprisoned in the blood, the flesh and bone of his own body,” a limit 
of bodily self which thereafter becomes his school and his gang, 
which seem like prisons as well.65 Where Gilmore accepts the prison 
of his individuality, Cleaver challenges it. The point of view character, 
Stacy, likens his “own body” to a prison, but his body and the social 
body of his gang are described as mutually constituting composites, 
“separate selves bound into one.” Comparing social organizations 
thereafter to prisons speaks as much to the duality of personal and 
social bodies as it does to the likeness of an organization with an 
excessive sense of its autonomy to a repressive state.
 The distinction between the two is summarized in Foucault’s 
argument, in Discipline in Punish, that the body is not the prison of 
the soul, but “the soul is the prison of the body.”66 The rhetoric of 
individual autonomy enacted by Gilmore represses the ability of the 
subject to participate in a social identity extending beyond the self, 
the social subjectivity Cleaver represents. It is worth noting that in 
these instances both Cleaver and Gilmore write in terms of figura-
tive imprisonment, a tendency critiqued in chapter 1 of this book. 
However, prison as a metaphor for those themselves incarcerated is a 
slippage that means something different than it does when nonpris-
oners use it. Just as “Black is beautiful” served as a rhetorical reversal 
of racism in the 1960s, metaphors of incarceration, like pejorative 
terms of identity, are reappropriated and thereby transformed, such 
as when black rap artists Tupac Shakur, DMX, and Eve all employ 
the call and response of social belonging by rewriting a pejorative 
term as positive (if problematic) social belonging: “Where my nig-
gas?” Identity not only is in flux in the tension between subject and 
history, but is also changing as historically transitory associations and 
meanings themselves alter. Words may carry with them the places 
they have been, but the street makes its own use of them as well. 
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The situational meaning and use of metaphoric imprisonment, like 
the racial epithet, change depending on who employs it.
 Cleaver’s Soul on Ice and Mailer’s The Executioner’s Song chart 
reversed readings of the process of identity formation in prison, a 
becoming and an erasure. At a quite literal level of identity, Cleaver 
ceased to be a prisoner through writing, as his writing encouraged 
the activist efforts (including Mailer’s) that saw him paroled, while 
Gilmore ceased to be a prisoner through his execution. In a more-
theorized sense, Cleaver’s model of self produced in his narrative most 
often resembles a social subjectivity, the self that extends past the 
skin to create space for radical consciousness beyond the isolation of 
individuality, while Gilmore’s desire to be an individual and to die are 
one and the same. The difference does not resolve neatly into Cleaver 
assigning too much responsibility for his criminality to social and 
historical forces, and Gilmore taking too much responsibility for his. 
Both books provide more space than that for the multiple points of 
view of lived experience situated in history, as opposed to the rheto-
ric of singular autonomy, of the individual versus history. Cleaver’s 
book regularly implicates the self in history, and though Gilmore 
opts for a more-impoverished model, Mailer’s narration testifies to 
the inadequacies of imagined autonomy. There is a tension in the 
relationship between the singular and plural, the both-and of the 
subject in history, and for Mailer, the tension is even sharper in his 
multiperspectival, schizophrenic account of an individual autonomy 
that can only fulfill its desire in its death.
 In 1968, readers of Soul on Ice were prepared to view the pris-
oner, particularly the black male prisoner, in political and historical 
terms. As demonstrated in the ACA transcripts, even some prison 
officials could accept the book and its author as resisting U.S. rac-
ism, understanding the book and its writer as revolutionary. In 1979 
The Executioner’s Song met a different readership, and there is nothing 
political in Gilmore’s defense for his murders of Ben Bushnell and 
Max Jensen, no larger historical injustice testified to in the narrative. 
His irredeemably criminal character matched the increasing pessi-
mistic belief that when it comes to rehabilitation in prison, noth-
ing works. The expanded criminalization and sentencing for drug 
crimes largely began in New York under Governor Rockefeller. That 
approach dismantled the state’s extensive treatment program and sig-
naled a departure from the rehabilitation the governor seemed to have 
endorsed just a few years before. That is, in 1967 Rockefeller had 
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established a special committee to recommend transformations for 
the state’s prison programs, and that committee conducted a survey of 
the best rehabilitative practices. Sociologist Dr. Robert Martinson had 
the review ready for publication in 1969, but the state suppressed the 
findings until a subpoena released them.67 It was a curious move, since 
Martinson’s research seemed to offer a dim view of rehabilitation. In 
the mid-1970s the findings were interpreted to support Rockefeller’s 
more extreme sentencing platform. According to Martinson, Nixon’s 
attorney general, William B. Saxbe, and many newspapers inaccurately 
distilled the findings to “nothing works,”68 for which Gilmore seemed 
to offer a case in point.
 When Mailer claims, “The public could live with a killer who was 
crazy, mixed-up, insane,” the “public” to which he refers is as much 
the one initially reading the “true life novel” as the one inside the 
book.69 That particular observation of what “the public” can accept 
appears in a fragment sandwiched between two of Schiller’s perspec-
tives but without direct attribution to anyone in particular, thereby 
situating the view as ambiguously Schiller’s and Mailer’s, as is much of 
the latter half of the book. The gulf between expectations of prisoners 
in 1968 and in 1979 offered in these two books parallels the discus-
sion of actual imprisonment policies and practices. Soul on Ice and 
The Executioner’s Song mark diminishing possibilities in the condition 
of prisoners as subjects of and representatives for the United States. 
The films of the next three chapters all represent these matters of 
race, representation, and imprisonment in ways that directly address 
the tensions between history and its narration as explored in Soul on 
Ice and The Executioner’s Song—and the bleak history that followed 
them. In the last two decades of the twentieth century, the number of 
people incarcerated in prisons and jails ballooned from less than five 
hundred thousand to nearly two million, and rates of incarceration 
increased almost fourfold, while the “war on drugs” targeted inner-
city communities largely composed of black and Hispanic citizens. 
Even as early as 1977 and 1978, keynote speakers at the ACA con-
ferences cite overcrowding as the most significant problem facing 
prison administration. Anthony Travisono, the ACA’s executive direc-
tor from 1975 to 1990, titled a 1977 article in The American Journal 
of Correction “Prison Crisis—Over 280,000 Men and Women in Our 
Nation’s Prisons.”70 Presumably, if that number presents a crisis, then 
its more than fourfold increase by 1999 is a disaster.

ormAn mAiler’s The Executioner’s Song stands as one his-
torical landmark in U.S. audiences’ attention to accounts of 
imprisonment that blur the difference between fictional and actual. 
The story of Gilmore in prison seeking his execution was told sev-
eral times, suggesting both book and television audiences’ interests 
and producers’ efforts to capitalize on related properties through mul-
tiple media. Gilmore’s sentence, after all, appears in Mailer’s Pulitzer- 
winning novel and Larry Schiller’s 1982 television film starring 
Tommy Lee Jones and Rosanna Arquette, as well as in Gilmore’s 
brother Mikal’s own version in his book and its HBO film adapta-
tion, both titled Shot in the Heart.2 Two decades after Mailer’s novel, 
three prison films have further complicated the difference between 
reality and imagination in representing criminality and imprisonment. 
American History X, The Hurricane, and The Farm: Life Inside Angola 
Prison span the spectrum from realistic fiction to biographical picture 
The Contradictions of
“Documentary Realism” in
American History X
The cinema provides us with an understanding of our own memory. Indeed 
we could almost say that cinema is a model of consciousness itself. Going to 
the cinema turns out to be a philosophical experience.
—Henri Bergson1
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to documentary, and they demonstrate how incarceration functions 
as a field that organizes race and masculinity in the transformation 
of criminal character.
 Before demonstrating how American History X represents crimi-
nalization, incarceration, and cross-racial redemption, this chapter 
begins with a description of how and why the prison population 
expanded in the 1980s and 1990s, and how the ACA responded to 
that transformation. Next, I show how changes in the movie indus-
try with regard to production and reception situate films in a highly 
problematic tension between the cultural imagination and historical 
actuality. Then this chapter as well as the subsequent two show that 
the court-determined guilt naming the subject a criminal initiates 
the identity of the prisoner, which all three films describe as man- 
making irrespective of the commission of crime. In these films, racial 
conflict directly leads to incarceration, and all three point out that 
to identify blackness is to misrecognize violent criminality. The pro-
cess of imprisonment thereafter functions as a sign of redemption, 
whereby even men innocent of their crimes are personally improved 
while incarcerated, and cross-racial identification among inmates is 
the irreducible sign of transformation, wherein a raced “I” becomes 
“us.” The fallacy of these prison films’ redemption narratives lies 
in their implicit endorsement of the legal system that they suggest 
unjustly imprisons, but nevertheless improves, black men. That fal-
lacy becomes more pernicious when one places these three films in 
their historical context. All three appeared in the last years of the 
twentieth century, a time when the United States’ three-decades-long 
experiment with incarceration reached enormous proportions, creat-
ing a system dramatically overrepresenting black men. That history is 
crucial for films making claims to the real. Even as fictions trade on 
the cachet of true-life stories, historical records such as documentary 
films can conform to the shape of prior imaginings—just as stories 
such as The Shawshank Redemption, a phenomenally popular film that 
consolidates nearly every component feature of prior movies set in 
prison, affect the narratives of subsequent films with far greater stakes 
in historical actuality.
 The nation’s incarceration rates nearly quadrupled between the 
end of the 1970s and the release of these three films at the end of the 
century, largely because of increasing sentences for offenses that pre-
viously had not even merited prison terms, and the racial differences 
in those prison populations grew stark. Critical comment did not 
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always accompany that expanding disparity, and the ACA Presiden-
tial Address in 1980 acknowledges the disproportionate increase in 
black inmates, only to then equivocate: “I will not attempt to explain 
the reasons for the racial imbalance. Suffice it to say that they are 
complex and varied.”3 The problems and their “complex and varied” 
causes only expanded in the next two decades. The nature of the 
crimes yielding prison terms changed dramatically between 1980 and 
1999, according to the U.S. Department of Justice Bureau of Statis-
tics. Adjusted for the population increase between 1980 and 1999, 
the number of sentences for violent crime increased by 265 percent, 
property crimes by 221 percent, both more than doubling. However, 
during that same period, rates for both property offenses and violent 
crime actually decreased, property offenses steadily declining since the 
mid-1970s, violent crime remaining steady until 1994, at which point 
it decreased sharply each year.4 Even more significant, the number of 
sentences for drug crimes increased more than tenfold, and the num-
ber of offenders imprisoned for public-disorder offenses increased by 
a factor of nearly eight.5 Compared with violent crime and theft, the 
proportionally far greater increases in prison sentences for drug and 
public-order offenses are the defining factor in the rapidly expanding 
prison population. More than 30 percent of prisoners were incarcer-
ated for offenses in 1999 that in the 1960s and early 1970s might 
have led instead to treatment programs, a matter driven home by 
the likelihood that, according the Atlantic Monthly, approximately 10 
percent of offenders have a mental illness.6 Those increases meant 
that in 1999, there were 476 people in prisons for every 100,000 U.S. 
citizens, a number that had increased every year since 1980, doubling 
in each passing decade.7
 That increase has not been race-neutral. In 1999 there were 3,408 
black men under state or federal jurisdiction for every 100,000 black 
men in the United States, 1,335 Latino men per 100,000, and 417 
white men per 100,000.8 That overrepresentation of black men in 
prison means that more than one out of every four black men likely 
will be incarcerated during his life, compared to a one in twenty-three 
chance for white men.9 While white and black men reportedly use 
illegal drugs equally, black men are five times more likely to find 
themselves arrested for it, and U.S. prison historians and journalists 
describe white offenders as receiving a greater availability of alterna-
tives to imprisonment by a prejudiced judicial process.10 Indeed, the 
reported narrowing of the wage gap between black and white men 
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of the 1980s and 1990s is inflated artificially due to the uncounted 
joblessness of incarcerated black men.11 These are difficult numbers 
for a nation dismantling many affirmative action programs, locating 
its racism in the past. Imprisonment became the same response to a 
broad array of offenses, many of them so-called “victimless crimes” 
and matters that had previously meant drug treatment or alternate 
custody such as that administered by halfway houses. Such a total 
solution meant that the increasing construction of prisons still failed 
to address overcrowding. If crime rates dipped, it was because of 
prisons, so more were needed; if crime rates increased, more prisons 
were needed. As Franklin E. Zimring, director of the Earl Warren 
Legal Institute, points out, regardless of the question posed to the 
criminal justice system in the past thirty years, “Prison has been the 
answer.”12
 Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, prison officials returned to 
a model of inquiry—“what works?”—as opposed to the “nothing 
works” approach that emerged in the 1970s. The reason for the shift 
is clear: the overcrowding that began in the mid-1970s rapidly accel-
erated thereafter, and prison administrators searched for alternatives. 
The keynote addresses of the ACA during these two decades remain 
as generally progressive as in the past, emphasizing shared respon-
sibility for social inequity and long-term solutions to problems of 
crime.13 For example, in 1982 Houston, Texas, Chief of Police Lee P. 
Brown argues, “Crime is the natural consequence of the social, eco-
nomic, and political systems of this country; and as long as unequal 
means of achievement exist, there will always be crime.” His criticism 
of national policy gestures to the rhetoric of war so often character-
izing imprisonment: “President Reagan leads us in the crime battle, 
but in the wrong direction”14—a reference to the administration’s 
policies treating criminality as an innate matter of morality.
 However, unlike during the 1970s, the willingness to treat crime 
and punishment as social phenomena is apparent not only in the 
plenary addresses but also in many of the general-session papers, such 
as a rehabilitations commissioner from Atlanta evoking a “we” who 
understand that “poverty, discrimination, lack of opportunity and poor 
education cause crime.”15 As prison populations soared amid dipping 
crime rates, the professionals most experienced with imprisonment 
saw firsthand the failures of the system. Presentations in the 1980s 
and 1990s suggest expanding parole options and call for alternate 
facilities such as community-based corrections. At the same time, 
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national legislation dismantled parole at the federal level, and the 
furlough programs came under harsh attack following the Willie 
Horton debacle. Prison officials of the late 1980s and early 1990s 
regularly repeat, “America can’t build its way out of the crowding 
problem.”16 However, state and federal lawmakers continued to try 
to do so, which identifies the political root of the dilemma. A survey 
of each state’s director of corrections in 1988 led the researchers to 
conclude that “the political climate clearly does not support” scaling 
back the increases in sentencing and reductions in parole.17 Prison 
officials initiated stopgap measures to an escalating problem that they 
viewed as a consequence of at best uninformed and at worst perni-
cious legislation.
 In the 1990s, the ACA intensified its criticism of the policies 
that increased the prison population. Its president in 1993 points to 
“unjust sentencing” and excessive criminalization and imprisonment; 
the Pennsylvania corrections commissioner that year identifies that 
the “fiscal and crowding crisis is the result of our having politicized 
the issue of crime around a ‘war on drugs.’”18 At the same confer-
ence, the chair of the U.S. Sentencing Commission suggests scaling 
back mandatory sentences, and a senior circuit judge recommends 
their immediate reduction.19 The 1994 ACA president remarks in his 
keynote address that there is “a widespread pattern of distortion and 
exaggeration concerning the nature and consequences of criminal 
behavior,” an illusion to which “the politically ambitious often delib-
erately contribute.”20 He cites a May 1994 U.S. News & World Report 
editorial that claims, “We are at war today. The enemy is the crimi-
nal.” President Perry M. Johnson discounts these hysterical accounts. 
He points out that crime is not the result of “some ‘other’—some 
‘them,’” suggesting instead that criminality is not distinct from but 
part of a broader social world. Like a much earlier participant, John-
son cites Churchill’s oft-quoted “never, never, never” speech regard-
ing giving in to the enemy. However, unlike that earlier participant, 
who resists giving in to the supposed criminality of black militancy, 
Johnson proposes a struggle against the forces that make criminality 
a tool for political gain.21 In 1996 a Virginia Democrat reiterates calls 
from the late 1960s and early 1970s for a long-term commitment 
to social programs of prevention rather than to political expediency, 
and an ACLU director and a Southern juvenile-facility administrator 
both sharply criticize the political failures of escalating “tough on 
crime” rhetoric.22 A Republican senator’s general address that year is 
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substantially less clear in its criticism and offers the requisite paean 
to family values; nevertheless, he pushes for gun crime to be the top 
federal priority, a tacit departure from the emphasis on drug crime at 
the time.23 At the ACA conferences of the 1990s, critique of wholesale 
incarceration proved cross-regional and occasionally bipartisan.
 Among the best approaches to posing the question of what works 
is voiced in 1997 by ACA President Reginald A. Wilkinson. He offers 
a series of perspectives of those involved in corrections, evoking 
points of view of staff, administrators, and inmates, an unconven-
tional rhetorical strategy surveying equally unconventional practices. 
In terms reminiscent of Deleuze and Guattari’s Nietzschean turn, he 
provides a litany of the pronoun I: “Imagine that I am a records office 
supervisor”; “I have been a member of a street gang”; “I am a state 
probation officer”; “I am a fifty-six-year-old inmate”; “I am a lifer at 
a large prison for women.”24 If every name in history is I, then I am 
a prisoner and I am a warden. His recognition of alternate practices 
for corrections and his rhetorical approach are both innovative, and 
he acknowledges that it is “a risk to step over known boundaries.” 
Nevertheless, he proposes that such approaches are necessary to depart 
from increasing incarceration.25
 However, the descriptions of the ACA president’s speech were not 
the only imaginative construction of prisoners. As Wilkinson makes 
clear in his 1998 address, television and the “silver screen” shape 
the perception and thereby the actuality of incarceration.26 At the 
close of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-
first, the ACA itself capitulated to the power of media presentation, 
as keynote speakers from 1999 to 2001 departed from past tradi-
tion. Attorney General Janet Reno and Sarah Brady, chair of the 
handgun-control lobby, spoke in 1995, and the ACA president and 
Michigan governor gave the general address in 1998. However, in 
1999 CNN’s Greta Van Susteren and ABC News’ Hugh Downs of 
20/20 offered the keynote addresses. The next year saw such speeches 
by singer Tony Orlando and a New England Patriots football player 
turned motivational speaker, as well as Patty Duke. In 2001, the gen-
eral assembly was addressed by Hunter “Patch” Adams, the doctor 
whose biography informs the based-on-a-true-story film Patch Adams 
(1998), starring Robin Williams and featuring a villain played by Bob 
Gunton, the evil warden of The Shawshank Redemption. That speech 
was immediately followed by one from Burl Cain, the warden of 
Angola, the Louisiana State Prison where the documentary The Farm 
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is set and in which Cain features. The year 2002 featured the host of 
the television show America’s Most Wanted. So it is not only American 
History X, The Hurricane, and The Farm that blur distinctions between 
actuality and imagination; it is also ACA speakers themselves who 
complicate the differences between news and entertainment.
 The actuality of prison practice shapes films that leverage the 
cachet of the real, even as such films also capitulate to the historically 
inaccurate fantasy that all prisoners are guilty of violent crime, typi-
cally murder. In Shots in the Mirror: Crime Films and Society, Nicole 
Rafter suggests that the bleak history of the past three decades of 
actual imprisonment sharply divides the two sorts of prison films, 
“commercial entertainments and [ . . . ] political truth-telling,” and 
that the “two may eventually merge in some way.”27 All three of the 
films I cover demonstrate this merging and its ramifications. American 
History X quotes directly the racial overrepresentation of incarceration 
patterns, though twisted to serve the interests of white supremacist 
characters. Raced criminality and imprisonment is the background 
to Rubin Carter’s story in The Hurricane, and the contemporaneous 
history of racial profiling and the overrepresentation of black men in 
prison give its 1999 release further relevance. The Farm’s occasional 
voice-over recounts racial statistics of imprisonment even as the cam-
era records black men of dubious guilt behind bars. All three films 
make claims to the real in representing imprisonment. This chapter 
and the next two emphasize these films’ deployment of the iden-
tity of the prisoner with conflicted purpose and dubious historicity. 
However, I am less invested in sorting truth from fiction, in ques-
tioning the veracity of the statistics Vinyard offers in his racist rants, 
in pointing out where The Hurricane deviates from the “real” biog-
raphy of Rubin Carter, or in challenging the representativeness of 
The Farm’s six inmates. Instead, I am interested in demonstrating a far 
more vexed relationship of history and imagination in their account 
of the differential tensions between black and white men, people in 
and out of prison, and individual autonomy and social belonging.
 These films are not only part of the historical and cultural 
landscape in which viewers situate themselves,28 but are also self-
consciously crafted as such, not with the sly wink-and-nudge of late-
twentieth-century irony and self-reflexive pastiche, but in the service 
of earnestness. They signify their own effort to tell the truth. They 
assert that claim to the real—in all three cases, of criminality and 
imprisonment as formative of selfhood—through narrative techniques 
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and film technologies that fracture a sense of unbroken reality. Non-
linear, fragmented, multiperspectival accounts stake claims as really 
real, a contentious matter given that the fictions and fictionalizations 
shape the patterns of prison-film narratives, including documentary. 
The identities of prisoners produced in these films draw attention to 
raced incarceration, but the films in attesting their truth-value thereby 
locate the resolution to that injustice within the reality constituted 
in the film. The Hurricane and American History X fulfill this logic, 
sharing a secret knowledge with viewers: we know the system of 
justice is racist, but in watching this film, and seeing justice be done 
in this film, we believe there is in fact social justice. That feature 
films fulfill culturally normative roles—what leftist critics a genera-
tion or two ago might have described as “bourgeois”—is not news. 
However, the stakes are higher for films attesting to their historical 
accuracy in a cultural climate where audiences increasingly encounter 
“reality” entertainment. Therefore, before engaging the production of 
the identity of the prisoner in each film, it is necessary to note how 
recent industry changes have fundamentally altered how films operate 
in the contexts of their production and reception. In addition, each 
of these films has been strategically screened to particular audiences, 
demonstrating a consequence of their claims to historical actuality 
and social relevance.
 The space of prison, more than most places, defines the position 
of its population. For prisons films, in which the subject characters 
are incarcerated and thus relatively immobile, the camera creates the 
sense of movement. In terms of de Certeau and Deleuze and Guattari, 
inmates may not be out for a walk in the prison, but the camera is, 
and the fragments of shots are pieced together in editing like jigsaw 
pieces connected to the larger blocks of scenes in a puzzle whose 
overall shape and size are determined largely in editing. That in itself 
has held true for movies for most of the twentieth century, but due 
to transformations in development and distribution, films themselves 
are freed from the theater and circulate in space in a manner that 
invites various ways of viewing. A common way of viewing film in 
academic inquiry has been psychoanalytic inquiry, the study of how 
fear and desire operate in identification, the misrecognition of the self 
vis-à-vis the screen.
 It is not difficult to see how this became the case. The vocabulary 
of psychoanalysis and the technology of film developed concurrently. 
The interpretation of dreams structured early Freudian analysis, and 
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theatrical film could be addressed as shared dreams, the audience 
seated in darkness, alone, together, watching the projections of the 
fantasies they had paid to see. However, industry restructuring of the 
past two decades, coupled with technological developments, radi-
cally transformed the ways in which films are made as well as their 
conventional viewing experience, changes that include the horizon-
tal and vertical integration of the film industry, the expansion of 
cable networks, and the development of VCRs and then DVD players. 
Therefore, while I occasionally make use of Lacanian and Deleuzo-
Guattarian terms to describe film characters, I am also interested in 
drawing attention to how desire functions as a social and market 
force, and my attention is thus focused at least as much on produc-
tion history and movie-industry mechanics as on the mechanisms of 
identification on and across the screen.
 American History X was produced and distributed in the United 
States by New Line Cinema, a Time Warner company. New Line 
Cinema grew to prominence as a factory for 1980s “slasher” films, and 
then became the parent company’s second-tier distributor for specialty 
markets, including prestige, horror, teen, and black films. Through- 
out the 1980s, the company thrived on the Nightmare on Elm Street 
franchise, but with the profit ratio of House Party in 1990 and its 
sequels in 1991 and 1994—the initial film grossed $26.4 million 
on a budget of $2.5 million—the company increasingly developed 
films with largely black casts to capitalize on the market share of 
African-American audiences, who historically have high numbers in 
theater ticket sales. Friday, the Ice Cube franchise of hood comedies 
from 1995 to 2002, offers another example of New Line’s produc-
tion and distribution in this genre. In the late 1990s, the production 
company expanded its role in the prestige-film market of hot new 
directors, ensemble casts, and unconventional narrative, producing 
director Paul Thomas Anderson’s critically acclaimed work. New 
Line’s production and distribution of American History X—with its 
subject of racism, its ensemble cast, and its first-time director, Tony 
Kaye—occurred, then, at a point when the company had a recent 
history of racially topical themes and was increasingly packaging 
medium-budget projects of established actors with new directors 
aimed at Academy Award recognition to build industry prestige and 
expand its market share.
 The production company is just one of many interrelated com-
ponents of the process of development and the chain of distribution. 
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A viewer might first have encountered American History X in its 1998 
theatrical debut; rented or bought the videotape or DVD as a Warner 
Home Video release; watched the film on the movie stations HBO 
or Cinemax (both of which are Time Warner companies), or on regu-
lar cable stations such as Time Warner’s TBS or TNT; or seen an adver-
tisement or read a review in Time, People, or Entertainment Weekly, all 
Time Warner magazines.29 The film failed to break even during its 
domestic theater run, for which the common response of distribu-
tors is to recoup such losses in overseas exhibition, cable, and rental 
sales. The Time Warner media conglomerate was in a position to 
exploit its vertical and horizontal control (producing and distributing 
the film, overseeing first-run theaters, owning not only the premier 
and standard cable companies but the material cable network itself) 
by releasing the film over many of its ancillaries, from pay-per-view 
services to the specialty movie channels to standard cable networks.
 That saturation means that the film can play on any number of 
stations in various time slots. Viewers might watch a segment of it as 
they scan through hundreds of channels, or it might play in part or in 
its entirety while a potential spectator works from home, studies, eats, 
does housework, or participates in any number of household activi-
ties—or it might be viewed in another context entirely. In 2003, for 
example, I saw part of American History X muted but closed-captioned 
on a large-screen television behind a bar in Austin, Texas, in between 
live band sets. Rather than pay for a film one intends to see, a viewer 
can see a film by accident in unexpected public locations. Films leave 
the interior seclusion of traditional spectatorship and become part of a 
larger network of sensory stimuli where they compete for attention.
 Filmmaking has both contributed to these transformations and 
responded to them. Editing practices such as rapid-fire cutting between 
shots and alternating color footage with black and white (American 
History X, The Hurricane, and The Farm all employ the latter method) 
demonstrate the influence of the short-format commercials and music 
videos where directors such as Kaye get their start. Black and white 
spliced with color has, since The Wizard of Oz (1939), differentiated 
reality from fantasy; Kansas, after all, is in black and white, the film 
of dream in color. Films such as The Purple Rose of Cairo (1985), 
Pleasantville (1998), and Mumford (1999) maintain the distinction even 
if some reverse the signification. Black and white is also a device sig-
nifying the past, either personal memory shared in its telling or public 
history, and the piecing together of that past leads to a disjointed 
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narrative that is really real (because it is in black and white and is frag-
mented), even as its reconstruction demands viewers’ engagement.
 Incorporating black and white with color is then both an aes-
thetic gesture—particularly for films engaging race as a topic—and 
a preventive measure against channel switching. Furthermore, the 
increasingly digital format of video, coupled with transformations 
in computer technology and the expansion of file-sharing networks, 
has changed the ways that people access and view film and televi-
sion programs. Audiences for major features such as American History 
X might, after the theatrical releases end, view them on cable. Or 
they might purchase a DVD or illegally download the digital files 
from any number of newsgroups or file-sharing networks to watch 
on a laptop computer at their leisure. Video becomes something that 
moves with viewers, seen in transit, stopping and starting at the con-
venience of the audience. Instead of Hollywood as a dream theater, 
films can become akin to the video billboards of the futuristic Los 
Angeles of Blade Runner (1982), viewed in medias res, part of a satu-
rated cultural landscape.
 Film viewing in these contexts has less in common with the 
Freudian or Lacanian analysand on a couch than it does with Deleuze 
and Guattari’s schizophrenic on the move, de Certeau’s sense of sub-
jectivity as demonstrated by a walk in the city, an urban landscape 
one might read. Just as the setting of the psychoanalytic subject (the 
couch, the narration of personal history) foregrounds its invest-
ments in individualization, the schizophrenic in the city foregrounds 
the investments in mobility, collective identity, and larger social his-
tory—all key elements in these films set in prison at the close of the 
1990s. And, more than either model, desire as a market force proves 
paramount—how directors and producers work to meet, manufacture, 
and challenge audiences’ sense of the real and how films produce it. 
People moving through the city sometimes situate themselves vis-
à-vis that reality through the reference points of fictional films. For 
example, Loren Hemsley, a bail bondsman in Los Angeles, describes 
conducting a home visit at Normandy and Crenshaw: “In case you 
don’t know,” he says, “that’s the neighbor hood Ice Cube and Chris 
Tucker lived in the movie Friday.”30 The shared cultural imagination 
of the mediascape becomes a city à la de Certeau, one by which peo-
ple relate to one another, and films serve as imagistic reference points 
viewers can use to locate themselves and others in the space and time 
of culture and history. As the opening epigraph for this chapter from 
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Henri Bergson suggests, film becomes a model for an “understanding 
of our own memory.” Prison writer Abu-Jamal plays this trope when 
a sound from prison “merges into the mind’s moviemaking machine, 
evoking distant memories.”31
 Race, place, and memory shape the landscapes of all three of these 
films determined by the prisons prominently featured as their set-
tings, prisons populated by white and black men—the latter often of 
dubious guilt. In American History X the black-and-white flashback 
that recounts the main character’s incarceration is the most significant 
stretch of the film’s narrative, while Jewison shot much of The Hur-
ricane on location in Ralway Prison, and The Farm takes place almost 
entirely inside the Louisiana State Prison. The first two films chroni-
cle main characters arrested for race-related murder, imprisoned, and 
thereafter released; The Farm is organized around two white and four 
black inmates and depicts their day-to-day existence in the prison. 
The confined space of the prison is the most important place in all 
three films, just as racial difference defines each of their characters.
 The claims of incarceration and race offered in the register of the 
real in American History X affect its reception and the use specific 
audiences make of it. The film is advertised, reviewed, and analyzed 
with this or that agenda by one group or another, matters of recep-
tion cued by its complicated production history. First-time feature 
director Tony Kaye filed a lawsuit over American History X against 
New Line Cinema and the Directors Guild in 1998, claiming that 
the film listed him as director against his wishes. During postproduc-
tion, New Line assumed control of piecing the film together after 
Kaye had spent some year and a half and still did not have a com-
pleted film. Edward Norton, who plays the role of the reforming 
white supremacist Derek Vinyard, reportedly oversaw the editing of 
the final cut, becoming the film’s centerpiece. Kaye had filed to have 
his name listed in the credits as “Humpty Dumpty,” suggesting that 
all the king’s men could not put together a two-hour film from its 
many pieces, but the U.S. District Court dismissed the case, in 2000, 
“with extreme prejudice,” denying appeal.32 The court’s ruling reso-
nates with the film itself, given its chronicle of Vinyard’s racist crime, 
his time in prison, and his subsequent dismissal of his own extreme 
racial prejudice.
 Despite that disavowal, the film is equivocal in its depiction of rac-
ism, particularly the causes and effects of raced criminality. Reviews 
of the film are split fairly evenly between, on one hand, reflecting the 
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film’s ambiguities or even subtextual endorsement of white supremacy 
and, on the other, praising its realism and tour de force acting.33 
The divide largely can be attributed to the film’s postproduction 
history and Norton’s hand in the editing, which likely emphasized 
his charismatic performance, thereby facilitating the critical accolades 
he received. He was nominated for an Academy Award for his role, 
and named Best Actor by the Southeastern Film Critics Association 
and the Golden Satellite Awards. The film also was nominated for 
the “Peace” Award offered by the nonprofit Political Film Society, 
slated for use as an educational tool by Amnesty International USA, 
and taught in some schools.34 The “Peace” Award in particular seems 
possibly out of place for a film whose style pays homage to Leni 
Riefenstahl as it attempts to explain Norton’s neo-Nazi character 
so persuasively that it can be read as glorifying him, a film that sees 
every black man a criminal, prisoner, or former offender. It seems 
likely that the film’s difficult delivery produces some of its ambiguity; 
after all, the film is the problem child of two men, Kaye and Norton 
(or three, if one counts the screenwriter, David McKenna), one of 
whom denied paternity, and its message of racial harmony is largely 
organized through the triumph of Norton’s will.
Figure 1
Hard Aryan youth. Derek Vinyard’s (Edward Norton) steeled masculine body early in 
American History X matches Hitler’s call in Triumph of Will (1935) for “this people to be 
hard, not soft, and you must steel yourselves for it in your youth.”
0
Chapter 5
 American History X is at once brilliant and deeply flawed, a tri-
umphant failure of excellent acting depicting a charismatic racist’s 
prison transformation.35 The film focuses on a white family, the Vin-
yards, especially the two sons, Derek (Norton) and Danny (Edward 
Furlong). Derek is a prominent young leader of a white suprema-
cist gang in Venice Beach, California, the DOC (Disciples of Christ). 
Three black men attempt to steal his truck from outside his house; 
he shoots two, one of whom is only wounded, and is then killed by 
Derek in an a scene of almost-unwatchable violence. Derek spends 
three years in prison, where, through contact with two black men—
the coworker Lamont, whose imprisonment is far out of proportion 
with his minor crime, and his former English teacher, Dr. Sweeney 
(Avery Brooks)—he learns to repudiate the racism that caused his 
crime. Released from prison, he spends a day trying to undo the 
racial conflicts he has helped to propagate, including violently reject-
ing DOC patriarch Cameron (Stacy Keach), leaving the group, and 
severing his younger brother Danny’s participation in the white gang. 
Those efforts take place during a skinhead rally edited in a sequence 
that has Kaye’s thumbprint, a frenetic montage described in Sight 
and Sound as one of “documentary realism,” suggestive of the film’s 
overall look and feel, described by industry trade Variety as one of 
“truthfulness and integrity,” its style one of “heightened realism.”36 
The claim to the real is a defining feature of the film.
 Much of the narrative is told by Derek to Danny or by Danny to 
the audience. On the day of Derek’s release from prison, Danny has 
submitted a paper in his English class treating Adolph Hitler as a civil 
rights leader, landing him in the office of the principal, Dr. Sweeney. 
Sweeney assigns a new paper to Danny, a paper titled “American His-
tory X,” in which he is “to analyze and interpret all of the events sur-
rounding Derek’s incarceration,” in order to demonstrate how those 
events shaped Danny’s current view of contemporary culture. That 
history is largely the assembly of memory in black and white, either 
Danny’s or Derek’s flashbacks, the latter offered as the elder brother 
narrates his prison experience as an explanation for why they both 
must reject the false consciousness of their racism. The chronology 
of events thus is out of sequence: a black-and-white first-person shot 
from the point of view of one of the prospective car thieves opens 
the film, followed by first Derek’s and then Danny’s perspective of the 
two murders. The film thereafter regularly features the flashbacks—the 
events leading to the incarceration—as they are invoked by the two 
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brothers’ activities through the first twenty-four hours after Derek’s 
release. The narrative is fairly complex, both a cause and a result of 
the crisis over the editing involving Kaye, Norton, and New Line. The 
fractured sequence allows the graphic shot of the particularly grue-
some murder to take place midway through the film, after audiences 
have had an opportunity to compare Derek’s persona before and after 
his incarceration.
 Memory serves as the narrative device linking chronologically dis-
jointed scenes. Danny’s point of view memories are triggered in two 
ways: either as he writes the paper to fulfill his assignment or as he 
walks through Venice Beach and is reminded by aspects of the land-
scape. Furlong’s character presents both the conventional analysand 
performing a talking cure in his voice-over as he reads his writing 
of the paper, and the subject taking a walk in the city. He pauses at 
the municipal basketball court, which calls up the memory of the 
black-versus-white game that loosely instigated the carjacking and 
subsequent murder, landing Derek in prison. Danny runs past dilapi-
dated storefronts on his way home, his rapid pace and destination a 
parallel to the end of Derek’s three years in prison and release that day, 
leading to the memory of the elder brother’s return that morning in 
the accompanying black-and-white flashback of his welcome by the 
family. The beachside Southern California city where the film was 
shot on location is offered visually several times as a broader context 
for “the events surrounding Derek’s incarceration” as perceived by 
Danny. Furlong takes a walk in a city, amid the ethnic diversity of its 
pedestrians, its graffiti, and its crime, the “stylistic procedures” that de 
Certeau suggests resist textualization.37 Those “pedestrian practices” 
trigger vignettes of memory, implicating the relationships of past and 
present—and between Danny and his brother—and shaping the essay 
he writes upon his return home.
 Making sense of the racial (and narrative) difficulty of his brother’s 
development is thus the job of Danny in the film; the paper he writes 
is effectively the film itself, so interpreting it is the viewer’s job as 
well. The film foregrounds this fact when Danny begins writing the 
essay. He sits at his computer and types the name of the film and 
essay, then types repeatedly, “Analyze and Interpret,” until it becomes 
“Anal sex and”—a bit of foreshadowing, as Derek’s anal rape in 
prison by white supremacist gang members plays its significant part 
in his reformation. Then Danny writes that when people look at him, 
they see his brother—much as Danny himself has, misrecognizing in 
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his brother a coherent self he yearns for and strives toward. The film 
self-consciously fashions itself as an object to analyze and interpret 
here, perhaps anticipating its own later role as a teaching tool in class-
rooms, where actual students might write their own essays (or profes-
sors, books) about it. There is a cued earnestness in the scene; just as 
Danny stops his own linguistic play to get serious, the film invites 
audiences to take the movie seriously, as Danny writes a fusion of 
his brother’s and his own diagnostic biography, which viewers watch 
played out on screen. Regarding the essay, Dr. Sweeney tells Danny, 
“I will be the only one reading it,” but he is wrong on two counts: 
Danny reads as he writes the film that viewers are deliberately hailed 
to “read” as well.
 The fusion of the two brothers means that they both can—and 
do—change their racist views, Derek during his prison sentence and 
Danny during the time it takes the older brother to offer a thick 
description of that time served. The brothers are sufficiently doubled, 
so that audiences can look at one and see the other as well, meaning 
that it does not really matter which one of them gets killed to close 
the tragedy. Derek walks Danny to school and, on leaving, looks 
back, seemingly hearing the “threat score” of rising violins, which 
predicts violence, the precursor to the deadly retribution that befalls 
Danny at the end. A black student shoots him in the school bathroom 
for a minor slight earlier in the film, providing the fulfillment of the 
film’s moral: racial violence only begets more of the same.
 However powerful that moral may be, the racial logic of the film 
is deeply flawed. There is not a sufficient narrative basis within the 
film for the black student to kill Danny—Danny’s brief altercation 
with the unnamed student earlier in the film is no motive, and there 
is no indication that when the character shoots him, he is looking 
at Danny but seeing his brother. In effect, the character is signified 
only by his blackness, and any black character might do as well as any 
other. Similarly, at least one of the three would-be car thieves loses to 
Derek and members of his gang in a racially charged black-on-white 
basketball game, but it is not clear if their crime is motivated by any-
thing more than the loss of the game, such as Derek’s leadership in 
the DOC. The two prominent black male characters of Dr. Sweeney 
and Lamont are relegated to helping the white Derek become who 
he needs to be to fulfill the story.38 Derek and Danny’s father, Dennis, 
was a firefighter shot on duty by a black man, and even Dr. Sweeney 
suggests having spent time in prison. Crime and incarceration are 
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connected to every single black man mentioned in the film. Fur-
thermore, there are virtually no black women, as Sweeney’s secretary, 
a black woman, is seen only partially and fleetingly, though several 
white women have prominent roles.
 That exclusion is produced largely by the focus on the Vinyard 
family, which makes racism a family and an oedipal phenomenon: 
Derek learned it from his father, and with the death of the father 
and the son’s assumption of the father’s place, Derek teaches it to 
Danny. Any mention in the film of the broader causes of racism, such 
as economic disparities and historical disenfranchisement producing 
segregation, as well as a social psychology of racial fear, are either 
voiced by Derek or Danny and twisted to substantiate their racism, 
or immediately dismissed by the brothers as irrelevant. For example, 
Derek says, “One in every three black males is in some phase of the 
correctional system. Is that a coincidence or do these people have, you 
know, like a racial commitment to crime?” He speaks the unspeakable 
in racializing criminality, the blatant “natural” or ontological racism 
so often politically decried while social welfare programs are dis-
mantled and racial profiling has been until recently de facto police 
protocol. Derek rallies his gang members around him with rhetorical 
and physical flourishes that are offered so as to seem persuasive to 
other characters in the narrative, and that thereby foster the credibility 
viewers might hold for his character. The effectiveness of Norton’s 
performance (around which he edited the film) becomes a sizable 
obstacle for any efforts of American History X to address a larger causal 
framework for racism and racial criminality.
 Derek’s racially motivated murder of the second would-be car thief 
depicts the crime that is the clearest origin of his imprisonment. The 
camera shot of the near decapitation of the wounded man features 
plenty of warning, including Derek’s shirtless slow-motion approach 
to the camera, pleas from both the victim and Danny, and the ubiq-
uitous crescendo of violins. Audiences are prepared so ruthlessly for 
the ultraviolent moment that they can look away, and likely many 
do—and the close-up of the terrorized black male character cuts to 
a long shot of the murder from Danny’s vantage point in which the 
victim is barely visible. Therefore, the scene of Derek’s crime that 
is the culmination of his racism, the crux of the film, and the one 
most commonly cited by viewers and reviewers, is quite literally not 
seen by many. His sentencing, or any other jurisprudential proceed-
ing, is not shown at all, and there is only a faceless parole officer 
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occasionally mentioned. The naming of Derek’s criminality as distinct 
from his criminal act thus is offered only obliquely when Danny offers 
his testimony, “It would have been life if I had testified,” a sentence 
he types and promptly erases. Sweeney will not be reading this sen-
tence, but Danny and viewers do.
 Derek’s imprisonment, which constitutes the longest stretch of 
unbroken narrative in the film, is organized around two inverse 
social arcs, a series of increasingly friendly discussions with his black 
coworker, Lamont, and Derek’s deteriorating relationship with the 
white supremacist prison gang, which culminates in their raping him. 
Both function as processes of prison rehabilitation. The rape scene has 
its own ominous approach, a gradually emptying shower, the disap-
pearance of the lone guard from the scene, and more of the camera’s 
adoring gaze, the slow motion of Derek’s naked skin. This moment of 
violence is paired with the earlier one, punishment matching crime in 
black-and-white flashback, the parallel complete down to the slow-
motion hyperreality of impossible clarity as Norton approaches the 
camera to commit murder, as individual drops of water fall from his 
face in the shower. Furthermore, the earlier sequence opens with 
Derek having rough sex with his girlfriend, ands its corresponding 
scene closes with Derek’s own violent rape.
 However, the Motion Picture Association of America ratings sys-
tem has greater leniency for the graphic depiction of violence com-
pared to sex,39 which means that Derek’s rape is represented with 
even more discretion and is thus watchable in a way that his crime 
is not. Derek’s victimization by white supremacy becomes more nar-
ratively significant than the victimization of the black man he killed. 
The greater importance is underscored by Norton’s extended time on 
camera—whether shirtless and triumphant in a reverse dunk on the 
basketball court; rallying his gang members by citing immigration 
and incarceration statistics; after his reform in prison, using his power 
to reject his racism in assaulting the patriarch of the white gang and 
disarming one of its soldiers; or persuading Danny to surrender his 
own prejudice. Understanding the rape as Derek’s real punishment 
in the film reflects what prison historians describe as the “just des-
serts” model of punishment prevalent since 1975.40 It is also a bodily 
punishment, a throwback to what Foucault deems old regime practice, 
except that rather than the state fulfilling the bodily torture, inmates 
themselves conduct it. And just as Foucault claims that the visibil-
ity of public torture such as that of Damien the Regicide sparked 
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unintended sympathy for the criminal, the spectacle of Derek’s rape 
deliberately elicits sympathy for him from the audience.
 Norton, arguably one of the finest actors of his generation, effec-
tively does too good a job in portraying a charismatic bigot, and the 
two-hour edit of the film he largely oversaw organizes itself around 
his character, highlighting the actor’s physicality, built for the film and 
deployed in a visual rhetoric of power. Norton’s character is language 
and body, and inadequacies in one can be compensated for by the 
other. When a potential suitor of his mother challenges him over a 
family dinner, Derek can support any insufficiencies of argument by 
taking off his shirt, the swastika tattooed above his pectoral a threat 
to the Jewish teacher, an excess of visibility that appears repeatedly 
in various flashbacks, the black and white highlighting Norton’s mus-
culature. Within the context of the narrative, the physical threat he 
poses is daunting to other characters; extranarratively, the camera loves 
him, and he gets the best lines. In the absence of any competing dis-
course, his language of hate is fetishized narratively and visually, and 
there is no competition. The mother, Doris Vinyard, is played by Bev-
erley D’Angelo in a largely understated, if powerful, performance, and 
the suitor—and history teacher who sends Danny to Principal Swee-
ney—is a bit part for Elliot Gould as Murray Rosenberg. D’Angelo’s 
and Gould’s characters proffer liberal rhetoric situated as outmoded 
and nostalgic, Doris even in a flowered minidress shot in soft focus 
outside her 1950s-era home. Sixties liberalism is not prepared to deal 
with harsher 1990s “reality.”
 Coupled with Furlong and Norton, D’Angelo and Gould offer 
performances that help the casting itself create the opportunity for 
complex white characters to be nuanced and convincingly portrayed, 
with backstory to provide cause for their behavior, while black char-
acters serve as background. Brooks is a polished, charismatic actor, but 
he has little room to maneuver while playing an urban saint. Both his 
role and the role of the character Lamont are undeviating, guiding 
Derek, and the other positions available for black men in the film, 
the basketball players fouling with violence, the car thieves, prisoners, 
and school-bathroom shooter, are all cardboard cutouts with crime 
on their minds and few to no lines. The film fulfills the equation of 
black masculinity with criminality that has proven so prevalent histori-
cally in the cultural imagination. Though Norton’s character, Vinyard, 
claims that one out of every three black men will enter the criminal 
justice system, the film itself gives far better than even odds.
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 A contributing factor to the film’s latent bias is the degree to 
which the writer and director try to break the ontological category 
of race and make it a free-floating signifier. When Derek abandons 
the Aryan gang during a party the evening he is released from prison, 
his former girlfriend Stacy repeatedly screams that he is a “nigger.” 
In the extended flashback in which he relates his prison experience 
to his younger brother—and by extension, the audience—viewers 
see how a Latino guard names Derek’s own whiteness as an epithet, 
which is contextualized later when Lamont tells him, “In the joint, 
you the nigger, not me,” and goes on to use the term to hail Derek 
several times. The rape scene is situated vaguely as a response to Der-
ek’s first disavowing the Aryan gang in the prison for their political 
inconsistency and then, after becoming friends with Lamont, playing 
in a mixed-race basketball game. The Aryan leader says, “Want to be 
a nigger? We’ll treat you like one.” Race is the X factor of American 
history; who is white and who is black can be reorganized easily 
as power structures are rearranged. The overrepresentation of black 
men in prison can create localized reversals of racial authority among 
prisoners, a claim Mailer’s Gilmore also makes to provide a basis for 
his own racism. American History X presents a Hegelian recognition 
of the other recognizing the self: “you the nigger.”
Figure 2
Look, a white man! In a scene that reverses Frantz Fanon’s recognition of raced black-
ness, Derek Vinyard (Norton) sees that others recognize him as the only white prisoner 
on the cell block.
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 However, the limits of such a racial reordering in U.S. culture, 
whose history often is predicated upon assumptions of racial differ-
ence, possibly contributed to the film’s failure at the box office. That 
is, the film can be understood by genre as a variation on the hood 
film, a white gang movie in the vein of John Singleton’s Boyz n the 
Hood (1991). Both feature the constitutive elements: gangs organized 
on lines of racial identity; violence criticized within the narrative 
but extranarratively more ambiguous in the degree to which it is 
glorified; the scarce father figures; the cult of masculinity in which 
manliness is activity, the violent subordination of others, and invul-
nerability; and the family largely supplanted by gangs but offering 
the saving grace for the main character’s rejection of violence, which 
occurs too late to save brother figures. The most visible difference 
between American History X and the hood gangster films is one of 
race. White masculine youth culture so subaltern as to turn to vio-
lence—with violence’s attendant crime, imprisonment, and vengeful 
murder—possibly proved unmoving for audiences more accustomed 
to seeing gangs of young black men as a menace to society, doomed 
to incarceration and violent death.
 American History X does not know what sort of movie it is, which 
is one way of saying that the overlapping audiences of popular 
moviegoers and film critics disagreed among themselves what to 
make of it. According to popular viewers recording their votes on 
the Internet Movie Database (IMDB), the film was the forty-second 
best film of all time at mid-2007, placing it above Chinatown (1974, 
forty-fifth) and The Maltese Falcon (1941, sixty-third).41 One might 
dismiss this ranking as unrelated to more “elite” valuation, but typi-
cal distinctions drawn between “high” and popular culture are chal-
lenged by the close parallels between the IMDB rankings and the 
one hundred best films as ranked by the American Film Institute. 
American History X was released too late to be considered for the 
AFI 100 in 1998 and was not included on the 2007 revised version, 
but in general there is a high degree of correlation between the AFI 
and IMDB lists, especially taking into account the IMDB inclusion of 
foreign films and overemphasis on recent films. Of the AFI top 50, 
19 appear in the IMDB top 50; 30 appear in the IMDB top 100, and 
only seven films do not appear in the IMDB top 250.
 Users of the movie database can rank a film and post comments, 
and American History X has generated fierce discussion among par-
ticipants. Through the end of 2003, more than eight hundred IMDB 
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members had made online contributions, more than each of the AFI’s 
top three of Citizen Kane (1941), Casablanca (1942), and The God-
father (1972), all of which were ranked in the top twenty-five by 
IMDB voters as well. Real is the primary term of contention among 
the online posts, which are roughly split as to whether the film is 
realistic or not, though applause for Norton’s acting performance is 
another focus. Professional film critics are similarly divided and in 
identical terms, recognizing the ambiguities of the film’s represen-
tation of racial conflict while celebrating Norton’s acting and the 
film’s look and feel. Norton’s performance is “history-making” in the 
National Review; the industry trade Variety praises the story’s “truth-
fulness” and Kaye’s on-location direction as “gritty,” suggesting that 
it adds to the “heightened realism of the film’s style.”42 The per-
ceived visual quality of American History X is bound to the contention 
regarding its symbolization of the real, with the historical traumas of 
racism and incarceration.
 For these overlapping groups of popular audiences and critics, 
what makes the film great is its thematic and visual participation in 
Figure 3
Interracial friendship as salvation. In The Shawkshank Redemption, the friendship 
between Andy (Tim Robbins) and Red (Morgan Freeman) saves both of them.
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a code of realism: its willingness to name and represent racial con-
flict without easy resolution in its substance, coupled with its styl-
ish cinematography and location shooting. When Danny (Furlong) 
walks along Venice Beach, the long shot substantiates the actual set-
ting; when he dies at the end, the possibility of a happy ending 
is frustrated. This is not the sacrificial death at the close of Cool Hand 
Luke (1967), Paul Newman’s pose of crucifixion signifying sacrifice 
and transcendence. Furthermore, the prison of the central section of 
the film is steel bars and dirty blacktop rather than a studio fantasy 
of technofetishism, as in Stanley Kubrick’s A Clockwork Orange (1971) 
and John Woo’s Face/Off (1997). Neither prison nor city is a utopian 
fantasy of racelessness, without distinction between black and white. 
The filmic world of the real is represented as isolated, nasty, brutish, 
and short, where people are born, suffer, and then are murdered at 
street curbs and in high school bathrooms because of racial hate. The 
camera’s unflinching gaze on that very unpleasantness and grittiness 
is symptomatic of its integrity and “documentary realism.”
 American History X’s initial box office failure followed by sub-
sequent positive critical and popular reception means that it paral-
lels Darabont’s Shawshank Redemption, which disappointed similarly 
at the box office but garnered seven Academy Award nominations 
and became a cultural phenomenon in its popularity and ubiquity 
Figure 4
Redeeming American history. In American History X, friendship with Lamont (Guy 
Torry) protects Derek (Norton) from racial violence.
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in cable rotation. The similarities are curious given the degree to 
which American History X attempts to challenge Shawshank’s roman-
tic narrative, lyrical style, and escapism with a stark, gritty look and 
feel to complement its bleak story. Nevertheless, both films capitu-
late to similar racist expectation and fictions of redemption, wherein 
black men are criminals whose rehabilitation involves helping white 
characters become who they need to be. In contrast to Shawshank 
Redemption, which I find compulsively watchable but ideologically 
bankrupt, I find the skillfully written and directed American History 
X well-intentioned but deeply problematic. I appreciate the film’s 
style and applaud its excellent acting and unglamorous representa-
tion of imprisonment, but am cautious of its exclamatory realness of 
white men in prison, when the historical account reads much the 
opposite.
he WholesAle fiction of American History X’s “documentary 
realism” gives way to the “invented characters and fictionalized 
events” of The Hurricane, based on the true story of Rubin “Hur-
ricane” Carter. The question of reality versus its absence as well as 
championship acting are similarly touchstones for the critical response 
to The Hurricane. Whether or not it tells the “real” story is similarly 
at stake among viewers posting comments to its IMDB forum. Like 
Edward Norton, Denzel Washington, with his portrayal of Carter, gar-
nered an Academy Award nomination for Best Actor, and his failure 
to win that year prompted discussion as to whether his 2002 Best 
Actor Award for his performance in Training Day (2001) was at all 
informed by white guilt.2 Critics in the major weeklies and dailies 
roundly praised Washington’s portrayal as “splendid,” “his best role,” 
“Based upon a true story” 
The Hurricane and the 
Problem of Prison Redemption
Most of the Jamesburg kids had only committed the same violations of rules 
as had endeared Huckleberry Finn to millions of people, but in us society 
found these deeds intolerable.
—Rubin “Hurricane” Carter in The Sixteenth Round: 
From Number 1 Contender to #454721
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a “knockout,” and “a moving, fiercely compacted performance.”3 The 
latter of these two speak directly to the middleweight Carter him-
self, a gesture underscored by the director, Norman Jewison, in his 
hyperbolic praise that he could not tell the difference between the 
actor and the former boxer.4 Feature articles in the magazines Ebony 
and Jet, both geared to black audiences, further highlight the film’s 
claim to the real, the latter by including a set photo of Washington-as-
Carter with the actual people of Carter’s life.5 Such reviews juxtapose 
pictures of Carter boxing with film stills of Washington in the ring 
and count on audiences to tell the difference. However, reading the 
history produced in the film presents more-significant challenges than 
telling the two men apart.
 Like American History X, with The Hurricane it is difficult to sort 
the difference between actual events and their imagination, both in 
its story and in selective contexts in which groups have screened the 
film. In addition, like the earlier film, The Hurricane features the cin-
ematic construction of the identity of the prisoner: crime or its lack, 
the declaration of criminality, and imprisonment as transformative, 
even redemptive. The film incorporates a wide variety of sources of 
varying adherence to actuality, from Carter’s autobiography (written 
while he was still in prison) to wholesale inventions, and much in 
between. Furthermore, as with American History X, matters of crimi-
nalization are linked inextricably with race, though this time the 
falsely presumed guilt of black men proves far more central to the 
film. This chapter first demonstrates the narrative and extranarrative 
efforts to equate Carter and Washington and the problems in doing 
so, and then describes the film’s rendition of racist criminal justice 
and the director’s efforts to complicate an overly simplified version. 
Next, I point out the rich psychoanalytic implications of Washington’s 
performance of Carter’s story, wherein a self divided cannot stand any 
more than an imagined unity of self. Instead, the film advocates a 
social identity, a “we”—paradoxically, an “us” that includes the judi-
cial process initiating the same imprisonment that the U.S. Supreme 
Court deemed unjust.
 On February 26, 2001, a group of student organizations at the 
University of Southern California sponsored the screening of The 
Hurricane, Jewison’s film account of Rubin “Hurricane” Carter’s life, 
from a tempestuous young man to the up-and-coming boxer impris-
oned for a crime he did not commit, to his years behind bars and 
the efforts of lawyers and activists that finally freed him. The flyer 
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for this screening lists the student organizations in small type across 
the top, including the Black Student Assembly and the Student Sen-
ate Minority Affairs. The banner just below reads, “RUBIN HUR-
RICANE CARTER,” the nickname and film title in larger letters, 
conflating man and movie; all of the text is white on a black back-
ground, including the date and location of the screening, which are 
listed at the bottom. The primary images of the flyer are three verti-
cal frames, a triptych. The leftmost panel features a photo of Carter 
wearing boxing gloves, fists low, facing the camera, his torso and head 
visible. The rightmost panel is a closer shot of the man playing the 
role of Carter in the film, Washington, his brow furrowed, eyes on 
the camera, one fist ungloved but taped, a more-guarded pose than its 
twin. The center panel dividing the stills of Carter and Washington 
is white, blank. That gap might emphasize the difference between 
the images of subject and actor, or possibly its whiteness framed by 
blackness reverses the racial politics of the film—or perhaps the pho-
tographs merely balance better that way. Two months later, the film 
screened at the University of Texas at Austin as part of the Sweatt 
Symposium on Civil Rights.6 John Artis, Carter’s codefendant and 
also a prisoner for sixteen years before a federal judge voided the 
earlier decision, delivered the keynote address for the conference, his 
presence and personal experience with the racial inequities of the 
judicial system guiding the reception of the film. The film cliché of 
the wrongly imprisoned protagonist assumes a greater urgency and 
authenticity when situated in the context of historical actuality and 
civil rights, with Artis there to tell the difference.
 The conflation of historical documentation and fictionalization 
poses risks to the apprehension of history, both the claim to history 
and the anxiety over its misrepresentation. Before the film has even 
begun, it offers the obligatory disclaimer that frames its subsequent 
criticism: “While this picture is based upon a true story, some char-
acters have been composited or invented, and a number of incidents 
fictionalized.” The inventions far surpass Mailer’s writing a dream 
and inserting it into the unconscious of one of Gilmore’s analysts, 
as the systemic racial bias in the judiciary that imprisoned Carter 
collapses into one white detective with a vendetta, Della Pesca (Dan 
Hedaya), a heavy fictionalization of Lieutenant Vincent DeSimone.7 
The Nation’s review praises Washington’s performance, but is highly 
critical of the film’s overwriting of “truth,” a claim to the real the 
article itself embodies in being written by Lewis M. Steel, a member 
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of Carter’s legal team—who, incidentally, is left out of the movie. 
Unlike Gilmore’s lawyers, whom Schiller dismisses as “hopeless as 
journalists,”8 Steel rises to the occasion. If filmmakers are going to 
write history, then lawyers will review their films.
 This is not the first time that a Washington role has been at stake 
in questions of historical actuality and its film depiction. He plays 
South African activist Stephen Biko in Richard Attenborough’s Cry 
Freedom (1987); a Union soldier in Edward Zwick’s Glory (1989), a 
film based on an actual colonel’s letters; and Malcolm X in Spike Lee’s 
so-titled film (1992).9 There has been a flurry of criticism regarding 
historical docudramas such as these,10 challenges that are pertinent to 
this film as well. The Hurricane’s collapse of systemic injustice into one 
rogue cop is a conventional narrative pattern, effectively an individu-
alization of institutional power that whitewashes more-endemic prob-
lems. Such fictionalization is one half of what Hayden White, among 
others, describes as “postmodern history,” where fiction is framed in 
a “real” context even as the real employs cues of the imagination.11 
The decisions made by cable-network programmers offer an example 
of the complicated relationship of real and imaginary in such post-
modern history. For example, the Court TV Channel is part of many 
standard cable packages, and grew to prominence with the trial of 
O. J. Simpson, featuring largely news and documentary programming 
related to the legal system, from live trial coverage to a talk show 
hosted by former district attorney and judge Catherine Crier. In the 
never-ending effort to fill its schedule, the channel began showing 
syndicated fiction serials with law-and-order themes, so whether a 
real judge or actor or former judge turned host appeared on camera 
may have been difficult for viewers of Court TV to sort, depending 
on the time slot.12
 The Hurricane would fit such programming quite nicely, with its 
many prominent courtroom scenes, prison settings, and “based upon 
a true story” legal battles for justice. The film assigns a three-part 
structure to Carter’s biography. The first follows the boxer’s life from 
childhood until his arrest (with Artis) for a triple murder in Paterson, 
New Jersey, in 1966, a period defined by both Carter’s repeated unjust 
incarceration and the meteoric rise of his boxing career. The second, 
initiated by his 1967 sentence to life in prison, features his resistance to 
incarceration through performing his own autonomy, refusing the 
trappings of prisoner because to assume them would, in his eyes, 
admit the criminality he disavows. He will not wear the uniform 
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of the prisoner, or eat prison food; he keeps largely to himself in 
his cell, writing his autobiography, The Sixteenth Round, and reading 
philosophy, literature, and law.
 The third stage of the story introduces Lesra Martin (Vicellous 
Reon Shannon), a teenage black youth from Brooklyn who is the 
ward of three white Canadians, Lisa Peters (Debra Unger), Sam Chai-
ton (Liev Schreiber), and Terry Swinton (John Hannah). They effec-
tively adopt Lesra in order to facilitate his education, teaching him to 
read and preparing him for college. At a book sale where the youth 
is the only nonwhite, he stares at a box full of books and focuses on 
The Sixteenth Round, its jacket prominently featuring Carter’s black 
male face. In an invitation to participate in the identification, the 
point-of-view shot equates the camera’s gaze with Shannon’s, and his 
hand that extends to select the book in which he recognizes himself 
is thus the viewer’s hand. After reading the book, Lesra, along with 
the Canadians, meets Carter in prison and reignites the legal campaign 
to free him. After nineteen years of protesting his innocence, Carter 
becomes a free man.
 In a manner similar to scenes of remembering in American History 
X, The Hurricane opens out of chronological sequence. Where the 
prior film uses the pair of brothers as narrators, memory coupled 
with the writing of the titular essay invoking flashbacks, the con-
nections in the puzzle of Carter’s life maintain largely thematic links 
established by the director, Jewison. A black-and-white episode of a 
1963 boxing match cuts to Carter in color preparing to fight prison 
guards in order to maintain possession of his prison manuscript in 
1973, then cuts to faceless men committing the 1966 triple murder in 
Paterson (although casual audiences are unlikely to know this, Jewison 
shot the scene at the Lafayette Bar and Grill in Paterson, where the 
actual murders occurred), and then to Carter and Artis being pulled 
over by the police. Conflict organizes the coherence among the open-
ing jump cuts connecting disparate moments in history.
 That device is replaced by literacy for the duration of the film, as 
shots of Lesra reading Carter’s biography cut to Washington’s portrayal 
of that life. The emphasis on literacy underscores the degree to which 
such editing emulates some of the conventions of the high-modern-
ist literary novel in the first half of the twentieth century, replacing 
the sequence of chronology with narrative movement triggered by 
characters’ personal memories and historical reconstruction, strate-
gies that arguably see their ur-example in U.S. writing in Faulkner’s 
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novels from The Sound and the Fury to Go Down, Moses. Like Shreve’s 
“let me play” of Absalom, Absalom!, such fragmentation, discontinu-
ity, and multiplicity engage audiences in actively constructing the 
narrative, piecing together the puzzle. Late-twentieth-century U.S. 
films situated as art draw from this literary tradition as well as from 
documentary style, jump cuts, the mix of color and black and white, 
and other techniques borrowed from French new-wave cinema of 
the 1950s and 1960s and expanded in music-video shorts and com-
mercials in the 1980s and 1990s, substantially altering the narrative 
styles of late-twentieth-century U.S. films.
 Both American History X and The Hurricane make literacy itself a 
narrative device. In the latter film, the reading of The Sixteenth Round 
by Lesra and Lisa and the epistolary exchange between the two of 
them and Carter provide the basis for the film’s movement in and 
out of prison, just as the letters between Cleaver and his lawyer and 
between Gary Gilmore and Nicole Baker pass back and forth. In The 
Hurricane, a scene of Lisa reading the biography aloud cuts to Carter 
in prison, or a shot of Carter reading a letter from Lesra cuts to 
Canada. Like American History X, then, writing and reading one’s 
own life vis-à-vis the life of the “other” of the prisoner serves as 
both a structural and a thematic device. Danny’s voice-over speaks 
his essay, writing how his perspective has been shaped by his broth-
er’s incarceration. Much of Washington’s dialogue, by comparison, 
comes directly from Carter’s book, and that actual prison writing, 
with its attendant emphasis on testimony—on relating the reality 
of imprisonment to those not themselves incarcerated—thus finds 
its way into this film largely set in prison. Re-created prison scenes 
frame actual prison writing.
 Like the narrative of Kaye’s film, the sequencing of The Hurricane 
is informed by treating reading and writing as fundamental to its 
story. Such a basis does emphasize the centrality of both Carter’s book 
and the account offered by two of the Canadians, Chaiton and Swin-
ton’s Lazarus and the Hurricane (1999)13; both are primary sources for 
the film’s screenplay. The narrative organization of the film, however, 
belongs to its director, Jewison, and his own effort to assemble the 
pieces in supervising the editing and telling the “truth.” He achieves 
this organization of the story’s parts through first an arrest and then 
three critical court scenes corresponding to the three parts of Carter’s 
life, with visible and invisible cues to the historical actuality of the 
events depicted, gestures that complicate their own historicity.
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 The most crucial scene of the film occurs when the police pull 
over Carter (Washington) and Artis (Whitt). Artis, the younger man, 
drives the boxer’s car and acts very nervous. Carter remains calm, and 
as it turns out, he and the first officer to approach the car know one 
another. The police officer says, “We’re looking for two Negroes 
in a white car,” to which Carter responds, “Any two will do?” The 
moment is one of twin recognitions, not only Carter and the officer 
recognizing one another, but also the officer recognizing Carter first 
as a black man and then as a particular celebrity, “The Hurricane.” 
That initial recognition provides the first elaboration of the judicial 
Figure 5
The policeman’s call: “Hey, you there!” A police car pulls over Rubin “Hurricane” 
Carter (Denzel Washington) and John Artis (Garland Whitt) and leads to this shot/
reverse shot sequence. The officer says, “We’re looking for two Negroes in a white car”; 
Carter replies, “Any two will do?”
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racial bias that results in Carter’s life sentence, and the court’s recogni-
tion of that bias nineteen years later is the basis for his release.
 The policeman’s declaration, “We’re looking for two Negroes,” 
makes the search akin to Faulkner’s description of the town of Jef-
ferson’s desire for Joanna Burden’s murder to be a “negro crime com-
mitted not by a negro but by Negro.”14 The police in this scene, like 
the lynch mob, are looking for blackness as criminality, and they find 
it where they see it: Carter and Artis are stopped, arrested, and impris-
oned. The scene very nearly appears twice in the movie, thereby 
emphasizing its importance. Later in the film, another black-and-white 
boxing sequence fades through a sly edit of a close-up of a red light 
that is not a police siren but a nightclub illumination, and Carter and 
Artis depart from the club only to be pulled over. The club they leave 
is an actual bar in Paterson, creating an invisible claim to historical 
actuality for the subsequent arrest. That arrest is the quintessential 
Althusserean moment, the policeman’s call of “You there!” hailing 
the subject.
 The policeman’s call is the first scene of several in the film presum-
ing Carter to be a criminal, and it sets the stage for the three times 
he is interpellated in court, named in the first and second instances 
as a criminal and in the third as innocent. All three identifications 
directly relate to his race. In the first, he is a child (played by Mitch-
ell Taylor Jr.) accused of trying to rob an older white man, though 
the film situates him as first protecting his friend from sexual assault 
and then defending himself against murder. The white judge who 
addresses him wishes he could try the black boy as an adult and sen-
tences him to reform school until he is twenty-one.
 The scene directly follows Carter’s interrogation conducted by his 
nemesis in the film, the detective Della Pesca (Hedaya), whose name 
roughly translates from Italian as “a catch” or “fishing for something.” 
Pesca, upon initially seeing the child, says, “I see a nigger with a knife.” 
That equation of blackness with violent criminality lays the basis for 
its numerous reiterations throughout the film, and it makes Pesca the 
face of racial bias. Carter’s race and criminality are called out repeat-
edly, police officers referring to him as a “black son of a bitch” and 
“a life criminal” before the murders for which Carter is later accused 
even occur. The detective is present in every courtroom and in the 
initial interrogation; he garners false testimony from witnesses, and, 
upon arresting Carter after the latter’s escape from reform school and 
stint in the military, says, “You still owe me time” (emphasis added). 
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Pesca functions as a personalization of the state, Carter’s years a debt 
to be paid directly to him. Jewison admits, “I love dramatic confronta-
tions like this, the standoff between two actors,”15 and such standoffs 
are the “composites” that are “fictionalized,” to both the distressed 
and apologist reviews of critics. Steel criticizes the “cinematic crime” 
committed by a “false Hollywood,” while Roger Ebert doubts that a 
chronicle of a “complex network of legal injustice” would have made 
The Hurricane a better film.16 In a Newsweek article that is at once 
about the story of Carter’s battle with racism and Washington’s fight 
against racial typecasting—another superimposition of subject and 
actor—the reviewer cannot decide if the blame for such narrative 
shortcuts lies with producers or audiences. The review offers, on one 
hand, that “audiences like their villains unregenerate”; on the other, 
it maintains that it would be better if the film “trusted the audience 
to swallow a less simplistic view of reality.”17
 Jewison does make some directorial effort to broaden the blame, 
cinematically representing the systemic racism arrayed against Carter. 
In the second courtroom scene, which concludes with the sentenc-
ing for the triple murder, the first shot is outside the courtroom, and 
the camera pans down from sky to white marble. There is a cut to 
the inside of the courtroom, a long shot from the entry that frames 
the assembled audience before the judge, then a cut to the national 
seal on a white wall, then downward to a medium shot of the white 
judge, who says that the defendants have been tried by a jury of 
their peers. There is then a cut to a brief shot of the all-white jury 
for a black man. That montage seems an effort on Jewison’s part to 
implicate nation, institution, legal system, and whiteness in a net-
work of forces differentiating the accused on the basis of blackness 
and isolating him in his criminality and attendant imprisonment, 
thereby fulfilling judicial racism’s “defeat in detail” (cf. chapter 2). 
In an all-or-nothing bid, Carter and his legal team opt to take their 
case above the state of New Jersey to a federal hearing, arguing that 
the state trials were conducted improperly. The judge in the third 
courtroom scene overturns the verdict for the film’s climax, and that 
moment is paired with the earlier one through a set of visual cues in 
order to demonstrate that the subject’s rights and the state’s wrongs 
can be redressed. The third scene similarly opens with a montage 
of the U.S. flag, the courtroom shot from outside, a close-up of the 
bas-relief of Justice, then Carter bidding farewell to fellow prison-
ers, and then to the lawyers’ arguments inside the courtroom. Those 
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arguments culminate in Carter speaking for himself before the court, 
then in the judge’s decision to free him.
 For the viewer schooled in the background of Carter’s actual 
case and the film’s production, the scene is a surreal composite of 
multiple historicities. The judge is named Sarokin, the arbiter of the 
actual trial. Sarokin is played by Rod Steiger, the bigoted sheriff 
from Jewison’s In the Heat of the Night (1967), and now he rules that 
a racially biased prosecution violated the defendant’s constitutional 
rights. His character recuperation is joined by that of an accom-
modating white guard, Jimmy Williams (Clancy Barnes), the sadistic 
prison officer of The Shawshank Redemption, who in this film aids 
Carter and then applauds Sarokin’s ruling. The judge’s ruling excul-
pating Carter quotes verbatim from the actual decision, and Jewison 
recorded Sarokin on videotape rehearsing his own role. The direc-
tor liked the rendition, but preferred Steiger, who then rehearsed 
with the record of Sarokin’s own rehearsal, taped almost fifteen years 
after the latter’s real courtroom performance. In the actual hearing, 
Carter was not present, but Jewison felt the scene would work better 
with Washington in it. Washington’s lines quote directly from Carter’s 
biography, published eleven years prior to the actual hearing at which 
his speech is set. The shots are fairly still and lengthy during that 
monologue, the editing subtle, lending “a reality to it,” according to 
the director. While Carter and Lesra wait for the judge’s decision, 
they talk, with Washington and Shannon’s dialogue offered in shot/ 
reverse shot with the bars between. This is an iconic shot so de 
rigueur of prison in film, photography, and experience that when 
Bob Dylan visited Carter in a minimum-security facility in 1975, an 
unused steel grille had to be appropriated to play the role of bars for 
a press photo.18 Jewison describes the last of the film’s many through-
the-bars scenes between Washington and Shannon as “too real.”19 To 
top it off, black-and-white footage of the actual Rubin Carter closes 
the film. The combination of scenes culminating in Carter’s freedom 
is postmodern history at its best or worst, depending on how sepa-
rately one likes to account the imagined from the actual.
 Again, I am less interested in sorting truth from fiction in the film 
than I am in suggesting how the difference between the two becomes 
one that is told, occurring in the narrativization. Jewison, as well as 
the screenwriters, Armyan Bernstein and Dan Gordon—the latter also 
responsible for writing another “based upon a true story” film about 
injustice in prison, Murder in the First (1995)—draw from a variety 
of narratives and documents. These include biographies of Carter, 

“Based upon a true story”
whether written by the man himself or coauthored by two of the 
Canadians; the transcripts of the trials themselves; and news footage 
of Carter, Dylan, and other actual figures involved in the case. The 
staging of shots simulates the events of the two and a half decades 
before: the faces of the murderers are not shown in the early sequence, 
and the film offers the points of view of witnesses as similarly limited. 
The undecidability of history nevertheless demands decision. The 
film reproduces Sarokin’s actual verdict, which reached its conclusion 
of prior judicial bias, a decision that, like the film, simultaneously 
recorded and invented history, retroactively determining what had 
already happened. In the federal district court of 1985, that meant 
dismissing the 1967 verdict as racially prejudiced, a dismissal that was 
later upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1988. In 1999 that meant 
concluding the film with Washington on courthouse steps followed 
by 1993 footage of a free Carter. The judicial process of indictment, 
incarceration, and exoneration offered as a “true story” in The Hur-
ricane becomes part of the cultural imagination, even as its story of a 
prisoner’s identity is one of personal transformation that has its own 
contemporaries and precedents in narrative film.
 In The Hurricane, resistance and redemption define Carter’s iden-
tity as a prisoner in visual and narrative terms strikingly similar to 
those of American History X. The images of masculine power as body 
and language offered in black-and-white flashback in the latter film 
similarly occur in The Hurricane, as viewers see Washington’s year 
and a half of physical training displayed in brightly lit boxing scenes. 
The frequent displays in each film thus offer chiaroscuro impressions 
of masculine hardness, of power and indomitability. Black-and-white 
segments in these instances function as a historical conceit, locat-
ing their scenes as having taken place before the primary narrative. 
In The Hurricane the historical anteriority of those scenes associates 
them with the really real, as black-and-white footage of Carter box-
ing occurs alongside actual documentary black-and-white footage of 
1960s civil rights demonstrations and the protests of Carter’s impris-
onment ten years later. However, unlike the Lafayette murder, the 
nightclub, and the prison scenes of The Hurricane shot on location, 
those boxing scenes were recorded on a Toronto set. Furthermore, 
Vinyard’s rhetoric of racial hate, as offered to a television reporter 
before his incarceration, pairs with Carter’s offhand comments to 
a newsweekly reporter, a mocking suggestion to shoot the “nigger-
hating cops” beating protesters.
 In prison, both men learn to disavow retributive violence, and each 

Chapter 6
leaves transformed. Lamont, one of the instruments of Vinyard’s salva-
tion and the reason that he even survives prison, calls out for him on 
his departure to remember “the brothers!” In one sense, that brother is 
Vinyard’s younger brother, Danny (Furlong), and each brother spends 
a fair portion of American History X remembering the other in various 
flashbacks. In another sense, “the brothers” are black men, and in a 
film structured on the idea of male siblings as mirrors for one another, 
Lamont’s call is one for cross-racial identification. In The Hurricane, 
Carter at first denies the prison, refusing to conform to its identifi-
cation of him as a prisoner, but even his very resistance capitulates 
to the self-negation that imprisonment intends. The dialogue quotes 
directly from the last words of Carter’s biography: “In the end, there 
is no prison, no more Rubin, no more Carter—only The Hurricane. 
And after him, there is no more.”20 Autonomy produces the narra-
tive destined for erasure; like the character of Butch Beauchamp, the 
character of Carter is a masculine identity of invulnerable mastery 
predicated upon autonomous individuality, wherein death is the end 
of history.
 A pair of scenes in the film captures the initiation into that auton-
omy as a practice of psychological resistance against the isolation and 
individuation of imprisonment, and then the repudiation of that iso-
lation in favor of a social identity. Carter arrives at prison after his 
conviction for the Lafayette murders and meets the warden as a per-
sonification of the prison. The warden demands that he assume the 
position of prisoner, that he strip to wear a “standard inmate uni-
form with your number sewn on it so we can identify you.” Carter’s 
refusal merits him ninety days in solitary confinement. Jewison offers 
that isolation in a montage of Washington in a series of shot/reverse 
shots—the camera’s fort-da—in which the camera’s gaze on the sub-
ject cuts to what the subject sees. After isolation for days, marked by 
growing facial hair and Carter’s increasing despair, he begins hearing 
another voice, and there is another Carter in the cell, an angry mir-
ror who proclaims that he is the tyrant of self: “I’m running shit.” 
The plaintive Carter replies, “What are we gonna do now?” and 
receives the reply, “Feel the hate,” and the oedipal epithet mother-
fucker, which causes the first Carter to cry in solitary. He imagines 
a more complete version of himself in this doppelgänger, thereby 
emphasizing the lack, the inadequacy of the self on his side of the 
mirror.
 Later, the Canadians visit for the first time, and Carter cuts their 
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visit short, angrily denying their ability to identify with his situation: 
“None of you can judge what I’ve been through. [ . . . ] What do you 
know about being in this place?” Washington’s dialogue in the scene 
draws largely from Carter’s The Sixteenth Round, and he declares that 
he is free in prison because there is nothing he wants. Separating 
himself from visitors means walling himself away from desire; wanting 
something means that there is something the prison can take away. 
Desire becomes its own instrument of punishment in a reversal of 
Lacanian lack, as desire is not predicated on lack but itself produces 
the possibility of lack.21 Carter leaves them, and a crane shot rising up 
past levels of cells tracks space in the prison, the distance between the 
here of the visiting room and the there to which they cannot go, the 
cell itself. Alone in his cell, Carter hears a litany of don’t trust ’ems 
from his other self.22 However, he decides that it is time to participate 
in a world outside his autonomy, and dismisses his double with, “It’s 
time for you to go.” The other Washington shouts, “Don’t you turn 
your back on me, nigger!” but the camera returns to the shot/reverse 
shot across the bars, Carter warming up by shadowboxing to the 
ubiquitous rising violins—signifying emotional import—ready again 
to fight for his freedom. A high shot from inside the cell emphasizes 
the light illuminating the typewriter. Given that gesture to writing 
oneself away from violence—communication with another to avoid 
Figure 6
A caged black militant. Denzel Washington’s performance of Carter in solitary con-
finement for refusing to obey prison rules appears visually reminiscent of Eldridge 
Cleaver, also in prison in 1966, the historical setting of this scene.
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the tyranny of one—it is worth noting that the scene draws directly 
from Carter’s autobiography.23
 These are the only two scenes in the film where Carter experi-
ences what might be understood as a schizophrenic episode, and they 
read as an amalgam of Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus and the 
American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders.24 The medical condition of paranoid schizophrenia 
is understood as consisting of brain abnormalities that cause mental 
disassociation, cognitive dysfunction, and verbal memory loss—though 
it also carries with it the popular misunderstandings of the “someone 
is out to get me” perception coupled with multiple personality disor-
der. In Anti-Oedipus, schizophrenia is the self divided, constituted in 
multiple social investments and thereby positioned against the model 
of individual autonomy. Carter’s extended isolation is an alienation 
from a world outside the self, fracturing his thinking, disconnecting 
him from any shared reality, precipitating anxiety and hallucinations. 
His delusions of persecution are, in the context of the film’s narrative, 
true, and the question—as in Soul on Ice and The Executioner’s Song—is 
not, Is the prisoner paranoid? but Is he paranoid enough? Washing-
ton plays the rest of the symptoms of clinical paranoid schizophrenia 
in a scene Jewison describes as “probably some of the most brilliant 
film acting” he has shot—heady praise, given that he has directed 
three Oscar-winning performances.25 Jewison identifies the subse-
quent scene as one of his “high emotional moments as a director,” 
as Carter participates in communication and trust across racial and 
correctional boundaries. In solitary confinement, the isolated, indi-
vidualized subject (Carter) “others” the self as a response to alienation. 
Isolation divorces him from the world, so the self fragments to create 
the multiplicity and conflict that constitute subjectivity.
 That first episode, where Carter envisions an angrier, more com-
plete self, matches Deleuze and Guattari’s description of the false 
autonomy of the oedipal subject and the paranoia attendant to the 
self ’s misrecognition of its singularity; Oedipus is a tyrant and a 
“motherfucker.” Separated from the world, the self will imagine itself 
to death. Jewison views Carter’s character in the first schizophrenic 
episode as suicidal, the step toward death that within the confines 
of individual autonomy means the end of history. The second epi-
sode, dismissing that other Carter, demonstrates the reinitiation of 
the subject to a social order, where the self is, in Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s terms, reterritorialized, reinscripted with desire—in this case, to 
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participate in a world beyond both the prison and the myth of iso-
lated autonomy. This second episode immediately cuts to a scene 
of Lesra and the Canadians in Toronto, with Unger’s voice-over of 
Lisa’s letter to Carter: “We get a rich, deep feeling of experiencing 
your presence here.” The camera and the careful editing perform a 
material reterritorialization, relocating Carter in the sequence. The 
Canadians feel him “here,” and the cut between the shots takes the 
audience “there” before returning to Carter looking at a picture of 
the scene as his refusal to want becomes a desire to be in the world, 
the linguistic participation that the typewriter allows.
 His return to history occurs through a chain of identifications. The 
first moment of such self-recognition occurs before his false imprison-
ment for the triple murder, when he watches race riots on television 
in a bar and locates himself as part of an “us,” a black identity larger 
than himself. Jewison acknowledges that this moment is when the 
picture “takes a turn.” It is a historical turn. Prior black-and-white 
sequences in the film feature footage of Washington boxing in a ring, 
scenes shot on a set in Toronto; these black-and-white riot images 
are from historical footage of policemen beating black protesters. 
Carter as he is performed in the film views documentary footage 
of a civil rights protest that invokes in him an “us,” a transsubjective 
identification, a participation in an identity that is the link between 
“I” and “we,” between personal and social history. In the film, how-
ever, Carter does not act on the recognition. The slip in difference 
between self and other occurs later, in the mutual recognition that 
takes place between him and Lesra—and, by extension, his white 
Canadian guardians. Lesra identifies himself in Carter, first in choos-
ing The Sixteenth Round, then as he reads the biography, proclaiming, 
“This book’s about my life!” In writing the prisoner a letter, he ini-
tiates the chain of communication that will see Carter finally freed.
 For Carter, recognition is not intersubjective identification, but 
a broadening of selfhood, a participation in the world beyond the 
self, which is constructed cinematically through cuts between shots 
in and out of prison and is linked by speaking the other’s words in 
the letters between them. Later, after Carter has participated through 
letters and visits with the Canadians, and thereby with the world 
outside of prison, a court appeal that he hopes will free him fails. 
He attempts to repudiate the outside connection, asking them to 
no longer write or call him, a break described in terms of renounc-
ing any self outside of prison, fully assuming instead his identity as 
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prisoner: “My number is 4572,” he says—dialogue emerging from 
an actual letter of Carter’s and matching the move made by Cleaver 
and others. That renunciation prompts a last-ditch effort from Lesra, 
who sends his high school diploma to Carter and a photo of himself 
with his girlfriend. Shannon’s voice-over accompanies Carter read-
ing in prison. Slow, rising draws of violin strings score Washington’s 
composure cracking. It is a cinematic cheap shot in terms of audience 
identification, cuing viewers exactly how to respond emotionally by 
making Washington’s feelings a model for the audience. However, it 
initiates Carter’s return to a world beyond the self, a plurality the film 
locates in the Canadians’ full-time bid to see him released.
 The Hurricane and American History X both offer prison as a trans-
formative place—educational, redemptive—where male characters 
repudiate race-based thinking and hard autonomy in favor of par-
ticipating in a larger social world of emotional connection that is 
initiated and sustained through communication and cross-racial iden-
tification. There are clear precedents in films of the prior decade, 
particularly in Spike Lee’s Malcolm X and Darabont’s The Shawshank 
Redemption. The former already has a multilevel relationship with 
American History X and The Hurricane. Like The Hurricane it is a biopic 
starring Denzel Washington. Jewison actually was listed to direct Mal-
colm X before Spike Lee drummed up opposition to a white director 
telling the story and took over the project himself. Jewison makes a 
wry comment to this effect in shooting a scene of Washington reading 
a letter in a cell with a poster of Malcolm X visible on the wall in 
the background. The poster is actually a picture of Washington play-
ing Malcolm in the film, a sly wink and nudge to the confluence of 
reality and imagination, as well as to the director’s own personal his-
tory. He gets to film Washington portraying Malcolm after all.
 American History X not only features the titular gesture of race as 
the X factor, but at one point the character of Sweeney (Brooks) also 
refers to Norton’s Vinyard as the “shining prince” of white suprem-
acist patriarch Cameron, an allusion to actor Ossie Davis’s eulogy 
for Malcolm X.26 In the autobiography from which Lee’s film is 
adapted, one of the chapter’s chronicling Malcolm X’s imprisonment 
is titled “Saved,” and it includes his growing literacy and letter writing, 
which feature prominently in the film version. Indeed, the period of 
incarceration plays as the film’s second act, preceded by Malcolm X’s 
early life of crime and his ignorance of racial politics, and followed 
by his life and end as a leader, an act culminating in footage of young 
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children standing and identifying themselves in intersubjective terms 
of (mis)recognition: “I am Malcolm X!”
 The Shawshank Redemption does not make the gesture to actuality 
but it does to literacy, and the development of the prison library and 
a prisoner learning to read play their parts in the film’s tale of the 
mutually redeeming friendship between a white man guilty of no 
crime beyond not loving his wife enough and a black man who did 
commit murder but has paid in decades of time. The titular redemp-
tion belongs to Andy Dupuis (Tim Robbins), who learns to love 
again, though the object of his affection is Red (Morgan Freeman). 
The relationship is cast as homosocial rather than erotic, and the final 
shot of the film is pure Hallmark, a high, long shot, in soft focus, of 
the two men approaching one another and embracing on a beach in 
afternoon light, sun glinting on the water. That film and The Hurricane 
share the happy ending of the uncomplicated “triumph of the human 
spirit” film, though the turn to footage of the actual Carter, overlaid 
with rolling text documenting events after his release, substantiates 
the historical truth of the latter film’s exultant denouement.
 Within a year of their respective releases in 1992 and 1994, Mal-
colm X and The Shawshank Redemption were either financially or criti-
cally successful, and the latter in particular set the stage for would-be 
high-concept films set in prison. The earnings of Lee’s film doubled 
its budget during its domestic theatrical release, not even counting 
overseas distribution sales and Time Warner’s subsequent rental and 
cable earnings, and it merited two Academy Award nominations. The 
Shawshank Redemption was advertised weakly and consequently did 
poorly at the box office, recouping its estimated production costs but 
not marketing expenses. Nevertheless, its Academy Award nomina-
tions and, more important, its word-of-mouth accounts made it the 
number one video rental the subsequent year, and it continues to be 
screened exhaustively on myriad cable outlets. Furthermore, it is the 
second-highest-rated film ever among IMDB users, as of early 2007, 
behind only The Godfather. It has been referenced or parodied in more 
than thirty subsequent films, and spawned a documentary in 2001 
chronicling its emergence as a cultural phenomenon.
 Its success speaks to the degree to which it meets audiences’ 
expectations—as cited in the preface to this book—how the film 
fulfills an audience’s sense of “how it must feel to be behind bars,” 
that recurrent place of fascination in the cultural imagination. The 
Shawshank Redemption draws from the two most notable prior prison 
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films, I Am a Fugitive from a Chain Gang (1932) and Cool Hand Luke, 
in offering wardens and guards as unremittingly evil caricatures,27 
consequently fostering an us-versus-them community among male 
inmates. In Captured on Film: The Prison Movie, Bruce Crowther points 
out that, along with the main character’s innocence, these are some of 
the fundamental characteristics in the development of prison films.
 However, in a sharp departure from the wholesale cruelty and 
punishment of earlier fictive prisons, in The Shawshank Redemption 
homosocial bonds across race and personal transformation become 
crucial factors in imagining incarceration. Writers, directors, and pro-
ducers imagine that prisons somehow simultaneously fulfill the self- 
destruction prisoners seek and provide a humanistic personal improve-
ment. The contradiction should come as little surprise, as actual 
prisons historically have been intended, somehow, to simultaneously 
separate, punish, and rehabilitate. In late-twentieth-century films set 
in prison, the crucial differences from these two influential predeces-
sors (which are also, incidentally, along with The Shawshank Redemp-
tion and American History X, part of the Warner film library) are the 
interracial milieu and the titular emphasis on redemption. Prisons 
are settings for conversion narratives, where white and black men 
learn to love one another and thereby to fulfill their respective desti-
nies after prison, becoming whoever they need to be. The Shawshank 
Redemption made such male romance narratives28 organized around 
an actor with box office success the blueprint for subsequent prison 
films of the 1990s, not only for Frank Darabont’s next direction, The 
Green Mile (1999), but also for American History X and The Hurricane. 
Framed as such, the degree to which such narratives represent actual 
imprisonment becomes beside the point. Films set in prison in this 
style are male romance, with plots of spiritual redemption brought 
about by interracial and homosocial (though not sexual) love, scored 
with rising violins and featuring close-ups of the tears of the men 
who are the focal characters in order to cue viewer responses. These 
films would not be expected to offer the “reality” of imprisonment 
any more than Harlequin historical romance novels might describe 
a “real” eighteenth century. Each genre reveals much more about 
the audiences that seek them than they do about their settings.
 Prisons in films seem more likely to reinforce existing cultural 
norms. Such an endorsement is apparent at the close of The Hur-
ricane, after Sarokin has declared Carter’s freedom. A long, slow shot 
frames the golden sky in soft focus, and then the marble edifice of 
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“Based upon a true story”
the courthouse fills the screen, its motto extending past even a the-
atrical ratio 1.85:1 screen: “The administration of justice is the firm-
est pillar of good government.”29 Carter (Washington) stands amid 
a crowd of reporters on the courthouse steps, and there is a close 
shot/reverse shot of one reporter asking Carter if he will remain the 
“Hurricane.” The freed man replies, “I’ll always be the ‘Hurricane,’ 
and a hurricane is beautiful.” The line might imply the historically 
and politically resonant racial rhetoric of “Black is beautiful,” but the 
camera—like the two court shots preceding it—locates authority not 
in the language of revolutionary identity, but in the judicial system 
metonymically referenced in the marble monument that dwarfs the 
people on its steps. Social justice for Carter occurs through relying 
on the same legal apparatus that placed him in prison almost two 
decades earlier; the redemption that takes place is that of the judicial 
system itself.
 Watching the film, some viewers (myself, for one) may want 
Carter to be angry, violently angry at so many years in prison, but the 
orchestral score builds while the high and long shot situates Carter 
beneath the imposing courthouse, and then text on a black screen 
relates a series of victories for the real-life characters. The state of 
New Jersey, we learn, appealed the case to the federal Supreme Court 
and lost, while Lesra became a lawyer, and Carter and Artis went on 
Figure 7
“A hurricane is beautiful.” Rubin Carter (Washington) experiences freedom after 19 
years. Like Derek Vinyard’s (Norton) own transformation, he leaves prison older, wiser, 
and more peaceful—and both lack the shaved head and traditional masculine hardness 
with which they entered.
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to serve as civil rights advocates—and Carter was awarded an honor-
ary title by the World Boxing Association. The gestures to historical 
actuality legitimize the nearly two decades of judicial appeal radically 
telescoped to fit the cultural constraints of a two-hour feature film. 
Judicial institutions trump revolution to fulfill mainstream ideology 
in fictionalizations geared to profit from a thirty-million-dollar invest-
ment.
 The amount of money invested in the story grows in its other 
incarnations. The Hurricane was produced and distributed by Uni-
versal Pictures, a property of NBC Universal—itself 80 percent the 
property of General Electric as of October 2003. The book pub-
lisher Houghton Mifflin, which NBC Universal acquired in 2001, 
released James S. Hirsch’s Hurricane: The Miraculous Journey of Rubin 
Carter (2000). The soundtrack for the film is an MCA property, which 
is also an NBC Universal company, and the album features numerous 
artists also distributed by MCA. As the parent company also owns 
the NBC network and USA cable channels, it is in a position to 
exploit the related properties among its multiple media outlets of 
film, DVD, television network, cable, music CD, and trade paperback.30 
The consolidated ownership of these properties and the high cost of 
their mass distribution may contribute to both a normalization of 
their stories and a capitulation to a previously successful narrative 
such as The Shawshank Redemption. Couple that with the similarly 
profitable appeal of the movie’s being based on actual events, and 
critical audiences encounter an increasingly familiar story: black men 
are imprisoned unfairly but nevertheless improved, a state of affairs 
that redeems them and the courts that imprison them. In the face of 
actual incarceration patterns, fact and fiction merge in a disturbing 
and long-standing trend with possible consequences, “reel” effects. 
Such films at once imagine the real and realize the imaginary in a 
wish fulfillment that may well affect actual prisoners.
hough tony kAye shot American History X on location 
in Venice Beach, California, the characters projected there are 
simulacra, copies without originals. And while Rubin Carter’s his-
torical actuality is cast in Denzel Washington, the events of his life 
are rewritten to fulfill the narrative structure of a high-concept Hol-
lywood production, a multimillion-dollar package organized around 
the proven assets of its director and star, with its story of a boxing 
champion wrongly imprisoned easily pitched to producers and then 
to audiences. It would seem that a largely cinema vérité documentary 
such as The Farm could resolve the tension between imagined and 
real imprisonment in film. After all, its cameras circulate through the 
corridors of the actual Louisiana State Prison, its characters the real 
prisoners, guards, and administrators. The film is part of the historical 
The Farm
“This is no dream 
or nothing made up, this is for real”
Serving time is just like a puzzle, a two-thousand-piece puzzle. There it is, 
throw it to you, and it’s scattered every which way. Now, put it back together. 
That’s the way your life is. When you are sentenced to a penal institution, 
your life is scattered. You is the one who has to put it back together.
—Eugene “Bishop” Tannehill in The Farm: Life Inside Angola Prison
7
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record, an actual documentary and not simply shot in a documentary 
style; it is a true story rather than merely based on one. However, it 
shares with American History X and The Hurricane the sense that racism 
contributes to the imprisonment of black men who are nevertheless 
redeemed in prison, and cross-racial identification transforms prison-
ers, even if it does not necessarily free them. This chapter shows how 
The Farm, like many documentaries, sometimes conforms to conven-
tions of fictional narratives in its effort to represent its reality, in this 
case one of imprisonment. Nevertheless, this film more than the oth-
ers most fully separates its representations of prisoners from popular 
imaginations of criminal justice and incarceration, largely because of 
the personalities of the prisoners themselves, their own statements of 
what freedom and imprisonment—and life and death—might mean.
 The Farm is a documentary directed by Liz Garbus, John Stack, 
and Wilbert Rideau, the last of whom was an inmate at the Louisiana 
State Prison during the filming—a new trial freed him in 2005.1 As 
of 1999 Louisiana joined the nation’s capital with the highest rate of 
incarceration in the United States, placing one out of every hundred 
people in prison or jail, according to the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice.2 The film’s representation of the maximum-security facility is 
organized around six inmates: George Crawford, a twenty-two-year-
old black man beginning a life sentence; John Brown, a thirty-five-
year-old white man on death row for twelve years, executed during 
the film; George “Ashanti” Witherspoon, a black man in his forties, 
twenty-five years into his seventy-five-year sentence; Vincent Sim-
mons, a forty-five-year-old black man who has served twenty years 
of his sentenced one hundred; Logan “Bones” Theriot, a sixty-one-
year-old white man, twenty-six years into his life sentence, who dies 
of lung cancer; and Eugene “Bishop” Tannehill, a sixty-five-year-old 
black man, thirty-eight years into his life sentence. Innocence and 
redemption are common themes in their representations. Crawford 
and Simmons deny their guilt, the latter becoming a writ lawyer in 
the effort to appeal his case. Witherspoon too becomes a writ lawyer 
and regularly leaves the prison to perform community outreach and 
teach CPR, while Tannehill leads church services in the prison. The 
film emphasizes the inmates’ experience of routine days, their isolation 
from their lives prior to prison, and, in the case of those who have 
already served many years, the dramatic difference between their cur-
rent lives and the criminality that precipitated their incarceration.
 The film received a nomination for an Academy Award and won 
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broad critical acclaim.3 Variety describes the film as a “matter-of-
fact—and, therefore, all the more devastating—indictment of the U.S. 
penal system.”4 However, the film also has been “roundly praised” 
by the Louisiana governor’s office and prison administration, which 
expressed interest in using the film in its guard training.5 The video 
is for sale at the Louisiana State Prison Museum, along with prison 
T-shirts, hats, pens, hot sauce, and other memorabilia. That the film 
means different things to different people is a banal observation. That 
the documentary is perceived in such diametrically opposed ways is 
a matter for analysis, given that its frequent employment of cinema 
vérité style—what Angola is “really” like—nevertheless leaves available 
competing uses: scathing depiction, training aid, cultural kitsch.
 The film’s supratext, like those of American History X and The Hur-
ricane, draws attention to the ways movies are directed not only by 
directors but also by and to specific audiences. American History X has 
seen critical indictment for its account of race relations even as oth-
ers have nominated it for human rights “Peace” awards; The Hurricane 
was used as a teaching tool by university civil rights organizations, 
and prison administrators considered employing The Farm to train 
new guards. These strategic projections of the films exemplify ways 
of viewing that emphasize the rhetorical—not what a text means, but 
what it is for, what it does, what it produces. In these films’ claims to 
the real, they produce history, repeatedly attempting to substantiate the 
actuality of their representations of prisons, race, and masculinity.
 In directly psychoanalytic terms, documentary filmmaker and 
theorist Jill Godmilow suggests, “Unconsciously embedded in these 
forms called documentary is the conceit of the ‘real,’ which substanti-
ates the truth claims made by these films.”6 Producers and audiences 
alike participate in the sense of documentary films as, if not the stuff 
of the real itself, then at least less mediated, less constructed than 
fictional narratives of “documentary realism” or narratives based on a 
true story. However, as Godmilow also points out, historically docu-
mentary has borrowed from the conventions of dramatic narrative 
film.7 Nancy F. Partner raises similar questions,8 and Paula Rabino-
witz emphasizes that documentary films typically maintain a reliance 
on both a political agenda and the narrative strategies of fictional 
film, which results in their “reinforcing dominant patterns of vision.”9 
Documentary films then capitulate to mainstream expectations similar 
to those for would-be blockbusters.
 What this means is that even as the “conceit of the ‘real’” is 
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embedded in the historical records of documentary film, narrative 
conceits of fiction help to shape their production. In an extended 
interview, Garbus claims that in the production of her work, the 
film is “something I came to very organically, rather than with a lot 
of intellectual ideas,” and that “story and character” are “paramount 
to the formalistic concerns.”10 It is easy to conceive of that organic 
process of storytelling as an approach to history itself informed by 
previous narrativization, through what Jameson terms “the political 
unconscious.” History as the sum of actual lives exists in a surplus to 
its narration, its vagaries exceeding the conventions of representation. 
For example, in the two years that The Farm’s outside directors, Garbus 
and Stack, visited the prison of more than 5000 inmates, they shot 
over 150 hours of film, which they distilled to 100 minutes organized 
around six characters. Garbus acknowledges that the film “was really 
made in the editing room,”11 a claim that is equally true of American 
History X and The Hurricane.
 Memory and history serve as the scattered pieces of a puzzle that 
viewers assemble together in the watching. Even as the editing of 
The Farm shapes the depiction of recorded events, the recorded events 
are themselves shaped by the presence of the camera. Of inmates 
with life sentences lacking the possibility of parole, Garbus says that 
they “see a camera and they think ‘there’s a chance.’”12 Godmilow 
addresses the related case of a documentary account of the Romanian 
revolution, in which revolutionaries acted for their own camcorders 
in order to “play well on TV and produce a useful political record.”13 
This is the other half of Hayden White’s conception of postmodern 
history: not only does the imaginary code itself as real, but also the 
historical is offered with the grammar of the imagination. The Farm, 
like American History X and The Hurricane, is shaped by the cultural 
expectations that are, in part, produced through the prison films that 
precede it, where prison is a place of redemption, and where predomi-
nantly black men are condemned, many unjustly, but are nevertheless 
transformed—where the criminal violence of black and white men 
is converted to homosocial love, and autonomy gives way to a social 
identity.
 The Farm offers a predominantly synchronic account of the Loui-
siana State Prison, “a slice of life” more attuned to space than time, 
an impression of the place shot over two years in bits and pieces of 
footage thereafter organized around six inmates. The opening mon-
tage of brief clips and dialogue from later in the film sets the stage 
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in medium shots of the inmates acknowledging their hopes, black-
and-white mug shots, an Angola road sign, a hearse and burial, and 
a score of harmonica blues underlying bits of dialogue: “God still 
exists behind prison bars”; “I am an innocent man”; “The slaves that 
worked these fields came from Angola in Africa and it picked up its 
name from there.” The measured tones of the narrator, Bernard Addi-
son, introduce the place: “Down in Louisiana lies America’s largest 
maximum-security prison,” where most inmates serve life sentences—
a place where the vast majority, 85 percent, will die behind bars. 
Addison then offers the film’s narrative thrust: “This is the story of 
six men trying to overcome the odds.” There is some tension between 
that organization around character and the film’s emphasis on set-
ting and on the broad experience of thousands at the nation’s largest 
maximum-security prison. Representation is one means of bridging 
the gap, and the six men roughly match the racial breakdown of the 
prison, where 77 percent of the more than five hundred new inmates 
admitted each year are black men—Crawford, Simmons, Tannehill, 
and Witherspoon are black, and Brown and Thierot are white.
 The first narrative sequence uses the admission of Crawford as 
a means into the story of the prison, and even before viewers meet 
him, a white female guard overseeing processing points out that many 
new inmates arrive every Monday: “We’re all guaranteed a job, we 
have good job security.” Her matter-of-fact tone, lacking any irony, 
introspection, or critical distance, is maintained in most of the film’s 
account of Angola’s 100 percent white administration. There are visual 
cues such as the red, white, and blue pen with which Crawford signs 
an admittance form, and prison guards later practice for Brown’s 
execution, joking with one of their own playing the role of the 
condemned. During Crawford’s processing, the color footage gives 
way to a black-and-white still, a mug shot, a gesture to the official 
declaration of criminality, the initiation of the prisoner’s identity and 
a conceit maintained for the other five inmates.
 After the new inmate’s arrival, there follows a brief scene of With-
erspoon conducting orientation during Crawford’s processing, but 
the film next focuses on the elderly Tannehill, who offers the young 
inmate’s opposite. He suggests that there are three things that Angola 
will do: “bring you to a crossroads,” “harden you,” and then “kill 
you.” Tannehill’s retrospective prophecy provides a point from which 
to look backward, a historical point of view from which he sees all 
and foretells the rest. Crawford sifts through personal family photos, 
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but in the Tannehill sequence the camera’s gaze shifts to the broader 
history of Angola: a shot of black-and-white photos of dogs chasing 
escapees cuts to footage of dogs in kennels today. The editing implies 
the particular, and particularly racial, significance of pursuing dogs 
(like those of both Light in August and Go Down, Moses) on a Southern 
plantation turned prison. The black-and-white stills function as the 
same gesture to historical anteriority and actuality as the mug shots, 
as the documentary footage Jewison employs repeatedly in The Hur-
ricane, as the flashbacks of memory in American History X. In all three 
films, black and white means past, the past means history, and history 
is real.
 The next sequence introduces Witherspoon, the model inmate 
who acknowledges that he has “done everything in prison that [he] 
should have done as a community leader in society.” Garbus describes 
him as “Mr. Rehabilitated” after twenty-five years14—one-third of 
his sentence—though his parole remains withheld. There is a pain-
ful irony prefacing Witherspoon’s depiction in the film. In 1982 he 
published a poem titled “The Lifer” in The Angolite, while the same 
issue features a cartoon wherein a warden tells a prisoner, “Your 
rehabilitation went so well, we’ve decided to keep you as a model for 
others.”15 Witherspoon also acts as a proxy for Rideau, the codirec-
tor of the film, who also is known as “Mr. Rehabilitated” and whose 
requests for a pardon were stalled until 2005.16 After Witherspoon, 
there is Thierot, dying of lung cancer in the prison hospital, whose 
account of prison life is a litany of affirmations: prison “is not as ter-
rible a place as you would think”; “you can still have a life inside, 
you can help other inmates”; “you can help other people—that’s not 
always self you have to look to.” Things get a bit surreal after that, as 
the camera follows Crawford, amid other black inmates, to work in 
the fields of the prison’s farms for pennies a day, overseen by armed 
guards on horseback, a sequence scored with a spiritual; the camera 
then cuts to the warden driving a truck.
 The warden, Burl Cain, admits, “It’s like a big plantation from days 
gone by. We hate to call it that in a way, but it kind of is because 
it’s inmates, it’s a prison. This was a plantation.” His words recall that 
the Thirteenth Amendment forbids slavery except in the context of 
imprisonment, “except as a punishment for crime.” The subsequent 
sequence in the film emphasizes the estrangement of the place—the 
prison’s existence as a whole other world—as the camera takes a walk 
through the city that is Angola: aerial shots of the eighteen thousand 

The Farm
acres of fields and buildings, on-site housing for staff, a baseball field 
for staffers’ children, the DJ at the prison radio station playing gospel 
and wishing the “brothers up on death row a beautiful day.” The 
montage seems to suggest the ambiguities of prison life, that it is 
at once an America viewers might immediately recognize and one 
completely foreign, where children play baseball and men in the J 
Block are in solitary confinement twenty-three hours a day. One of 
the men on death row is Brown, fruitlessly awaiting an appeal to his 
execution. After John Brown—whose own name, though unremarked, 
has its own historical resonances with race and racial violence in the 
Old South—the subsequent narrative sequence introduces the sixth 
of the film’s characters, Simmons. He has served two decades of a 
century-long sentence, and twenty years after receiving a sixth-grade 
education and defending himself because he lacked the money for 
legal counsel, he has become a self-trained writ lawyer, appealing his 
case and protesting his innocence to the parole board.
 Almost every reviewer of The Farm comments on the scene of 
Simmons’s parole hearing, and the filmmakers acknowledge that it 
Figure 8
“It’s like a big plantation.” Warden Burl Cain’s description of Angola Prison’s 
working farm strikes a resonant chord with the overrepresentation of black men in 
prison and Louisiana’s legacy of slavery.

Chapter 7
gets a “big response” from audiences.17 Because the documentary 
begins in the prison itself, it cannot film any of the actual court hear-
ings that previously sentenced the inmates and thereby named their 
criminality, initiating their identity as prisoners. Simmons’s hearing 
and the consequent denial of his parole are therefore the reinscrip-
tion of his criminal status, his identity of prisoner. He introduces what 
he describes as “exculpatory evidence,” which includes a statement 
from one of the victims, who claimed that she could not identify her 
assailant because “all niggers look alike.” Simmons’s blackness, then, 
identifies him as criminal, an “any one will do” to parallel Carter’s 
story, the anonymous “negro crime” of Light in August, the guilt of 
blackness facing Dale Pierre in The Executioner’s Song.
 During her own testimony to the parole board, recorded on cam-
era, the victim acknowledges the racial consequence of her rape in a 
dialogue that includes a member of the parole board, a black man.
Victim: I have a problem with black people. [ . . . ] I’m scared of 
’em.
Board memBer: You’re not scared of me this morning, are you?
Victim: No. [ . . . ] but I wouldn’t be alone in a room with you.
Board memBer: That goes both ways.
It seems unlikely that, had her assailant been a white man, the victim 
would have developed a racial fear of white men. The white fantasy 
of supermenial black men sexually assaulting white women broadens 
violent personal trauma into a social pathology of race-based fear 
familiar to both, who recognize the other: “You’re black” / “You’re 
white.” A scene of the white Canadians tracking down a witness in 
The Hurricane includes this dialogue, but the Hegelian recognition 
of one’s self in the other’s acknowledgment of the self is addressed 
and passed over in favor of polite discussion over tea and cookies. 
Here the mutual recognition of “That goes both ways” means that 
the black parole-board member participates in a pathology of rac-
isms, the victim’s fear of his black masculinity and its social and 
historical context of consequences (the judicial lynching of Simmons, 
for example) precipitates his own response to her white feminin-
ity. For the documentary, it is as if the previous century and a half 
never happened, the past not history or even past but right now—the 
New South is just like the Old South, and Simmons’s hundred-year 
sentence is just like a noose round a neck from a century before.
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 However, like the red, white, and blue pen, like the prison guard 
boasting of her job security, and, most pertinent, like the warden 
admitting the likeness between plantation and prison, slave and 
inmate, the acknowledgment here does not precipitate any self-critical 
reflection on the part of the arbiters of justice. In what appears to 
be about forty seconds of unbroken footage—it is difficult to tell, as 
the editing of this sequence is particularly skillful—the parole board 
dismisses Simmons and conducts not discussion but half-spoken plati-
tudes in ratifying their foregone conclusion of guilt before sending 
for Simmons: “He did it. He just didn’t . . . You know, I have a . . . .” 
“Of course he did it. Of course.” The scene is disorienting because 
the board knows it is being filmed, yet its members do not seem to 
care that their desultory judgment becomes part of the historical 
record, not only in the denial of parole they sign but also in the far 
more public manner of what became a Sundance Award–winning 
documentary.18
 Certainly The Farm introduces Simmons’s case in a sympathetic 
manner and does not, with any rigor, subject his claims of innocence 
to any evaluation. Nor does it make any comment on the likelihood 
Figure 9
The parole hearing. Vincent Simmons appears before his parole board with what 
he claims to be “exculpatory evidence”; after approximately 40 seconds of delibera-
tion, the board rejects his appeal.
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that an appeal rather than parole hearing would address exculpatory 
evidence. The parole board focuses on events between the guilty 
verdict and the parole hearing, and the board does suggest that Sim-
mons appeal, which he does, though the U.S. Supreme Court sub-
sequently rejects that appeal. His innocence or guilt is less at stake 
than the board’s failure even to pretend to listen. However, just as the 
record of the decision may shock audiences, they have seen it before. 
The Shawshank Redemption features longtime convict Red (Freeman) 
claiming not his innocence but his repentance and rehabilitation, only 
to have his petition for parole denied. It is not until a later scene of 
a subsequent parole hearing, when he renounces any meaning of 
rehabilitation, when he coldly acknowledges that he does not care if 
he is free or not, that his form is stamped “approved.” The capricious-
ness of the judicial system, particularly in the predominantly white 
administration of black prisoners, is what prison films anticipate as 
their audiences’ expectation.
 Tannehill presents another case of redemption without release, 
though his conversion is not legal but spiritual. He has become an 
ordained minister in his almost four decades at Angola, and the film 
includes one of his sermons, which begins, “There is a way to escape 
and be born again and live a holy life, a victorious life. So what about 
being behind bars, Bishop? God still exists behind prison bars. Thank 
you, Jesus. He sanctifies and he qualifies and he specialize[s] the 
individual that take[s] knowledge of him and repent[s].” Tannehill is 
minister and sinner, speaker and audience, voicing both halves of the 
call and response. The sermon melds into a mythologized autobiog-
raphy in which Bishop walks the Damascus road. “As a young man, 
twenty-four years old, thank you, Jesus. Met a man, innocent man, a 
good man, on a railroad track one morning [ . . . ]. I took that man’s 
life. Went on down the railroad track. Got into rock and roll [ . . . ]. 
They picked me up and they rescued me and put me in jail.” The 
sermon is completely insane, and brilliant, an apoplectic confession 
in rap rhyme, akin to Reverend Hightower’s mad exposition of his 
grandfather’s Civil War exploits in his Sunday exhortations to Jef-
ferson in Light in August, a fusion of myth and memory in a hail to 
salvation. The Angola minister receives a better response than High-
tower, and the closing applause beats the clapping hands that first 
bring Tannehill to the microphone. Time served and service such as 
this have placed a recommendation for Tannehill’s pardon on the desk 
of Louisiana’s governor, but in the course of his tenure the governor 
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has never signed such a pardon, and has not done so by the film’s end 
either.
 All six focal characters are similarly cast in terms of transfor-
mation; irrespective of their guilt, they are saved by religion, good 
works, or critical self-reflection, made into better men in prison. 
Like Malcolm X, Tannehill is “Saved”—though by Southern Bap-
tist Christianity rather than by the politicized Black Muslim faith 
the American Correctional Association tried and failed to bar from 
prisons in the early 1960s. Crawford, even though just admitted, 
acknowledges that though he is innocent of the murder that commits 
him, his prior crimes have caught up with him. Witherspoon admits 
his guilt for his crime but points out that the man he is today “is a 
totally different person”—like Cleaver, the prisoner of now is not the 
same man sentenced years before—and the film supports that view, 
chronicling his community work as a trustee on behalf of the prison 
administration. He and the warden speak very nearly the identical 
line of not giving up hope even during a life sentence, though (like 
Simmons, like Red) Witherspoon’s parole bid fails, according to the 
rolling text that closes the film. In terms that coincidentally quote 
Figure 10
An inmate’s last days. Logan “Bones” Theriot decides not be buried outside of 
prison grounds as his family wishes, opting instead to remain, “Where my friends 
are.”
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almost directly from Gary Gilmore, the death row prisoner Brown 
admits that he is further from Christ than he would like, but that 
he now has “more concern about [himself] and others.” His affect, 
coupled with the awareness that he has not gone far enough in the 
time before his execution, nearly reproduces Theriot’s feeling that he 
“wanted more time,” and that one can turn to others in the dimin-
ishing time one has.
 Theriot’s final scene in the film hints at some of the challenges 
facing documentary film in the effort to testify, to tell the truth about 
imprisonment and its ends. Theriot’s friends come to visit him in 
the hospital after he has ceased eating and has admitted that he only 
waits to die, and his friends think him lucky to expect to be buried 
outside of Angola. He surprises them, telling them that rather than 
being buried outside prison grounds at a family plot, he has chosen 
to be buried here, “where [his] friends are.” Some of his black and 
white companions cry when they hear, and hands are held, his frail 
body embraced—“We love you. We love you.” The scene appears 
far different from the romantic shot closing The Shawshank Redemp-
tion, though both feature black and white men transformed in the 
mutual love fostered in prison. There is no soft focus, no rising shot 
and orchestral cue, just a still camera, a cheap white room, a plate of 
leftover food, foil-wrapped and left on the floor, not to be eaten by a 
man who is not acting and will die and be buried at Angola during 
the course of the film.
 Real life is never as glossy and slick as Hollywood productions, 
even those with claims to the real in their biographical narratives or 
the “heightened realism” of their style. Nevertheless, there is the sense 
that the foreclosure of life imprisonment has created the space for 
physical affection between men and across race. I am not suggesting 
that the love among Theriot and his friends is not felt, that love 
might not be experienced within confinement, that prisons’ gendered 
populations and enforced time together do not ever foster valuable 
interracial relationships among men, expressed through bodies and 
language in a manner beyond what is generally sanctioned by main-
stream U.S. culture. However, I am suggesting that films such as Cool 
Hand Luke and, to a far-greater extent, The Shawshank Redemption 
made that phenomenon part of the cultural imagination, a definitive 
aspect of what U.S. audiences expect from prison films, documen-
tary or otherwise. The masculine homosociality of Cool Hand Luke 
occurs strictly among white men, while The Shawshank Redemption 
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initiates the shift to cross-racial identification. As in Cleaver’s Soul on 
Ice and Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-Oedipus, the shared identity of 
inmate trumps racial difference, though there is the significant lack of 
the revolutionary imperative to social change in Darabont’s adaptation 
of Stephen King’s novella. The character of Red (Freeman) originally 
was written as a white man, which contributes to the unremarked 
nature of racial difference in the film.
 To understand the historical record of documentary film as uncon-
sciously shaped to reify dominant cultural norms is, then, to under-
stand historical records themselves as shaped by prior imaginings, a 
matter underscored in a strange sequence after Theriot’s final scene, 
which takes place at Christmas. A radio-station DJ announces that the 
prison is on flood watch, and the film then cuts to an aerial shot of 
the river near the prison and the narration, “That spring, the Missis-
sippi River rose to its highest level in a century.”19 To this point in 
its narrative, The Farm has not been concerned terribly with telling 
time, and the cut here seems informed by the desire to broaden from 
a personal to a public trauma, and to shift from death in winter to a 
spring that is both renewing and threatening land and inmates. The 
inmates work together through the night to stack the sandbags and 
build the levees to save the prison from a flooding Mississippi in a 
scene weirdly reminiscent of “The Old Man” section of Faulkner’s If 
I Forget Thee, Jerusalem, originally published as The Wild Palms (1939),20 
where the “tall convict” also battles a Mississippi flood and afterward 
returns to prison.
 The same historical and cultural forces that shaped Faulkner’s 
writing shaped the South and its river, built Angola: its land, its racial 
identities, and its history. They also contributed to the strategies and 
the language of narration used to tell that history. Thus, The Farm 
sounds like Faulkner sometimes, as when the warden comments on 
signs that the flood might be a grave matter: “When they move the 
horses, you know it’s serious.” Floods are part of the South and its 
history, part of the novels that tell that history and, in circular fash-
ion, then become a part of it. Rising rivers are imagined in novels 
and films, and are recorded in documentary, as in the pair of films 
both titled The River (1938, 1984). The 1938 film is a Depression-era 
documentary on the Mississippi floods released at the same time that 
Faulkner began his own (largely uncredited) film writing in Holly-
wood, and also the time he began writing If I Forget Thee, Jerusalem. 
The 1984 fictional feature film, also set in the South, received five 
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Academy Award nominations and similarly shows a battle against the 
rising waters that—like the battles of the novel and both documenta-
ries—makes a natural disaster the objective correlative to some human 
conflict.
 Certainly the near flooding of Angola during the two-year film-
ing of The Farm took place, and it earns two mentions in a presenta-
tion given by Angola’s Warden Cain (and Cathy Fontenot, Angola’s 
director of classification) at the 2001 ACA meeting.21 However, just 
as there are five thousand other inmates besides the six whose stories 
Garbus, Rideau, and Stack show in their narrative, there is much 
besides the rise of the Mississippi that happened at the Louisiana 
State Prison from 1996 to 1998. I am suggesting that, like the bonds 
among men and across racial lines formed inside prison walls, like 
uniformly violent crimes that lead to confinement, like the seemingly 
unjust imprisonment of black men, and like the inmates’ redemption, 
the description of the flood of near-biblical proportion comprises the 
narrative in a manner that capitulates to the layers of prior representa-
tion that have become the cultural imagination, in all of its dubious 
facticity and less-determinate meaning.
 The stock pieces of prison films are in place, from administration 
to visitation to shot/reverse shot sequences across prison bars. There 
is the casual cruelty of the admitting guard who equates new inmates 
with job security, the prison warden who delays evacuating the prison 
during the flood—though it is not mentioned in the film, the warden 
did eventually relocate three thousand inmates.22 Crawford experi-
ences a poignant visit from his mother, just as Vinyard sees his own 
mother, and Carter meets his wife. Crawford’s mother exclaims, “This 
is no dream or nothing made up, this is for real”—and viewers know 
it is real because we have seen the scene before. Bruce Crowther’s 
Captured on Film details the shared characteristics of prison films, first 
as offshoots of the 1920s and 1930s gangster films and then through 
the 1980s. Crowther identifies the generic features such as the main 
character’s innocence, visits from the inmate’s mother and her unre-
mitting belief in her son, and cruel wardens and guards, types easily 
read in the documentary.
 It is important to distinguish between prison as a setting and the 
prison film as a seemingly coherent genre, because prison is a set-
ting with strings attached that shapes but does not wholly determine 
the sort of stories told in films set there. The Farm does not entirely 
capitulate to the expectations of prison as a setting cast in the cultural 
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imagination. In The Hurricane, like so many courtroom scenes of 
films before, the full authority and power of the judicial system are 
embodied in magisterially robed justices, marble edifices, and elo-
quent arguments that in the last instance result in clearly righteous 
decisions. In The Farm, however, Simmons’s hearing takes place in 
what appears to be a too-small trailer with shoddy fake paneling, 
and Brown’s appeal of his execution includes competing arguments 
offered amid the bad suits and folding chairs populating what might 
be a junior high school cafeteria. Lacking the imagined trappings, 
justice looks like a cheap and ad hoc process. Still, the directors focus 
on the characters that they found most compelling, or that they felt 
audiences would find most compelling. Directors, after all, aim the 
camera and thereby the field of view, the characters and stories that 
can be seen on-screen. One reason that those characters and those 
stories may be most convincing is that those stories and those char-
acters are most recognizable. At the end of the film, for instance, 
both white characters have died. The remaining four are black men. 
Crawford, Simmons, Tannehill, and Witherspoon are in prison, and 
none are represented as belonging there.
 The fundamental problem with the logic of the redemption nar-
ratives of these films is that they largely endorse the use value of the 
same judicial system they at least in part describe as unjust. These 
films largely posit prison as man-making, as a setting for personal 
transformation, irrespective of an inmate’s responsibility for crime. 
Simmons may or may not have committed the rapes of which he is 
accused—though The Farm implies he did not—but in his convic-
tion he is named a criminal and is incarcerated, thereby becoming a 
better man, schooling himself beyond his sixth-grade education so as 
to contest his innocence in legal discourse. And while Tannehill and 
Witherspoon acknowledge their guilt for violent crime, they have 
become self-described changed men in the course of their decades-
long sentences (thirty-eight and twenty-five years, respectively), 
who now participate in the functioning of the prison system that 
contains them. Crawford protests his innocence of the murder that 
sentences him, but acknowledges his guilt for other crimes.
 Similarly, in American History X, Lamont admits to stealing a televi-
sion, but he thereafter participates in the racial reeducation of a white 
supremacist murderer whose crime is greater but whose sentence 
is far shorter than his own. “The Hurricane” trades his flurries of 
physical violence for reasoned argument made in court, asking that 
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the judge “embrace that higher principle”: justice is not fought for; 
it is calm, compassionate, and rational. All of these black men are 
described in the context of their respective films as having been 
unjustly incarcerated but thereby improved. In the sedimentary layers 
of representation that constitute the cultural imagination, doing what 
comes naturally means understanding incarceration in terms of a pair 
of contradictions regarding black men behind bars: all black men are 
violent criminals, and black prisoners are innocent but made better 
through imprisonment.
 Two claims clarify this enigma, the first from one of the films, 
the second from the discourse surrounding them. In The Hurricane, 
Lesra becomes increasingly aware of his own race in light of Carter’s 
blackness and incarceration, juxtaposed with the whiteness of Les-
ra’s guardians, which precipitates a brief, heated exchange between 
Lesra and them. Lisa offers that “not all white people are racists,” 
to which Lesra replies that “not all black people are murderers.” 
The Film Journal’s review of The Farm points out, “The filmmakers 
obviously set out to prove the existence of racism and other forms 
of prejudice in the judicial system that placed these men in Angola, 
and that continues to discriminate against them in parole hearings 
and appeals. However, a prejudicial justice system isn’t news” (emphasis 
added).23
 We can sort the causes and consequences of this contradiction 
of blackness equated with criminality, repudiated or not, and the 
acknowledged injustice of justice by referencing a heuristic of Slavoj 
Žižek, one built around the story of “The Emperor’s New Clothes.” 
In For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor 
(1991),24 Žižek offers an analysis of the apparent contradiction of will-
ing participation in the false consciousness of an ideological symbolic 
order as immutable reality.25 His is a critique of the phenomenon of 
members of a social order upholding the “naturalness” of cultural 
practices known to be arbitrary—in Lacanian terms, the simultaneous 
acknowledgment and disavowal of a gap between the symbolic and 
the real. Žižek describes the three most common responses of the 
crowd observing that the emperor’s new clothes are in fact not there 
at all: conformity, cynicism, and perversion. The first recognizes that 
the Emperor has no clothes, but does nothing, so as not to disturb 
the social order. The second identifies the lack of completeness in the 
social reality but, rather than call attention to it, pretends to believe 
in order to profit from those who do not know. The third view is a 
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capitulation to the need for completeness, the position that recognizes 
the gap but situates itself so as to fulfill the perceived completeness 
of the social order—the emperor wears only the clothes we give 
him.26
 In terms of black men overrepresented in prison, these respective 
positions can be understood as follows. The conformist acknowledges 
that the system of justice is racist, but for the sake of social peace says 
nothing. The cynic knows that the system of justice is racist, but says, 
“Because I am white I say nothing, as I benefit from that system”; 
or, “Because I am black but not myself in prison, I say nothing.” The 
third response admits that the system of social justice is racist, but in 
watching a film depicting that prejudicial order, sees justice done in 
the film—concluding that then there is in fact social justice. Rep-
resenting racist injustice therefore runs risks related to those raised 
in familiar arguments regarding how representations of violence in 
film attempting to critique that violence nevertheless capitulate to 
the desire to see it, inadvertently glorifying that which they seek 
to condemn.27 American History X occupies the second and third of 
these positions. There is an aspect of cynicism in Derek Vinyard’s 
racist, murderous violence and, consequently, in his imprisonment, 
which is treated as the fulfillment of a prejudice originating in the 
oedipal family rather than one constituted in broader social history. 
Hence imprisonment is not prejudiced, because it happens to white 
people too. The way that the film treats race as a free-floating signifier 
seems cynical, but it is actually perverse. The identification of “you 
the nigger” makes the equation of blackness and prisoner complete 
and therefore justifies a prejudiced social system: if a white man is 
a “nigger” in prison, then there is no racial prejudice in the judicial 
system.
 The Hurricane presents a more ambiguous case. On one hand, 
throughout the film the mise-en-scène, character, and dialogue repeat-
edly call out that the emperor is not wearing any clothes: the all-
white jury of Carter’s peers, the racist face of injustice in the white 
detective, Washington’s “Any two will do?” On the other hand, the 
film radically condenses any harsh portrayal of Carter’s imprisonment 
to the initiatory scene of solitary confinement, which ends with the 
appearance of the conciliatory prison guard, Jimmy (Barnes), who 
aids Carter’s fight against an identity as inmate. Extranarratively, that 
characterization redeems Barnes’s prior role as the criminally savage 
prison guard in The Shawshank Redemption. Within the narrative the 
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closing shot of Carter’s stance outside the prison on the steps of the 
federal courthouse endorses the ability of the justice system to make 
amends for itself, to correct its mistakes, an affirmation reinforced by 
the subsequent rolling text describing the events surrounding Carter 
after his release. In the end, The Hurricane’s flirtations with politics and 
history fade to its generic classification as a “triumph of the human 
spirit” film. Justice is slow but certain, and almost two decades in 
prison readily collapse to a couple of scenes of glossy production and 
powerful acting framed by testaments to its story being really real. 
Both The Hurricane and American History X, in repeatedly attesting 
to their own reality, further capitulate to Žižek’s third position of 
perversity in suggesting that these are not fictions, that there really 
is social justice in prison practice, justice made manifest in narratives 
of redemption.
 That aspect of salvation makes The Farm similarly problematic. All 
of the prisoners, both white and black, are described in sympathetic 
terms, sympathy largely predicated upon their self-reflection regard-
ing their criminality and its attendant incarceration, and their trans-
formation in response to that imprisonment. The perverse viewer can 
claim that Simmons may not be guilty, but at least his twenty years 
in prison have provided him with an education. A similar observa-
tion is that Theriot, instead of resisting his inmate identity, adopts 
his prisoner status, even choosing to be buried on prison grounds. 
Presumably there are plenty of inmates at Angola who are far more 
recalcitrant, who do not seem to have learned so much in their time, 
embraced the salvation of prison, or adopted it as home. Many Angola 
inmates might claim that prison has made them worse rather than 
better, but they are not included in a film as limited by cultural 
expectation as by budget and administrative access—which is not to 
say that the film functions in a perverse capacity. One of the aspects 
of lifetime incarceration as fantasized in the cultural imagination is 
the institutionalization of the long-term inmate, wherein the prisoner 
so fully adopts the identity of inmate as to be unable to function 
outside prison walls. This view is offered most fully in The Shawshank 
Redemption, where one released long-termer commits suicide, and 
Red (Morgan) contemplates violating his parole so as to return to 
prison.
 In contrast, The Farm includes, at its end, lifers describing how 
much they desire to be free. Tannehill says, “It would be so much 
overfloatin’ of joy that it would be hard for me to express myself ”; 
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Simmons says he has had “dreams of freedom for years.” When per-
forming community-service duties outside of Angola, class A trustees 
such as Witherspoon describe counting every blade of grass. Fur-
thermore, the film does not end with the triumphant fulfillment 
of unprejudiced justice for black men in prison. Tannehill’s pardon 
remains unsigned, Simmons’s appeal is rejected, as is Witherspoon’s, 
and Crawford’s family is trying to raise three thousand dollars for 
trial transcripts so as to pursue an appeal. All of this information 
is provided in rolling text that attests to a far less optimistic reality 
than that which closes The Hurricane. Instead of concluding with the 
orchestral violins, there is the irony of the spiritual “Praise the Lord, 
I’m Free” and Theriot’s burial on prison grounds, which fades to an 
aerial shot of Angola, where so many are not free and where the odds 
are not beaten. In the final analysis, the film suggests that justice is not 
blind and that the emperor is naked—and in telling the difference, it 
has produced at least one historical effect, as Simmons now has legal 
representation as a result of the film.28 The Farm thereby functions as 
a writ of habeas corpus in the court of popular opinion, reintroduc-
ing to the cultural imagination the representation of actual prisoners 
speaking for themselves to actual consequence. That right to speak is 
foremost among the many contributions made by this extraordinary 
documentary.
Directors have positioned films between the poles of actuality and 
imagination since the earliest movies were shown, and documen-
tary and fantasy have provided points of reference throughout film 
history. The Lumière brothers’ cinématographe device displayed foot-
age of a train pulling into a station in 1895, even as actual trains 
could be seen outside; thereafter, an audience member of that display, 
Georges Méliès, was a pioneer of special effects and the auteur of the 
fantastical Cinderella (1899) and A Trip to the Moon (1902). American 
History X, The Hurricane, and The Farm, spanning realist fiction, a 
biopic, and documentary, all leverage the cachet of the real, of his-
tory—and cinema is not the only history. Early practices in actual 
prisons reemerged in prison films of the 1990s, as the emphasis on 
reading and writing therein echoes Benjamin Rush’s call for “good 
books” in late-eighteenth-century prisons and Zebulon Brockway’s 
literacy program at Elmira Reformatory in the 1880s.29 However, 
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history is not the only force that shapes imagination, either in the 
aesthetic axiom “Art imitates life,” or in even historicist imperatives 
of reading a correspondence between actual events and imaginative 
fiction in a documentary record. The reiterative imaginations of the 
real have shaped the history these films offer. To read the relationship 
between history and imagination in one direction, the realistic fiction 
of American History X features Norton touting statistics he culled from 
the California governor’s office, and The Hurricane’s dialogue regularly 
quotes from Carter’s prison writing and from actual court testimony. 
To read the relationship in reverse, a documentary shaped by the 
fantasies of imprisonment projects actual prison walls as redemptive 
spaces of male bonding.
 Of course, anyone—director, film editor, screenwriter, casual audi-
ence member, cultural critic—can show or say anything for any reason. 
However, there are consequences, and some of those consequences 
are the assembly of the shape and size of a shared reality. Going to 
the movies, one finds that going to prison is a philosophical experi-
ence, wherein one learns to better situate oneself in the world. Going 
to the movies, one learns that history as public memory is a puzzle, 
pieced together retroactively. However, puzzles have a predetermined 
shape, and the cultural imagination demarcates the shape of inmate 
experience such that even prison documentaries perpetuate types and 
narratives deployed in popular mainstream fiction.
 These films, in claiming the real, produce history. History is made 
in these films less in the resemblances and differences among them for 
which prison experience is more accurate, but more in the struggle 
of competing interpretations. It is made in the representations and 
conversations surrounding cultural artifacts such as these films, the 
discourse that sanctifies, qualifies, and specializes in them, discourse 
that would do well to draw together their disparate audiences. Popu-
lar audiences, critics, and theorists too often dismiss as irrelevant the 
viewing experience of those whose investments seem different from 
their own. Part of the distance between popular and critical audiences 
develops from the latter’s overemphasis on criticism as censure rather 
than as analysis. Film critics, especially academics, often emphasize 
the pejorative sense of the job description, not seeming to like very 
much the films they have watched the numerous times that detailed 
accounts require. This apparent absence of any pleasure in viewing 
distances them from the viewers who see films for enjoyment, educa-
tion, and distraction. Indeed, the separation among critics, audiences, 
and theorists is tremendous.
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 For example, the theoretically invested critic of these prison films 
might attempt to sort them in Lacanian terms, delineating between 
their status as phi (f) or objet petit a—that is, whether they represent 
the imagination or the symbolization of the unattainable real.30 It 
is possible that uncritical viewing treats them as the former, critical 
viewing the latter, and that criticism never affirming the completeness 
of the order of representation thereby fulfills Žižek’s fourth posi-
tion—the naysayer who suggests that telling history is a matter of 
sorting among the flurry of competing scripts, a sustained revision, 
telling the difference over and over again. That constant skepticism is 
more in line with Deleuze and Guattari, for whom sorting between 
the fields of the imaginary and the symbolic is a red herring, as the 
production of the real is the crux. Crucial to these films are the 
social investments in the racism that equates blackness and criminal-
ity, contrasted with the blocked desires of inmates such as Crawford, 
Simmons, Tannehill, and Witherspoon—a desire for life such as that 
spoken in the latter’s life-affirming sentence, “I want real freedom.” 
Furthermore, The Farm functions within the field of what Deleuze 
and Guattari describe as “minor literature,” given Rideau’s position 
as prisoner and codirector and coeditor of the collection Life Sen-
tences, and the film’s enunciation of the collective social identity of 
prisoners for audiences not themselves imprisoned.31 In de Certeau’s 
terms, the films take viewers for a walk in the prisons that are their 
real and imagined settings, representing the bars, cells, crimes, and 
visiting rooms that define enclosure. Prisoners’ bodies are thereby 
written within contained space. In a fusion of Foucault and Lacan, 
de Certeau describes the relationship of law and subject in terms of 
imprisonment: “Because the law is already applied with and on bod-
ies, ‘incarcerated’ in physical practices, it can make people believe 
that it speaks in the name of the ‘real.’”32 Incarceration as an effect 
of law therefore inscribes not only actuality but also righteousness: all 
prisoners are guilty of violent crime because they are in prison.33
 What is most important in this theoretical glossing is the degree 
to which it foregrounds the simultaneous desire for and unavailabil-
ity of the real, which is precisely the crux of the films, according to 
their popular and critical reviews. Various audiences of theorists, crit-
ics, reviewers, historians, and popular viewers can be joined because 
most—and likely all—viewers do not exclusively inhabit one identity 
or another. I have hoped to demonstrate such crossover in work-
ing among these various discourses of theory, review, and criticism 
within a selection of 1998 and 1999 films set in prisons and united 
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by claims to the real. The analysis of American History X and The Hur-
ricane demonstrates the pervasiveness of imprisonment in the cultural 
imagination and the difficulty of drawing connections between that 
visibility of imagined imprisonment and the accompanying invisibility 
of its actual corollary. The Farm presents a more difficult case, wherein 
a documentary film that is de facto part of the historical record fulfills 
expectations shaped in popular imaginings. What is at stake is telling 
the difference.
 Telling the difference, testifying in a present that is itself constantly 
becoming the past, casts history in terms of performance, participa-
tion in a “now” whose textualization is a record, but never can be 
the stuff of the real itself. These films, in attesting to their actuality, 
are part of the flurry of documents narrating the history of now, but 
“now” is fluid and dynamic, and, like de Certeau’s walk in the city, 
resists textualization. The Hurricane’s documentary footage showing 
1974 protests of Carter’s incarceration features the soundtrack of Gil 
Scott-Heron’s song released that same year, “The Revolution Will 
Not Be Televised.”34 The lyrics begin, “You will not be able to stay 
home, brother”—because the revolution will not be mediated—and 
close with, “It will be live.” Crawford’s mother says, in her visit with 
her son, who is imprisoned for life at Angola, “This is no dream or 
nothing made up, this is for real.” As the next chapter will demon-
strate, the best efforts of representing prisoners will be live and “for 
real,” and will include prisoners’ testifying, performing themselves in 
the history of now.
ooks such as those by Faulkner, Cleaver, and Mailer circulate 
among audiences, leaving scarce traces of the actual experience 
of their reading, and while sales figures, book clubs, awards, reviews, 
syllabi, and subsequent critical attention provide types of records, the 
act of the reading itself remains largely closed from analysis. Films 
too are often viewed in more-private spaces, and even conventional 
theatrical screenings pose challenges to gauging a sense of any par-
ticular audience’s responses and investments. Two live performances 
from the fall of 1999 directly concerning imprisonment provide the 
basis for the analysis of this final chapter, first because their overlap-
ping activist agendas invite audiences on the grounds of a preexisting 
social commitment, and second because those audiences are materially 
present, providing a sense of their immediate reactions. “Live from 
Staging Prisons and 
the Performance of History
interViewer: Then you think it is possible to reconcile politics and litera-
ture? To use the theatre or one’s fiction to achieve political ends?
Bullins: Oh, yes, if that is what you wish to do.
—An interview with Ed Bullins in the Negro American Literature Forum1
We don’t expect to find anything the same even one minute later because 
one minute later is history.
—Huey Newton, Black Panther Party cofounder2
8
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Death Row” is a series of death penalty protests staged with some 
conventions of theater, while Jury Duty is a drama based on a true 
story, performed once in the context of a fundraiser for a social work 
program.3
 The first is a social and political ritual understood in theatrical 
terms, while the second is a more traditional dramatic enterprise 
explicitly staged in one instance as a social work production. The 
field of performance studies provides the tactics by which to pair these 
different though related sorts of cultural events.4 In this chapter, we 
will see how both the protest and the play demonstrate the degree to 
which race and class inform criminalization and its attendant impris-
onment. The former maintains the emphasis on the degree to which 
black masculinity has become commensurate with criminality, while 
the latter, with a focal character who is a white woman, expands in 
an important manner the sense of who is imprisoned. This matter is 
given greater urgency by the fact that women, particularly women 
of color, are the fastest-growing group of prisoners in the United 
States, according to the Department of Justice.5 In a manner dis-
tinct from the greater ambiguity of most of the works surveyed in 
the prior chapters, both of these performances clearly protest aspects 
of imprisonment and the death penalty. However, like The Farm, 
The Executioner’s Song, Soul on Ice, and Go Down, Moses, “Live from 
Death Row” and Jury Duty are less concerned with attesting to the 
innocence of particular individuals than they are with inviting their 
audiences to view criminality and incarceration as matters of social 
responsibility.
 Making use of the strategies and the descriptive terms of the the-
ater is not limited only to performance studies; activism concerning 
imprisonment and its appraisal has done so before as well. In Barred: 
Women, Writing, and Political Detention (1992), Barbara Harlow refers 
to the 1990 indictment of the U.S. Government for violating the 
rights of political prisoners such as Mumia Abu-Jamal, an activist and 
writer whose death sentence has garnered much public and academic 
attention. Harlow writes, “The staging of the tribunal followed months 
of preparation . . . [and involved] a set of temporary role reversals (cast-
ing defending attorneys as prosecutors and prisoners as plaintiffs).”6 
Harlow points the way toward challenging the distinction between 
prisoners and their others; the tribunal, held at the New York City 
Hunter College Playhouse, represents a social as well as linguistic 
reversal, a staged deconstruction of the judicial process. According to 
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Harlow, such performances offer an important social function.7 To 
show injustice, while not an end in itself, is an act of signification 
and significance, giving public voice and representative body to the 
subaltern in ways that make inequity visible.
 In the case of Abu-Jamal, that tribunal sat at the midpoint of 
two decades of activist involvement that has seen his death sentence 
commuted to life imprisonment, though an international struggle 
continues for a judicial reexamination of his conviction. The degree 
to which staged events such as the one Harlow describes contribute 
directly to subsequent legal action is a matter beyond the scope of 
this analysis. Still, this chapter does describe some of the processes by 
which staged activism operates, and doing so may well contribute to 
analyses of how engaging audiences as social bodies can contribute 
to historical change. Nevertheless, my primary purpose is to describe 
how two performances situate themselves with regard to specific actu-
alities of criminality and incarceration, how they hail their audiences, 
and how they thereby provide a model of plural identity upon which 
social action likely depends. Like the other works surveyed in this 
book, both performances emphasize their implication in their con-
temporary history and in its practices of imprisonment. 
 Both “Live from Death Row” and Jury Duty demonstrate the 
production of a social body, and each illustrates a different sort of 
activism and performance implicated in the ethics of incarceration 
and execution, with stakes in social justice and claims to the real. 
“Live from Death Row” is staged activism, social protest that employs 
tactics of performance, sometimes to mixed results, while Jury Duty 
is activist performance, more conventional stage drama deliberately 
located within a particular political project. In that terminological 
distinction between these two performances is their difference and 
the difference the difference makes; in their similarity one can find a 
model of agency that competes with bleaker Althusserean versions of 
human subjectivity. The audiences that such performances address are 
not a priori monoliths; their unity is invoked, hailed into becoming. 
Social protests such as these either deliberately or inadvertently draw 
on the conventions of theater to produce the shared convictions of 
communitas in addressing their audiences via their political investments, 
treating such spectators as a social body joined in affect. The method 
and purpose of these performances is to call into being an audience 
unified through a shared social commitment, an alliance that may or 
may not be directed toward specific political action, be it renewed 
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dedication to one’s cultural work, protest, voting practices, letter-writ-
ing campaigns, or other forms of activism. “Live from Death Row” 
and Jury Duty hail audiences in their staging of personal and social 
history, and both provide a model of spectatorship that is at least 
potentially participatory.
“Live from Death Row” 
and Jury Duty
The social protest “Live from Death Row” has since 1998 conducted 
an ongoing series of protests and is sponsored by the Campaign to 
End the Death Penalty. The organization held its September 23, 1999, 
forum at the University Teaching Center on the campus of the Uni-
versity of Texas at Austin, in conjunction with Mumia Awareness 
Week. “Live from Death Row” takes its name from Abu-Jamal’s 1995 
volume of prison writings, a collection of essays drawing from per-
sonal observation, court records, and other research, almost always 
pairing the experience of the individual with a broader cultural 
history. It is a rhetorical approach that has its clearest precedent in 
Cleaver’s Soul on Ice and Rideau’s award-winning Angolite essays of 
the 1970s and 1980s, many of which are collected in Life Sentences. 
The series of community-held forums circulate flyers, blanket e-mails, 
and employ other grassroots methods to invite an audience to hear 
prisoners on death row tell their stories, offering an opportunity 
for dialogue between those in and out of prison. The implication is 
that to communicate “live” with death row inmates is more fully to 
conceive of them as alive and thus to take a stand against their execu-
tions. That particular September evening drew an audience of almost 
one hundred spectators, mostly white students from the university. 
Two administrators—both white men—of the local chapters of the 
activist organizations sponsoring the event began the forum, before 
giving way to an African-American woman, Rosa Thigpen, mother 
of inmate Kenny Collins. Thereafter, the prisoners Jody Lee Miles, 
John Booth, and Collins phoned in from prison first to give speeches 
and then to answer questions.
 The other performance, Jury Duty, was written and directed by 
Ken Webster and is based on his experience as a member of a criminal 
trial jury in Travis County, Texas, which rendered a guilty verdict—
convicting Rebecca Walton in the shooting of Luis Flores—and a 

Staging Prisons and the Performance of History
subsequent sixty-year prison sentence. The play recounts, in a series 
of retrospective monologues, the story of a white female drug addict 
and prostitute who murdered her pimp. It includes her trial and the 
deliberations about her culpability both by the accused and by several 
of the jurors during her sentencing. The playwright acknowledges 
that he “wrote the play as a protest of a broken justice system, and 
as a release for [himself] after the unpleasant experience of being a 
participant in the broken process.”8 Indeed, correspondence with 
friends in which Webster describes the painful experience of serv-
ing on the jury inadvertently served as an early draft of the play. 
The performance was offered as a fund-raiser for the Diversity Insti-
tute at the University of Texas at Austin’s School of Social Work and 
was held in the social work auditorium. Institute staff members pref-
aced the performance with a discussion of the program, mentioning 
the play only with regard to its role as a “perfect fund-raiser,” because 
of both its content and its cachet in being “based on a true story.”
 “Live from Death Row” features local activists, families of con-
demned inmates, and, via speakerphone, inmates themselves. For the 
September meeting, the staff has taped a photo of Abu-Jamal behind 
the lectern to one side, and a large sign hangs in the middle: “Stop 
Executions!” it reads in big letters, subtitled with the forum’s spon-
sor, “Campaign to End the Death Penalty.” The panelists and their 
table are at the center of the stage; a speakerphone and a microphone 
to one side complete the mise-en-scène. The audience is reminded 
that the inmates will call after seven, and then the first panelist, Jim 
Harrington of the Texas Civil Rights Project, speaks. The audience 
is silent, except for the scribbling of pens and the occasional murmur 
of agreement or disgusted half laugh of acknowledgment when Har-
rington cites that those on death row are mostly minorities, poor, 
mentally disabled—grist for what he describes three times as the 
“machinery of death.” When he finishes, the audience applauds, and 
the organizer, Quentin Reese, again reminds us that the convicts will 
call a little after seven—the repetition suggesting that their call is 
what we are really here for. Until then, Thigpen, mother of one of 
the death row inmates, will speak.
 Thigpen, an African-American woman in her forties, says, “Good 
evening,” and we reply in unison, “Good evening!”—a call-response 
oratory that continues, contrasting with the uninterrupted mono-
logue of the previous, white speaker. She provides a brief narra-
tive of her son’s trial and the incompetence of his court-appointed 
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lawyer. Collins has maintained his innocence, and Thigpen shows a 
photograph of her son, one of her last, as the Supermax prison in 
Baltimore, Maryland, will not allow photos of inmates to be taken. 
Unlike Harrington, Thigpen frequently elicits our verbal response 
and invokes a “we” of which the audience is a part. She says, for exam- 
ple, “The lawyer and the judge are in cahoots together, as we well 
know,” and there are murmurs of agreement from the audience.
 There are two important implications here, the first regarding 
class and the legal system, the second regarding cross-racial identifica-
tion. The alliance arrayed against the defendant is one that Gilmore 
in The Executioner’s Song gestures toward as well, when he points out 
that the state psychiatrist judging him competent to stand trial is 
“paid by the same people who pay [Gilmore’s] lawyers.” The doc-
tor, Gilmore’s defense, opposing counsel, and the judge all represent 
the “State of Utah. [Gilmore] can’t win for losing.”9 Similarly, The 
Hurricane calls attention to an all-white jury finding a black man 
guilty, a group described by the judge as a “jury of your peers.” Such 
recognitions are not new; in a story published in Esquire in 1944, 
Chester Himes writes, “The only lawyers I know are the ones who 
defended me. They were appointed by the state, and to tell the truth, 
they must have been working for it.”10 Judge, jury, and the lawyers 
for both defense and prosecution become part of the same machine 
of the state arrayed against the accused. The convention of court-
appointed defense does play into the paranoia fostered in such trial 
narratives organized around the defendant as the focal character, nar-
ratives that become part of the cultural imagination. However, also 
part of that imagination are matters of the historical record, and lapses 
on the part of court-appointed defense counselors are legion, and a 
matter of regional and national media attention.11
 Thigpen’s assertion of complicity between judge and lawyers is 
one that “we well know.” She invokes a “we,” joining audience and 
speaker in a community with already well-formed, shared knowledge, 
even if she does provide us with more; for example, she points out 
that there are no educational courses for her son in Supermax, as 
there were in the previous penitentiaries where he had served. She 
implores those in the audience to help—almost all of us are students 
at the university housing the event—as she addresses us as a “we” 
composed largely of young, white, middle-class men and women. 
She asks us to speak out later in life when we are the leaders of our 
communities, to help “these people,” assuming that these people are 
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not us, and that her audience will have the power to speak that she 
lacks. Her claim belies the circumstances, given that she stands at the 
lectern and we are her audience. Nevertheless, her performance is 
an incredibly sophisticated one, bridging the gaps between herself, 
her audience, and prisoners in a demonstration of the ways race and 
affluence mediate voice.
 Thigpen makes rhetorical moves that both breach cultural differ-
ence and reinscribe it. She identifies the audience of mostly white col-
lege students as those who can change what she cannot. Her appeals 
to a shared humanity assume that “we” know the inequities of the 
legal system and are prepared to help “these people,” including her 
son. Indeed, “Live from Death Row” largely shapes its audience’s 
sense of itself by distinguishing “us” from “these people” in prison. 
We are there to protest the death penalty, but we are also there to be 
reminded that “we” are not “these people.” She identifies the audience 
as those who can speak, and thus change what she cannot, whether 
because of our youth, our education, our class position, or the color of 
our skin. Thigpen appeals to an essential, shared, and simple human-
ity, assumed in our presence as that protesting audience, a “we” who 
know the inequities of the legal system, who can help “these people.” 
“Live from Death Row” produced the shared identity of its audience 
in part by distinguishing them from those in prison, and it offered 
the means to renew its unity in advertising the next protest against 
the death penalty. We were there to be reminded of ourselves.
 After the closing applause for Thigpen, Reese reminds us of the 
next protest date. He asks us to take a stand when then Governor 
George W. Bush or another politician speaks in support of the death 
penalty. Then the phone rings and Reese cocks the microphone closer 
to the speakerphone. It is Jeannette, our link to inmate Jody Lee 
Miles. When prison officials discovered “Live from Death Row,” they 
barred the prisoners from calling directly to the performance. The 
prisoners are allowed phone calls only to friends and family. Jeannette 
is a friend and our link. We cannot speak directly to the inmates, and 
audience members instead direct questions for the inmates to Reese. 
He repeats those questions over the phone to Jeannette, who repeats 
them to the inmates on a second phone, and then relays the prison-
ers’ responses by holding the phone receiver she uses to speak to the 
inmates next to the phone with which she speaks to Reese. When 
Reese explains these Byzantine barriers to us, we laugh, a surprising 
sound in this room. The whole procedure is absurd, a farce—but 
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it does reveal the circuitry of power at work, a Foucauldian sys-
tem of concealment, control, and disidentification, whereby extrinsic 
and repressive forces block the flow of the communication and self- 
representation so formative of identity.
 We could turn to Foucault’s description of the degree to which 
statements constitute the subject, which he makes in The Archaeol-
ogy of Knowledge (1972)12 and elsewhere, but we are better served in 
turning to Mumia Abu-Jamal, the man whose book, Live from Death 
Row, gives the protest its inspiration and name. Abu-Jamal forcefully 
proclaims precisely this communicative relationship, the strategy of 
self-making dependent on an audience. He describes his gratitude to 
readers in the preface to the paperback edition: “You have made my 
repressive isolation more than worthwhile. In those darkest of days, 
under a death warrant, with a date to die, your simple act of reading 
this book fed my soul.” His thanks comes in the face of the isola-
tion consequent to writing the book, as he alleges that time spent 
in solitary confinement was suffered as punishment for publishing.13 
Such solitary confinement recently has been linked to increased 
rates of inmate suicide,14 meaning that Abu-Jamal’s position, like so 
many inmates on death row and in other areas of maximum security, 
is doubly fraught, and the stay to his death sentence in 1995 did not 
protect him from that dangerous isolation. Nevertheless, given the 
life-sustaining nature of meaningful human communication, Abu-
Jamal and Jody Miles decided it was worth the risk.
 Some of what Miles has to say disappears in the static of his 
enforced dislocation, but we get the general picture as he reads his 
statement. He has lived on Maryland’s death row for two years, and 
spent a year in prison prior to his move to Supermax; he “know[s] 
how the system works.” What that system might be becomes clear 
only after Miles speaks of the enforcement of the death penalty, 
even while insisting, “It’s transparent that there is no clear consensus 
among legislators and citizens concerning [it].” Miles reiterates race 
as a primary determinant in its implementation. He argues that a 
white person accused of killing a white person may receive the death 
penalty, and a black person accused of killing a white person likely 
will, but he claims that a white defendant in the murder of a black 
person has at most received a sentence of eleven years—a claim with 
more rhetorical force than historical accuracy, though indicative of 
general trends. Miles repeatedly asserts his innocence, pointing out 
evidence used against him in his trial obtained through an illegal 
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wiretap, evidence not objected to by his court-appointed lawyer. In 
Miles’s polemic, the system works as a closed circuit of race and class, 
of enforced difference between white and black, of victims of the 
judicial process—and as a stark contrast between those who can afford 
attorneys and those who cannot.
 Miles’s voice grows indistinct when the phone transmission fades, 
as it often does. During these lags, the audience silently faces the 
speakerphone. A few look down at their tables in embarrassment or 
frustration, or strain to hear. After Miles finishes, we clap only for a 
moment before realizing that Miles cannot hear our response. The 
technological mediation grows more crippling to discourse when 
Thigpen’s son, Collins, begins speaking, and the transmission is virtu-
ally nil. Adjusting the microphone and the telephone and tinkering 
with the amplifier do not help. A few remarks are clear, though: 
“thirteen years,” “Supermax,” “I basically don’t know what lies ahead,” 
“subjected to being placed in a situation such as myself,” and “no 
matter what color you are.” Collins’s speech is far less distinct than 
Gilmore’s voice, recorded by his lawyers with smuggled tape record-
ers to be transcribed by Schiller’s typists, so that even after death, 
“Gilmore’s voice coming in over the earphones” is clear.15 Still, even 
if his voice is garbled, Collins speaks at length and in detail about the 
challenges he has faced in the appeals process.
 Ironically, the constraints imposed by the institution make his 
meaning clearer: we in the audience may not be able to hear, but our 
understanding of imprisonment increases precisely because we are not 
able to understand what Collins is saying. Playwrights, theorists, and 
critics have grappled with the tension of theater and the representa-
tion of pain at least since Antonin Artaud.16 Critics of Artaud have 
suggested that the French visionary “wanted spoken words delivered, 
to some extent, for the sake of their sonority, explosiveness, sensuous 
and associative properties”—for their connotative rather than denota-
tive qualities—to communicate not language but experience.17 This 
is exactly the unintended result for Collins, whose speech in its very 
unintelligibility best conveys his circumstances. The audience cannot 
understand all of Collins’s words, but thereby better understands his 
position, and thus “hears” him better. If this account offers too easy 
a gloss of his contested subjectivity, it certainly illustrates the tech-
nological mediation by which institutional power accomplishes its 
object: the constructed silence and invisibility of prisoners, the diffi-
culty of communicating from the inside to the outside. The voices of 
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the condemned speaking in an unintelligible broadcast is a version of 
Bel-Imperia’s prison letter written in her own blood to Hieronoimo, 
in Thomas Kidd’s Jacobean drama, The Spanish Tragedy—the mean-
ing invested in the condition of writing or speaking overwrites the 
words themselves.
 There are several key similarities between “Live from Death Row” 
and Jury Duty. Though the inmates of the former are men in prison 
and those of the latter are actors playing roles, both are concealed in 
one way or another. Collins and the others appear only in voice, while 
the actual circumstances upon which Jury Duty is based are overwrit-
ten by the ironic disclaimer in its program, “Any similarities to any 
person, living or dead, is purely coincidental”—even though the play 
is introduced as being “based on a true story.” Both performances 
stage dialogue between those in and out of prison, and both make 
extensive use of biographical and autobiographical monologues, as do 
Soul on Ice, The Executioner’s Song, The Hurricane, and The Farm.
 The reliance on biography and on telling one’s own story is not 
surprising. According to Ioan Davies, who surveys the writing prac-
tices of prisoners in Writers in Prison, the performance of the narrative 
of self matches the actual writing that takes place in prison: “Most 
prison writing is autobiographical, and yet, like all autobiographies, 
it is inserted into other situations.”18 When one’s subjectivity is con-
tested—which Foucault and Melossi and Pavarini argue is the pri-
mary function of imprisonment—speaking or writing the self offers 
an affirmation of selfhood in face of forces arrayed against it. In Soul 
on Ice, Cleaver claims, “I started to write. To save myself.” And the 
prisoner needs to save himself, because as Cleaver notes, prison can 
cause an inmate “to lose his sense of self.”19 The self-declarations of 
prisoners, then, are inserted into “other situations,” in Gilmore’s let-
ters reframed in Mailer’s The Executioner’s Song, in passages of Carter’s 
The Sixteenth Round incorporated verbatim in Jewison’s The Hurricane, 
and in the spoken autobiographical vignettes of prisoners in Angola 
included in The Farm. For Jury Duty, itself the work of a dramatist 
and jury member reconstructing the situation of a prisoner testifying 
on her own behalf, one of those “other situations” is a fund-raiser 
for a social work program celebrating human diversity and cultural 
difference.
 Jury Duty’s performance on October 9, 1999, was a special, one-
night performance, a benefit/fund-raiser sponsored by the University 
of Texas at Austin’s School of Social Work, for one of its programs, 
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the Diversity Institute, described in the theater program as “a collab-
orative, multidisciplinary project of faculty, staff, students and com-
munity members [ . . . ] dedicated to advancing better understanding 
and more effective working relationships among the unique cultures 
of our society.” Two staff members of the School of Social Work 
introduce what they repeatedly describe as a “perfect fund-raiser,” 
perhaps because of its representation of cultural difference and the 
inequities of the legal system, its local setting, or its blending of 
humor, social realism, and empathy in the portrayal of drug addicts, 
economic and social poverty, and the violence to which such lack 
contributes.
 The two Diversity Institute representatives do not mention the 
play, though, as they discuss their program and invite DI participants 
in the audience to stand and be recognized; some do, and there is 
applause. Carol Lewis, associate director for the institute, is introduced 
as having an “other life” as an actor and dancer, but she speaks instead 
of the institute. Introducing these people, as well as staging the per-
formance in the auditorium of the School of Social Work, frames 
the drama less as a play than as social work. This particular audience 
does not seem unsettled in any way by this. Rather, with those at the 
proscenium asking institute staff in the audience to stand and receive 
acknowledgment—a reversal of the typical audience applause for 
those onstage—we seem to be other than a typical theater crowd.
 Let me illustrate the distinction even while acknowledging the 
problems of such terms as typical and we. I attended primarily because 
it was an activist performance. My friend Jane, now a theater-history 
professor, received notice of the fund-raiser through her work as 
director for a student-services program. We arrived at the School 
of Social Work early, so before the show began we walked to the 
University of Texas at Austin Theater Building, where both Bertolt 
Brecht’s Threepenny Opera and Tennessee Williams’s Vieux Carré were 
playing that evening. We spoke with some acquaintances and then 
returned to join the audience for Jury Duty. Back in the auditorium, 
each of us noticed a change between this audience and the theatergo-
ers we had just seen; it is difficult to pin down the exact difference. 
At Jury Duty, Jane and I were both a part of and apart from oth-
ers in the auditorium. We, like everyone else, were there to see an 
activist performance, but our clothes, our conversation, and our lack 
of familiarity with others in the audience tagged us as “other.” An 
informal survey after the show suggested that almost all of those in the 
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audience knew one another from the School of Social Work. They 
discussed current classes and local services, while Jane and I talked of 
critical distance and dramatic convention. There was a community-
is-here feeling that did not include us.
 Concerning the play itself: the blocking is simple, with the twelve 
jury members sitting in two rows facing the audience. Ten of the jury 
remain seated and silent throughout the drama. A chair set stage right 
is for the defendant, who never sits but stands between chair and jury 
when she speaks, directly addressing the audience. Her monologues 
are interspersed with those of other characters who also rise to stand 
between the chair and the jury when they speak. The various char-
acters abandon the speaking position with a voiced need to go to the 
bathroom, the repeated dramatic device for stage exit. Other con-
ventions established within the play are employed less regularly. For 
example, though Bruce, the jury spokesperson, claims that his mono-
logue is “all in my head,” his commentary does elicit some nonverbal 
response from the other jurors, and when one, Maggie, later speaks, 
she is very much aware of Bruce’s earlier monologues. The jury 
members never speak while they sit, maintaining an unbroken gaze on 
the various speakers to their right, reproducing the audience’s com-
munal spectatorship and focusing our gaze on the primary speakers. 
These include the defendant, Becky Wallace (played by Mary Furse), 
accused of murdering her pimp, Chico; Michael (played by Judson 
L. Jones), an accessory to the murder; and jurors Bruce and Maggie 
(played by Corey Gagne and Margaret Ann Hoard, respectively).
 Becky describes a community of mostly absent characters, of other 
drug users, pimps, and prostitutes. She talks about Michael and Chico 
before they arrive onstage. The appearance of the dead pimp, Chico 
(played by Titos Menchaca), at the close, exchanging his violence 
in life for complacency and knowledge in death, ends an escalat-
ing conflict between the defendant and Bruce through mediation. 
The conflict between the two speaking jurors gives way to tension 
between Becky and her primary defender, between Bruce’s “self-
righteous” defense of Becky on humanistic grounds and the failure 
of that argument to significantly reduce her sentence. Other than a 
brief but telling interaction between Becky and Michael when she 
accuses him of telling her story and he replies, “It’s my story too,” 
the dialogue at the close is the first time that characters onstage have 
spoken to one another. Bruce tells some of Becky’s story as well, “a 
grim tale of the worst possible childhood you can imagine,” though 
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she narrates most of her own personal history. She speaks of needing 
drugs so badly that she prostituted herself, and amplifies the magni-
tude of that need by acknowledging that though she is a lesbian, she 
had sex with men. Becky addresses the audience directly, asking the 
heterosexual men, “Can you imagine sucking dick?” and, similarly, 
the heterosexual women, “Or eating pussy? How bad do you want 
it?” Forced heterosexuality, against the grain of desire, becomes the 
high price Becky was forced to pay, the harsh terms and description 
an effort to force the audience to engage the pain these terms rep-
resent.20
 Furse performs Becky Wallace in the Brechtian manner of epic 
acting that Harry Elam notes as common to social-protest perfor-
mance. In this tradition, the actor “function[s] not only as the char-
acter but as a commentator on the actions of the character [ . . . and] 
compel[s] the audience to evaluate the social, political, and economic 
circumstances that created the character.”21 Playwright and director 
Webster constructs Becky’s lived history to have positioned her in 
the denouement of violent murder, even as he presents the juror 
Maggie to challenge the inevitability of the violence emerging from 
that history. Whereas Bruce sees her act as unavoidable given her 
circumstances, Maggie assumes Becky’s culpability. The two offer a 
convenient binary of mercy and justice. It is also the divide of his-
torical determinism versus individual autonomy and agency, subject-
to and subject-of, akin to the tensions raised in Faulkner’s novels and 
between Cleaver’s and Mailer’s sense of human possibility. In terms 
of spectator identification, the social work students and professionals 
in the audience are not likely to see their present selves represented 
in the stories told by characters such as the self-described “crack 
whore,” Becky, and drug user, Michael, both imprisoned for murder; 
or by Chico as he is invoked early in the play, a purveyor of sex, drugs, 
and violence, and dead to boot. In a move akin to Jewison’s ironic cut 
to Carter’s all-white jury in The Hurricane, Becky describes her own 
as a “jury of my peers, as they say [PAUSE]”—implying that they in 
fact are not. 
 The jury members may not see themselves in Becky any more than 
she sees herself in her jury; however, the jury does mirror the audi-
ence. In terms of staging, they are largely silent watchers, their gaze, 
like the gazes of the audience members, fixed on whoever speaks. 
The jury performs the reflection of the spectators, an expansion of 
what Vsevolod Meyerhold and Tom Stoppard sought to accomplish 
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in scenery by framing the stage with large mirrors or suggesting a 
huge mirror as a backdrop.22 The unpublished script of Jury Duty 
underscores this role in its description of the jury: “Ten of them are 
either audience members or special guest actors.” Actual spectators 
are intended to perform the jury’s reflection of the audience. Within 
the context of the performance, the jury collectively bears witness and 
sometimes individually offers responses to Becky’s history and crime. 
Bruce points out the institutional and personal causes for Becky’s 
current situation, addresses drug addiction as a disease, claims that the 
state’s social welfare and legal systems let her down, and repeatedly 
maintains that she was “forced to have sex to keep a roof over her 
head.” On the other hand, Maggie opts for justice rather than mercy, 
asking what sort of “message” a soft ruling for murder would send. A 
prison sentence becomes exactly that, a linguistic act, communicating 
what is thought and believed to be true of crime and punishment.
 Both representative jurors perform the compromises necessary 
for the unanimity required of juries by the law. After determining 
guilt or innocence, the jury must next, if delivering a verdict of 
guilty, determine the sentence. The jury can deliberate as long as it 
needs—so long as its final judgments are singular. Like the collective 
population of Jefferson brought together by Stevens to witness the 
return of Butch Beauchamp at the close of Go Down, Moses, the jury 
is an assembly defined by its riven differences; unlike those citizens, 
though, the jurors must not only witness history but also decide 
it. Jurors Bruce and Maggie occupy dramatically opposed positions 
concerning what constitutes guilt, agency, and just punishment. Each 
also makes clear that the other jurors differ from them, particularly 
in terms of Becky’s reproductive rights, as both recognize that one 
group of jurors subscribing to eugenics was primarily concerned that 
Becky remain in prison past her childbearing years. So various alle-
giances form and lines of disagreement are drawn among the dispa-
rate jurors. This is not the jury of the central trial of The Hurricane, 
a jury whose only characteristics are a shared whiteness and a verdict 
of guilty. The jury of Jury Duty is a perfect illustration of an institu-
tional social body, the state’s jury selection process “hailing” it into 
being. The individuals summoned were not a jury until selected; once 
selected, their membership constituted a particular and localized soci-
ality, which subsequently becomes, for the audience, a model of the 
plural subject. The social body of the jury in the theater mirrors the 
social worker audience—an “I” that comprises and is compromised 
by its various and contradictory “we’s.”
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 However, in performance Jury Duty departs from its plural and 
conflicted jury, a “we” forced by a legal apparatus to speak in one 
voice, when the play leaves behind its “true story” to swing sharply to 
the imaginary, as the character of the murder victim, Chico, appears 
and offers Becky forgiveness. Like Gilmore’s ghost in The Executioner’s 
Song visiting Pete Galovan to explain, forgive, and acknowledge,23 
Chico appears to redeem Becky. Considering that the redemption 
comes from the murder victim himself, his authority is unequivocal. 
Chico is less a deus ex machina than machina ex deus, a machine of 
love and grace sprung from death to resolve the core conflict of the 
drama, transforming crisis into reconciliation. Brechtian alienation 
gives way to conventional catharsis. Chico offers a character who 
reflexively acknowledges his own past by both recuperating it and 
maintaining critical distance from it. He identifies with violence, even 
the ultimate degradation of his own murder, while still manifesting 
empathy. His cruel history and mysterious knowledge give him abso-
lute authority in mediation; he is the social worker par excellence. 
The auditorium audience sees itself physically mirrored in the rows 
of seated jurors—a collective audience—who have offered, until this 
point, an excellent model of social agency, the various tensions that 
a person must resolve in taking a stand. The arrival of Chico under-
mines that complexity, smoothing out the difficulties of human 
experience. Audience members are invited to see themselves reflected 
in the transformed Chico, now so knowing and forgiving.
 The magical resolution means that the jury, the audience’s mir-
ror, no longer needs to debate the agency of human action working 
through the tension between circumstance and autonomy. The sym-
bolic order of the rule of law, where a social body is called upon, after 
internal debate, to speak univocally, is erased in favor of an imaginary 
unity, a specter of forgiveness. For the audience of social workers, 
Jury Duty at this moment dodges the complex social subjectivity it 
has heretofore modeled. The tension played out in the jury’s debate 
with itself is evacuated by the fantasy of absolute knowledge. In effect, 
the ghost of Chico lets the jury, and by extension the audience, 
off the hook—at least until the final lines of the play. Becky asks 
Chico what death is like, and Chico, in the tradition of the ghost of 
Hamlet’s father, replies, “I can’t tell you.” Becky asks, “Is it better than 
bein’ alive?” Chico can only shrug, and exit; light fades on the jury 
and lingers only a little longer on Becky. For this particular theater 
audience of social workers, the close of the play is a demand to renew 
their commitment so that those with whom they work can harbor 
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more hope. Like the audience of “Live from Death Row,” their per-
sonal commitments are addressed and affirmed. Here the commitment 
is professional as well, and the box office proceeds to which they have 
contributed are donated to the social work organization in which 
many of them participate. They are reminded of themselves.
Audiences as Social Bodies 
and “one minute later is history”
“Live from Death Row” and Jury Duty reflect both halves of what 
Richard Schechner describes as the “double-mirror” of performance: 
the theatrical reading of cultural moments and the cultural account 
of theatrical representation.24 That “double-mirror,” which has proven 
foundational for performance studies, offers a means to read activism 
and performance forward and backward, as staged activism and activist 
performance. By activist performance, I mean a production explicitly 
acknowledging itself as theater and framed by a dramatic conven-
tion that associates itself with a particular social project. While such 
a performance may or may not utilize Brechtian or other forms of 
narrative disruption and audience estrangement, the subject matter of 
activist performance makes its alliances explicit. Staged activism, on 
the other hand, even if it employs theatrical strategies of representa-
tion, asserts that what the audience experiences is really real.
 Just as in the films surveyed in chapters 5, 6, and 7, there is a 
crucial difference between Collins phoning in from Supermax prison 
and an actor performing a character on trial. Indeed, like the case 
of John Artis appearing at a human rights symposium screening The 
Hurricane, one of the fundamental goals of staged activism is telling 
the difference between the real and the performed, providing the space 
for people to describe their positions in their own words, commu-
nicating as fully as possible their circumstances. Elaine Scarry argues 
that the collective effort to challenge inequity “depends centrally on 
its ability to communicate the reality of physical pain to those who 
are not themselves in pain,” and that therefore “the human voice 
must aspire to become a precise reflection of material reality.”25 The 
garbled transmission of Collins in “Live from Death Row” and the 
character Becky’s haunting final lines in Jury Duty both represent 
powerful examples of such aspirations of human voice—though there 
is the substantial difference of the actuality of the former and the 
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fantasy of the latter. While much of the play may be based on a true 
story, that final dialogue is the playwright’s effort to stage a sense of 
despair rather than to communicate exact circumstances. However, 
there are two actual people whose experience shapes those words: 
the defendant upon whom Webster based the character of Becky, 
Rebecca Walton, and Webster himself, the director’s own pain regard-
ing his participation in a “broken process.”
 Though an activist performance, Jury Duty is extremely conven-
tional in that the interaction between actors onstage and seated audi-
ence members remains sharply regulated; they speak and move, while 
we sit and offer only laughter, silence, and applause. Similarly, “Live 
from Death Row” employs conventions that dictate how the prin-
cipals and the audience interact. The performance attempts to revise 
those conventions by facilitating direct communication between the 
audience and the inmates. However, the mechanical difficulties that 
so precisely described the condition of those imprisoned also rein-
scribed the gulf between those in and out of prison, inhibiting the 
dialogue the program tried to establish. The technical problems refer-
ence the cultural and material differences between those in and out 
of prison, such as in Jury Duty, which invites the audience to see itself 
reflected in the dynamic of its jury, but not in the defendant.
 Both the play and the protest “Live from Death Row” presume 
a social difference between their audiences and prisoners. As Thig-
pen made clear, the agency she imagined of her audience was based 
on the difference between the free and the incarcerated, a differ-
ence suggested in the circumstances of that particular performance as 
one between white and black. The audience may have more clearly 
understood Collins’s precarious position because they could not see 
him or hear him distinctly. However, the audience did not necessar-
ily hear themselves in the prisoner, a matter of identification. This 
unbridged gap between those in and out of prison poses a strategic 
challenge to staged activism and activist performances that are posi-
tioned against imprisonment practices.
 The performances discussed in this chapter differ greatly from 
prison theater programs that stage shows within prison walls for and 
by prisoners.26 Activist performance and staged activism both resem-
ble some aspects of the “social protest performances” Elam describes, 
particularly in terms of their representation of specific social groups 
and opposition to what those groups conceive of as unjust condi-
tions. However, activist performance and staged activism differ from 
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such social-protest performances in the ways they communicate to 
their audiences. Elam claims that the social-protest performances 
modeled resistance, “direct[ed] the audience to take action,” and 
“affirmed cultural unity,”; they are, in all of the instances he describes, 
contingent upon shared race and class markers and direct interaction 
between actors and audience.27 Performances such as those of El 
Teatro Campesino and the Black Revolutionary Theater Movement 
treat the theater’s fourth wall as a two-way mirror that both reflects 
and can be seen through, a means by which spectators not only rec-
ognize themselves and their struggles on stage, but also verbally or 
physically engage those representations during the production. They 
are less apart from the play than a part of the work.
 Activist performance and staged activism, on the other hand, nei-
ther require the active participation of the audience nor reflect the 
identity of that audience. Jury Duty and “Live from Death Row” are 
staged for audiences not themselves in prison. Each of them rein-
scribes the differences between prisoners and audience members, and 
maintains theatrical conventions of largely passive audiences. Conse-
quently, they do not provide a clear directive for what their audiences 
should do with regard to their shared social projects of protesting 
the death penalty and addressing imprisonment as a racial, class-based 
practice. At one level, they only remind their audiences of their 
shared belief, without providing clear means to transform that belief 
to action.
 Given the lack of identification between audience members and 
prisoners in the activist performance of Jury Duty and the staged 
activism of “Live from Death Row,” and the lack of a clear strategy 
for what their audiences should do after the performances, I seem 
to be painting a bleak picture of their efficacy. However, what these 
performances do accomplish is of vital importance. These perfor-
mances invite their audiences to share social and professional commit-
ments: opposition to the death penalty in “Live from Death Row” and 
the social work of Jury Duty. Furthermore, these two performances 
conduct a rich model of social subjectivity, particularly the latter, in 
its representation of the collective jury, its competing viewpoints, and 
its final sentence. Not least, acknowledging the very gulf drawn 
between those in and out of prison, reinscribed in these events, is 
a recognition of difference that allows that gulf to be seen anew, a 
re-vision.
 The social subjectivity modeled in these two performances is one 
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of interpellated communal spectatorship. Of course, “interpellate” 
immediately invokes Althusser, whose widely regarded—though not 
unchallenged—claim of subjects as hailed into being has been read 
by Janelle Reinelt and others as “anesthetizing,” in that it “seem[s] 
to dematerialize agency and opposition.”28 However, the manner in 
which Jury Duty and “Live from Death Row” address their audi-
ences makes available a recuperation of interpellation, a recovery that 
strips the term of its repressive connotations. Althusser’s example of 
the policeman’s call hailing the subject involves both the threat and 
the guilt presumed in such a call.29 The example of the policeman 
assumes a wholly asymmetrical relation of authority, but that impli-
cation elides the more complex situation that the term interpellation 
carries with it, one of “a question put by a member of a legislative 
assembly to a minister or member of the government.”30 This richer 
conceptualization of interpellation grants greater authority and shifts 
identity from the isolated singular to the participatory plural. The 
subject is a participant, a member of a larger assembly.
 In Jury Duty, the titular jury whose duty it is to consider its own 
conflicting positions before finally speaking in one voice best models 
such a social subjectivity, a union of singular and plural. The “I/we” 
of that social body, like activism and performance read in the double-
mirror, reads two ways. Such a body becomes at once the multiple and 
contradictory investments of an individual, and the unity of a group 
hailed by common allegiance.31 Staged performance thus becomes 
the crucible that fuses social body and individual body, united in 
affect. Similarly, Scarry associates agency with a collective subject, the 
need for social action best predicated upon a larger understanding 
of self, a self beyond one’s own skin. The social body operates as a 
metaphor to mobilize social action: if “I” extend beyond my skin, “I” 
am more likely to extend the boundaries of what will cause me to 
act on my own behalf.
 Scarry’s implication of enlarging one’s self speaks to Foucault’s 
point that concludes chapter 4: “The soul is the effect and instrument 
of a political anatomy: the soul is the prison of the body.”32 That is, 
the rigid rhetoric of the autonomous individual sharply limits agency; 
destabilizing that subject enables social and contingent (rather than 
individual and autonomous) agency. The I/we of the social body 
as audience of staged activism and activist performance is at once 
singular and plural, composed of individuals hailed by allegiance to 
the activist project at hand. Such a sense of a hailed audience may 
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counter some aspects of Althusser’s sense of singular interpellation, but 
it accords with his claim specifically of theater (and Brechtian theater 
at that), which can offer “the production of a new spectator, an actor 
who starts where the performance ends.”33
 I do not mean to reduce the value of these two performances to 
the theoretical model of identity as a social body drawn from them. 
Performances in their production and reception may benefit from 
terms to describe them more richly, but they are more than that 
vocabulary. This is especially true for staged activism and activist 
performance, whose effect always has strings attached to a particular 
social project. While staged activism and activist performance differ 
in the degree to which they imbue their representation with truth-
value and maintain dramatic conventions in their performance, both 
cast their audiences as communities, summon them through and unify 
them by the common identity established by the social project in 
which these performances situate themselves. In the case of “Live 
from Death Row,” that commonality is the opposition to the death 
penalty held by those attending the protest; in Jury Duty, the audi-
ence attends the fund-raiser in support of a social work program. 
What works such as these two do most successfully is remind their 
audiences that they are a “we”—plural in number and singular in 
commitment. Those audiences are reminded of their position and 
the fact that others share it, and in being so reminded, maintain it. 
 The value of such a gathered audience cannot be determined 
solely on the basis of what immediate historical changes it brings 
about. For example, no prisoners are released, any more than the 
1990 tribunal saw the immediate commutation of Abu-Jamal’s death 
sentence; resistance is a process of transformation pitted against tre-
mendous social and historical forces. The racial and class-based prison 
populations contested by “Live from Death Row” and Jury Duty 
are only recent examples of inequity. Nevertheless, the opacity and 
silence of the prison system is challenged by these kinds of public 
performances. By definition, prisons conceal their practices of era-
sure; the manner in which they do it is rendered audible by inmates 
such as Miles and Collins. To be enacted, social change must first be 
voiced, and Jury Duty and “Live from Death Row” both give voice to 
otherwise silenced populations, drawing attention to the actuality of 
incarceration at a time when many representations of imprisonment 
fill a shape determined in a cultural imagination that is in tension 
with historical actuality. These two performances hail their respective 
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audiences in a manner that reminds them of their opposition to a 
racial and class-based prison system. However, both performances also 
reinforce the difference between “we” and “these people,” a distinc-
tion that limits just how far the borders of the social body might be 
breached.
 Still, embedded within these performances are at least two distinct 
strategies by which those limits might be tested. First, there is the 
role Webster plays as writer and director of Jury Duty. In drawing 
from his own experience as jury member, he demonstrates that the 
mechanisms of the U.S. legal system implicate its citizens in the set 
of claims and counterclaims that determine criminality and its atten-
dant imprisonment. Second, while my analysis of  “Live from Death 
Row” addresses it as a performance, it remains a historical event 
understood only here as staged, employing theatrical convention. As 
such, that reading might seem to run the risk of aestheticizing poli-
tics, which Walter Benjamin has famously associated with fascism.34 
However, there is a difference between deploying politics as art and 
interpreting political acts within a framework of analysis sensitive 
to both history and the mechanisms by which audiences may identify 
themselves vis-à-vis their moment. The culturally and historically 
nuanced interpretive practices pervasive in the past two decades of 
academic humanities study provide a powerful set of tools for the 
analysis of not only books and films, but also performances—even, 
and perhaps especially, when what is performed is history itself.
 Such an understanding is a literalization of history, its textualiza-
tion, and the analysis as to how its fleetingly available experience 
operates rhetorically. Of course, it is not unexpected to explore what 
some event means; at stake is what some confluence of actualities 
does. The juror Maggie is concerned about what sort of “message” 
mercy might send, and while she is a fictional character, her words 
echo not only the playwright Webster’s fellow jury member upon 
whom her character is based, but also the words of “tough on crime” 
politicians and their electorates, whether noted by ACA officials or 
criminologists. Such a sense of a verdict and its accompanying prison 
sentence sending a message understands historical events as function-
ing rhetorically, and performance is the closest opportunity to “read” 
the real of history, not what it means, but how it works. Such an 
account is the reverse of the theatricality described in The Execu-
tioner’s Song. Mailer portrays events in theatrical terms. He likens Gil-
more’s presentation in court to stage and film acting, writes that the 
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prison officials rehearse his execution, and depicts the execution itself 
as a play of stage and spectators.35 As staged and acted, the events seem 
unreal. This is the sense of theater critiqued by Deleuze and Guattari, 
who would replace theater with history.36
 However, just as the purposes and methods of literary studies 
change after a historical turn, and just as the phrases “the personal is 
political” and “always historicize” are axiomatic to the point of being 
clichés, reading history as performance need not aestheticize and thus 
anesthetize it. Instead, such an understanding draws attention to the 
ephemeral quality of the real of history and the necessity to provide 
as full a record, as thick a description, as possible, even while recog-
nizing the impossibility of doing so completely. Just as the ephemeral 
quality of performances means that no two are the same, history as 
performance leaves available the possibility of change as suggested by 
Huey Newton. No more than he can we “expect to find anything the 
same even one minute later because one minute later is history.”37 At 
stake is what sort of historical change and what new possibilities prove 
emergent at the expense of others.
he previous chapters of this book chronicle how a postbel-
lum Southern racist imagination cast black men as criminals, a 
trend recorded in the early National Prison Association transcripts 
and in historiography chronicling the jim crow era, as well as in 
Faulkner’s fiction. That dangerous equation broadened nationally to 
be represented and critiqued in the writing not only of Cleaver (and, 
to a limited extent, Mailer), but also of American Correctional Asso-
ciation officials. In addition, it is pervasive in films and performances 
at the end of the twentieth century. Those chapters also document 
the diminishing possibilities for how various types of criminality 
might be defined and addressed, from the individuation of prisoners 
in the 1930s to the revolutionary possibilities of 1968 and then their 
foreclosure thereafter in the 1970s, with the nearly unilateral practice 
of incarceration for an increasing array of offenses through the 1980s, 
the enforcement of which specifically targeted inner-city communi-
ties in a manner capitulating to cultural expectation. Challenging the 
imagination, and thereby contributing to the transformation of history, 
demands writing its genealogy, naming the past and tracing the ways 
it has produced both the dramatic inequities and the imaginations of 
the present—testifying in order to imagine a different future.
 It is one thing to imprison those who have committed violent 
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crimes in order to incapacitate them, to deprive of freedom the peo-
ple convicted of committing felonies that pose threats to the liberties, 
lives, pursuits, and properties of others. When prisons are imag-
ined to contain only such violent, often-murderous offenders, it is 
extremely difficult for those not in prison to recognize themselves 
in prisoners.1 However, the two performances, like the previous texts 
surveyed in this book, call attention to the racial and class-based enter-
prise of punishment. Chapter 1 lays the basis for prison history to be 
best understood as national history, and also demonstrates how it has 
been a racial practice, a matter best illustrated by a Southern prison 
administrator in 1888 claiming that prisons exist in order to house 
freed slaves.2 Chapter 2 points out how Faulkner’s fictional Jeffer-
son desires Joanna Burden’s murder to be a “negro crime,” just as a 
nameless Southerner tells a visitor in 1908 that “we feel like killing 
a nigger,” irrespective of guilt or even any offense at all.3 The nar-
rative arc of Go Down, Moses follows Lucas Beauchamp’s father to 
Lucas’s grandson, the first pages opening with an escaped slave, pro-
gressing through the threats and persecutions of jim crow, and on to 
a Northern prison’s execution of Butch. That native son returns to 
a Jefferson no longer imagined of one mind, but divided by lines of 
identity painstakingly united for a moment and assembled to witness 
his return.
 Chapters 3 and 4 track the potential for progressive change and 
its loss, as discussions in 1968 of crime as historically and socially 
situated and punishment as racial transform to crime being addressed 
as a raceless, random, and all-pervasive phenomenon that can be met 
only with incarceration. These transformations are especially vis-
ible between the Cleaver (and Mailer) of 1968 and the Mailer (and 
Cleaver) of 1979, but the changes are just as visible in the presenta-
tions of prison wardens, governors, and members of the ACA during 
that period. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 describe films set in prison in the 
late 1990s, prisons almost uniformly depicted as places of personal 
salvation, where even the black men unfairly imprisoned benefit from 
the experience. At the same time, the U.S. prison system surpassed 
every comparable country in terms of both rates of incarceration and 
the overall population of prisoners, and black men are radically over-
represented in those numbers.
 In chapter 8, the “Live from Death Row” speaker and prisoner 
Miles, a white man, critiques at length the racial implementation of 
the death penalty, a critical matter as well in Abu-Jamal’s book from 
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which the series of protests takes its name.4 The ghost of Chico in 
Jury Duty tells the sympathetic juror, Becky, and the audience that the 
“death penalty is for killin’ cops or pretty white girls.” The pairing 
of “pretty white girls” and police officers implies both the cultural 
myth instigating lynching as cited in chapter 2 and the regularly ignit-
ing tension between police forces and black and ethnic communities, 
tension that is the background to the texts of chapters 3 and 6.5 The 
character of Becky (and the real person upon whom she is based) will 
not be executed, but her criminality remains a foregone conclusion 
for the jury of her “peers, as they say.” Chico acknowledges, “Those 
people had made up their minds. They didn’t see no person. They saw 
a junkie whore.” The jury has already decided her fate because they 
recognize her not as a human being but as an addict and a prosti-
tute, terms that recall the variations of “dope-fiend whore” so often 
repeated in Faulkner’s Requiem for a Nun. Crime in these terms is 
a personal failure determined by identity difference, in which juries 
who would not see themselves as peers of the accused, who do not 
recognize themselves in the criminal, see in those such as Becky 
what Gavin Stevens first sees in Butch: a “seed not only violent but 
dangerous and bad.”
 Reimagining prisoners in other ways demands greater atten-
tion both to the broad cultural trends of race and class divisions just 
described, and to the historical actualities of imprisonment chronicled 
throughout the previous chapters. Imprisonment thereby is divorced 
from an imagined correlation to a violent or murderous offense, 
linked instead to unemployment, poverty, drug use, and the racism 
of profiling, targeted arrests, and inequitable sentencing. The 1993 
president of the ACA cites an example of four black youths in Michi-
gan all sentenced to life for simple robberies, just one case of many 
where the correlating indicators of sentencing are not the severity of 
the crime, but race, age, and gender.6 Certainly many people in prison 
have committed serious crimes that endanger others, crimes that 
demand their separation. However, the conception that all prisoners 
are guilty of such offenses fails to take into account the enormous 
expansion of incarceration as the sine qua non of punishment tak-
ing place in the United States since the mid-1970s. According to 
the U.S. Department of Justice, property crime has declined steadily 
since 1973, and violent offenses since 1993, yet the prison population 
doubled in the 1980s and again in the 1990s.7 Broadening the crimi-
nality of drug use, aggressively targeting black and poor populations, 
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and dismantling treatment programs all contributed to an increase in 
the proportion of substance-abuse offenders and to the overrepresen-
tation of black men in prisons and jails. Drug arrests among adults 
quadrupled between 1970 and 2002, from 322,300 to more than 1.3 
million.8 Prisons have filled not with murderers and rapists but with 
drug users, most often poor, and black or Hispanic.
 There is thus a sharp divide in the quite-basic matter between the 
crimes prisoners are imagined to commit and their actual offenses. For 
example, the prisoners—real and imagined—surveyed in the books, 
films, and performances that this book addresses are all convicted of 
murder, assault, and rape, and these sorts of representations create in 
the cultural imagination a sense that prisons unilaterally warehouse 
dangerous, even murderous offenders. The gulf between actuality and 
imagination in this regard helps foster the apathy and even more 
pernicious hard-line positions of politicians and voters, a reactionary 
perspective insidiously made easier when criminals, and thus prisoners, 
are presumed to be black. However, that very rhetoric of “tough on 
crime” can be turned against itself, for which crimes—and committed 
by whom—are targeted? Participation in sex for money and in drug 
use brands the Becky of Jury Duty a “junkie whore” (just as Nancy 
Mannigoe is a “nigger dope-fiend whore” in Requiem for a Nun) and 
thus predetermines her criminalization in the view of the jury.
 However, the back-page advertisements of many large-city weekly 
periodicals routinely feature advertisements for marijuana, as well as 
Xanax, Valium, Vicodin, and other prescription pharmaceuticals used 
recreationally, all for sale via online pharmacies promising discretion; 
other ads solicit customers for escorts and invite young women to 
work for such services. It is not the general crimes of illegal drug 
use and prostitution that police and courts must strictly enforce 
and prisons punish. Instead, laws differentiate the manner in which 
particular populations commit transgressions from how more-privi-
leged groups (such as middle and upper classes) do so.
 The clearest expression of how offenses are distinguished is brought 
into focus in the huge disparities in minimum sentencing for posses-
sion of cocaine between its crack and powder forms. The former is 
cheaper and more frequently used by low-income, inner-city popula-
tions. The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 equated the possession of 
five grams of crack cocaine with five hundred grams of powdered 
cocaine, an equation of personal use of the former with large-scale 
trafficking of the latter. For example, given White House estimates, 
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those quantities represent street values of five hundred to a thousand 
dollars of crack versus upwards of twenty-five to fifty thousand dollars 
of cocaine.9 Several high-profile cases have further tagged crack as a 
“black” drug, though a federal commission determined in 1995 that 
only one-third of crack cocaine users were black. However, nearly 
85 percent of those convicted for possession were black, a factor at 
least suggesting targeted arrest patterns.10 A 1989 National Institute 
of Drug Use survey, during the height of the purported crack epi-
demic among African-Americans, determined that only 12 percent 
of drug users were black men and women, but that 44 percent of 
those arrested for possession were black.11 Norval Morris, who for 
more than two decades has been the most prominent historian of the 
U.S. prison system, points out the identical rates of drug use among 
racial groups. However, while rates of arrest for drug crimes were the 
same among white and black offenders in 1968, they had increased 
fivefold in arrests of black men and women by 1990.12 Racially tar-
geted arrests, therefore, have overrepresented black men and women 
in prison.
 That problem is compounded by the mandatory minimum sen-
tences initiated by the Sentence Reform Act of 1984 and the far-
harsher penalties for crack cocaine instituted in the Anti-Drug Act 
of 1986. Those arrested were more likely to serve longer sentences, 
given incarceration’s increased frequency, duration, and mandatory 
minimums. Drug arrests in the 1980s and 1990s targeted inner-city 
populations, particularly black and Hispanic users.13 The tremendous 
discrepancies in sentencing for crack offenders are described by U.S. 
Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, in a dissenting opinion, 
as “three to eight times longer” than those meted out for possession 
of cocaine in its powdered form.14 Derrick Bell criticizes these dis-
crepancies in 200415—and the ACA raised these concerns a decade 
before that.
 A senior circuit judge makes this point at the 1993 ACA meeting 
in a paper on the failures of mandatory sentencing titled “Revise the 
Guidelines Now.”16 Another paper at the same conference, given by 
the chair of the U.S. Sentencing Commission, identifies related prob-
lems and makes recommendations to address them. The chair suggests 
that the “most logical resolution” to mandatory sentencing would be 
to eliminate it and to institute guidelines, but recognizes that “such 
a prospect is not politically feasible.”17 A Pennsylvania Department of 
Corrections commissioner similarly indicates “that elected officials 
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are reluctant to say or do anything that appears to be soft on crime.”18 
Rather than effectiveness, fairness, or logic, political weakness and a 
fear of public perception and imagination have been the important 
causes for sentencing practices that have continued to incarcerate too 
many for too little. In 1995 the ACA itself shifted from the declared 
principles by which it had defined criminality since 1870 to a more 
“dynamic and flexible” vision statement advocating greater com-
munity involvement and legislative address of the causes of crime.19 
However, such vision has been merely optative, and public policy 
remains far more myopic.
 Like the “probable felon” list developed in Florida for the 2000 
national election, arrest and sentencing patterns in the 1980s and 
1990s suggest that these punishments are not designed to eliminate 
crimes so much as incorporate them in a larger strategy of subjugation. 
Whether or not incarcerating a racial and class-based population of 
prisoners has been the intent of law enforcement, the judicial system, 
and prison administrations is immaterial. As with the Voter Rights 
Act, it is the effect of disenfranchisement that is the key. That effect 
began with the Rockefeller drug laws spreading nationally in the 
1970s; continued in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which vir-
tually eliminated discretionary sentencing at the federal level; hugely 
escalated with the Reagan administration’s Anti-Drug Act in 1986; 
and was cemented by that act’s expansion two years later. The climate 
did not change in subsequent presidencies. William J. Bennett, the 
highly conservative critic of education, morality, and politics, served 
as both President Reagan’s and President George H. W. Bush’s drug 
czar, and Bennett’s deputy, John P. Walters, became the White House 
director of national drug-control policy for the subsequent President 
Bush’s administration in 2001.
 The Clinton administration offered little in terms of difference 
in this regard. In his final year, President Bill Clinton granted clem-
ency for five individuals serving extensive sentences for minimal 
participation in the drug trade,20 but he resisted broader, more sys-
temic changes, siding with Congress in rejecting the U.S. Sentenc-
ing Commission’s recommendations to address the racial disparities 
brought about by the inequitable minimum sentences initiated under 
Reagan. A willingness to view black and low-income populations as 
criminals, a hard-line conservative stance casting drug use in general 
as a moral failure and certain forms of drugs in particular as beyond 
the pale, and the political fear of being perceived as soft on crime all 
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combine to make predetermined criminality at once the cause and 
effect of jurisprudential conviction. Many prisoners—like the char-
acter and self-described “crack whore” Becky Wallace of Jury Duty, 
like Rosa Thigpen’s son, Kenny Collins, in “Live from Death Row”—
are thereby differentiated less by their crimes than by their poverty, 
race, or other cultural differences.
 The prior analyses of “Live from Death Row” and Jury Duty sug-
gest that mounting a challenge to incarceration demands an identifi-
cation with prisoners by those not themselves imprisoned, but those 
two performances also highlight the difficulties of doing so. The sense 
of “feeling imprisoned” criticized in chapter 1 seems a poor strategy 
to foster such recognition, and the solipsistic excess of prison as a 
metaphor does little to critique inequity. Instead, what needs to be 
challenged is the relationship between crime and criminalization and 
the equation of criminality and prisoner, the attribution and distribu-
tion of offenses. The thirty-year experiment in wholesale imprison-
ment for virtually all crimes has proven inordinately expensive, both 
fiscally and socially. The mandatory minimum sentences for many 
crimes, and the lengthy imprisonment for millions of people that 
these mandatory minimums lead to, is not a constant in U.S. impris-
onment, but a historically recent approach without a clear effect on 
crime rates.21 Only in the past three decades has prison been the 
primary answer to questions of crime.
 Furthermore, the enduring first principle of the ACA declares that 
it is not the commission of crime but the conviction in court that 
names one a criminal. From slavery, through jim crow, to anxiety over 
black militancy, to the history of now, whiteness in the United States 
has regularly feared and desired blackness to equate with criminality. 
That inequity has also contributed to a racial economic divide and, 
consequently, to that divide’s relationship to crime, conviction, and 
punishment. As cited in chapter 1, research suggests that rather than 
incarceration rates matching crime rates, unemployment provides 
the clearest correlation to imprisonment patterns.22 These are not 
new observations. Former U.S. president Rutherford B. Hayes, first 
president of the NPA, recognized the relationship between unem-
ployment and imprisonment as early as 1888, an equation that was 
reiterated throughout the next century and beyond in meetings for 
that particular social body. Instead of basing identification across 
prison walls on everyone’s feeling like a captive or prisoner some-
times, it is necessary to point out that many, perhaps most, people 
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commit the crimes that are part of the texture of everyday life, but 
racial and class-based populations are far more likely to be targeted 
as criminals.
 At stake is the problematic nature of social and cultural identity, 
long a mainstay of academic discussion and a key feature of the 
“culture wars” of the 1980s and 1990s. Incarceration as a division 
of identity underscores how it at once constitutes and is defined by 
individuals and social groups, including those in and out of prisons. 
If incarceration, like other cultural indices, can be understood as a 
category of difference, then, like those categories, its hinge between 
the individual and the social, between the I and the we, is identity. 
The Civil Rights Act of 1964, along with its expansion in writs of 
habeas corpus, provided the basis for much of the prison reform of 
the 1960s. The act makes this same point in its particular language, 
which prohibits discrimination based on race, sex, nationality, or reli-
gion: “The term ‘person’ includes one or more individuals, governments, 
governmental agencies, political subdivisions” (emphasis added).23 Sin-
gular and plural conflate in cultural markers of difference.
 That approach applies well to strategies of reading that locate 
textual production and reception in particular cultural contexts. For 
example, Faulkner’s narration of criminal consciousness in Sanctuary 
and Light in August is coincident both with competing psychoana-
lytic models of individual development and with the employment of 
those models in actual prisons, as demonstrated in the transcripts of 
the American Prison Association. However, Faulkner’s willingness in 
Go Down, Moses to emphasize racial injustice and to broaden social 
agency follows Wright’s more polemical take in Native Son, and would 
not be spoken by prison officials themselves until decades later. From 
the mid-1960s to the late 1970s, Cleaver, Mailer, and Deleuze and 
Guattari were all variously theorizing what they describe repeatedly as 
national or cultural “schizophrenia,” which they all specifically relate 
to race. Soul on Ice and The Executioner’s Song undertake analytical and 
narrative methods with a level of cultural and historical engagement 
that U.S. literary criticism did not broadly engage until the 1980s. 
Cleaver’s (and Deleuze and Guattari’s thereafter) attention to the revo-
lutionary possibilities of black and inmate identities was at first shared 
and then largely dismissed by some of the officials writing prison 
policy and practice from 1968 to 1979, according to the American 
Correctional Association transcripts—and the beginning of a sharp 
increase in incarceration concluded that period.
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 As those trends intensified at the close of the twentieth century, 
race became the dominant sign in the equation of criminality (and its 
attendant incarceration) with black masculinity. The films of 1998 and 
1999 that are surveyed here, as well as the performance “Live from 
Death Row,” variously challenge and capitulate to the misrecognition 
of blackness and criminality—the fears and desires circulating around 
black men in prison. Jury Duty departs in this regard from the prior 
texts, broadening who might be considered a criminal and thus a 
prisoner. However, though the drama does not reinforce the mis-
recognition of black masculinity with criminality, it does, like many 
of these texts, simultaneously draw attention to the unjust practices 
of incarceration and thwart identification with the prisoner. Facilitat-
ing such identification is likely a crucial step for creating meaningful 
investments between those outside of prison and those within.
 Such historical awareness and cultural recognition shifts identifi-
cation between those not imprisoned and those who are from the 
glib cynicism of “it is not a crime if you don’t get caught,” to the less 
openly sustainable cynicism of racism, as well as to alienation and 
subjugation based on economic disparity. Again, the first principle of 
the most prominent association of prison administrators since 1870 
has remained that not crime but conviction in court names one 
a criminal. However, determinations of criminality, conviction, and 
consequences have historically targeted disenfranchised populations 
in the United States. Ever since the Boston Selectmen’s 1723 proc-
lamation that a gathering of “more than two Indians, Negroes or 
Mulatto servants or slaves” was a punishable offense,24 and the over-
representation of black men and women began in the nation’s first 
prison, there has been a demonstrated willingness to name black and 
poor people as criminals.
 These eighteenth-century cases are only precedents for late- 
twentieth-century arrest patterns, sentencing inconsistencies, and 
prison populations, which are all part of the historical record. That 
history has been imagined, represented, and contested in the books, 
films, and performances described throughout this book. Docu-
menting that history and its imagination demands that rather than 
adopting the positions Žižek describes as conformity, cynicism, or 
perverse capitulation to racial and class-based imprisonment prac-
tices, we embrace skepticism as necessary to challenge incarceration. 
Again, undoubtedly it is true that many prisoners have committed 
crimes that threaten public safety. However, criminalization, arrests, 
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convictions, and sentencing in the past three decades have drawn on 
existing racist imaginations of black masculinity in determining crime 
and punishment.
 Certainly, the boundaries of cultural difference can be difficult to 
breach in order to establish identification. However, incorporating 
incarceration as a division less of guilty and innocent or immoral and 
moral, and instead as a category of cultural identity in its own right, 
provides a means to foster such recognition. The multiple indices by 
which selfhood is located at once divide and unite human experience. 
Such determinations of subjectivity do not take place in the singu-
larity of an idealized, pure, and simple humanity or in an imagined 
autonomous individuality. Instead, strategies of selfhood are negoti-
ated through the multiple lines of approach to gender, race, class, eth-
nicity, nationality, sexuality, and imprisonment, among others. Those 
separated in their identities as inmates from those not imprisoned are 
nevertheless joined in terms of other shared identities, other hinges of 
I and we. Performances such as Jury Duty and “Live from Death Row” 
offer models of materially present audiences, demonstrating the social 
bodies in which the negotiation of identity takes place, recognizing 
the “I” not in the other but in the “we.” They also emphasize the 
social responsibility of imprisonment. Understanding the demonstra-
tion of “Live from Death Row” as a performance also provides a 
sense of how historical events themselves are subject to analysis that 
is sensitive to how they operate and what they produce.
 Such implications of identity, performance, politics, and history in 
texts both literary and otherwise echo the prescient claims of Richard 
Poirier in 1971, the title of whose book Performing Self resonates with 
more recent theories of selfhood as performed. Chapter 1 cites his 
description of Mailer’s “engagements with language as political.”25 
As the chapters of this book individually and in sum demonstrate, 
that claim holds true of all the cultural works surveyed, not only 
because the producers of the books, films, and performances engage 
the political, but also because literary studies in the past quarter 
century has emphasized the historical and cultural implications of 
production and reception.
 Those transformations in humanities study make Ed Bullins’s 
response in a 1973 interview, which opens chapter 8, seem a little 
quaint in its historical distance. His claim—that one’s cultural work 
might have political goals “if that is what you wish to do”—comes 
before what has since become the larger sense that books, films, and 
0
Conclusion
performances already operate politically. This matter certainly held 
true for Bullins, who found himself embroiled in a bitter dispute 
with Cleaver regarding the role of radical black theater with respect 
to politics, and with the Black Panther Party as a whole in the matter 
of black nationalists versus the practical edge of cross-racial alliances. 
These conflicts led to Bullins’s departure from the party being maneu-
vered by Cleaver, though it was Cleaver himself who had appointed 
the playwright as minister of culture.26 That particular internecine 
battle, one of many within a particular social body rife with such 
struggles, demonstrates the value for those initiating social change 
to recognize the necessity of broad-based alliances. As an Ameri-
can Prison Association participant observes in 1929, “The trouble 
with good people is that they waste so much effort fighting one 
another.”27 Those whose work is situated in literary, historical, and 
political studies must work together and account for other forms of 
cultural work—or the divisions among them will provide the means 
for defeat in detail, the division, isolation, and destruction that have 
been the very practice of actual imprisonment. A provocative example 
of “good people” working together occurred in 2004, when NAACP 
leadership proposed an alliance with the American Correctional Asso-
ciation to address the challenges of race and imprisonment.28
 A “we” of scholars, teachers, historians, critics, activists, and citizens 
may not agree on the best tactics for challenging the social inequities 
most starkly represented within the U.S. prison system. However, we 
can agree that expanded criminalization, extended sentencing, and 
arrest patterns through the 1980s and 1990s targeting particular popu-
lations are practices that have produced a prison population overrep-
resenting minorities. Accompanying these matters of the historical 
record is the saturation of imprisonment in a cultural imagination 
that equates blackness with criminality. This saturation took place 
even though practices of incarceration have largely concealed the 
actual experience of more than two million people in prison or jail, 
with an additional 4.7 million people under another form of judicial 
control, whether parole or probation. The effort of this book has 
been to participate in the attempt to bring a series of problematic 
dualities to the forefront of literary and cultural studies: racism’s 
pervasiveness and invisibility, the huge numbers and concealment of 
prison populations, the dynamic between imprisonment’s actuality 
and imagination, and an insufficient corresponding critique of all of 
these crucial matters.
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 The texts surveyed in this book not only make visible what is 
largely a concealed practice, but also offer a variety of strategic posi-
tions by which to imagine and thereby produce the social transforma-
tions necessary to alter the ways prison history has shaped national 
history. For example, Webster, the writer and director of Jury Duty, 
draws attention to how the jury operates as a particular form of public 
sphere emblematic of the broader sociality it represents. As the play 
is staged, jury and Jury reflect both the audience and what the play-
wright describes as a “broken process”; for the particular audience of 
social workers present for one performance, the play demands that 
they fix this broken process. Similarly, there are the participants in 
“Live from Death Row,” not only Collins and Miles but also Har-
rington, Reese, Jeannette, and Thigpen, those not in prison who serve 
as intermediaries between those who are and those who are not, 
facilitating communication, and thereby identification, across prison 
walls.
 Earlier chapters include a litany of such intermediary roles, both 
imagined and real. There is Faulkner’s character of the attorney Gavin 
Stevens, whose initial racist (mis)recognition gives way to his efforts 
and expenditures at the unmade request of a black woman he barely 
knows. In the final pages of the novel, he spends his time and money 
to assemble, if just for a moment, a community that is differentiated 
along lines of race and class but nevertheless brought together to 
witness the return of its native son, initiated into history, recorded 
in the daily paper. Then there is Cleaver’s depiction of his white 
female lawyer, Beverly Axelrod, who works on his behalf, as well 
as Cleaver’s self-representation of himself as part of the nation and 
history in and through which he writes himself. There is Mailer, his 
efforts on behalf of Cleaver’s release and his chronicle, however brief, 
of the attorney Gil Athay and his work to free Dale Pierre, just a 
fragment in a larger whole describing the forces involved in history 
and story, imprisonment and execution. There are Rideau, Garbus, 
and Stack, the prisoner as journalist and director working alongside 
two documentary filmmakers to incorporate into the historical record 
and cultural imagination the lives of prisoners typically hidden from 
view. These books, films, and performances all increase prisoners’ vis-
ibility and thereby provide an opportunity to revise national history, 
literary and otherwise, to incorporate more fully a sense of the lived 
experience of millions in the United States.
 Making prison history central to the study of national history 
begins to account for the degree to which the former has shaped 
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the latter. Reading the writing of prisoners and their depictions by 
others is part of that project, incorporating narratives of imprison-
ment into a story of nation. There is much more of this story to tell, 
including looking back further historically and in greater detail. We 
can more closely examine the early discussions of prisons—which 
involved Benjamin Rush and others—the expansion of the prison 
system through the nation in the early and mid-nineteenth century, 
and prison reform at the end of that century, informed in part by the 
ideals of a liberal humanities education, even as a rhetoric of impe-
rialism proved as pervasive in the NPA as elsewhere. There are many, 
many more works whose representations of imprisonment demand 
a richer account, whether these representations are unremarked in 
familiar texts, or are in books and films that have thus far escaped 
attention. Expanding the theorization and analysis of inmate identities 
will foster more-nuanced senses of how various matters of cultural 
difference shape and are shaped by the experience of imprisonment 
as it has been endured through more than two centuries.
 Such a body of study and the accompanying framework are nec-
essary in order to bring a richer discussion of prisons and prisoners 
to the forefront of both the academic and, more important, the gen-
eral public consciousness. Scholarship in this vein works in concert 
with classrooms, which play their own roles by organizing knowledge, 
identifying lines of inquiry, and serving as places of staged readings, 
where materially present audiences engage literary, historical, and 
scholarly texts.29 Performed analysis in the social sphere of the class-
room is only one of the many spaces in which incarceration needs 
to be addressed in order to recognize both its centrality to national 
experience and the necessity of a more informed critical conversation. 
That discourse is necessary to challenge a clear threat to the promise 
of the United States—a threat that curtails liberties, limits pursuits, 
and ends lives behind prison walls in racial and class-based popula-
tions that have been targeted for arrest and warehoused with little 
recourse. Challenging these practices will bring closer to fulfillment 
the impossible but necessary “becoming” of a full democracy, never 
to be realized, but nevertheless to be attempted. The Angolite poem 
quoted in chapter 1 reads: “Go ahead / Lock us up / Lock us all up 
/ Lock away the ones you see / In the mirror.” However, we who 
incarcerate have locked up millions of people precisely because we do 
not recognize ourselves among them, and that is among the greatest 
failures in U.S. history.
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and imprisonment in U.S. history, pointing out how race and class have been 
implicated in social control and punishment since pre-Revolutionary America. 
Thomas L. Dumm’s Democracy and Punishment: Disciplinary Origins of the United 
States (Madison: U Wisconsin P, 1987) offers another Foucauldian history, arguing 
that producing and incarcerating criminality occurs in an opposition that helps 
define the idea of freedom as conducted in liberal democratic discourse. Adam 
Jay Hirsch’s The Rise of the Penitentiary: Prisons and Punishment in Early America 
(New Haven: Yale UP, 1992) anticipates many of Christianson’s points regard-
ing the relationship of slavery and imprisonment. Paul W. Keve’s Prisons and the 
American Conscience: A History of U.S. Federal Corrections (Carbondale: Southern 
Illinois UP, 1991) serves as an administrative history, an official view from the 
inside and from the top, as he served as the commissioner of corrections in 
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the number of crimes committed. Morris and Rothman’s The Oxford History of 
the Prison: The Practice of Punishment in Western Society (New York: Oxford UP, 
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of U.S. and international imprisonment practices. David M. Oshinsky’s “Worse 
Than Slavery”: Parchman Farm and the Ordeal of Jim Crow Justice (New York: Free 
Press Paperbacks, 1997) is the most rigorously documented account organized 
around the Mississippi prison, and it demonstrates how imprisonment in the jim 
crow South perpetuated practices of slavery. William L. Selke’s Prisons in Crisis 
(Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana UP, 1993) conducts a sociological study 
in determining that the U.S. prison system fails to accomplish its intent because 
its purposes (punishment, incapacitation, and rehabilitation) are misguided or 
unreasonable and often contradictory; imprisonment practices often exacerbate 
rather than alleviate the problems the system seeks to solve. John M. Sloop’s 
The Cultural Prison: Discourse, Prisoners, and Punishment (Tuscaloosa: U Alabama 
P, 1996) surveys popular news periodicals from 1950 to 1993 to demonstrate 
how the representation of prisoners has several distinct types at different periods, 
particularly with regard to raced and gendered criminality. Michael Tonry has 
held a longtime commitment to the study of imprisonment as a vital component 
of criminology, and his edited collection The Handbook of Crime and Punishment 
(New York: Oxford UP, 1998) is an invaluable survey of correctional policies 
and practices.
 3. That understanding of historicism traces back to Jameson’s The Political 
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theory, rewriting Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari, Althusser, and Foucault in sorting 
the tensions between history and the subject, between causality and narrativity, 
and among real, imaginary, and symbolic. It is worth noting that Lacan’s own 
work contesting and revising Freudian psychoanalysis already lays the basis less 
for a subject without history than for a subject composed in history (see chapter 
1, n36)—and even the Freudian superego, however undertheorized, leaves room 
for such cultural and historical contingencies.
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Chapter 3
 1. Cleaver, Soul on Ice, 98.
 2. In the first seventy years of the association’s history, two presidents 
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represented the South; between WWII and 1979, there were eight. In Dixie 
Rising: How the South Is Shaping American Values, Politics, and Culture (New York: 
Time Books/Random House, 1996), Peter Applebome describes the expansion 
of Southern policies and practice, particularly how divides over civil rights split 
the Democratic party, sending many conservative Democrats to the right and 
making Southern states largely Republican. Of course, Malcolm X in his April 
3, 1964 speech, “The Ballot or the Bullet,” reprinted in Malcolm X Speaks: Se-
lected Speeches and Statements, George Breitman, ed. (New York: Pathfinder, 1989), 
predicted that very split for those exact reasons, even foretelling the expansion 
of violent riots that summer (23–44).
 3. The 1964 Civil Rights Act proved a turning point in the federal govern-
ment’s “hands-off ” policy for the oversight of state prisons. The Arkansas ruling 
in Holt v. Sarver (1970) was the broadest of several states’ similar findings. Earlier 
rulings focused particularly on the First Amendment rights of black prisoners. 
U.S. prisons tried to bar the religious practices of Black Muslims in the early 
1960s, but the federal courts upheld the latter’s religious freedom in Pierce v. 
LaVallee (1962, 1963) and Sewell v. Pegelow (1962).
 4. Kathleen Rout, Eldridge Cleaver (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1991), vii.
 5. Cleaver’s Soul on Fire (Waco, TX: World Books, 1978) chronicles his turn 
to Christianity, and by 1980 he was supporting Ronald Reagan for president, a 
stark contrast to his heated conflict with the then-governor in 1968. Kathleen 
Rout titles this section of Cleaver’s biography “Advertisements for Himself,” a 
gesture to Mailer’s Advertisements for Myself (Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP, 1992), 
first published in 1959.
 6. These include the legitimacy of writ lawyers in Johnson v. Avery (1969), 
communication with the press in Nolan v. Fitzpatrick (1971)—although Pell v. 
Procunier (1974) would limit that right—and prisoners’ rights to receive both 
mail and visitors in Procunier v. Martinez (1974).
 7. The most dismissive read Cleaver’s description, “Rape was an insurrec-
tionary act,” as a rationalization and seem to stop there, never getting as far as 
his admission that he was wrong, sick, and evil—see 3, 34–35. George Jackson in 
Soledad Brother similarly situates his own crime of robbery as revolution: “When 
the peasant revolts, the student demonstrates, the slum dweller riots, the robber 
robs, he is reacting” (179). Unlike Cleaver, he does not admit the larger wrong-
doing of his act. However, that lack of apology is likely a consequence of the 
disparity between his crime of stealing $70 and the sentence he received, one 
year to life.
 8. According to Franklin’s “The Literature of the American Prison,” prison 
practices in the United States so disproportionately have contained black men 
that the African-American literature written on the margins of dominant culture 
paradoxically has proven the dominant discourse within prison literature (51–52). 
Deleuze and Guattari’s definition of a minor literature offered in Kafka: Toward 
a Minor Literature (Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 1986) illuminates the rhetorical 
position of prison writers such as Cleaver—and in a more mediated fashion, the 
prisoners who represent themselves in The Farm and “Live from Death Row” in 
chapters 7 and 8. Deleuze and Guattari identify three characteristics of minor 
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literature: the articulations of the oppressed in the language of the oppressor, 
which they relate specifically to “blacks in America today”; the political nature 
of writing and its implication in social conflicts and asymmetrical power rela-
tions; and the collective value and political expression of writing, as “literature is 
the people’s concern” (16–17). These are precisely the terms M. Karenga uses to 
define African-American cultural expression in “Black Art: Mute Matter Given 
Force and Function,” in The Norton Anthology of African American Literature, Henry 
Louis Gates Jr. and N. Y. McKay, eds. (New York: Norton, 1997), 1973–77. In 
The Political Unconscious, Jameson similarly privileges resistant discourse, which he 
also explicitly associates with “black language,” one of the “still vital sources of 
language production,” prior to its assimilation by dominant language use (87).
 9. Himes, “The Meanest Cop in the World” and “On Dreams and Real-
ity,” The Collected Stories of Chester Himes (New York: Thunder’s Mouth Press, 
1991), 209–13, 214–26. In contrast, Malcolm X notes in his autobiography, “I 
can’t remember any of my prison numbers. That seems surprising, even after 
the dozen years since I have been out of prison. Because your number in prison 
became part of you. You never heard your name, only your number. On all of 
your clothing, every item, was your number, stenciled. It grew stenciled on your 
brain” (152).
 10. D. Quentin Miller makes a related point regarding “minority prison nar-
ratives” in “‘On the Outside Looking In’: White Readers of Nonwhite Prison 
Narratives,” Prose and Cons: Essays on Prison Literature in the United States (Jef-
ferson, NC: McFarland, 2005). Of James Baldwin, Wideman, and Leonard Peltier, 
Miller writes that “the ethnic prison narrative cannot follow a conventional 
narrative order,” instead opting to “disrupt chronology” and incorporate “letters, 
poems, and vignettes” to reorient the context of crime and punishment for white 
readers (16).
 11. Cleaver, Soul on Ice, 21.
 12. Parker L. Hancock, “Presidential Address,” Proceedings of the Ninety-Eighth 
Annual Congress of Correction, 1968 (ACA: Washington, DC, 1968), 13.
 13. Ibid., 15, 19.
 14. Ibid., 23.
 15. Vincent O’Leary, “Current Issues in Community Based Correction,” Pro-
ceedings of the One Hundredth Annual Congress of Correction of the American Correc-
tional Association, 1970 (College Park, MD, 1970), 131. The next few years would 
see the same points raised in nearly identical terms. The 1971 ACA President 
Louie L. Wainwright notes that “society is experiencing a period of cultural and 
social revolution” (“Presidential Address,” Proceedings of the One Hundred and First 
Annual Congress of the American Correctional Association, 1971 [College Park, MD, 
1971], 3).
 16. Others’ views were more extreme. In 1969, Warden R. W. Meier de-
scribes university riots not as symptomatic of social change but as a pernicious 
direct cause of unrest in prison (“Administration and Problems in Correctional 
Institutions,” Proceedings of the Ninety-Ninth Annual Congress of Correction of the 
American Correctional Association, 1969 [Washington, DC, 1969], 62). He offers a 
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list of troublemakers: “resistors, draft dodgers, professional agitators, communists, 
hippies and revolutionaries [ . . . and] former prisoners, militants, far-out liberals, 
subversives, and even a few clergymen, educators and social workers,” whose 
“delight in fomenting unrest” he parallels with “drunken Mexicans” rioting in 
prison (62–63). Presidential addresses remain significantly less reactionary and 
racist through this twelve-year period.
 17. Sloop, 16, 63, 91.
 18. Leon J. Quinn, “Militant Black: A Correctional Problem,” Proceedings of 
the Ninety-Ninth Annual Congress of the American Correctional Association, 1969, 
222–24.
 19. Ibid., 224, 227–28.
 20. James W. L. Park, “The Politics of Predators,” Proceedings of the One Hun-
dred and Second Annual Congress of Correction of the American Correctional Association, 
1972 (College Park, MD, 1972), 112–13.
 21. Scott Fleming, “Lockdown at Angola: The Case of the Angola 3,” Kath-
leen Cleaver and George Katsiaficas, eds., Liberation, Imagination, and the Black 
Panther Party Liberation: A New Look at the Panthers and Their Legacy (New York: 
Routledge, 2001), 230. Fleming chronicles the three decades of imprisonment 
at the Louisiana State Prison endured by Herman Wallace, Robert King Wilk-
erson, and Albert Woodfox, whose incarceration he describes as a part of the 
longstanding persecution of the Black Panther Party. Regarding the associate 
warden’s comment regarding communism, it is at odds with Cleaver’s observa-
tions that black revolutionary radicalism conflicted with the Communist Party—a 
charge disputed in U.S. Senate hearings as described in G. Louis Heath, ed., The 
Black Panther Leaders Speak (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 1976), 79–80. See 
also Charles E. Jones, ed., The Black Panther Party Reconsidered (Baltimore: Black 
Classic Press, 1998), 1.
 22. Joseph M. Dell’Olio, “The Public, Crime, and Corrections—Acceptance 
or Rejection,” Proceedings of the Ninety-Ninth Annual Congress of Correction of the 
American Correctional Association, 1969, 85–86.
 23. A. Leon Higginbotham, “Is Yesterday’s Racism Relevant Today in Cor-
rections?,” Proceedings of the One Hundredth Annual Congress of Correction of the 
American Correctional Association, 1970, 19–35.
 24. The Goldman Panel supervised the prisons directly after the riot. The 
McKay Commission held public hearings in April 1972 in a broader examina-
tion of the state’s practices and concluded by criticizing the violent response 
and Rockefeller’s failure to visit the prison in person. The “Rights of People” 
session at the 1972 ACA conference focuses largely on the rights of corrections 
officers and administrators (American Correctional Association, 1972, 136–51). 
The shift between the 1968 meeting in San Francisco and four years later in 
Pittsburgh is significant, and the violence of Attica likely set the tone for the 
1972 opening address. The Governor of Pennsylvania, Milton J. Shapp, rather 
than begin with the customary congratulatory remarks saluting the ACA, be-
gins with a vignette of a furloughed youth raping and murdering a young girl 
(“Governor’s Address,” Proceedings of the One Hundred and Second Annual Congress 
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of Correction of the American Correctional Association, 1972 [College Park, MD, 
1972], 1).
 25. Benjamin J. Malcolm, “The Self-Proclaimed ‘Political Prisoner,’” Proceed-
ings of the One Hundred and Second Annual Congress of Correction of the American 
Correctional Association, 1972 (College Park, MD, 1972), 108.
 26. Robert Bright, “The Self-Proclaimed Political Prisoner,” Proceedings of the 
One Hundred and Second Annual Congress of Correction of the American Correctional 
Association, 1972 (College Park, MD, 1972), 110.
 27. James P. Collins, “Attica: Anatomy of the New Revolutionary,” Proceed-
ings of the One Hundred and Second Annual Congress of Correction of the American 
Correctional Association, 1972 (College Park, MD, 1972), 193–95.
 28. Vernon Fox, “Racial Issues in Corrections: Cultural Awareness—How to 
Achieve It!,” Proceedings of the One Hundred and Second Annual Congress of Cor-
rection of the American Correctional Association, 1972 (College Park, MD, 1972), 
175–78.
 29. Ibid., 181–82.
 30. David R. Struckhoff, “A Sociological Perspective on Classification, Dis-
cretionary Judgment, and Racism,” Proceedings of the One Hundred and Second 
Annual Congress of Correction of the American Correctional Association, 1972 (College 
Park, MD, 1972), 185–87.
 31. E. Eugene Miller, “Necessary Preconditions to Achieving Cultural Aware-
ness,” Proceedings of the One Hundred and Second Annual Congress of Correction of 
the American Correctional Association, 1972 (College Park, MD, 1972), 171–74.
 32. C. B. Farrar, “Criteria of Responsibility,” Proceedings of the 59th Annual 
Congress of the American Prison Association, 1929, 349.
 33. Robert Sheer describes these in his introduction to Cleaver’s Eldridge 
Cleaver: Post-Prison Writings and Speeches (New York: Ramparts/Random House, 
1969), ix.
 34. One lengthy presentation in 1974, by far the longest of that year’s con-
ference, by West Virginia Warden Donald E. Bordenkircher, titled “Prisons and 
the Revolutionary,” manages to at one moment decry McCarthyism and then 
lay the blame for grassroots and inmate-led prison reform movements at the 
feet of the Communist Party (Proceedings of the One Hundred and Fourth Annual 
Congress of Correction of the American Correctional Association, 1974 (College Park, 
MD, 1974), 109–17, 132. The next year, Robert H. Fosen dismisses the term 
“political prisoner” in an aside as a wholly pejorative bogeyman, designating a 
black man who is “loud and demanding, half articulate, aware of his rights and 
blind to the rights of others” (“Accreditation: A New Challenge to the Old 
Dilemma,” Proceedings of the One Hundred and Fifth Annual Congress of Correction 
of the American Correctional Association, 1975 [College Park, MD, 1975], 31).
 35. The legislation of that model takes place in Senate Bills 1437 and 2699, 
among others introduced there and in the House between 1976 and 1984, which 
provided for standardized rather than indeterminate sentencing and deempha-
sized parole. These efforts culminated in the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984. 
Those “just desserts” reforms were the consequence of, on the one hand, liberals 
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who were critical of what they perceived as harsher sentences for minority 
criminals and, on the other hand, conservatives adopting a “tough on crime” 
posture—see Roy D. King, “Prisons,” Michael Tonry, ed., 592–93.
 36. Cleaver, Soul on Ice, 98–100.
 37. In Écrits: A Selection, Alan Sheridan translates Lacan’s manque as “lack”—
with the exception of “the expression, created by Lacan, manque-à-être, for which 
Lacan himself proposed the English neologism ‘want-to-be’” (xi). Bruce Fink 
similarly clarifies “want in being or want to be” as distinct from “lack of be-
ing” (The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance [Princeton: Princeton 
UP, 1995], 103). Without the dashes, the phrase emphasizes lack more than the 
impossible desire to fill the lack; with the dashes, then, manque-à-être emphasizes 
the desire rather than the absence in Lacanian subject formation.
 38. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 14, 21.
 39. Ibid., 23.
 40. Ibid., 381.
 41. Cleaver, Soul on Ice, 35.
 42. Ibid., 36.
 43. As determined in Coffin v. Reichard (1944), “A prisoner retains all the 
rights of an ordinary citizen except those expressly, or by necessary implication, 
taken from him by law.” However, that affirmation of rights must be read in 
conjunction with Price v. Johnston (1948): “Lawful incarceration brings about the 
necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction 
justified by the considerations underlying our penal system.” Prisoners’ rights as 
citizens are both retained and withdrawn.
 44. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 136–37, 389n64. Wideman similarly 
describes his goal in Brothers and Keepers as the “attempt to break out, to knock 
down the walls” (18).
 45. Cleaver, Soul on Ice, 36.
 46. Cleaver, Soul on Ice, 38, 79, 110. Cleaver, Post-Prison Writing, 165. Similarly, 
Rubin Carter in his biography quotes at length from a statement John Brown 
made the morning of his execution (233).
 47. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 270.
 48. Cleaver, Soul on Ice, 21, 29.
 49. Ibid., 30.
 50. Ibid., 30–31.
 51. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 23, 105.
 52. Cleaver, Soul on Ice, 49, 51.
 53. Rout, 10.
 54. Cleaver, “Flashlight,” 120.
 55. Ibid., 124.
 56. Ibid., 302.
 57. Playboy (December 1969), 288.
 58. Ibid., 288.
 59. Cleaver, Soul on Ice, 183–220.
 60. Ibid., 191.
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 61. Ibid., 219. The analysis has a clear debt to Fanon. Cleaver refers to Fanon’s 
The Wretched of the Earth as the “Black Bible,” and the relationship between black 
men and white men in Cleaver’s model here demonstrates how “historical and 
economic realities come into the picture” when Fanon adds race to Lacanian 
identification in Black Skin, White Masks (161). According to Fanon, the anxiety of 
white masculinity produces its own fulfillment: “Projecting his own desires onto 
the Negro, the white man behaves ‘as if ’ the Negro really had them” (165).
 62. Cleaver’s paean to black women in the final chapter reads as something 
of an apology both to racist misogyny in general and to Cleaver’s own involve-
ment with Beverly Axelrod, his white lawyer. His painfully derisive descriptions 
of homosexuality are numerous and have received comment elsewhere, as in Amy 
Abugo Ongiri’s “We Are Family: Miscegenation, Black Nationalism, Black Mas-
culinity, and Black Gay Cultural Imagination,” in Race-ing Representation: Voice, 
History, and Sexuality, Kostas Myrsiades and Linda Myrsiades, eds. (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield, 1998), and Shelton Waldrep’s “‘Being Bridges’: Cleaver/
Baldwin/Lorde and African-American Sexism and Sexuality,” Critical Essays: Gay 
and Lesbian Writers of Color, Emmanuel S. Nelson, ed. (New York: Haworth, 1993). 
What has not received much attention is how the predatory homosexuality en-
demic among men in prison might shape Cleaver’s perceptions.
 63. Robert Felgar, “Soul on Ice and Native Son,” Negro American Literature 8 
(1974): 235.
 64. Cleaver, Soul on Ice, 217.
 65. Ibid., 217.
 66. CNN, “‘He was a Symbol’: Eldridge Cleaver Dies at 62,” U.S. News 
Story Page (1 May 1998, online: http://www.cnn.com/US/9805/01/cleaver.
late.obit).
 67. John P. Conrad, “Looking toward the Year 2000: The Role of Correc-
tional Research,” Proceedings of the One Hundredth Annual Congress of Correction of 
the American Correctional Association, 1970, 335.
 68. Ibid., 337.
 69. Park, 112.
 70. Fox, 180; Struckhoff, 188.
 71. Cleaver, Soul on Ice, 185, 229. The bodily convulsions brought on by the 
tension of history also have a parallel in The Executioner’s Song. Larry Schiller 
debates whether or not to agree to sell his firsthand exclusive account of the 
execution for $125,000, and his deliberations focus on “true history” versus 
“journalistic crap,” a tension that he internalizes. He finally rejects the monetary 
reward, quite literally rejecting such “crap” in a wild episode of diarrhea before 
he turns down the deal (857–59).
 72. Cleaver, Soul on Ice, 220.
 73. Jackson, Soledad Brother, 187, 298.
 74. Ibid., 283, 136, 283, 27.
 75. Cleaver, Soul on Ice, 242.
 76. Ibid., 3.
 77. Jackson, Soledad Brother, 300.
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 78. Cleaver, Soul on Ice, 26.
 79. Cleaver’s analysis of racial struggle in the 1960s leads him to an extended 
quote from Frederick Douglass’s Fourth of July speech juxtaposed with a gloss 
of Uncle Tom’s Cabin. That turn to Stowe anticipates her critical reevaluation 
in the 1970s and 1980s, although his reading of the popular response to Uncle 
Tom’s Cabin remains flat-out inaccurate: the “most alienated view of America was 
preached by the Abolitionists, and by Harriet Beecher Stowe in her Uncle Tom’s 
Cabin. But such a view of America was too distasteful to receive wide attention” 
(76). Upon its publication, Stowe’s novel received very wide attention in terms 
of both sales and popular comment.
 80. Cleaver, Soul on Ice, 222–35.
 81. Ibid., 117.
 82. Ibid., 137.
 83. Intercollegiate Studies Institute, “The Fifty Worst Books of the Century” 
(online: http://www.isi.org/publications/ir/50worst.html).
Chapter 4
 1. Mailer, The Armies of the Night, 188.
 2. That Vintage International imprint, also borne on recent editions of 
Faulkner novels, effectively serves as Random House’s latest incarnation of the 
Modern Library series, which became a contributing force in consolidating mid-
twentieth-century U.S. literature, as I suggest in “Go Down, Moses [and Other 
Stories]: Bibliography as a Novel Approach to a Question of Genre,” The Papers 
of the Bibliographical Society of America 96:4 (2002).
 3. Mailer’s The Armies of the Night offers similar challenges of genre. Its own 
categorization is “History/Writing,” and its jacket praise includes that of the New 
York Times Book Review: “Only a born novelist could have written a piece of 
history so intelligent, mischievous, penetrating, and alive.” Time offers that the 
book is “worthy to be judged as literature.”
 4. In 1972, Furman v. Georgia reversed the death sentences of two men 
convicted in Georgia, one for murder and one for rape, and of another man in 
Texas convicted of rape. Such sentences for black men convicted of rape echo 
the similar circumstances of the United States during the 1930s addressed in 
chapter 2. The 5–4 decision was contested bitterly, resulting in nine separate 
opinions. 
 5. Mailer, “The Man Who Studied Yoga,” 157; Mailer, Miami and the Siege 
of Chicago (Cleveland: World, 1968), 42, 140, 174; Mailer, The Armies of the Night, 
141, 161, 188, 189, 197, 270. In An American Dreamer: A Psychoanalytic Study of 
the Fiction of Norman Mailer (London/Toronto: Associated University Presses, 
1980), Andrew Gordon touches on Mailer’s loose use of “schizophrenia,” and he 
associates it with the tension between author and nation, between liberty and 
despotism (187). However, in the absence of a Deleuzo-Guattarian sense of the 
term, the cultural and historical ramifications remain hazy.
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 6. Mailer, Miami, 140; Mailer, Armies, 197.
 7. Mailer, Armies, 51, 190. Mailer clarifies his response as “a miserable rec-
ognition, and on many a count, for if he felt even a hint this way, then what im-
measurable tides of rage must be loose in America itself?” (51). He reiterates the 
point later even as he defends its basis: “Of course that was why he was getting 
tired of hearing of Negro rights and Black Power—every Black riot was wash-
ing him loose with the rest, pushing him to that point where he would have to 
throw his vote in with revolution—what a tedious perspective of prisons and law 
courts and worse; or stand by and watch as the best Americans white and Black 
would be picked off, expended, busted, burned and finally lost” (187). Mailer 
wants to cover his bases, to defend even a borderline-racist refusal to identify 
himself with blackness in terms of hesitant sympathy for revolution: “And all 
the Left-wing Blacks would be his polemical associates—the Lord protect him!” 
(214). Cleaver proved more unified in his cross-racial political allegiances, as his 
presidential campaign with the Peace and Freedom Party demonstrated an alli-
ance between its mostly white membership and the Black Panthers.
 8. Mailer, The Armies of the Night, 3–4.
 9. Mailer, The Executioner’s Song, 983, 984. In his own prison story, Adams 
v. Texas (New York: St. Martin’s P, 1991), Randall Adams offers his description 
of Gilmore’s last words and prisoners’ responses to his execution (46). Errol 
Morris’s documentary The Thin Blue Line (Third Floor Productions/Miramax, 
1988) contributed to renewed attention to Adams’s case, which subsequently led 
to Adams’s release in 1989.
 10. Robert Merrill, “Mailer’s Sad Comedy: The Executioner’s Song,” Texas 
Studies in Literature and Language 34.1 (1992): 141.
 11. Mailer, The Executioner’s Song, 798.
 12. Mary V. Dearborn, Mailer: A Biography (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 
1999), 348.
 13. Ibid., 1024–25.
 14. Jonathan Dee, “The Reanimators: On the Art of Literary Graverobbing,” 
Harper’s (June 1999): 80.
 15. Dee, 84. Gregg Easterbrook makes the same point in the exact same terms 
in “It’s Unreal: How Phony Realism in Film and Literature Is Corrupting and 
Confusing the American Mind,” Washington Monthly (October 1996). Easterbrook 
castigates another “true story” account of multiple murder in terms he might ap-
ply to Mailer as well, suggesting that In Cold Blood muddies “the lines of realism 
and the invented not so much in the pursuit of an otherwise unobtainable truth 
(as Truman Capote initially claimed about In Cold Blood) but in pursuit of an 
improved story that would call attention to the writer (as Capote later admitted 
was his real goal)” (42).
 16. Mailer’s use of news excerpts works slightly differently from that of John 
Dos Passos in U.S.A. (New York: Random House, 1937). The accounts in that 
novel provide a texture of the historical real, commenting on coincident events as 
a gesture between history and fiction and a testament to the “truth” of the latter. 
The Executioner’s Song, with its emphasis on the narrativization of history, attests 
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not only to the narrative equivalency between the novel’s events and the news 
excerpts, but also to mutual causality. By including more-complete excerpts and 
the process of narrativization, Mailer’s gambit is that of realer-than-thou, which, 
in a different context, Phil Barrish suggests is a transhistorical phenomenon in 
U.S. letters, in American Literary Realism, Critical Theory, and Intellectual Prestige, 
1880–1995 (New York: Cambridge UP, 2001).
 17. Wright, xxviii.
 18. Mailer, The Executioner’s Song, 511.
 19. Ibid., 1051–52.
 20. Ibid., 1051.
 21. Ibid., 1053.
 22. Merrill, 129.
 23. Mailer, The Executioner’s Song, 793, 831.
 24. Mark Edmundson views the bond between writer and written as that of 
“Romantic Self-Creations: Mailer and Gilmore in The Executioner’s Song,” Con-
temporary Literature 31.4 (1990)—an account Merrill also suggests. David Guest 
goes the furthest in reading author and object alike as in the romantic outlaw’s 
double-bind of resistance. If Gilmore disavows his own self-determination and 
agency, he might receive a life sentence; if he declares himself the sum of his 
actions, he pits himself against the state in a contest that at once asserts his im-
portance (he is so dangerous that the state must kill him) and condemns him (he is 
so dangerous that the state must kill him). Guest in his critique conflates character 
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 30. Žižek cites Jacques-Alain Miller’s then-unpublished seminar differentiat-
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Valdez and Amiri Baraka (Ann Arbor: U Michigan P, 1998), 110.
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(London: Routledge, 1990), 6; Tom Stoppard, “The Real Inspector Hound,” 
The Norton Anthology of English Literature, vol. 2, 5th ed., ed. M. H. Abrams et al. 
(New York: Norton, 1986), 2432.
 23. Mailer, The Executioner’s Song, 997.
 24. Schechner, 296.
 25. Elaine Scarry, The Body In Pain: The Making and Unmaking of the World 
(New York: Oxford, 1985), 9.
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Jessica Kingsley, 1998); Julie Taylor, “Desdemona’s Lament,” TDR 45.4 (2001); 
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(2003).
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Michigan P, 1996), 4.
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mation of the Public Sphere, trans. Thomas Burger and Frederick Lawrence (Cam-
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“Today occasions for identification have to be created—the public sphere has to 
be ‘made,’ it is not ‘there’ any more” (201). One might contest “any more,” the 
possibility that at some earlier point in history such homogenous publics could 
be engaged in medias res. In a related context—and in yet another example 
of the metaphorical prison overwriting actuality—potential public spheres are 
framed in terms of the prison visiting room: written with power, simultaneously 
bringing together and keeping apart the inside and out. In “On Negt and Kluge,” 
Jameson describes the boundaries that distinguish each within that space: visi-
tors from outside, prisoners from inside are constrained within a system of rules 
regulating contact (“On Negt and Kluge,” The Phantom Public Sphere, ed. Bruce 
Robbins [Minneapolis: U Minnesota P, 1993], 72). “Live from Death Row” in 
its actuality evacuates the rhetorical force of such a metaphorical prison.
 32. Foucault, Discipline, 30.
 33. Althusser, For Marx, trans. Ben Brewster (New York: Vintage, 1969), 51.
 34. Benjamin, “The Work of Art in an Age of Mechanical Reproduction” in 
Illuminations, trans. Harry Zohn (New York: Schocken Books, 1978), 242.
 35. Mailer, The Executioner’s Song, 675, 677; 916; 974, 979, 980, 981. The Farm 
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features prison officials rehearsing John Brown’s lethal injection, joking among 
themselves as they do so.
 36. Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 381.
 37. Clemons and Jones, 30.
Conclusion
 1. However, it is not impossible for such recognition to take place. Cleaver’s 
rhetorical flourishes and ingenuous loops and dips in prose, as well as his invita-
tions to cross-racial identification, invite nonprisoners to recognize themselves 
in Soul on Ice. The Farm’s sympathetic portrayal of inmates encourages viewers 
not only to look to them, but, in the cases of Tannehill and Witherspoon, look 
up to them.
 2. Brooker, 70.
 3. Oshinsky, 100.
 4. Abu-Jamal, 12, 29–33, 77.
 5. The violent police suppression of civil rights activists in particular and 
black neighborhoods in general in the early 1960s merits Rubin Carter’s widely 
publicized comments—taken out of context—regarding killing policemen of-
fered in Carter’s autobiography, The Sixteenth Round, 226; the scene also appears 
in the film The Hurricane. The violence he imagines for rhetorical effect became 
actual shoot-outs between some of the Black Panthers and the Oakland police 
from 1967 to 1973, the responsibility for which remains bitterly contested, but 
which contributed to the fear of black militancy exhibited in the American Cor-
rectional Association transcripts in the early 1970s. The social tensions producing 
such violence as a recurrent phenomenon see their reiteration in the similarly 
contested shooting that led to Abu-Jamal’s imprisonment.
 6. Johnson, “Corrections,” 3.
 7. While the Department of Justice acknowledges these declines as cited in 
chapter 5, they nevertheless attribute increasing prison and jail populations to 
violent crime: “Over half of the increase in State prison population since 1995 
is due to an increase in the prisoners convicted of violent offenses” (“Over Half 
of the Increase in State Prison Population Since 1995 is Due to an Increase 
in the Prisoners Convicted of Violent Offenses,” Bureau of Justice Statistics 
[online: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/corrtyp.htm]). However, else-
where, that increase is described in more specific terms that clarify the alleged 
increase. According to the U.S. Department of Justice, “At the end of 2000, 
49% of State prisoners were serving time for violent offenses, up from 47% 
in 1995” (“Prisons in 2002,” Bureau of Justice Statistics [online: http://www.
ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/abstract/p02.htm]). Furthermore, other Department of Justice 
figures demonstrate that the rate of offenses has declined steadily, reaching its 
lowest level ever in 2002 (“Violent Crime” [online]). In addition, by shifting 
the focus strictly to state prisoners rather than a combination of federal prison-
ers, these particular figures ignore the fact that more than 40 percent of people 
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accused of a federal crime are charged with a drug offense, according to federal 
officials (John P. Walters, Executive Office of the President, Office of National 
Drug Control Policy, “Cocaine” [online: http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/ 
publications/pdf/ncj198582.pdf], 3). Other federal accounts place this proportion 
at 60 percent, according to the U.S. Sentencing Commission, Special Report to 
the Congress Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (U.S, 1995, online: http://www.
ussc.gov/crack/exec.htm., chapter 3). Some anecdotal evidence suggests that the 
harsher federal penalties for drug offenses encourage zealous or politically aspir-
ing prosecutors to shift trials to the federal courts.
 8. U.S. Department of Justice, “Estimated Arrests for Drug Abuse Viola-
tions by Age Group, 1970–2002” (online: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/glance/
tables/drugtab.htm).
 9. Walters, 3.
 10. U.S. Sentencing Commission, chapters 7 and 8, appendices B and C.
 11. Margaret A. Moore, “Race, Gender, and the Criminal Justice System,” 
American Correctional Association, The State of Corrections: Proceedings ACA An-
nual Conferences, 1992 (Arlington, VA: Kirby Lithographic, 1993), 197.
 12. Morris, “The Contemporary Prison,” 214–15.
 13. Tonry, Handbook, 19–20; U.S. Sentencing Commission, chapter 8.
 14. U.S. v. Christopher Lee Armstrong (1996).
 15. Bell, Silent Covenants, 45–46.
 16. Heaney, 114.
 17. Wilkins, 111.
 18. Lehman, 77.
 19. American Correctional Association, “Mission Statement, Core Values 
and Guiding Principles, Vision Statement,” The State of Corrections: Proceedings 
American Correctional Association Annual Conferences, 1995 (Laurel, MD: American 
Correctional Association, 1996), 347–48.
 20. Nell Bernstein, “Swept Away: Thousands of women, often guilty of little 
more than lousy judgment, are serving long prison sentences as drug ‘con-
spirators,’” Salon.com (20 July 2000, online: http://dir.salon.com/mwt/fea-
ture/2000/07/20/conspirators/index.html); Ernest Dumas, “Chasing Amy’s 
Freedom: It took the devoted intervention of a former U.S. senator and a presi-
dential pardon, but an Arkansas woman finally tasted freedom last week after nine 
years in prison,” The Arkansas Times (14 July 2000, online: http://www.arktimes.
com/000714coverstory.html).
 21. Property crime has declined steadily since the expansion of imprison-
ment. No correlation has been demonstrated authoritatively between rates of 
imprisonment and the commission of crimes of theft or violence. Ruth Wil-
son Gilmore traces the expansion of California’s prison system, identifying the 
economic factors and cultural costs of the twenty-two prisons the state built at 
roughly $300 million apiece in the 1980s and 1990s (1998, 171–72). Abu-Jamal 
and Morris in the 1990s both point out that the U.S. imprisons its citizens at a 
rate far higher than comparable nations. There is not only the matter of rates of 
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incarceration and length of sentences, but also the issue of the variable defini-
tions of crime itself. In 1973, the ACA president posed the questions, “Are there 
some kinds of behavior defined as illegal which the community is now willing 
to tolerate? On the other hand, are there some kinds of behavior which were 
formerly tolerable but are no longer?” (Wheeler, “Presidential Address,” Proceed-
ings of the One Hundred and Third Annual Congress of Correction of the American Cor-
rectional Association, 1973 [College Park, MD, 1973], 3–4). While the term socially 
constructed has become passé, the president’s view suggests the degree to which 
prison leadership itself realizes crime to be a set of acts historically fluctuating 
in their definition. Looking backward through the over three decades since her 
questions, what has become no longer tolerable is wholesale and long-term 
imprisonment demarcating lines of race and class.
 22. In addition to Western and Petit’s observations regarding imprisoned 
black men and unemployment trends, Gould, Weinberg, and Mustard conclude 
that rather than incarceration rates matching crime rates, unemployment provides 
the clearest correlation to imprisonment patterns.
 23. U.S. Code, Civil Rights Act, v. 42 section 2000e (1964, online: http://
caselaw.lp.findlaw.com/casecode/uscodes/42/chapters/21/subchapters/vi/ 
sections/section_2000e.html).
 24. Bright, 109.
 25. Poirier, The Performing Self, 5.
 26. Mike Sell, “The Black Arts Movement: Performance, Neo-Orality, and 
the Destruction of the ‘White Thing,’” African American Performance and Theatre 
History: A Critical Reader, Harry J. Elam Jr. and David Krasner, eds. (New York: 
Oxford UP, 2001), 61–62, 77–78n37. Bullins’s life and work provide something 
of a crucible for some of the historical tensions of the late 1960s and 1970s, as 
well as matters of identity and identification raised in chapters 3 and 4. Richard 
G. Scharine opens a 1979 essay in which he argues for the autobiographical 
qualities of much of the playwright’s work with a description of Bullins as an 
“ex-Philadelphia street-gang member, ex-Navy boxing champ, ex-L.A. college 
student, ex-San Francisco Black Panther Minister of Information” (“Ed Bullins 
Was Steve Benson (But Who Is He Now?),” Black American Literature Forum 
13.3 [1979]: 103. The description reads as an amalgam of Eldridge Cleaver and 
Rubin Carter as well, although Scharine mistakenly lists Bullins as minister of 
information rather than of culture. Cleaver was actually minister of informa-
tion. Scharine further describes the main character of The Reluctant Rapist as 
“Bullins’ best metaphor yet for the revolutionary artist” (108). Bullins replies to 
Scharine’s observations in terms that echo the focus on schizophrenia in chapters 
3 and 4: “I believe my characters sometimes have multiple identities, as parts of 
a whole, an ever-changing, interchangeable universe, as the points in a vision 
which expands—dreamlike” (Bullins, “Who He Is Now: Ed Bullins Replies,” 
Black American Literature Forum 13.3 [1979]: 109).
 27. Harris, 295–96.
 28. Vanessa St. Gerard, “Mfume Urges a Partnership between ACA and the 
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NAACP,” American Correctional Association, The State of Corrections: Proceedings 
ACA Annual Conferences, 2004 (Upper Marlboro, MD: Graphic Communications, 
2005), 1–2.
 29. I had the opportunity to teach such courses in the English Department 
at The University of Texas at Austin in 2001 and 2002 and in criminal justice 
at the University of South Carolina Upstate in 2006.
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